The Lessons of History


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I. Hesitations


II. History and the Earth


III. Biology and History


IV. Race and History


V. Character and History


VI. Morals and History


VII. Religion and History


VIII. Economics and History


IX. Socialism and History


X. Government and History


XI. History and War


XII. Growth and Decay


XIII. Is Progress Real?



关于 威尔和 阿里尔-杜兰特


书目 指南







This postlude needs little preface. After finishing The Story of Civilization to 1789, we reread the ten volumes with a view to issuing a revised edition that would correct many errors of omission, fact, or print. In that process we made note of events and comments that might illuminate present affairs, future probabilities, the nature of man, and the conduct of states. (The references, in the text, to various volumes of the Story are offered not as authorities but as instances or elucidations so come upon.) We tried to defer our conclusions until we had completed our survey of the narrative, but doubtless our preformed opinions influenced our selection of illustrative material. The following essay is the result. It repeats many ideas that we, or others before us, have already expressed; our aim is not originality but inclusiveness; we offer a survey of human experience, not a personal revelation.

这首后记不需要什么序言。在完成 《 至1789年 的文明史》 之后,我们重读了这十卷书,以期出版一个修订版,纠正许多遗漏、事实或印刷错误。在这一过程中,我们注意到了一些事件和评论,这些事件和评论可能会对目前的事务、未来的可能性、人的本性和国家的行为有所启示。(文中对《 故事 》各卷的引用不是作为权威,而是作为实例或阐释来提供的)。我们试图推迟我们的结论,直到我们完成对叙述的调查,但毫无疑问,我们预先形成的意见影响了我们对说明材料的选择。下面的文章就是这个结果。它重复了许多我们或在我们之前的其他人已经表达过的观点;我们的目的不是原创性,而是包容性;我们提供的是人类经验的调查,而不是个人的启示。

Here, as so often in the past, we must gratefully acknowledge the help and counsel given us by our daughter Ethel.



威尔和 阿里尔-杜兰特

I. Hesitations


As his studies come to a close the historian faces the challenge: Of what use have your studies been? Have you found in your work only the amusement of recounting the rise and fall of nations and ideas, and retelling “sad stories of the death of kings”? Have you learned more about human nature than the man in the street can learn without so much as opening a book? Have you derived from history any illumination of our present condition, any guidance for our judgments and policies, any guard against the rebuffs of surprise or the vicissitudes of change? Have you found such regularities in the sequence of past events that you can predict the future actions of mankind or the fate of states? Is it possible that, after all, “history has no sense,” 1 that it teaches us nothing, and that the immense past was only the weary rehearsal of the mistakes that the future is destined to make on a larger stage and scale?

当他的研究即将结束时,历史学家面临着挑战。你的研究有什么用?你在你的工作中是否只发现了叙述国家和思想的兴衰的乐趣,以及重述 "国王死亡的悲惨故事"?你对人性的了解是否比街上的人不用翻书就能学到的多?你是否从历史中得到了对我们目前状况的任何启示,对我们的判断和政策的任何指导,对意外的反击或变化的变化的任何防范?你是否在过去的事件序列中发现了这样的规律性,以至于你可以预测人类的未来行动或国家的命运?是否有可能,毕竟 "历史是没有意义的"? 1 它没有教给我们任何东西,巨大的过去只是未来在更大的舞台和规模上注定要犯的错误的疲惫排练?

At times we feel so, and a multitude of doubts assail our enterprise. To begin with, do we really know what the past was, what actually happened, or is history “a fable” not quite “agreed upon”? Our knowledge of any past event is always incomplete, probably inaccurate, beclouded by ambivalent evidence and biased historians, and perhaps distorted by our own patriotic or religious partisanship. “Most history is guessing, and the rest is prejudice.” 2 Even the historian who thinks to rise above partiality for his country, race, creed, or class betrays his secret predilection in his choice of materials, and in the nuances of his adjectives. “The historian always oversimplifies, and hastily selects a manageable minority of facts and faces out of a crowd of souls and events whose multitudinous complexity he can never quite embrace or comprehend.” 3 — Again, our conclusions from the past to the future are made more hazardous than ever by the acceleration of change. In 1909 Charles Péguy thought that “the world changed less since Jesus Christ than in the last thirty years”; 4 and perhaps some young doctor of philosophy in physics would now add that his science has changed more since 1909 than in all recorded time before. Every year—sometimes, in war, every month—some new invention, method, or situation compels a fresh adjustment of behavior and ideas. — Furthermore, an element of chance, perhaps of freedom, seems to enter into the conduct of metals and men. We are no longer confident that atoms, much less organisms, will respond in the future as we think they have responded in the past. The electrons, like Cowper’s God, move in mysterious ways their wonders to perform, and some quirk of character or circumstance may upset national equations, as when Alexander drank himself to death and let his new empire fall apart (323 B.C. ), or as when Frederick the Great was saved from disaster by the accession of a Czar infatuated with Prussian ways (1762).

有时我们会有这样的感觉,大量的疑虑袭击了我们的事业。首先,我们真的知道过去是什么,实际发生了什么,还是说历史是 "一个寓言",没有完全 "达成共识"?我们对任何过去事件的了解总是不完整的,可能是不准确的,被矛盾的证据和有偏见的历史学家所掩盖, ,也许被我们自己的爱国主义或宗教党派主义所扭曲。"大多数历史是猜测,其余的是偏见"。 2 即使是那些认为自己超越了对国家、种族、信仰或阶级的偏见的历史学家,也会在他选择的材料和他的形容词的细微差别中暴露出他秘密的偏爱。"历史学家总是过度简化,匆忙地从众多的灵魂和事件中挑选出可管理的少数事实和面孔,而他永远无法完全接受或理解这些纷繁复杂的事实。 3 - 同样,由于变化的加速,我们从过去到未来的结论比以往任何时候都更加危险。1909年,查尔斯-佩吉(Charles Péguy)认为,"自耶稣基督以来,世界的变化比过去30年还要少"。 4 也许一些年轻的物理学哲学博士现在会补充说,自1909年以来,他的科学所发生的变化比之前所有记录的时间都要多。每年--有时,在战争中,每个月--一些新的发明、方法或情况迫使我们重新调整行为和想法。我们不再相信原子,更不用说生物体,在未来会像我们认为的那样作出反应。电子,就像考珀的上帝一样,以神秘的方式移动他们的奇迹,一些性格或情况的怪癖可能会打乱国家的方程式,就像亚历山大把自己喝死,让他的新帝国分崩离析( 公元前 323年),或者像腓特烈大帝被一个迷恋普鲁士方式的沙皇的加入从灾难中拯救出来(1762)。

Obviously historiography cannot be a science. It can only be an industry, an art, and a philosophy—an industry by ferreting out the facts, an art by establishing a meaningful order in the chaos of materials, a philosophy by seeking perspective and enlightenment. “The present is the past rolled up for action, and the past is the present unrolled for understanding” 5 —or so we believe and hope. In philosophy we try to see the part in the light of the whole; in the “philosophy of history” we try to see this moment in the light of the past. We know that in both cases this is a counsel of perfection; total perspective is an optical illusion. We do not know the whole of man’s history; there were probably many civilizations before the Sumerian or the Egyptian; we have just begun to dig! We must operate with partial knowledge, and be provisionally content with probabilities; in history, as in science and politics, relativity rules, and all formulas should be suspect. “History smiles at all attempts to force its flow into theoretical patterns or logical grooves; it plays havoc with our generalizations, breaks all our rules; history is baroque.” 6 Perhaps, within these limits, we can learn enough from history to bear reality patiently, and to respect one another’s delusions.

很明显,历史学不可能是一门科学。它只能是一种产业、一种艺术和一种哲学--一种产业,即找出事实,一种艺术,即在混乱的材料中建立一种有意义的秩序,一种哲学,即寻求观点和启蒙。"现在是为行动而卷起的过去,而过去是为理解而展开的现在。 5 --或者说我们相信并希望如此。在哲学 ,我们试图从整体的角度来看待部分;在 "历史哲学 "中,我们试图从过去的角度来看待此刻。我们知道,在这两种情况下,这都是完美的咨询;完全的视角是一种光学幻觉。我们不知道人类历史的全部;在苏美尔人或埃及人之前可能有许多文明;我们才刚刚开始挖掘!我们必须用部分的知识来操作。我们必须用部分的知识来操作,暂时满足于概率;在历史上,就像在科学和政治上一样,相对性是主宰,所有的公式都应该被怀疑。"历史对所有试图把它的流动强加于理论模式或逻辑沟槽的行为嗤之以鼻;它肆意破坏我们的概括,打破我们所有的规则;历史是巴洛克式的。" 6 也许,在这些限度内,我们可以从历史中学到足够的东西,以耐心地承受现实,并尊重彼此的妄想。

Since man is a moment in astronomic time, a transient guest of the earth, a spore of his species, a scion of his race, a composite of body, character, and mind, a member of a family and a community, a believer or doubter of a faith, a unit in an economy, perhaps a citizen in a state or a soldier in an army, we may ask under the corresponding heads—astronomy, geology, geography, biology, ethnology, psychology, morality, religion, economics, politics, and war—what history has to say about the nature, conduct, and prospects of man. It is a precarious enterprise, and only a fool would try to compress a hundred centuries into a hundred pages of hazardous conclusions. We proceed.


II. History and the Earth


Let us define history, in its troublesome duplexity, as the events or record of the past. Human history is a brief spot in space, and its first lesson is modesty. At any moment a comet may come too close to the earth and set our little globe turning topsy-turvy in a hectic course, or choke its men and fleas with fumes or heat; or a fragment of the smiling sun may slip off tangentially—as some think our planet did a few astronomic moments ago—and fall upon us in a wild embrace ending all grief and pain. We accept these possibilities in our stride, and retort to the cosmos in the words of Pascal: “When the universe has crushed him man will still be nobler than that which kills him, because he knows that he is dying, and of its victory the universe knows nothing.” 7

让我们把历史,在其麻烦的双重性中,定义为过去的事件或记录。人类历史是太空中一个短暂的点,它的第一课是谦虚。在任何时候,一颗彗星都可能离地球太近,让我们的小地球在忙碌中颠覆,或者用烟雾或热量窒息它的人和跳蚤;或者微笑的太阳的一个碎片可能从切线上滑落--有些人认为我们的星球在几个天文时刻前就滑落了--然后落在我们身上,疯狂地拥抱,结束所有的悲伤和痛苦。我们大踏步地接受这些可能性,并以帕斯卡尔的话反驳宇宙。"当宇宙粉碎了他,人仍然会比杀死他的东西更高贵,因为他知道他正在死亡,而宇宙对它的胜利一无所知。" 7

History is subject to geology. Every day the sea encroaches somewhere upon the land, or the land upon the sea; cities disappear under the water, and sunken cathedrals ring their melancholy bells. Mountains rise and fall in the rhythm of emergence and erosion; rivers swell and flood, or dry up, or change their course; valleys become deserts, and isthmuses become straits. To the geologic eye all the surface of the earth is a fluid form, and man moves upon it as insecurely as Peter walking on the waves to Christ.

历史受制于地质学。每天,大海在某处侵占陆地,或陆地侵占大海;城市在水下消失,沉没的大教堂敲响了它们忧郁的钟声。山脉在涌现和侵蚀的节奏中上升和下降;河流膨胀和泛滥,或干涸,或改变路线;山谷变成沙漠,地峡变成海峡。在地质学的眼里,地球上所有的 ,都是一种流动的形式,人类在上面移动,就像彼得在波浪上走到基督面前一样不牢靠。

Climate no longer controls us as severely as Montesquieu and Buckle supposed, but it limits us. Man’s ingenuity often overcomes geological handicaps: he can irrigate deserts and air-condition the Sahara; he can level or surmount mountains and terrace the hills with vines; he can build a floating city to cross the ocean, or gigantic birds to navigate the sky. But a tornado can ruin in an hour the city that took a century to build; an iceberg can overturn or bisect the floating palace and send a thousand merrymakers gurgling to the Great Certainty. Let rain become too rare, and civilization disappears under sand, as in Central Asia; let it fall too furiously, and civilization will be choked with jungle, as in Central America. Let the thermal average rise by twenty degrees in our thriving zones, and we should probably relapse into lethargic savagery. In a semitropical climate a nation of half a billion souls may breed like ants, but enervating heat may subject it to repeated conquest by warriors from more stimulating habitats. Generations of men establish a growing mastery over the earth, but they are destined to become fossils in its soil.


Geography is the matrix of history, its nourishing mother and disciplining home. Its rivers, lakes, oases, and oceans draw settlers to their shores, for water is the life of organisms and towns, and offers inexpensive roads for transport and trade. Egypt was “the gift of the Nile,” and Mesopotamia built successive civilizations “between the rivers” and along their effluent canals. India was the daughter of the Indus, the Brahmaputra and the Ganges; China owed its life and sorrows to the great rivers that (like ourselves) often wandered from their proper beds and fertilized the neighborhood with their overflow. Italy adorned the valleys of the Tiber, the Arno, and the Po. Austria grew along the Danube, Germany along the Elbe and the Rhine, France along the Rhone, the Loire, and the Seine. Petra and Palmyra were nourished by oases in the desert.

地理是历史的母体,是其滋养的母亲和约束的家园。它的河流、湖泊、绿洲和海洋吸引着定居者来到它们的海岸,因为水是生物和城镇的生命,并为运输和贸易提供廉价的道路。埃及是 "尼罗河的礼物",美索不达米亚在 "河流之间 "和沿其流出的运河建立了连续的文明。印度是印度河、雅鲁藏布江和恒河的女儿;中国的生命和悲伤都归功于大河,这些大河(就像我们自己)经常从它们适当的河床上游荡,用它们的溢流肥沃了附近地区。意大利装饰着台伯河、阿诺河和波河的河谷。奥地利沿多瑙河生长,德国沿易北河和莱茵河 ,法国沿罗纳河、卢瓦尔河和塞纳河生长。佩特拉和帕尔米拉得到了沙漠中绿洲的滋养。

When the Greeks grew too numerous for their boundaries, they founded colonies along the Mediterranean (“like frogs around a pond,” said Plato 8 ) and along the Euxine, or Black, Sea. For two thousand years—from the battle of Salamis (480 B.C. ) to the defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588)—the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean were the rival seats of the white man’s ascendancy. But in and after 1492 the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama invited men to brave the oceans; the sovereignty of the Mediterranean was challenged; Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Venice declined; the Renaissance began to fade; the Atlantic nations rose, and finally spread their suzerainty over half the world. “Westward the course of empire takes its way,” wrote George Berkeley about 1730. Will it continue across the Pacific, exporting European and American industrial and commercial techniques to China, as formerly to Japan? Will Oriental fertility, working with the latest Occidental technology, bring the decline of the West?

当希腊人的数量超过了他们的边界时,他们在地中海沿岸建立了殖民地(柏拉图说:"就像池塘周围的青蛙")。 8 )和沿欧新海(即黑海)建立殖民地。两千年来,从萨拉米斯战役( 公元前 480年)到西班牙无敌舰队的失败(1588年),地中海的北岸和南岸一直是白人统治的对手。但在1492年和之后,哥伦布和瓦斯科-达伽马的航行邀请人们勇敢地走向海洋;地中海的主权受到挑战;热那亚、比萨、佛罗伦萨、威尼斯衰落了;文艺复兴开始消退;大西洋国家崛起,并最终将其宗主国扩展到半个世界。乔治-伯克利(George Berkeley)在1730年左右写道:"帝国的路线是向西走的"。它将继续跨越太平洋,向中国出口欧洲和美国的工业和商业技术,就像以前向日本一样?东方的生育能力,与西方的最新技术合作,是否会带来西方的衰落?

The development of the airplane will again alter the map of civilization. Trade routes will follow less and less the rivers and seas; men and goods will be flown more and more directly to their goal. Countries like England and France will lose the commercial advantage of abundant coast lines conveniently indented; countries like Russia, China, and Brazil, which were hampered by the excess of their land mass over their coasts, will cancel part of that handicap by taking to the air. Coastal cities will derive less of their wealth from the clumsy business of transferring goods from ship to train or from train to ship. When sea power finally gives place to air power in transport and war, we shall have seen one of the basic revolutions in history.


The influence of geographic factors diminishes as technology grows. The character and contour of a terrain may offer opportunities for agriculture, mining, or trade, but only the imagination and initiative of leaders, and the hardy industry of followers, can transform the possibilities into fact; and only a similar combination (as in Israel today) can make a culture take form over a thousand natural obstacles. Man, not the earth, makes civilization.

随着技术的发展,地理因素的影响越来越小。地形的特征和轮廓可能为农业、采矿或贸易提供机会 ,但只有领导者的想象力和主动性,以及追随者的坚韧不拔的精神,才能将可能性转化为事实;也只有类似的组合(如今天的以色列)才能使一种文化在无数自然障碍中形成。人,而不是地球,创造了文明。

III. Biology and History


History is a fragment of biology: the life of man is a portion of the vicissitudes of organisms on land and sea. Sometimes, wandering alone in the woods on a summer day, we hear or see the movement of a hundred species of flying, leaping, creeping, crawling, burrowing things. The startled animals scurry away at our coming; the birds scatter; the fish disperse in the brook. Suddenly we perceive to what a perilous minority we belong on this impartial planet, and for a moment we feel, as these varied denizens clearly do, that we are passing interlopers in their natural habitat. Then all the chronicles and achievements of man fall humbly into the history and perspective of polymorphous life; all our economic competition, our strife for mates, our hunger and love and grief and war, are akin to the seeking, mating, striving, and suffering that hide under these fallen trees or leaves, or in the waters, or on the boughs.


Therefore the laws of biology are the fundamental lessons of history. We are subject to the processes and trials of evolution, to the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest to survive. If some of us seem to escape the strife or the trials it is because our group protects us; but that group itself must meet the tests of survival.

因此,生物学的规律是历史的基本教训。我们受制于进化的过程和考验,受制于为生存而进行的斗争和适者生存的考验。如果我们中的一些人似乎逃脱了纷争或考验,那是因为我们的 群体保护了我们;但这个群体本身必须满足生存的考验。

So the first biological lesson of history is that life is competition. Competition is not only the life of trade, it is the trade of life—peaceful when food abounds, violent when the mouths outrun the food. Animals eat one another without qualm; civilized men consume one another by due process of law. Co-operation is real, and increases with social development, but mostly because it is a tool and form of competition; we co-operate in our group—our family, community, club, church, party, “race,” or nation—in order to strengthen our group in its competition with other groups. Competing groups have the qualities of competing individuals: acquisitiveness, pugnacity, partisanship, pride. Our states, being ourselves multiplied, are what we are; they write our natures in bolder type, and do our good and evil on an elephantine scale. We are acquisitive, greedy, and pugnacious because our blood remembers millenniums through which our forebears had to chase and fight and kill in order to survive, and had to eat to their gastric capacity for fear they should not soon capture another feast. War is a nation’s way of eating. It promotes co-operation because it is the ultimate form of competition. Until our states become members of a large and effectively protective group they will continue to act like individuals and families in the hunting stage.

因此,历史上的第一个生物学教训是,生命就是竞争。竞争不仅是贸易的生命,也是生命的贸易--当食物多的时候是和平的,当嘴巴超过了食物的时候是暴力的。动物们毫无顾忌地相互吞噬;文明人则通过适当的法律程序相互吞噬。合作是真实的,并随着社会发展而增加,但主要是因为它是竞争的工具和形式;我们在我们的团体--我们的家庭、社区、俱乐部、教堂、政党、"种族 "或国家中合作,以便在与其他团体的竞争中加强我们的团体。竞争的团体具有竞争的个人素质:好胜心、好斗心、党性、自豪感。我们的国家,作为我们自己的乘法,就是我们自己;它们用更大胆的字体书写我们的本性,并在一个大象般的规模上做我们的善与恶。我们好胜、贪婪、好斗,因为我们的血液记得我们的祖先为了生存而不得不追逐、战斗和杀戮的几千年,并且不得不吃到肚子里去,因为他们担心不久就会夺取另一场盛宴。战争是一个国家的饮食方式。它促进合作,因为它是竞争的最终形式。在我们的国家成为一个庞大而有效的保护集团的成员之前,他们将继续像个人和家庭一样在狩猎阶段行事。

The second biological lesson of history is that life is selection. In the competition for food or mates or power some organisms succeed and some fail. In the struggle for existence some individuals are better equipped than others to meet the tests of survival. Since Nature (here meaning total reality and its processes) has not read very carefully the American Declaration of Independence or the French Revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man, we are all born unfree and unequal: subject to our physical and psychological heredity, and to the customs and traditions of our group; diversely endowed in health and strength, in mental capacity and qualities of character. Nature loves difference as the necessary material of selection and evolution; identical twins differ in a hundred ways, and no two peas are alike.

历史上的第二个生物学教训是,生命就是选择。在对食物、配偶或权力的竞争中,有些生物体成功了,有些则失败了。在争取生存的斗争中,一些个体比其他个体更有能力应对生存的考验。由于大自然(这里指的是整个现实及其过程)没有仔细阅读《美国独立宣言》或《法国大革命人权宣言》,我们生来都是不自由的 ,也是不平等的:受制于我们的生理和心理遗传,以及我们群体的习俗和传统;在健康和力量、心理能力和性格品质方面有不同的禀赋。大自然喜欢差异,将其作为选择和进化的必要材料;同卵双胞胎有一百个方面的差异,没有两颗豌豆是相同的。

Inequality is not only natural and inborn, it grows with the complexity of civilization. Hereditary inequalities breed social and artificial inequalities; every invention or discovery is made or seized by the exceptional individual, and makes the strong stronger, the weak relatively weaker, than before. Economic development specializes functions, differentiates abilities, and makes men unequally valuable to their group. If we knew our fellow men thoroughly we could select thirty per cent of them whose combined ability would equal that of all the rest. Life and history do precisely that, with a sublime injustice reminiscent of Calvin’s God.


Nature smiles at the union of freedom and equality in our utopias. For freedom and equality are sworn and everlasting enemies, and when one prevails the other dies. Leave men free, and their natural inequalities will multiply almost geometrically, as in England and America in the nineteenth century under laissez-faire. To check the growth of inequality, liberty must be sacrificed, as in Russia after 1917. Even when repressed, inequality grows; only the man who is below the average in economic ability desires equality; those who are conscious of superior ability desire freedom; and in the end superior ability has its way. Utopias of equality are biologically doomed, and the best that the amiable philosopher can hope for is an approximate equality of legal justice and educational opportunity. A society in which all potential abilities are allowed to develop and function will have a survival advantage in the competition of groups. This competition becomes more severe as the destruction of distance intensifies the confrontation of states.

大自然对我们的乌托邦中的自由与平等的结合嗤之以鼻。因为自由和平等是不共戴天的敌人,当一个人占上风时,另一个人就会死亡。让人自由,他们的自然不平等就会几乎以几何级数增加,就像十九世纪英美两国在 自由放任 下的情况一样 。 为了遏制不平等的增长,必须牺牲自由,就像1917年后的俄罗斯那样。即使受到压制,不平等也会增长;只有那些经济能力低于平均水平的人渴望平等;那些意识到自己能力超群的人渴望自由;最终,超群的能力会得逞。平等的乌托邦在生物学上是注定要失败的,和蔼可亲的哲学家所能希望的最好结果是法律正义和教育机会的大致平等。一个允许所有潜在能力发展和发挥作用的社会在群体竞争中会有生存优势。随着距离的破坏加剧了国家的对抗,这种 的竞争变得更加严重。

The third biological lesson of history is that life must breed. Nature has no use for organisms, variations, or groups that cannot reproduce abundantly. She has a passion for quantity as prerequisite to the selection of quality; she likes large litters, and relishes the struggle that picks the surviving few; doubtless she looks on approvingly at the upstream race of a thousand sperms to fertilize one ovum. She is more interested in the species than in the individual, and makes little difference between civilization and barbarism. She does not care that a high birth rate has usually accompanied a culturally low civilization, and a low birth rate a civilization culturally high; and she (here meaning Nature as the process of birth, variation, competition, selection, and survival) sees to it that a nation with a low birth rate shall be periodically chastened by some more virile and fertile group. Gaul survived against the Germans through the help of Roman legions in Caesar’s days, and through the help of British and American legions in our time. When Rome fell the Franks rushed in from Germany and made Gaul France; if England and America should fall, France, whose population remained almost stationary through the nineteenth century, might again be overrun.


If the human brood is too numerous for the food supply, Nature has three agents for restoring the balance: famine, pestilence, and war. In a famous Essay on Population (1798) Thomas Malthus explained that without these periodic checks the birth rate would so far exceed the death rate that the multiplication of mouths would nullify any increase in the production of food. Though he was a clergyman and a man of good will, Malthus pointed out that the issuance of relief funds or supplies to the poor encouraged them to marry early and breed improvidently, making the problem worse. In a second edition (1803) he advised abstention from coitus except for reproduction, but he refused to approve other methods of birth control. Having little hope of acceptance for this counsel of sanctity, he predicted that the balance between mouths and food would be maintained in the future, as in the past, by famine, pestilence, and war.

如果人类的数量超过了食物的供应,自然界有三种手段来恢复平衡:饥荒、瘟疫和战争。在著名的 《人口论》 (1798年)中,托马斯-马尔萨斯解释说,如果没有这些定期检查,出生率将远远超过死亡率,以至于嘴巴的繁殖将抵消食物生产的任何增长。虽然他是一位神职人员,也是一位善良的人,但马尔萨斯指出,向穷人发放救济金或物资鼓励他们早婚和不当繁殖,使问题更加严重。在第二版 (1803)中,他建议除了生殖之外,不要同房,但他拒绝批准其他控制生育的方法。由于这一神圣的建议被接受的希望不大,他预言,未来嘴和食物之间的平衡将和过去一样,通过饥荒、瘟疫和战争来维持。

The advances of agricultural and contraceptive technology in the nineteenth century apparently refuted Malthus: in England, the United States, Germany, and France the food supply kept pace with births, and the rising standard of living deferred the age of marriage and lowered the size of the family. The multiplication of consumers was also a multiplication of producers: new “hands” developed new lands to raise more food. The recent spectacle of Canada and the United States exporting millions of bushels of wheat while avoiding famine and pestilence at home seemed to provide a living answer to Malthus. If existing agricultural knowledge were everywhere applied, the planet could feed twice its present population.

十九世纪农业和避孕技术的进步显然反驳了马尔萨斯:在英国、美国、德国和法国,食物供应与出生率同步,生活水平的提高推迟了结婚年龄,降低了家庭规模。消费者的增加也是生产者的增加:新的 "手 "开发了新的土地来饲养更多的食物。最近,加拿大和美国出口了数百万蒲式耳的小麦,同时避免了国内的饥荒和瘟疫,这一景象似乎为马尔萨斯提供了一个活生生的答案。如果现有的农业知识在各地得到应用,地球可以养活目前两倍的人口。

Malthus would answer, of course, that this solution merely postpones the calamity. There is a limit to the fertility of the soil; every advance in agricultural technology is sooner or later canceled by the excess of births over deaths; and meanwhile medicine, sanitation, and charity nullify selection by keeping the unfit alive to multiply their like. To which hope replies: the advances of industry, urbanization, education, and standards of living, in countries that now endanger the world by their fertility, will probably have the same effect there, in reducing the birth rate, as they have had in Europe and North America. Until that equilibrium of production and reproduction comes it will be a counsel of humanity to disseminate the knowledge and means of contraception. Ideally parentage should be a privilege of health, not a by-product of sexual agitation.


Is there any evidence that birth control is dysgenic—that it lowers the intellectual level of the nation practicing it? Presumably it has been used more by the intelligent than by the simple, and the labors of educators are apparently canceled in each generation by the fertility of the uninformed. But much of what we call intelligence is the result of individual education, opportunity, and experience; and there is no evidence that such intellectual acquirements are transmitted in the genes. Even the children of Ph.D.s must be educated and go through their adolescent measles of errors, dogmas, and isms; nor can we say how much potential ability and genius lurk in the chromosomes of the harassed and handicapped poor. Biologically, physical vitality may be, at birth, of greater value than intellectual pedigree; Nietzsche thought that the best blood in Germany was in peasant veins; philosophers are not the fittest material from which to breed the race.

是否有任何证据表明节育是不正常的--它降低了实行节育的国家的智力水平?据推测, ,聪明的人比简单的人更多地使用它,而教育者的劳动显然在每一代人身上都被不知情的人的生育能力所抵消。但是,我们所说的智力大部分是个人教育、机会和经验的结果;没有证据表明这种智力获得是通过基因传播的。即使是博士生的孩子也必须接受教育,并经历错误、教条和主义的青春期麻疹;我们也不能说在那些受苦受难的穷人的染色体中潜藏着多少潜在能力和天才。在生物学上,身体的活力在出生时可能比智力血统更有价值;尼采认为,德国最好的血液在农民的血管里;哲学家并不是培育种族的最合适的材料。

Family limitation played some part in the history of Greece and Rome. It is amusing to find Julius Caesar offering (59 B.C. ) rewards to Romans who had many children, and forbidding childless women to ride in litters or wear jewelry. Augustus renewed this campaign some forty years later, with like futility. Birth control continued to spread in the upper classes while immigrant stocks from the Germanic North and the Greek or Semitic East replenished and altered the population of Italy. 9 Very probably this ethnic change reduced the ability or willingness of the inhabitants to resist governmental incompetence and external attack.

家庭限制在希腊和罗马的历史上发挥了一些作用。有趣的是,凯撒大帝( 公元前 59年)奖励多子女的罗马人,并禁止无子女的妇女乘坐轿子或佩戴珠宝。奥古斯都在大约40年后再次发起这一运动,但也是徒劳的。节育措施继续在上层阶级中蔓延,而来自日耳曼北部和希腊或闪族东部的移民则补充和改变了意大利的人口。 9 很可能这种种族变化降低了居民抵御政府无能和外部攻击的能力或意愿。

In the United States the lower birth rate of the Anglo-Saxons has lessened their economic and political power; and the higher birth rate of Roman Catholic families suggests that by the year 2000 the Roman Catholic Church will be the dominant force in national as well as in municipal or state governments. A similar process is helping to restore Catholicism in France, Switzerland, and Germany; the lands of Voltaire, Calvin, and Luther may soon return to the papal fold. So the birth rate, like war, may determine the fate of theologies; just as the defeat of the Moslems at Tours (732) kept France and Spain from replacing the Bible with the Koran, so the superior organization, discipline, morality, fidelity, and fertility of Catholics may cancel the Protestant Reformation and the French Enlightenment. There is no humorist like history.

在美国,盎格鲁-撒克逊人较低的出生率削弱了他们的经济和政治力量;而罗马天主教家庭较高的出生率表明,到2000年,罗马天主教会将成为国家以及市或州政府的主导力量。一个类似的过程正在帮助法国、瑞士和德国恢复天主教;伏尔泰、加尔文和路德的土地可能很快会回到教皇的怀抱。因此,出生率,就像战争一样,可能会决定神学的命运; ,就像在图尔(732)击败穆斯林使法国和西班牙没有用可兰经取代圣经一样,天主教徒优越的组织、纪律、道德、忠诚和生育能力可能会取消新教改革和法国启蒙运动。没有比历史更幽默的人了。

IV. Race and History


There are some two billion colored people on the earth, and some nine hundred million whites. However, many palefaces were delighted when Comte Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau, in an Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–55), announced that the species man is composed of distinct races inherently different (like individuals) in physical structure, mental capacity, and qualities of character; and that one race, the “Aryan,” was by nature superior to all the rest.

地球上约有20亿有色人种,约有9亿白种人。然而,当约瑟夫-阿瑟-德-戈比诺伯爵在《 人类种族不平等 论 》( Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines ,1853-55)中宣布,人类这个物种是由不同的种族组成的,在身体结构、心理能力和性格品质方面有着内在的差异(像个人);而且有一个种族,即 "雅利安人",天生就比其他所有种族优越。

Everything great, noble, or fruitful in the works of man on this planet, in science, art, and civilization, derives from a single starting point, is the development of a single germ;… it belongs to one family alone, the different branches of which have reigned in all the civilized countries of the universe…. History shows that all civilization derives from the white race, that none can exist without its help, and that a society is great and brilliant only so far as it preserves the blood of the noble group that created it. 10

在这个星球上,人类在科学、艺术和文明方面的一切伟大、崇高或富有成效的工作,都来自一个单一的起点,是一个单一的胚胎的发展;......它只属于一个家族,其不同的分支在宇宙的所有文明国家都有统治地位....。历史表明,所有的文明都来自于白种人,没有白种人的帮助,任何文明都不可能存在,一个社会只有在保留了创造它的高贵群体的血液时才是伟大和辉煌的。 10

Environmental advantages (argued Gobineau) cannot explain the rise of civilization, for the same kind of environment (e.g., soil-fertilizing rivers) that watered the civilizations of Egypt and the Near East produced no civilization among the Indians of North America, though they lived on fertile soil along magnificent streams. Nor do institutions make a civilization, for this has risen under a diversity, even a contrariety, of institutions, as in monarchical Egypt and “democratic” Athens. The rise, success, decline, and fall of a civilization depend upon the inherent quality of the race. The degeneration of a civilization is what the word itself indicates—a falling away from the genus, stock, or race. “Peoples degenerate only in consequence of the various mixtures of blood which they undergo.” 11 Usually this comes through intermarriage of the vigorous race with those whom it has conquered. Hence the superiority of the whites in the United States and Canada (who did not intermarry with the Indians) to the whites in Latin America (who did). Only those who are themselves the product of such enfeebling mixtures talk of the equality of races, or think that “all men are brothers.” 12 All strong characters and peoples are race conscious, and are instinctively averse to marriage outside their own racial group.

环境优势(戈比诺认为)不能解释文明的兴起,因为浇灌埃及和近东文明的同类环境(如土壤肥沃的河流)在北美的印第安人中没有产生文明, ,尽管他们生活在壮丽的溪流边的肥沃土壤上。制度也不能造就文明,因为文明是在各种不同的制度下兴起的,甚至是相反的制度,如君主制的埃及和 "民主 "的雅典。一个文明的兴起、成功、衰落和灭亡取决于种族的内在品质。文明的堕落就是这个词本身所表示的--从种属、种群或种族中脱落。"民族的退化只是因为他们经历了各种血统的混合。 11 通常情况下,这是由充满活力的种族与它所征服的人通婚而产生的。因此,美国和加拿大的白人(他们没有与印第安人通婚)比拉丁美洲的白人(他们有)更优越。只有那些自己是这种削弱的混合物的产物的人才会谈论种族平等,或者认为 "所有人都是兄弟"。 12 所有强势的人物和民族都有种族意识,并本能地厌恶自己种族群体以外的婚姻。

In 1899 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Englishman who had made Germany his home, published Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts ( The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century ), which narrowed the creative race from Aryans to Teutons: “True history begins from the moment when the German with mighty hand seizes the inheritance of antiquity.” Dante’s face struck Chamberlain as characteristically German; he thought he heard unmistakably German accents in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians; and though he was not quite sure that Christ was a German, he was confident that “whoever maintains that Christ was a Jew is either ignorant or dishonest.” 13 German writers were too polite to contradict their guest: Treitschke and Bernhardi admitted that the Germans were the greatest of modern peoples; Wagner put the theory to music; Alfred Rosenberg made German blood and soil the inspiring “myth of the twentieth century”; and Adolf Hitler, on this basis, roused the Germans to slaughter a people and to undertake the conquest of Europe.

1899年,以德国为家的英国人休斯顿-斯图尔特-张伯伦出版了《 十九世纪的基础》( Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts ),将创造性种族从雅利安人缩小到日耳曼人。"真正的历史是从德国人用强有力的手夺取古代遗产的那一刻开始的"。但丁的脸让张伯伦觉得是德国人的特征;他认为他在圣保罗写给加拉太人的书信中听到了明确无误的德国口音;尽管他不太确定基督是德国人,但他相信 "凡是坚持认为基督是犹太人的,不是无知就是不诚实"。 13 德国作家们都很有礼貌,不敢反驳他们的客人。特雷茨克和伯恩哈迪承认,德国人是现代民族中最伟大的民族;瓦格纳将这一理论付诸于音乐;阿尔弗雷德-罗森堡将德国人的血和土地作为鼓舞人心的 "二十世纪的神话 ";而阿道夫-希特勒则在此基础上鼓动德国人屠杀一个民族并进行对欧洲的征服。

An American, Madison Grant, in The Passing of the Great Race (1916), confined the achievements of civilization to that branch of the Aryans which he called “Nordics”—Scandinavians, Scythians, Baltic Germans, Englishmen, and Anglo-Saxon Americans. Cooled to hardness by northern winters, one or another tribe of these fair-haired, blue-eyed “blond beasts” swept down through Russia and the Balkans into the lazy and lethargic South in a series of conquests marking the dawn of recorded history. According to Grant the “Sacae” (Scythians?) invaded India, developed Sanskrit as an “Indo-European” language, and established the caste system to prevent their deterioration through intermarriage with dark native stocks. The Cimmerians poured over the Caucasus into Persia, the Phrygians into Asia Minor, the Achaeans and Dorians into Greece and Crete, the Umbrians and Oscans into Italy. Everywhere the Nordics were adventurers, warriors, disciplinarians; they made subjects or slaves of the temperamental, unstable, and indolent “Mediterranean” peoples of the South, and they intermarried with the intermediate quiet and acquiescent “Alpine” stocks to produce the Athenians of the Periclean apogee and the Romans of the Republic. The Dorians intermarried least, and became the Spartans, a martial Nordic caste ruling “Mediterranean” helots. Intermarriage weakened and softened the Nordic stock in Attica, and led to the defeat of Athens by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, and the subjugation of Greece by the purer Nordics of Macedonia and Republican Rome.

美国人麦迪逊-格兰特在 《伟大种族的消逝》 (1916年)中,将文明的成就局限于雅利安人的那个分支,他称之为 "北欧人"--斯堪的纳维亚人、斯基泰人、波罗的海德国人、英国人和盎格鲁-撒克逊人。这些白发蓝眼的 "金发野兽 "被北方的严冬冷却到了极点,他们中的一个或另一个部落穿过俄罗斯和巴尔干半岛,在一系列标志着有记载历史的黎明的征服中,席卷了懒惰和昏昏欲睡的南方。根据格兰特的说法,"Sacae"(斯基泰人?)入侵了印度,将梵语发展为一种 "印欧 "语言,并建立了种姓制度,以防止他们与黑暗的本地人通婚而变质。西梅里亚人越过高加索涌入波斯,弗里吉亚人进入小亚细亚,阿凯亚人和多利亚人进入希腊和克里特岛,翁布里亚人和奥斯卡人进入意大利。在任何地方,北欧人都是冒险家、战士、纪律严明的人;他们使南方那些脾气暴躁、不稳定和懒散的 "地中海 "民族成为臣民或奴隶,他们与中间的安静和默许的 "阿尔卑斯 "民族通婚,产生了伯里克利时代的雅典人和共和国时期的罗马人。多里安人通婚最少,成为斯巴达人,一个武艺高强的北欧种姓统治着 "地中海 "的无助者。通婚削弱和软化了阿提卡的北欧人种群,导致雅典在伯罗奔尼撒战争中被斯巴达击败,希腊被马其顿和罗马共和国的纯正北欧人征服。

In another inundation of Nordics—from Scandinavia and northern Germany—Goths and Vandals conquered Imperial Rome; Angles and Saxons conquered England and gave it a new name; Franks conquered Gaul and gave it their name. Still later, the Nordic Normans conquered France, England, and Sicily. The Nordic Lombards followed their long beards into Italy, intermarried, and vitalized Milan and Florence into a Renaissance. Nordic Varangians conquered Russia, and ruled it till 1917. Nordic Englishmen colonized America and Australia, conquered India, and set their sentinels in every major Asiatic port.

在另一次北欧人--来自斯堪的纳维亚和德国北部--哥特人和汪达尔人征服了帝国罗马;盎格鲁人和撒克逊人征服了英格兰,并给它起了一个新名字;法兰克人征服了高卢,并给它起了自己的名字。再后来,北欧的诺曼人 ,征服了法国、英格兰和西西里岛。北欧的伦巴第人跟随他们的长胡子进入意大利,进行通婚,并使米兰和佛罗伦萨的文艺复兴充满活力。北欧的瓦兰吉人征服了俄罗斯,并统治它直到1917年。北欧的英国人殖民了美洲和澳大利亚,征服了印度,并在亚洲的每个主要港口设置了他们的哨兵。

In our time (Grant mourned) this Nordic race is abandoning its mastery. It lost its footing in France in 1789; as Camille Desmoulins told his café audience, the Revolution was a revolt of the indigenous Gauls (“Alpines”) against the Teutonic Franks who had subjugated them under Clovis and Charlemagne. The Crusades, the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, the First World War depleted the Nordic stock and left it too thin to resist the higher birth rate of Alpine and Mediterranean peoples in Europe and America. By the year 2000, Grant predicted, the Nordics will have fallen from power, and with their fall Western civilization will disappear in a new barbarism welling up everywhere from within and from without. He wisely conceded that the Mediterranean “race,” while inferior in bodily stamina to both the Nordics and the Alpines, has proved superior in intellectual and artistic attainments; to it must go the credit for the classic flowering of Greece and Rome; however, it may have owed much to intermarriage with Nordic blood.

在我们的时代(格兰特哀叹道),这个北欧种族正在放弃它的主宰地位。1789年,它在法国失去了立足之地;正如卡米尔-德穆兰(Camille Desmoulins)告诉他的咖啡馆听众的那样,革命是本土高卢人("阿尔卑斯山人")对日耳曼法兰克人的反抗,后者曾在克洛维和查理曼大帝手下征服过他们。十字军东征、三十年战争、拿破仑战争、第一次世界大战耗尽了北欧人的种群,使其过于单薄,无法抵御欧洲和美洲的阿尔卑斯山和地中海人的高出生率。格兰特预言,到2000年,北欧人将衰落,随着他们的衰落,西方文明将在一种新的野蛮主义中消失,从内部和外部到处涌现。他明智地承认,地中海 "种族 "虽然在身体耐力方面不如北欧人和阿尔卑斯人,但在智力和艺术造诣方面已被证明更胜一筹;希腊和罗马的经典之花必须归功于它;然而,它可能在很大程度上得益于与北欧人的通婚。

Some weaknesses in the race theory are obvious. A Chinese scholar would remind us that his people created the most enduring civilization in history—statesmen, inventors, artists, poets, scientists, philosophers, saints from 2000 B.C. to our own time. A Mexican scholar could point to the lordly structures of Mayan, Aztec, and Incan cultures in pre-Columbian America. A Hindu scholar, while acknowledging “Aryan” infiltration into north India some sixteen hundred years before Christ, would recall that the black Dravidic peoples of south India produced great builders and poets of their own; the temples of Madras, Madura, and Trichinopoly are among the most impressive structures on earth. Even more startling is the towering shrine of the Khmers at Angkor Wat. History is color-blind, and can develop a civilization (in any favorable environment) under almost any skin.

种族理论中的一些弱点是显而易见的。一位中国学者会提醒我们,他的人民创造了历史上最持久的文明--从 公元前 2000年到我们这个时代的政治家、发明家、艺术家、诗人、科学家、哲学家、圣人。一位墨西哥学者可以指出哥伦布时代前美洲的玛雅、阿兹特克和印加文化的领主式结构。一位印度学者在承认 "雅利安人 "在公元前约1600年渗入北印度的同时,会回忆起南印度的黑色德拉维德民族产生了他们自己的伟大建筑家和诗人, ;马德拉斯、马杜拉和特里奇诺波利的寺庙是地球上最令人印象深刻的结构之一。更令人吃惊的是吴哥窟的高棉人的高耸神殿。历史是不分肤色的,几乎可以在任何皮肤下发展出一种文明(在任何有利的环境下)。

Difficulties remain even if the race theory is confined to the white man. The Semites would recall the civilizations of Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, Palestine, Phoenicia, Carthage, and Islam. The Jews gave the Bible and Christianity to Europe, and much of the Koran to Mohammed. The Mohammedans could list the rulers, artists, poets, scientists, and philosophers who conquered and adorned a substantial portion of the white man’s world from Baghdad to Cordova while Western Europe groped through the Dark Ages (c. 565–c. 1095).


The ancient cultures of Egypt, Greece, and Rome were evidently the product of geographical opportunity and economic and political development rather than of racial constitution, and much of their civilization had an Oriental source. 14 Greece took its arts and letters from Asia Minor, Crete, Phoenicia, and Egypt. In the second millennium B.C. Greek culture was “Mycenaean,” partly derived from Crete, which had probably learned from Asia Minor. When the “Nordic” Dorians came down through the Balkans, toward 1100 B.C. , they destroyed much of this proto-Greek culture; and only after an interval of several centuries did the historic Greek civilization emerge in the Sparta of “Lycurgus,” the Miletus of Thales, the Ephesus of Heracleitus, the Lesbos of Sappho, the Athens of Solon. From the sixth century B.C. onward the Greeks spread their culture along the Mediterranean at Durazzo, Taranto, Crotona, Reggio Calabria, Syracuse, Naples, Nice, Monaco, Marseilles, Málaga. From the Greek cities of south Italy, and from the probably Asiatic culture of Etruria, came the civilization of ancient Rome; from Rome came the civilization of Western Europe; from Western Europe came the civilization of North and South America. In the third and following centuries of our era various Celtic, Teutonic, or Asiatic tribes laid Italy waste and destroyed the classic cultures. The South creates the civilizations, the North conquers them, ruins them, borrows from them, spreads them: this is one summary of history.

埃及、希腊和罗马的古代文化显然是地理机会、经济和政治发展的产物,而不是种族构成的产物,它们的许多文明都有东方的来源。 14 希腊的艺术和文字来自小亚细亚、克里特岛、腓尼基和埃及。在 公元前 二千年,希腊文化是 "迈锡尼 "文化,部分来自克里特岛,而克里特岛可能从小亚细亚学习。 公元前 1100年,当 "北欧 "多里安人穿过巴尔干半岛来到这里时,他们摧毁了这种原希腊文化的大部分;只有在间隔了几个世纪之后,历史上的希腊文明才出现在 "利库古斯 "的斯巴达、泰勒斯的米利都、赫拉克里图斯的以弗所、萨福的莱斯伯斯和索隆的雅典。从 公元前 六世纪开始,希腊人在杜拉佐、塔兰托、克罗托纳、雷焦卡拉布里亚、锡拉库扎、那不勒斯、尼斯、摩纳哥、马赛、马拉加等地沿着地中海传播他们的文化。从意大利南部的希腊城市和可能是亚洲文化的伊特鲁里亚,产生了古罗马的文明;从罗马产生了西欧的文明;从西 欧洲产生了北美和南美的文明。在我们这个时代的第三个和随后的几个世纪里,各种凯尔特人、日耳曼人或亚洲人的部落使意大利成为废墟,摧毁了经典文化。南方创造了文明,北方征服了它们,毁坏了它们,借用了它们,传播了它们:这是历史的一个总结。

Attempts to relate civilization to race by measuring the relation of brain to face or weight have shed little light on the problem. If the Negroes of Africa have produced no great civilization it is probably because climatic and geographical conditions frustrated them; would any of the white “races” have done better in those environments? It is remarkable how many American Negroes have risen to high places in the professions, arts, and letters in the last one hundred years despite a thousand social obstacles.

试图通过测量大脑与脸部或体重的关系将文明与种族联系起来,对这个问题没有什么启示。如果非洲的黑人没有产生伟大的文明,那可能是因为气候和地理条件使他们受挫;任何一个白人 "种族 "在这些环境中都会做得更好?值得注意的是,在过去的一百年里,尽管有无数的社会障碍,但仍有许多美国黑人在职业、艺术和文学领域上升到了很高的位置。

The role of race in history is rather preliminary than creative. Varied stocks, entering some locality from diverse directions at divers times, mingle their blood, traditions, and ways with one another or with the existing population, like two diverse pools of genes coming together in sexual reproduction. Such an ethnic mixture may in the course of centuries produce a new type, even a new people; so Celts, Romans, Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes, and Normans fused to produce Englishmen. When the new type takes form its cultural expressions are unique, and constitute a new civilization—a new physiognomy, character, language, literature, religion, morality, and art. It is not the race that makes the civilization, it is the civilization that makes the people: circumstances geographical, economic, and political create a culture, and the culture creates a human type. The Englishman does not so much make English civilization as it makes him; if he carries it wherever he goes, and dresses for dinner in Timbuktu, it is not that he is creating his civilization there anew, but that he acknowledges even there its mastery over his soul. In the long run such differences of tradition or type yield to the influence of the environment. Northern peoples take on the characteristics of southern peoples after living for generations in the tropics, and the grandchildren of peoples coming up from the leisurely South fall into the quicker tempo of movement and mind which they find in the North.

种族在历史中的作用是初步的,而不是创造性的。不同的种群,在不同的时间从不同的方向进入某个地方,将他们的血液、传统和方式与彼此或现有的人口混合在一起,就像两个不同的基因库在性繁殖中走到一起。这样的种族混合可能在几个世纪的过程中产生一个新的类型,甚至是一个新的民族;所以凯尔特人、罗马人、盎格鲁人、撒克逊人、朱特人、丹麦人和诺曼人融合后产生了英国人。当新的类型形成后,其文化表现形式是独特的,并构成一种新的文明--新的相貌、性格、语言、文学、宗教、道德和艺术。不是种族造就了文明,而是文明造就了人:地理、经济和政治环境创造了一种文化,而文化又创造了一种人的类型。英国人与其说是创造了英国文明,不如说是英国文明创造了他;如果他走到哪里都带着英国文明,在廷巴克图穿上衣服吃饭,这并不是说他在那里重新创造了他的文明,而是他甚至在那里承认了英国文明对他灵魂的控制。从长远来看,这种传统或类型的差异屈服于 环境的影响。北方人在热带地区生活了几代人之后,就具有了南方人的特征,而从悠闲的南方来的人的孙子则陷入了他们在北方发现的较快的运动和思想节奏。

Viewed from this point, American civilization is still in the stage of racial mixture. Between 1700 and 1848 white Americans north of Florida were mainly Anglo-Saxon, and their literature was a flowering of old England on New England’s soil. After 1848 the doors of America were opened to all white stocks; a fresh racial fusion began, which will hardly be complete for centuries to come. When, out of this mixture, a new homogeneous type is formed, America may have its own language (as different from English as Spanish is from Italian), its indigenous literature, its characteristic arts; already these are visibly or raucously on their way.


“Racial” antipathies have some roots in ethnic origin, but they are also generated, perhaps predominantly, by differences of acquired culture—of language, dress, habits, morals, or religion. There is no cure for such antipathies except a broadened education. A knowledge of history may teach us that civilization is a co-operative product, that nearly all peoples have contributed to it; it is our common heritage and debt; and the civilized soul will reveal itself in treating every man or woman, however lowly, as a representative of one of these creative and contributory groups.

"种族 "反感在某种程度上源于民族血统,但它们也是由后天文化--语言、服饰、习惯、道德或宗教--的差异造成的,也许是主要的。除了广泛的教育之外,对这种反感没有任何治疗方法。对历史的了解可能会告诉我们,文明是一种合作的产物,几乎所有的民族都为它做出了贡献;它是我们共同的遗产和债务;文明的灵魂将显示在把每一个男人或女人,无论多么卑微,都作为这些创造性和贡献性群体之一的代表。

V. Character and History


Society is founded not on the ideals but on the nature of man, and the constitution of man rewrites the constitutions of states. But what is the constitution of man?


We may define human nature as the fundamental tendencies and feelings of mankind. The most basic tendencies we shall call instincts, though we recognize that much doubt has been cast upon their inborn quality. We might describe human nature through the “Table of Character Elements” given on the following page. In this analysis human beings are normally equipped by “nature” (here meaning heredity) with six positive and six negative instincts, whose function it is to preserve the individual, the family, the group, or the species. In positive personalities the positive tendencies predominate, but most individuals are armed with both sets of instincts—to meet or to avoid (according to mood or circumstance) the basic challenges or opportunities of life. Each instinct generates habits and is accompanied by feelings. Their totality is the nature of man.

我们可以把人性定义为人类的基本倾向和情感。我们将把最基本的倾向称为本能,尽管我们认识到,人们对它们的先天质量产生了很多怀疑。我们可以通过下一页的 "性格要素表 "来描述人性。在这种分析中,人类通常被 "自然"(这里指遗传)配备了六种积极和六种消极的本能,其功能是保护个人、家庭、团体或物种。在积极的人格中,积极的倾向占主导地位,但大多数人都有两套本能,以应对或避免(根据情绪或环境)生活的基本挑战或机会。每种本能都会产生习惯,并伴随着情感。它们的总和就是人的本性。

But how far has human nature changed in the course of history? Theoretically there must have been some change; natural selection has presumably operated upon psychological as well as upon physiological variations. Nevertheless, known history shows little alteration in the conduct of mankind. The Greeks of Plato’s time behaved very much like the French of modern centuries; and the Romans behaved like the English. Means and instrumentalities change; motives and ends remain the same: to act or rest, to acquire or give, to fight or retreat, to seek association or privacy, to mate or reject, to offer or resent parental care. Nor does human nature alter as between classes: by and large the poor have the same impulses as the rich, with only less opportunity or skill to implement them. Nothing is clearer in history than the adoption by successful rebels of the methods they were accustomed to condemn in the forces they deposed.















Play Work Curiosity Manipulation Thought Innovation Art

玩耍 工作 好奇心 操纵 思考 创新 艺术

Buoyancy Energy Eagerness Wonder Absorption Resolution Aesthetic feeling

浮力 能量 热情 奇迹 吸收力 解析力 审美 感受





Rest Sloth Indifference Hesitation Dreaming Imitation Disorder

休息 懒惰 漠不关心 犹豫不决 做梦 模仿 紊乱

Fatigue Inertia Boredom Doubt Vacuity Acceptance Confusion

疲劳 惯性 厌烦 怀疑 空虚 接受 困惑





Approach Competition Pugnacity Mastery

办法 竞争 勇气 驾驭能力

Courage Rivalry Anger Pride

勇气 竞争 愤怒 傲慢





Retreat Co-operation Timidity Submission

撤退 合作 迟钝 提交

Anxiety Friendliness Fear Humility

焦虑 友善 恐惧 谦逊





Eating Hoarding Property

吃东西 囤积 财产

Hunger Greed Possessiveness

饥饿 贪婪 占有欲





Rejection Spending Poverty

拒绝 花费 贫困

Disgust Prodigality Insecurity

厌恶 贪婪 不安全感





Communication Seeking approval Generosity

通讯 寻求认同 慷慨解囊

Sociability Vanity Kindliness

社会性 虚荣心 友善





Solitude Fearing disapproval Selfishness

孤独 害怕不被认可 自私

Secretiveness Shyness Hostility

沉默寡言 羞涩 敌对性





Sexual activity Courtship

性活动 求爱

Sexual imagination Sexual love

性的想象力 性爱





Sexual perversion Blushing

性变态 脸红

Sexual neurosis Modesty

性神经症 谦虚



Parental care




Parental love




Filial dependence


Filial rebellion


Filial resentment


Evolution in man during recorded time has been social rather than biological: it has proceeded not by heritable variations in the species, but mostly by economic, political, intellectual, and moral innovation transmitted to individuals and generations by imitation, custom, or education. Custom and tradition within a group correspond to type and heredity in the species, and to instincts in the individual; they are ready adjustments to typical and frequently repeated situations. New situations, however, do arise, requiring novel, unstereotyped responses; hence development, in the higher organisms, requires a capacity for experiment and innovation—the social correlates of variation and mutation. Social evolution is an interplay of custom with origination.


Here the initiative individual—the “great man,” the “hero,” the “genius”—regains his place as a formative force in history. He is not quite the god that Carlyle described; he grows out of his time and land, and is the product and symbol of events as well as their agent and voice; without some situation requiring a new response his new ideas would be untimely and impracticable. When he is a hero of action, the demands of his position and the exaltation of crisis develop and inflate him to such magnitude and powers as would in normal times have remained potential and untapped. But he is not merely an effect. Events take place through him as well as around him; his ideas and decisions enter vitally into the course of history. At times his eloquence, like Churchill’s, may be worth a thousand regiments; his foresight in strategy and tactics, like Napoleon’s, may win battles and campaigns and establish states. If he is a prophet like Mohammed, wise in the means of inspiring men, his words may raise a poor and disadvantaged people to unpremeditated ambitions and surprising power. A Pasteur, a Morse, an Edison, a Ford, a Wright, a Marx, a Lenin, a Mao Tse-tung are effects of numberless causes, and causes of endless effects.

在这里,主动的个人--"伟人"、"英雄"、"天才"--重新获得了他作为历史形成力量的地位。他不完全是卡莱尔所描述的神;他从他的时代和土地中成长起来,是事件的产物和象征,也是事件的代理人和代言人;如果没有一些需要新反应的情况,他的新想法就会不合时宜和不可行。当他成为行动的英雄时,他的地位的要求和危机的高涨使他发展和膨胀到这样的规模和力量,而在正常的 ,他仍然是潜在的和未开发的。但他不仅仅是一个效果。事件通过他发生,也在他周围发生;他的想法和决定在历史进程中发挥了重要作用。有时,他的口才,就像丘吉尔的口才,可能抵得上一千个军团;他在战略和战术方面的远见,就像拿破仑的远见,可能赢得战斗和战役,建立国家。如果他是一个像穆罕默德一样的先知,在鼓舞人心的方法上很有智慧,他的话语可能会使一个贫穷和弱势的民族产生未经预谋的野心和令人惊讶的力量。一个巴斯德,一个莫尔斯,一个爱迪生,一个福特,一个莱特,一个马克思,一个列宁,一个毛泽东,都是无数个原因的结果,也是无尽的结果的原因。

In our table of character elements imitation is opposed to innovation, but in vital ways it co-operates with it. As submissive natures unite with masterful individuals to make the order and operation of a society, so the imitative majority follows the innovating minority, and this follows the originative individual, in adapting new responses to the demands of environment or survival. History in the large is the conflict of minorities; the majority applauds the victor and supplies the human material of social experiment.


Intellect is therefore a vital force in history, but it can also be a dissolvent and destructive power. Out of every hundred new ideas ninety-nine or more will probably be inferior to the traditional responses which they propose to replace. No one man, however brilliant or well-informed, can come in one lifetime to such fullness of understanding as to safely judge and dismiss the customs or institutions of his society, for these are the wisdom of generations after centuries of experiment in the laboratory of history. A youth boiling with hormones will wonder why he should not give full freedom to his sexual desires; and if he is unchecked by custom, morals, or laws, he may ruin his life before he matures sufficiently to understand that sex is a river of fire that must be banked and cooled by a hundred restraints if it is not to consume in chaos both the individual and the group.

因此,智力是历史上的一种重要力量,但它也可能是一种溶解和破坏性的力量。在每一百个新思想中,有九十九个或更多的新思想可能会比它们要取代的传统反应差。没有一个人,无论他多么聪明或见多识广,能在一生中获得如此充分的理解,从而安全地判断和否定其社会的习俗或制度,因为这些都是在历史的实验室中经过几个世纪的实验后,几代人的智慧。 一个被荷尔蒙沸腾的年轻人会想,为什么他不应该给自己的性欲以充分的自由;如果他不受习俗、道德或法律的约束,在他成熟到足以理解性是一条火河,如果它不在混乱中吞噬个人和团体,就必须用100个约束来储存和冷却。

So the conservative who resists change is as valuable as the radical who proposes it—perhaps as much more valuable as roots are more vital than grafts. It is good that new ideas should be heard, for the sake of the few that can be used; but it is also good that new ideas should be compelled to go through the mill of objection, opposition, and contumely; this is the trial heat which innovations must survive before being allowed to enter the human race. It is good that the old should resist the young, and that the young should prod the old; out of this tension, as out of the strife of the sexes and the classes, comes a creative tensile strength, a stimulated development, a secret and basic unity and movement of the whole.


VI. Morals and History


Morals are the rules by which a society exhorts (as laws are the rules by which it seeks to compel) its members and associations to behavior consistent with its order, security, and growth. So for sixteen centuries the Jewish enclaves in Christendom maintained their continuity and internal peace by a strict and detailed moral code, almost without help from the state and its laws.


A little knowledge of history stresses the variability of moral codes, and concludes that they are negligible because they differ in time and place, and sometimes contradict each other. A larger knowledge stresses the universality of moral codes, and concludes to their necessity.


Moral codes differ because they adjust themselves to historical and environmental conditions. If we divide economic history into three stages—hunting, agriculture, industry—we may expect that the moral code of one stage will be changed in the next. In the hunting stage a man had to be ready to chase and fight and kill. When he had caught his prey he ate to the cubic capacity of his stomach, being uncertain when he might eat again; insecurity is the mother of greed, as cruelty is the memory—if only in the blood—of a time when the test of survival (as now between states) was the ability to kill. Presumably the death rate in men—so often risking their lives in the hunt—was higher than in women; some men had to take several women, and every man was expected to help women to frequent pregnancy. Pugnacity, brutality, greed, and sexual readiness were advantages in the struggle for existence. Probably every vice was once a virtue—i.e., a quality making for the survival of the individual, the family, or the group. Man’s sins may be the relics of his rise rather than the stigmata of his fall.

道德准则之所以不同,是因为它们根据历史和环境条件进行自我调整。如果我们把经济史分为三个阶段--狩猎、农业、工业--我们可以预计,一个阶段的道德准则会在下一个阶段发生变化。在狩猎阶段,人必须准备好追赶、战斗和杀戮。 当他抓到猎物时,他会吃到肚子里的所有东西,因为他不确定什么时候能再吃到东西;不安全感是贪婪之母,因为残忍是那个时代的记忆--如果只是在血液中的话--当时对生存的考验(就像现在国家之间的考验)是杀人的能力。据推测,男性的死亡率--他们经常冒着生命危险进行狩猎--要高于女性;有些男性必须带走几个女人,而每个男人都要帮助女性经常怀孕。在为生存而战的过程中,好斗、野蛮、贪婪和性欲都是优势。也许每一种恶习都曾是一种美德,即一种使个人、家庭或群体生存的品质。人类的罪恶可能是他崛起的遗迹,而不是他堕落的污点。

History does not tell us just when men passed from hunting to agriculture—perhaps in the Neolithic Age, and through the discovery that grain could be sown to add to the spontaneous growth of wild wheat. We may reasonably assume that the new regime demanded new virtues, and changed some old virtues into vices. Industriousness became more vital than bravery, regularity and thrift more profitable than violence, peace more victorious than war. Children were economic assets; birth control was made immoral. On the farm the family was the unit of production under the discipline of the father and the seasons, and paternal authority had a firm economic base. Each normal son matured soon in mind and self-support; at fifteen he understood the physical tasks of life as well as he would understand them at forty; all that he needed was land, a plow, and a willing arm. So he married early, almost as soon as nature wished; he did not fret long under the restraints placed upon premarital relations by the new order of permanent settlements and homes. As for young women, chastity was indispensable, for its loss might bring unprotected motherhood. Monogamy was demanded by the approximate numerical equality of the sexes. For fifteen hundred years this agricultural moral code of continence, early marriage, divorceless monogamy, and multiple maternity maintained itself in Christian Europe and its white colonies. It was a stern code, which produced some of the strongest characters in history.

历史并没有告诉我们人类是何时从狩猎转向农业的--也许是在新石器时代,并通过发现可以播种谷物来补充野生小麦的自发生长。我们可以合理地假设,新的制度要求新的美德,并将一些旧的美德变为恶习。勤劳变得比勇敢更重要,规律和节俭比暴力更有利,和平比战争更有胜算。孩子是经济资产;控制生育被认为是不道德的。在农场里,家庭是父亲和季节约束下的生产单位,父亲的权威有一个坚实的经济基础。每个正常的儿子在思想和自立方面都很快成熟起来;15岁时,他对生活中的物质任务的理解就像他在40岁时的理解一样;他所需要的只是土地、一把犁和一只愿意的手臂。因此,他很早就结婚了,几乎是自然界所希望的那样;他并没有因为永久定居点和家庭的新秩序对婚前关系的限制而焦虑太久。对于年轻女性来说,贞洁是必不可少的,因为失去贞洁可能会带来不受保护的母亲身份。一夫一妻制是由两性在数量上的近似平等所要求的。一千五百年来,这种由禁欲、早婚、不离婚的一夫一妻制和多胎生育组成的农业道德规范在基督教 ,在欧洲及其白人殖民地得以维持。这是一个严厉的准则,它产生了一些历史上最强大的人物。

Gradually, then rapidly and ever more widely, the Industrial Revolution changed the economic form and moral superstructure of European and American life. Men, women, and children left home and family, authority and unity, to work as individuals, individually paid, in factories built to house not men but machines. Every decade the machines multiplied and became more complex; economic maturity (the capacity to support a family) came later; children no longer were economic assets; marriage was delayed; premarital continence became more difficult to maintain. The city offered every discouragement to marriage, but it provided every stimulus and facility for sex. Women were “emancipated”—i.e., industrialized; and contraceptives enabled them to separate intercourse from pregnancy. The authority of father and mother lost its economic base through the growing individualism of industry. The rebellious youth was no longer constrained by the surveillance of the village; he could hide his sins in the protective anonymity of the city crowd. The progress of science raised the authority of the test tube over that of the crosier; the mechanization of economic production suggested mechanistic materialistic philosophies; education spread religious doubts; morality lost more and more of its supernatural supports. The old agricultural moral code began to die.

逐渐地,然后迅速地,越来越广泛地,工业革命改变了欧洲和美国生活的经济形式和道德的上层建筑。男人、女人和孩子们离开了家和家庭,离开了权威和团结,以个人身份在工厂里工作,每个人都有报酬,这些工厂不是为了容纳人而是为了容纳机器。每隔十年,机器就会增加,变得更加复杂;经济上的成熟(支持家庭的能力)来得更晚;孩子不再是经济资产;婚姻被推迟了;婚前性行为变得更加难以维持。城市为婚姻提供了各种阻碍,但它又为性提供了各种刺激和便利。妇女被 "解放 "了,也就是说,被工业化了;避孕药具使她们能够将性交和怀孕分开。父亲和母亲的权威由于工业中日益增长的个人主义而失去了其经济基础。叛逆的年轻人不再受到村庄监控的约束;他可以在城市人群的保护下隐姓埋名,隐藏自己的罪过。科学的进步使试管的权威超过了教士的权威;经济生产的机械化提出了机械主义的物质主义哲学;教育传播了宗教的怀疑;道德越来越多地失去了超自然的支持。旧的农业道德规范开始消亡。

In our time, as in the times of Socrates (d. 399 B.C. ) and Augustus (d. A.D. 14), war has added to the forces making for moral laxity. After the violence and social disruption of the Peloponnesian War Alcibiades felt free to flout the moral code of his ancestors, and Thrasymachus could announce that might was the only right. After the wars of Marius and Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, Antony and Octavius, “Rome was full of men who had lost their economic footing and their moral stability: soldiers who had tasted adventure and had learned to kill; citizens who had seen their savings consumed in the taxes and inflation caused by war;… women dizzy with freedom, multiplying divorces, abortions, and adulteries…. A shallow sophistication prided itself upon its pessimism and cynicism.” 15 It is almost a picture of European and American cities after two world wars.

在我们这个时代,正如苏格拉底( 公元前 399年)和奥古斯都( 公元 14年)的时代一样,战争增加了造成道德松懈的力量。在伯罗奔尼撒战争的暴力和社会混乱之后,阿尔西比亚德感到可以自由地藐视他祖先的道德准则,而瑟拉西马库斯可以宣布强权是唯一的权利。在马略和苏拉、凯撒和庞培、安东尼和屋大维的战争之后,"罗马充满了失去经济基础 ,失去道德稳定的人:尝过冒险滋味并学会杀人的士兵;看到他们的储蓄在战争造成的税收和通货膨胀中消耗殆尽的公民;......被自由冲昏头脑的妇女,离婚、堕胎和通奸的情况成倍增加....一种浅薄的复杂性以其悲观主义和愤世嫉俗为荣"。 15 这几乎是两次世界大战后欧洲和美国城市的写照。

History offers some consolation by reminding us that sin has flourished in every age. Even our generation has not yet rivaled the popularity of homosexualism in ancient Greece or Rome or Renaissance Italy. “The humanists wrote about it with a kind of scholarly affection, and Ariosto judged that they were all addicted to it”; Aretino asked the Duke of Mantua to send him an attractive boy. 16 Prostitution has been perennial and universal, from the state-regulated brothels of Assyria 17 to the “night clubs” of West-European and American cities today. In the University of Wittenberg in 1544, according to Luther, “the race of girls is getting bold, and run after the fellows into their rooms and chambers and wherever they can, and offer them their free love.” 18 Montaigne tells us that in his time (1533–92) obscene literature found a ready market; 19 the immorality of our stage differs in kind rather than degree from that of Restoration England; and John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure —a veritable catena of coitus—was as popular in 1749 as in 1965. 20 We have noted the discovery of dice in the excavations near the site of Nineveh; 21 men and women have gambled in every age. In every age men have been dishonest and governments have been corrupt; probably less now than generally before. The pamphlet literature of sixteenth-century Europe “groaned with denunciations of wholesale adulteration of food and other products.” 22 Man has never reconciled himself to the Ten Commandments. We have seen Voltaire’s view of history as mainly “a collection of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes” of mankind, 23 and Gibbon’s echo of that summary. 24

历史提供了一些安慰,它提醒我们,罪在每个时代都很盛行。即使是我们这一代,也还不能与同性恋在古希腊、罗马或文艺复兴时期的流行程度相提并论。"人文主义者以一种学术性的感情来写它,阿里奥斯托判断他们都沉迷于此";阿雷蒂诺要求曼图亚公爵送他一个有吸引力的男孩。 16 从亚述的国家管制的妓院到西方的 "夜总会",卖淫一直是长期的和普遍的。 17 到今天的西欧和美国城市的 "夜总会"。据路德说,1544年在维滕贝格大学,"女孩们越来越大胆,追着伙伴们跑到他们的房间和寝室,以及任何他们能去的地方,向他们提供免费的爱"。 18 蒙田告诉我们,在他的时代(1533-92),淫秽文学找到了一个现成的市场。 19 我们舞台上的不道德行为与英国复辟时期的不道德行为在种类上有所不同,而不是程度上有所不同;约翰-克莱兰的《 一个快乐女人的回忆》-- 真正的交媾之作--在1749年和1965年一样流行。 20 我们已经注意到在尼尼微遗址附近的发掘中发现了骰子。 21 每个时代的男人和女人都在赌博。每个时代的人都是不诚实的,政府都是腐败的;现在可能比以前少。十六世纪欧洲的小册子文学 "呻吟着谴责在食品和其他产品中大量掺假"。 22 人类从未对十诫进行过自我调和。我们看到伏尔泰认为历史主要是人类 "罪行、愚蠢、 和不幸的集合"。 23 以及吉本对这一总结的回应。 24

We must remind ourselves again that history as usually written (peccavimus) is quite different from history as usually lived: the historian records the exceptional because it is interesting—because it is exceptional. If all those individuals who had no Boswell had found their numerically proportionate place in the pages of historians we should have a duller but juster view of the past and of man. Behind the red façade of war and politics, misfortune and poverty, adultery and divorce, murder and suicide, were millions of orderly homes, devoted marriages, men and women kindly and affectionate, troubled and happy with children. Even in recorded history we find so many instances of goodness, even of nobility, that we can forgive, though not forget, the sins. The gifts of charity have almost equaled the cruelties of battlefields and jails. How many times, even in our sketchy narratives, we have seen men helping one another—Farinelli providing for the children of Domenico Scarlatti, divers people succoring young Haydn, Conte Litta paying for Johann Christian Bach’s studies at Bologna, Joseph Black advancing money repeatedly to James Watt, Puchberg patiently lending and lending to Mozart. Who will dare to write a history of human goodness?

我们必须再次提醒自己,通常书写的历史 (peccavimus) 与通常生活的历史是完全不同的:历史学家记录的是例外,因为它是有趣的--因为它是例外。如果所有那些没有博斯韦尔的人都能在历史学家的书页中找到他们在数量上的相应位置,那么我们对过去和人类的看法就会变得更加乏味,但也更加公正。在战争和政治、不幸和贫困、通奸和离婚、谋杀和自杀的红色面孔背后,是数以百万计的有序家庭、虔诚的婚姻、男人和女人的善良和亲情、麻烦和快乐的孩子们。即使在有记载的历史中,我们也能发现许多善良,甚至是高尚的例子,以至于我们可以原谅,尽管不能忘记那些罪过。慈善的礼物几乎等同于战场和监狱的残酷。谁敢写一部人类善良的历史?

So we cannot be sure that the moral laxity of our times is a herald of decay rather than a painful or delightful transition between a moral code that has lost its agricultural basis and another that our industrial civilization has yet to forge into social order and normality. Meanwhile history assures us that civilizations decay quite leisurely. For 250 years after moral weakening began in Greece with the Sophists, Hellenic civilization continued to produce masterpieces of literature and art. Roman morals began to “decay” soon after the conquered Greeks passed into Italy (146 B.C. ), but Rome continued to have great statesmen, philosophers, poets, and artists until the death of Marcus Aurelius ( A.D. 180). Politically Rome was at nadir when Caesar came (60 B.C. ); yet it did not quite succumb to the barbarians till A.D. 465. May we take as long to fall as did Imperial Rome!

因此,我们不能确定我们这个时代的道德松懈是腐朽的预兆,而不是在失去农业基础的道德准则和我们的工业文明尚未锻造成社会秩序和规范的另一个道德准则之间的痛苦或愉快的过渡。同时,历史向我们保证,文明的衰败是相当悠闲的。在希腊因诡辩家而开始道德弱化的250年里,希腊文明继续产生文学和艺术的杰作。罗马的道德在被征服的希腊人进入意大利( 公元前 146年)后不久就开始 "衰败",但罗马仍然有伟大的政治家、哲学家、诗人和艺术家,直到马库斯-奥勒留去世 (公元 180年), 。凯撒来的时候,罗马在政治上处于低谷( 公元前 60年);但直到 公元 465年,它才完全屈服于野蛮人。但愿我们也能像罗马帝国一样,花那么长的时间来堕落!

Perhaps discipline will be restored in our civilization through the military training required by the challenges of war. The freedom of the part varies with the security of the whole; individualism will diminish in America and England as geographical protection ceases. Sexual license may cure itself through its own excess; our unmoored children may live to see order and modesty become fashionable; clothing will be more stimulating than nudity. Meanwhile much of our moral freedom is good: it is pleasant to be relieved of theological terrors, to enjoy without qualm the pleasures that harm neither others nor ourselves, and to feel the tang of the open air upon our liberated flesh.


VII. Religion and History


Even the skeptical historian develops a humble respect for religion, since he sees it functioning, and seemingly indispensable, in every land and age. To the unhappy, the suffering, the bereaved, the old, it has brought supernatural comforts valued by millions of souls as more precious than any natural aid. It has helped parents and teachers to discipline the young. It has conferred meaning and dignity upon the lowliest existence, and through its sacraments has made for stability by transforming human covenants into solemn relationships with God. It has kept the poor (said Napoleon) from murdering the rich. For since the natural inequality of men dooms many of us to poverty or defeat, some supernatural hope may be the sole alternative to despair. Destroy that hope, and class war is intensified.. Heaven and utopia are buckets in a well: when one goes down the other goes up; when religion declines Communism grows.


Religion does not seem at first to have had any connection with morals. Apparently (for we are merely guessing, or echoing Petronius, who echoed Lucretius) “it was fear that first made the gods” 25 —fear of hidden forces in the earth, rivers, oceans, trees, winds, and sky. Religion became the propitiatory worship of these forces through offerings, sacrifice, incantation, and prayer. Only when priests used these fears and rituals to support morality and law did religion become a force vital and rival to the state. It told the people that the local code of morals and laws had been dictated by the gods. It pictured the god Thoth giving laws to Menes for Egypt, the god Shamash giving Hammurabi a code for Babylonia, Yahveh giving the Ten Commandments and 613 precepts to Moses for the Jews, and the divine nymph Egeria giving Numa Pompilius laws for Rome. Pagan cults and Christian creeds proclaimed that earthly rulers were appointed and protected by the gods. Gratefully nearly ever state shared its lands and revenues with the priests.

宗教起初似乎与道德并无任何联系。显然(因为我们只是猜测,或呼应佩特罗尼乌斯,他呼应了卢克莱修)"是恐惧首先造就了神灵" 25 -对地球、河流、海洋、树木、风和天空中隐藏力量的恐惧。宗教成为对这些力量的祭祀性崇拜, ,通过祭品、牺牲、咒语和祈祷。只有当祭司们用这些恐惧和仪式来支持道德和法律时,宗教才成为一种重要的力量,并与国家相抗衡。它告诉人们,当地的道德和法律准则是由神灵决定的。它描绘了托斯神为埃及向美尼斯提供法律,沙马什神为巴比伦提供法典,耶和华为犹太人向摩西提供十诫和613条戒律,神圣的仙女埃吉莉亚为罗马提供努马-庞皮利乌斯的法律。异教和基督教的信条宣称,地上的统治者是由诸神任命和保护的。几乎每个国家都感激地与祭司分享其土地和收入。

Some recusants have doubted that religion ever promoted morality, since immorality has flourished even in ages of religious domination. Certainly sensuality, drunkenness, coarseness, greed, dishonesty, robbery, and violence existed in the Middle Ages; but probably the moral disorder born of half a millennium of barbarian invasion, war, economic devastation, and political disorganization would have been much worse without the moderating effect of the Christian ethic, priestly exhortations, saintly exemplars, and a calming, unifying ritual. The Roman Catholic Church labored to reduce slavery, family feuds, and national strife, to extend the intervals of truce and peace, and to replace trial by combat or ordeal with the judgments of established courts. It softened the penalties exacted by Roman or barbarian law, and vastly expanded the scope and organization of charity.


Though the Church served the state, it claimed to stand above all states, as morality should stand above power. It taught men that patriotism unchecked by a higher loyalty can be a tool of greed and crime. Over all the competing governments of Christendom it promulgated one moral law. Claiming divine origin and spiritual hegemony, the Church offered itself as an international court to which all rulers were to be morally responsible. The Emperor Henry IV recognized this claim by submitting to Pope Gregory VII at Canossa (1077); and a century later Innocent III raised the authority and prestige of the papacy to a height where it seemed that Gregory’s ideal of a moral superstate had come to fulfillment.

虽然教会为国家服务,但它声称自己凌驾于所有国家之上,因为道德应该凌驾于权力之上。它告诉人们,不受更高忠诚度约束的爱国主义可以成为贪婪和犯罪的工具。在基督教世界所有相互竞争的政府中,它颁布了一条道德法则。教会声称自己有神圣的起源和精神霸权,将自己作为一个国际法庭,所有 ,统治者都要对其承担道德责任。亨利四世在卡诺萨向教皇格雷戈里七世屈服(1077年),从而承认了这一主张;一个世纪后,英诺森三世将教皇的权威和威望提高到一个高度,似乎格雷戈里的道德超国家的理想已经实现。

The majestic dream broke under the attacks of nationalism, skepticism, and human frailty. The Church was manned with men, who often proved biased, venal, or extortionate. France grew in wealth and power, and made the papacy her political tool. Kings became strong enough to compel a pope to dissolve that Jesuit order which had so devotedly supported the popes. The Church stooped to fraud, as with pious legends, bogus relics, and dubious miracles; for centuries it profited from a mythical “Donation of Constantine” that had allegedly bequeathed Western Europe to Pope Sylvester I (r. 314–35), and from “False Decretals” (c. 842) that forged a series of documents to give a sacred antiquity to papal omnipotence. 26 More and more the hierarchy spent its energies in promoting orthodoxy rather than morality, and the Inquisition almost fatally disgraced the Church. Even while preaching peace the Church fomented religious wars in sixteenth-century France and the Thirty Years’ War in seventeenth-century Germany. It played only a modest part in the outstanding advance of modern morality—the abolition of slavery. It allowed the philosophers to take the lead in the humanitarian movements that have alleviated the evils of our time.

在民族主义、怀疑主义和人类弱点的攻击下,这个宏伟的梦想破灭了。教会由一些人组成,这些人往往被证明是有偏见的、腐败的或敲诈的。法国的财富和权力不断增长,并使教廷成为她的政治工具。国王们变得强大起来,足以迫使教皇解散曾如此虔诚地支持教皇的耶稣会。教会屈从于欺诈,如虔诚的传说、虚假的遗物和可疑的奇迹;几个世纪以来,它从神话般的 "君士坦丁捐赠 "中获利,据称该捐赠将西欧遗赠给教皇西尔维斯特一世(314-35年),以及从伪造一系列文件以赋予教皇全能地位的 "假文告"(约842)中获利。 26 等级制度越来越多地将其精力用于促进正统而不是道德,宗教裁判所几乎使教会蒙受致命的耻辱。即使在宣扬和平的同时,教会也在16世纪的法国和17世纪的德国煽动了宗教战争。它在现代道德的突出进步--废除奴隶制--中只发挥了很小的作用。它允许哲学家在人道主义运动中发挥主导作用,这些运动减轻了我们时代的罪恶。

History has justified the Church in the belief that the masses of mankind desire a religion rich in miracle, mystery, and myth. Some minor modifications have been allowed in ritual, in ecclesiastical costume, and in episcopal authority; but the Church dares not alter the doctrines that reason smiles at, for such changes would offend and disillusion the millions whose hopes have been tied to inspiring and consolatory imaginations. No reconciliation is possible between religion and philosophy except through the philosophers’ recognition that they have found no substitute for the moral function of the Church, and the ecclesiastical recognition of religious and intellectual freedom.

历史证明了教会的信念,即人类大众渴望一种富于奇迹、神秘和神话的宗教。在仪式、教会服装和主教权力方面允许有一些小的修改;但教会不敢改变理性微笑的教义,因为这种修改会冒犯和幻灭数以百万计的人,他们的希望被绑在鼓舞人心和安慰人心的想象中。在宗教 和哲学之间不可能达成和解,除非哲学家们承认他们没有找到教会道德功能的替代品,以及教会对宗教和知识自由的承认。

Does history support a belief in God? If by God we mean not the creative vitality of nature but a supreme being intelligent and benevolent, the answer must be a reluctant negative. Like other departments of biology, history remains at bottom a natural selection of the fittest individuals and groups in a struggle wherein goodness receives no favors, misfortunes abound, and the final test is the ability to survive. Add to the crimes, wars, and cruelties of man the earthquakes, storms, tornadoes, pestilences, tidal waves, and other “acts of God” that periodically desolate human and animal life, and the total evidence suggests either a blind or an impartial fatality, with incidental and apparently haphazard scenes to which we subjectively ascribe order, splendor, beauty, or sublimity. If history supports any theology this would be a dualism like the Zoroastrian or Manichaean: a good spirit and an evil spirit battling for control of the universe and men’s souls. These faiths and Christianity (which is essentially Manichaean) assured their followers that the good spirit would win in the end; but of this consummation history offers no guarantee. Nature and history do not agree with our conceptions of good and bad; they define good as that which survives, and bad as that which goes under; and the universe has no prejudice in favor of Christ as against Genghis Khan.

历史是否支持对上帝的信仰?如果我们所说的上帝不是指自然界的创造活力,而是指一个智慧和仁慈的最高存在,那么答案一定是不情愿的否定。就像生物学的其他部门一样,历史从根本上说仍然是在斗争中对最合适的个人和群体的自然选择,在这场斗争中,善良没有得到任何好处,不幸比比皆是,而最后的考验是生存能力。除了人类的罪行、战争和残忍之外,还有地震、风暴、龙卷风、瘟疫、潮汐和其他 "上帝的行为",这些行为周期性地使人类和动物的生活变得荒凉,总的证据表明,要么是盲目的,要么是公正的命运,我们主观地赋予其秩序、辉煌、美丽或崇高的偶然和明显的杂乱的场景。如果历史支持任何神学,这将是像琐罗亚斯德教或摩尼教那样的二元论:一个善灵和一个恶灵为控制宇宙和人的灵魂而争斗。这些信仰和基督教(本质上是摩尼教)向他们的追随者保证,好的精神最终会获胜;但对于这个结局,历史没有提供任何保证。自然和历史不同意我们对善恶的概念;它们把善定义为生存的东西,把恶定义为消失的东西;宇宙对基督和成吉思汗没有偏见。

The growing awareness of man’s minuscule place in the cosmos has furthered the impairment of religious belief. In Christendom we may date the beginning of the decline from Copernicus (1543). The process was slow, but by 1611 John Donne was mourning that the earth had become a mere “suburb” in the world, and that “new philosophy calls all in doubt”; and Francis Bacon, while tipping his hat occasionally to the bishops, was proclaiming science as the religion of modern emancipated man. In that generation began the “death of God” as an external deity.

对人类在宇宙中微不足道的地位的认识不断提高,进一步削弱了宗教信仰。在基督教中,我们可以从哥白尼(1543年)开始衰退。 这个过程是缓慢的,但到了1611年,约翰-多恩哀叹地球已成为世界上的一个 "郊区","新哲学使一切都受到怀疑";而弗朗西斯-培根在偶尔向主教倾倒帽子时,宣布科学是现代解放者的宗教。那一代人开始了作为外部神灵的 "上帝之死"。

So great an effect required many causes besides the spread of science and historical knowledge. First, the Protestant Reformation, which originally defended private judgment. Then the multitude of Protestant sects and conflicting theologies, each appealing to both Scriptures and reason. Then the higher criticism of the Bible, displaying that marvelous library as the imperfect work of fallible men. Then the deistic movement in England, reducing religion to a vague belief in a God hardly distinguishable from nature. Then the growing acquaintance with other religions, whose myths, many of them pre-Christian, were distressingly similar to the supposedly factual bases of one’s inherited creed. Then the Protestant exposure of Catholic miracles, the deistic exposure of Biblical miracles, the general exposure of frauds, inquisitions, and massacres in the history of religion. Then the replacement of agriculture—which had stirred men to faith by the annual rebirth of life and the mystery of growth—with industry, humming daily a litany of machines, and suggesting a world machine. Add meanwhile the bold advance of skeptical scholarship, as in Bayle, and of pantheistic philosophy, as in Spinoza; the massive attack of the French Enlightenment upon Christianity; the revolt of Paris against the Church during the French Revolution. Add, in our own time, the indiscriminate slaughter of civilian populations in modern war. Finally, the awesome triumphs of scientific technology, promising man omnipotence and destruction, and challenging the divine command of the skies.


In one way Christianity lent a hand against itself by developing in many Christians a moral sense that could no longer stomach the vengeful God of the traditional theology. The idea of hell disappeared from educated thought, even from pulpit homilies. Presbyterians became ashamed of the Westminster Confession, which had pledged them to belief in a God who had created billions of men and women despite his foreknowledge that, regardless of their virtues and crimes, they were predestined to everlasting hell. Educated Christians visiting the Sistine Chapel were shocked by Michelangelo’s picture of Christ hurling offenders pell-mell into an inferno whose fires were never to be extinguished; was this the “gentle Jesus, meek and mild,” who had inspired our youth? Just as the moral development of the Hellenes had weakened their belief in the quarrelsome and adulterous deities of Olympus (“A certain proportion of mankind,” wrote Plato, “do not believe at all in the existence of the gods.” 27 ), so the development of the Christian ethic slowly eroded Christian theology. Christ destroyed Jehovah.

在某种程度上,基督教通过在许多基督徒中培养一种道德感,使他们无法再忍受传统神学中复仇的上帝,从而对自己伸出了援手。地狱的概念从有教养的思想中消失了,甚至从讲台上的讲道中消失了。长老会 ,对《威斯敏斯特忏悔录》感到羞愧,该忏悔录保证他们相信上帝创造了数十亿的男人和女人,尽管他预先知道,无论他们的美德和罪行如何,他们都注定要下永生地狱。受过教育的基督徒在参观西斯廷教堂时,被米开朗基罗描绘的基督将罪犯扔进火光冲天的地狱所震惊;这就是激励我们年轻人的 "温柔的耶稣,温顺的耶稣 "吗?正如希腊人的道德发展削弱了他们对奥林匹斯山上争吵和通奸的神灵的信仰(柏拉图写道:"一定比例的人类,""根本不相信诸神的存在"。 27 ),所以基督教伦理的发展慢慢侵蚀了基督教神学。基督摧毁了耶和华。

The replacement of Christian with secular institutions is the culminating and critical result of the Industrial Revolution. That states should attempt to dispense with theological supports is one of the many crucial experiments that bewilder our brains and unsettle our ways today. Laws which were once presented as the decrees of a god-given king are now frankly the confused commands of fallible men. Education, which was the sacred province of god-inspired priests, becomes the task of men and women shorn of theological robes and awe, and relying on reason and persuasion to civilize young rebels who fear only the policeman and may never learn to reason at all. Colleges once allied to churches have been captured by businessmen and scientists. The propaganda of patriotism, capitalism, or Communism succeeds to the inculcation of a supernatural creed and moral code. Holydays give way to holidays. Theaters are full even on Sundays, and even on Sundays churches are half empty. In Anglo-Saxon families religion has become a social observance and protective coloration; in American Catholic families it flourishes; in upper- and middle-class France and Italy religion is “a secondary sexual characteristic of the female.” A thousand signs proclaim that Christianity is undergoing the same decline that fell upon the old Greek religion after the coming of the Sophists and the Greek Enlightenment.

用世俗机构取代基督教是工业革命的高潮和关键结果。国家应该试图取消神学支持,这是今天使我们的大脑感到困惑和不安的许多关键试验之一。曾经作为上帝赐予的国王的法令出现的法律,现在坦率地说是易变的人的混乱的命令。原本是受上帝启发的牧师的神圣职责的教育,现在变成了脱去神学长袍和敬畏的男人和女人的任务,他们依靠理性和说服力来教化那些只害怕警察的年轻叛徒,他们可能根本就没有学会理性。曾经与教会结盟的学院已经被商人和科学家占领。爱国主义、资本主义或共产主义的宣传取代了对超自然的信条和道德准则的灌输。圣日让位于假日。即使在星期天,剧院也是满座,即使在星期天,教堂也是半空。在盎格鲁-撒克逊家庭中,宗教已成为一种社会纪念活动和保护性色彩;在美国天主教家庭中,宗教蓬勃发展;在法国和意大利的中上层社会,宗教是 "女性特有的第二性 "。一千种迹象表明,基督教正在经历旧希腊宗教在诡辩家和希腊启蒙运动到来后的同样衰落。

Catholicism survives because it appeals to imagination, hope, and the senses; because its mythology consoles and brightens the lives of the poor; and because the commanded fertility of the faithful slowly regains the lands lost to the Reformation. Catholicism has sacrificed the adherence of the intellectual community, and suffers increasing defections through contact with secular education and literature; but it wins converts from souls wearied with the uncertainty of reason, and from others hopeful that the Church will stem internal disorder and the Communist wave.


If another great war should devastate Western civilization, the resultant destruction of cities, the dissemination of poverty, and the disgrace of science may leave the Church, as in A.D. 476, the sole hope and guide of those who survive the cataclysm.

如果另一场伟大的战争摧毁了西方文明,那么随之而来的城市毁灭、贫困蔓延和科学的耻辱可能会让教会像 公元 476年那样,成为那些在大灾难中幸存下来的人的唯一希望和指南。

One lesson of history is that religion has many lives, and a habit of resurrection. How often in the past have God and religion died and been reborn! Ikhnaton used all the powers of a pharaoh to destroy the religion of Amon; within a year of Ikhnaton’s death the religion of Amon was restored. 28 Atheism ran wild in the India of Buddha’s youth, and Buddha himself founded a religion without a god; after his death Buddhism developed a complex theology including gods, saints, and hell. 29 Philosophy, science, and education depopulated the Hellenic pantheon, but the vacuum attracted a dozen Oriental faiths rich in resurrection myths. In 1793 Hébert and Chaumette, wrongly interpreting Voltaire, established in Paris the atheistic worship of the Goddess of Reason; a year later Robespierre, fearing chaos and inspired by Rousseau, set up the worship of the Supreme Being; in 1801 Napoleon, versed in history, signed a concordat with Pius VII, restoring the Catholic Church in France. The irreligion of eighteenth-century England disappeared under the Victorian compromise with Christianity: the state agreed to support the Anglican Church, and the educated classes would muffle their skepticism, on the tacit understanding that the Church would accept subordination to the state, and the parson would humbly serve the squire. In America the rationalism of the Founding Fathers gave place to a religious revival in the nineteenth century.

历史的一个教训是,宗教有很多生命,而且有复活的习惯。在过去,上帝和宗教经常死而复生!伊赫纳顿用法老的所有权力来摧毁阿蒙的宗教;在伊赫纳顿死后一年内,阿蒙的宗教又恢复了。 28 无神论在佛祖年轻时的印度大行其道,佛祖自己也创立了一个没有神的宗教;在他死后,佛教发展出一套复杂的神学,包括神、圣人和地狱。 29 哲学、科学和教育剥夺了希腊的万神殿,但这一真空吸引了十几个富含复活神话的东方信仰。1793年,赫伯特和肖梅特错误地解释了伏尔泰,在巴黎建立了无神论的理性女神崇拜;一年后,罗伯斯庇尔害怕混乱并受到卢梭的启发,建立了至高无上的崇拜;1801年,精通历史的拿破仑与庇护七世签署了一项协议, ,在法国恢复了天主教教会。十八世纪英国的非宗教信仰在维多利亚时代对基督教的妥协下消失了:国家同意支持英国圣公会,而受过教育的阶级将掩盖他们的怀疑态度,但有一项默契,即教会将接受对国家的服从,而牧师将谦卑地服务于乡绅。在美国,开国元勋们的理性主义在十九世纪让位于宗教复兴。

Puritanism and paganism—the repression and the expression of the senses and desires—alternate in mutual reaction in history. Generally religion and puritanism prevail in periods when the laws are feeble and morals must bear the burden of maintaining social order; skepticism and paganism (other factors being equal) progress as the rising power of law and government permits the decline of the church, the family, and morality without basically endangering the stability of the state. In our time the strength of the state has united with the several forces listed above to relax faith and morals, and to allow paganism to resume its natural sway. Probably our excesses will bring another reaction; moral disorder may generate a religious revival; atheists may again (as in France after the debacle of 1870) send their children to Catholic schools to give them the discipline of religious belief. Hear the appeal of the agnostic Renan in 1866:


Let us enjoy the liberty of the sons of God, but let us take care lest we become accomplices in the diminution of virtue which would menace society if Christianity were to grow weak. What should we do without it?… If Rationalism wishes to govern the world without regard to the religious needs of the soul, the experience of the French Revolution is there to teach us the consequences of such a blunder. 30

让我们享受上帝之子的自由,但让我们小心,以免我们成为美德减少的帮凶,如果基督教变得软弱,美德将威胁社会。如果理性主义想不顾灵魂的宗教需要而治理世界,那么法国大革命的经验就可以告诉我们这种错误的后果。 30

Does history warrant Renan’s conclusion that religion is necessary to morality—that a natural ethic is too weak to withstand the savagery that lurks under civilization and emerges in our dreams, crimes, and wars? Joseph de Maistre answered: “I do not know what the heart of a rascal may be; I know what is in the heart of an honest man; it is horrible.” 31 There is no significant example in history, before our time, of a society successfully maintaining moral life without the aid of religion. France, the United States, and some other nations have divorced their governments from all churches, but they have had the help of religion in keeping social order. Only a few Communist states have not merely dissociated themselves from religion but have repudiated its aid; and perhaps the apparent and provisional success of this experiment in Russia owes much to the temporary acceptance of Communism as the religion (or, as skeptics would say, the opium) of the people, replacing the church as the vendor of comfort and hope. If the socialist regime should fail in its efforts to destroy relative poverty among the masses, this new religion may lose its fervor and efficacy, and the state may wink at the restoration of supernatural beliefs as an aid in quieting discontent. “As long as there is poverty there will be gods.” 32

历史是否证明了勒南的结论,即宗教是道德的必要条件--自然伦理太弱,无法抵御潜伏在文明之下并在我们的梦境、 、战争中出现的野蛮行为?约瑟夫-德-迈斯特回答说。"我不知道一个流氓的心可能是什么;我知道一个诚实人的心是什么;它是可怕的"。 31 在我们这个时代之前,历史上没有一个重要的例子,说明一个社会在没有宗教的帮助下成功地维持了道德生活。法国、美国和其他一些国家的政府已经与所有的教会分离,但他们在维持社会秩序方面得到了宗教的帮助。只有少数共产主义国家不仅与宗教脱离关系,而且还拒绝了宗教的帮助;也许这种试验在俄罗斯的明显和暂时的成功在很大程度上归功于人们暂时接受共产主义作为人民的宗教(或者,正如怀疑论者所说,鸦片),取代教会作为安慰和希望的提供者。如果社会主义政权在消除群众相对贫困的努力中失败了,这种新的宗教可能会失去它的热情和效力,国家可能会对恢复超自然的信仰作为平息不满情绪的一种帮助而眨眼。"只要有贫穷,就会有神灵"。 32

VIII. Economics and History


History, according to Karl Marx, is economics in action—the contest, among individuals, groups, classes, and states, for food, fuel, materials, and economic power. Political forms, religious institutions, cultural creations, are all rooted in economic realities. So the Industrial Revolution brought with it democracy, feminism, birth control, socialism, the decline of religion, the loosening of morals, the liberation of literature from dependence upon aristocratic patronage, the replacement of romanticism by realism in fiction—and the economic interpretation of history. The outstanding personalities in these movements were effects, not causes; Agamemnon, Achilles, and Hector would never have been heard of had not the Greeks sought commercial control of the Dardanelles; economic ambition, not the face of Helen “fairer than the evening air clad in the beauty of a thousand stars,” launched a thousand ships on Ilium; those subtle Greeks knew how to cover naked economic truth with the fig leaf of a phrase.

按照卡尔-马克思的说法,历史就是经济活动--个人、群体、阶级和国家之间对食物、燃料、材料和经济权力的争夺。政治形式、宗教机构、文化创造,都植根于经济现实中。因此,工业革命带来了民主、女权主义、节育、社会主义、宗教的衰落、道德的松动、文学从对贵族赞助的依赖中解放出来、小说中的现实主义取代了浪漫主义,以及对历史的经济解释。这些运动中的杰出人物是效果,而不是原因;如果不是希腊人寻求对达达尼尔海峡的商业控制,阿伽门农、阿基里斯和赫克托尔永远不会被人听到;经济上的野心,而不是海伦 "比晚霞更美丽,披着无数星星的美丽 "的脸,在伊留姆岛上发射了无数船只;那些狡猾的希腊人知道如何用一句话的无花果叶来掩盖赤裸裸的经济真相。

Unquestionably the economic interpretation illuminates much history. The money of the Delian Confederacy built the Parthenon; the treasury of Cleopatra’s Egypt revitalized the exhausted Italy of Augustus, gave Virgil an annuity and Horace a farm. The Crusades, like the wars of Rome with Persia, were attempts of the West to capture trade routes to the East; the discovery of America was a result of the failure of the Crusades. The banking house of the Medici financed the Florentine Renaissance; the trade and industry of Nuremberg made Dürer possible. The French Revolution came not because Voltaire wrote brilliant satires and Rousseau sentimental romances, but because the middle classes had risen to economic leadership, needed legislative freedom for their enterprise and trade, and itched for social acceptance and political power.

毋庸置疑,经济解释照亮了许多历史。德利安联盟的资金建造了帕台农神庙;埃及艳后的国库使奥古斯都疲惫不堪的意大利重新焕发生机, ,给了维吉尔一笔年金和贺拉斯一个农场。十字军东征,就像罗马与波斯的战争一样,是西方试图占领通往东方的贸易路线;美洲的发现是十字军东征失败的结果。美第奇家族的银行为佛罗伦萨的文艺复兴提供了资金;纽伦堡的贸易和工业使丢勒成为可能。法国大革命的发生并不是因为伏尔泰写了出色的讽刺诗,卢梭写了感伤的浪漫小说,而是因为中产阶级已经上升为经济领袖,他们的企业和贸易需要立法自由,并渴望得到社会的认可和政治权力。

Marx did not claim that individuals were always actuated by economic interest; he was far from imagining that material considerations led to Abélard’s romance, or the gospel of Buddha, or the poems of Keats. But perhaps he underestimated the role played by noneconomic incentives in the behavior of masses: by religious fervor, as in Moslem or Spanish armies; by nationalistic ardor, as in Hitler’s troops or Japan’s kamikazes; by the self-fertilizing fury of mobs, as in the Gordon riots of June 2–8, 1780, in London, or the massacres of September 2–7, 1792, in Paris. In such cases the motives of the (usually hidden) leaders may be economic, but the result is largely determined by the passions of the mass. In many instances political or military power was apparently the cause rather than the result of economic operations, as in the seizure of Russia by the Bolsheviks in 1917, or in the army coups that punctuate South American history. Who would claim that the Moorish conquest of Spain, or the Mongol conquest of Western Asia, or the Mogul conquest of India, was the product of economic power? In these cases the poor proved stronger than the rich; military victory gave political ascendancy, which brought economic control. The generals could write a military interpretation of history.


Allowing for these cautions, we may derive endless instruction from the economic analysis of the past. We observe that the invading barbarians found Rome weak because the agricultural population which had formerly supplied the legions with hardy and patriotic warriors fighting for land had been replaced by slaves laboring listlessly on vast farms owned by one man or a few. Today the inability of small farms to use the best machinery profitably is again forcing agriculture into large-scale production under capitalistic or communistic ownership. It was once said that “civilization is a parasite on the man with the hoe,” 33 but the man with the hoe no longer exists; he is now a “hand” at the wheel of a tractor or a combine. Agriculture becomes an industry, and soon the farmer must choose between being the employee of a capitalist and being the employee of a state.

考虑到这些注意事项,我们可以从过去的经济分析中获得无尽的指导 。我们注意到,入侵的野蛮人发现罗马很虚弱,因为以前为军团提供为土地而战的坚韧的爱国战士的农业人口,已经被在一个人或少数人拥有的巨大农场上无精打采地劳动的奴隶所取代。今天,小农场没有能力使用最好的机械来获利,这再次迫使农业进入资本主义或共产主义所有权下的大规模生产。曾经有人说过,"文明是持锄头的人的一种寄生虫"。 33 但拿着锄头的人已经不存在了;他现在是拖拉机或联合收割机车轮上的 "手"。农业成为一种产业,很快农民必须在成为资本家的雇员和成为国家的雇员之间做出选择。

At the other end of the scale history reports that “the men who can manage men manage the men who can manage only things, and the men who can manage money manage all.” 34 So the bankers, watching the trends in agriculture, industry, and trade, inviting and directing the flow of capital, putting our money doubly and trebly to work, controlling loans and interest and enterprise, running great risks to make great gains, rise to the top of the economic pyramid. From the Medici of Florence and the Fuggers of Augsburg to the Rothschilds of Paris and London and the Morgans of New York, bankers have sat in the councils of governments, financing wars and popes, and occasionally sparking a revolution. Perhaps it is one secret of their power that, having studied the fluctuations of prices, they know that history is inflationary, and that money is the last thing a wise man will hoard.

在天平的另一端,历史报告说,"能够管理人的人管理只能够管理东西的人,而能够管理钱的人则管理所有的东西。" 34 因此,银行家们观察着农业、工业和贸易的趋势,邀请并指导资本的流动,把我们的钱加倍和三倍地用于工作,控制贷款、利息和企业,冒着巨大的风险来赚取巨大的收益,上升到经济金字塔的顶端。从佛罗伦萨的美第奇和奥格斯堡的富格尔到巴黎和伦敦的罗斯柴尔德家族和纽约的摩根家族,银行家们一直坐在政府的理事会中,为战争和教皇提供资金,偶尔也会引发一场革命。也许这是他们权力的一个秘密,因为他们研究过价格的波动,知道历史是通货膨胀的,而钱是一个聪明人最后要囤积的东西。

The experience of the past leaves little doubt that every economic system must sooner or later rely upon some form of the profit motive to stir individuals and groups to productivity. Substitutes like slavery, police supervision, or ideological enthusiasm prove too unproductive, too expensive, or too transient. Normally and generally men are judged by their ability to produce—except in war, when they are ranked according to their ability to destroy.

过去的经验表明,每个经济体系迟早都要依靠某种形式的利润动机来激发个人和团体的生产力。像奴隶制、警察监督或意识形态的热情这样的替代物被证明太不具生产力,太昂贵,或太短暂了。通常情况下,人们 ,根据他们的生产能力来判断--但在战争中除外,那时他们是根据他们的破坏能力来排名的。

Since practical ability differs from person to person, the majority of such abilities, in nearly all societies, is gathered in a minority of men. The concentration of wealth is a natural result of this concentration of ability, and regularly recurs in history. The rate of concentration varies (other factors being equal) with the economic freedom permitted by morals and the laws. Despotism may for a time retard the concentration; democracy, allowing the most liberty, accelerates it. The relative equality of Americans before 1776 has been overwhelmed by a thousand forms of physical, mental, and economic differentiation, so that the gap between the wealthiest and the poorest is now greater than at any time since Imperial plutocratic Rome. In progressive societies the concentration may reach a point where the strength of number in the many poor rivals the strength of ability in the few rich; then the unstable equilibrium generates a critical situation, which history has diversely met by legislation redistributing wealth or by revolution distributing poverty.


In the Athens of 594 B.C. , according to Plutarch, “the disparity of fortune between the rich and the poor had reached its height, so that the city seemed to be in a dangerous condition, and no other means for freeing it from disturbances… seemed possible but despotic power.” 35 The poor, finding their status worsened with each year—the government in the hands of their masters, and the corrupt courts deciding every issue against them—began to talk of violent revolt. The rich, angry at the challenge to their property, prepared to defend themselves by force. Good sense prevailed; moderate elements secured the election of Solon, a businessman of aristocratic lineage, to the supreme archonship. He devaluated the currency, thereby easing the burden of all debtors (though he himself was a creditor); he reduced all personal debts, and ended imprisonment for debt; he canceled arrears for taxes and mortgage interest; he established a graduated income tax that made the rich pay at a rate twelve times that required of the poor; he reorganized the courts on a more popular basis; and he arranged that the sons of those who had died in war for Athens should be brought up and educated at the government’s expense. The rich protested that his measures were outright confiscation; the radicals complained that he had not redivided the land; but within a generation almost all agreed that his reforms had saved Athens from revolution. 36

在 公元前 594年的雅典,根据普鲁塔克的说法,"富人和穷人之间的财富差距已经达到了顶峰,所以城市似乎处于一种危险的状态,除了专制的权力,似乎没有其他办法使它摆脱动荡。" 35 穷人发现他们的地位每年都在恶化--政府掌握在他们的主人手中,腐败的法院对每一个问题都作出不利于他们的裁决--开始谈论暴力反抗的问题。富人对他们的财产受到挑战感到愤怒,准备用武力保护自己。理智占了上风;温和派人士争取到了索伦,一个具有贵族血统的商人,当选为最高的大法官。他使货币贬值,从而减轻了所有债务人的负担(尽管他自己也是一个债权人);他减少了所有个人债务,并结束了因债务而被监禁的情况;他取消了 、拖欠的税款和抵押贷款利息;他建立了分级所得税,使富人的支付率是穷人的12倍;他在更受欢迎的基础上重组了法院;他安排那些为雅典而战死的人的儿子由政府出资抚养并接受教育。富人抗议说他的措施是赤裸裸的没收;激进派抱怨说他没有重新划分土地;但在一代人的时间里,几乎所有人都认为他的改革使雅典免于革命。 36

The Roman Senate, so famous for its wisdom, adopted an uncompromising course when the concentration of wealth approached an explosive point in Italy; the result was a hundred years of class and civil war. Tiberius Gracchus, an aristocrat elected as tribune of the people, proposed to redistribute land by limiting ownership to 333 acres per person, and alloting surplus land to the restive proletariat of the capital. The Senate rejected his proposals as confiscatory. He appealed to the people, telling them, “You fight and die to give wealth and luxury to others; you are called the masters of the world, but there is not a foot of ground that you can call your own.” 37 Contrary to Roman law, he campaigned for re-election as tribune; in an election-day riot he was slain (133 B.C. ). His brother Caius, taking up his cause, failed to prevent a renewal of violence, and ordered his servant to kill him; the slave obeyed, and then killed himself (121 B.C. ) ; three thousand of Caius’ followers were put to death by Senatorial decree. Marius became the leader of the plebs, but withdrew when the movement verged on revolution. Catiline, proposing to abolish all debts, organized a revolutionary army of “wretched paupers”; he was inundated by Cicero’s angry eloquence, and died in battle against the state (62 B.C. ). Julius Caesar attempted a compromise, but was cut down by the patricians (44 B.C. ) after five years of civil war. Mark Antony confused his support of Caesar’s policies with personal ambitions and romance; Octavius defeated him at Actium, and established the “Principate” that for 210 years (30 B.C. – A.D. 180) maintained the Pax Romana between the classes as well as among the states within the Imperial frontiers. 38

以智慧著称的罗马元老院,在意大利的财富集中接近爆炸点时,采取了毫不妥协的做法;其结果是百年的阶级和内战。当选为人民护民官的贵族Tiberius Gracchus提议重新分配土地,将所有权限制在每人333英亩,并将剩余土地分配给首都不安分的无产阶级。元老院认为他的建议是没收性的,予以拒绝。他向人民呼吁,告诉他们:"你们战斗和死亡是为了把财富和奢侈送给别人;你们被称为世界的主人,但没有一英尺的土地可以称为自己的。" 37 与罗马法律相反,他竞选连任护民官;在选举日的骚乱中,他被杀( 公元前 133年)。他的兄弟凯厄斯接手了他的事业,未能阻止暴力事件的再次发生,并命令他的仆人杀死他;那个奴隶服从了命令,然后自杀了( 公元前 121年);凯厄斯的三千名追随者被元老院的法令处死。马略成为平民的领袖,但在运动接近革命时退出。卡提林提议废除所有债务,组织了一支由 "可怜的穷人 "组成的革命军;他被西塞罗愤怒的雄辩所淹没,并在与国家的战斗中死去( 公元前 62年)。朱利叶斯-凯撒试图达成妥协,但在五年的内战后被贵族们砍倒( 公元前 44年)。马克-安东尼将他对凯撒政策的支持 ,与个人的野心和浪漫相混淆;屋大维在阿克提姆打败了他,并建立了 "公国",在210年里( 公元前 30年- 公元 180年)维持了各阶层之间以及帝国疆域内各州之间的罗马和平。 38

After the breakdown of political order in the Western Roman Empire ( A.D. 476), centuries of destitution were followed by the slow renewal and reconcentration of wealth, partly in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. In one aspect the Reformation was a redistribution of this wealth by the reduction of German and English payments to the Roman Church, and by the secular appropriation of ecclesiastical property and revenues. The French Revolution attempted a violent redistribution of wealth by Jacqueries in the countryside and massacres in the cities, but the chief result was a transfer of property and privilege from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. The government of the United States, in 1933–52 and 1960–65, followed Solon’s peaceful methods, and accomplished a moderate and pacifying redistribution; perhaps someone had studied history. The upper classes in America cursed, complied, and resumed the concentration of wealth.

在西罗马帝国的政治秩序崩溃后 (公元 476年),几个世纪的贫困之后,财富缓慢地更新和集中,部分是在天主教会的等级制度中。在一个方面,宗教改革是通过减少德国和英国对罗马教会的付款,以及通过对教会财产和收入的世俗侵占来重新分配这种财富。法国大革命试图通过在农村的Jacqueries和在城市的大屠杀来实现财富的暴力再分配,但其主要结果是财产和特权从贵族阶层转移到资产阶级。美国政府在1933-52年和1960-65年遵循了索伦的和平方法,完成了温和而平和的再分配;也许有人研究过历史。美国的上层阶级咒骂着,顺从着,并恢复了财富的集中。

We conclude that the concentration of wealth is natural and inevitable, and is periodically alleviated by violent or peaceable partial redistribution. In this view all economic history is the slow heartbeat of the social organism, a vast systole and diastole of concentrating wealth and compulsive recirculation.


IX. Socialism and History


The struggle of socialism against capitalism is part of the historic rhythm in the concentration and dispersion of wealth. The capitalist, of course, has fulfilled a creative function in history: he has gathered the savings of the people into productive capital by the promise of dividends or interest; he has financed the mechanization of industry and agriculture, and the rationalization of distribution; and the result has been such a flow of goods from producer to consumer as history has never seen before. He has put the liberal gospel of liberty to his use by arguing that businessmen left relatively free from transportation tolls and legislative regulation can give the public a greater abundance of food, homes, comfort, and leisure than has ever come from industries managed by politicians, manned by governmental employees, and supposedly immune to the laws of supply and demand. In free enterprise the spur of competition and the zeal and zest of ownership arouse the productiveness and inventiveness of men; nearly every economic ability sooner or later finds its niche and reward in the shuffle of talents and the natural selection of skills; and a basic democracy rules the process insofar as most of the articles to be produced, and the services to be rendered, are determined by public demand rather than by governmental decree. Meanwhile competition compels the capitalist to exhaustive labor, and his products to ever-rising excellence.

社会主义与资本主义的斗争是财富集中和分散的历史节奏的一部分。当然,资本家在历史上履行了一种创造性的职能:他通过红利或利息的承诺将人民的储蓄聚集成生产性资本;他为工业和农业的机械化以及分配的合理化提供资金;结果是历史上从未见过的商品从生产者流向消费者。他把自由主义的福音用在了他的身上,认为商人不受交通费和立法管制的影响,可以为公众提供更多的食物、住宅、舒适和休闲,而不是由政治家管理的、由政府雇员操作的、据说不受供求规律影响的行业。在自由企业中,竞争的刺激和所有权的热情和激情激发了人们的生产力和创造力;几乎每一种经济能力都会在人才的洗牌和技能的自然选择中迟早找到自己的位置和回报;而基本的民主统治着这个过程,因为大多数要生产的物品和要提供的服务是由公众需求决定的, ,而不是由政府的命令。同时,竞争迫使资本家竭尽所能地劳动,并使他的产品不断提高质量。

There is much truth in such claims today, but they do not explain why history so resounds with protests and revolts against the abuses of industrial mastery, price manipulation, business chicanery, and irresponsible wealth. These abuses must be hoary with age, for there have been socialistic experiments in a dozen countries and centuries. We read that in Sumeria, about 2100 B.C. ,

今天,这种说法有很多道理,但它们并不能解释为什么历史上对工业控制、价格操纵、商业欺诈和不负责任的财富等弊端的抗议和反抗如此响亮。这些弊端必须随着时间的推移而变得老旧,因为在十几个国家和几个世纪中都有过社会主义的实验。我们读到,在苏美尔,大约在 公元前 2100年......。

the economy was organized by the state. Most of the arable land was the property of the crown; labourers received rations from the crops delivered to the royal storehouses. For the administration of this vast state economy a very differentiated hierarchy was developed, and records were kept of all deliveries and distributions of rations. Tens of thousands of clay tablets inscribed with such records were found in the capital Ur itself, in Lagash, Umma… Foreign trade also was carried out in the name of the central administration. 39

经济是由国家组织的。大部分可耕地都是王室的财产;劳动者从运送到皇家仓库的作物中获得配给。为了管理这个庞大的国家经济,建立了一个非常有区别的等级制度,并对所有的交付和分配口粮的情况进行了记录。在首都乌尔、拉加什、乌玛......都发现了数以万计的刻有此类记录的泥板。 39

In Babylonia (c. 1750 B.C. ) the law code of Hammurabi fixed wages for herdsmen and artisans, and the charges to be made by physicians for operations. 40

在巴比伦(约 公元前 1750年),汉谟拉比的法典规定了牧民和工匠的工资,以及医生的手术费。 40

In Egypt under the Ptolemies (323 B.C. – 30 B.C. ) the state owned the soil and managed agriculture: the peasant was told what land to till, what crops to grow; his harvest was measured and registered by government scribes, was threshed on royal threshing floors, and was conveyed by a living chain of fellaheen into the granaries of the king. The government owned the mines and appropriated the ore. It nationalized the production and sale of oil, salt, papyrus, and textiles. All commerce was controlled and regulated by the state; most retail trade was in the hands of state agents selling state-produced goods. Banking was a government monopoly, but its operation might be delegated to private firms. Taxes were laid upon every person, industry, process, product, sale, and legal document. To keep track of taxable transactions and income, the government maintained a swarm of scribes and a complex system of personal and property registration. The revenue of this system made the Ptolemaic the richest state of the time. 41 Great engineering enterprises were completed, agriculture was improved, and a large proportion of the profits went to develop and adorn the country and to finance its cultural life. About 290 B.C. the famous Museum and Library of Alexandria were founded. Science and literature flourished; at uncertain dates in this Ptolemaic era some scholars made the “Septuagint” translation of the Pentateuch into Greek. Soon, however, the pharaohs took to expensive wars, and after 246 B.C. they gave themselves to drink and venery, allowing the administration of the state and the economy to fall into the hands of rascals who ground every possible penny out of the poor. Generation after generation the government’s exactions grew. Strikes increased in number and violence. In the capital, Alexandria, the populace was bribed to peace by bounties and spectacles, but it was watched by a large military force, was allowed no voice in the government, and became in the end a violent mob. Agriculture and industry decayed through lack of incentive; moral disintegration spread; and order was not restored until Octavius brought Egypt under Roman rule (30 B.C. ).

在托勒密王朝( 公元前 323年- 公元前 30年)统治下的埃及,国家拥有土地并管理农业:农民被告知要耕种什么土地,种植什么作物;他的收获由政府文士测量和登记,在皇家打谷场上脱粒,并由一个活的fellaheen链输送到国王的粮仓。政府拥有矿场,并占有矿石。它将石油、盐、纸莎草和纺织品的生产和销售国有化。所有的商业都由国家控制和管理;大多数零售业都在国家代理人手中,销售国家生产的商品。银行业由政府垄断,但其业务可以委托给私人公司。每个人、行业、工艺、产品、销售和法律文件都被征税。为了跟踪应税的 交易和收入,政府保留了一大群文士和一个复杂的个人和财产登记系统。这个系统的收入使托勒密成为当时最富有的国家。 41 伟大的工程项目得以完成,农业得到改善,很大一部分利润被用于发展和装饰国家,并资助其文化生活。大约在 公元前 290年,著名的亚历山大博物馆和图书馆成立了。科学和文学蓬勃发展;在这个托勒密时代的不确定日期,一些学者将五经翻译成希腊文的 "七十士"。然而,不久之后,法老们开始了昂贵的战争, 公元前 246年之后,他们酗酒和贪污,让国家的管理和经济落入那些从穷人身上榨取每一分钱的无赖手中。一代又一代,政府的苛捐杂税不断增加。罢工的数量和暴力程度都在增加。在首都亚历山大,民众被赏金和奇观所收买,以获得和平,但他们被一支庞大的军队所监视,在政府中没有发言权,最终成为一个暴力的暴民。农业和工业因缺乏激励而衰败;道德解体蔓延;直到屋大维将埃及置于罗马统治之下( 公元前 30年),秩序才得以恢复。

Rome had its socialist interlude under Diocletian. Faced with increasing poverty and restlessness among the masses, and with imminent danger of barbarian invasion, he issued in A.D. 301 an Edictum de pretiis, which denounced monopolists for keeping goods from the market to raise prices, and set maximum prices and wages for all important articles and services. Extensive public works were undertaken to put the unemployed to work, and food was distributed gratis, or at reduced prices, to the poor. The government—which already owned most mines, quarries, and salt deposits—brought nearly all major industries and guilds under detailed control. “In every large town,” we are told, “the state became a powerful employer,… standing head and shoulders above the private industrialists, who were in any case crushed by taxation.” 42 When businessmen predicted ruin, Diocletian explained that the barbarians were at the gate, and that individual liberty had to be shelved until collective liberty could be made secure. The socialism of Diocletian was a war economy, made possible by fear of foreign attack. Other factors equal, internal liberty varies inversely as external danger.

罗马在戴克里先时期有过社会主义的插曲。面对人民群众日益增长的贫困和不安,以及迫在眉睫的野蛮人入侵的危险,他在 公元 301年发布了一项 法令, 谴责垄断者为提高价格而从市场上截留货物,并为所有重要物品和服务规定了最高价格和工资。政府开展了广泛的公共工程,让失业者工作,并向穷人免费或减价分发食物。政府--它已经拥有大多数矿场、采石场和盐矿--将几乎所有的主要行业和行会都置于详细的控制之下。"在每一个大型 ,"我们被告知,"国家成为一个强大的雇主,......站在私人工业家的肩膀上,他们在任何情况下都被税收压垮。" 42 当商人们预言毁灭时,戴克里先解释说,野蛮人就在门口,个人自由必须被搁置,直到集体自由能够得到保障。戴克里先的社会主义是一种战争经济,由于害怕外国的攻击而成为可能。在其他因素不变的情况下,内部自由与外部危险成反比。

The task of controlling men in economic detail proved too much for Diocletian’s expanding, expensive, and corrupt bureaucracy. To support this officialdom—the army, the court, public works, and the dole—taxation rose to such heights that men lost incentive to work or earn, and an erosive contest began between lawyers finding devices to evade taxes and lawyers formulating laws to prevent evasion. Thousands of Romans, to escape the taxgatherer, fled over the frontiers to seek refuge among the barbarians. Seeking to check this elusive mobility, and to facilitate regulation and taxation, the government issued decrees binding the peasant to his field and the worker to his shop until all his debts and taxes had been paid. In this and other ways medieval serfdom began. 43

事实证明,对戴克里先不断扩大的、昂贵的和腐败的官僚机构来说,在经济细节上控制人们的任务太重了。为了支持这个官场--军队、法院、公共工程和救济金--税收上升到如此高的水平,以至于人们失去了工作或挣钱的动力,并且在寻找逃税手段的律师和制定防止逃税法律的律师之间开始了一场侵蚀性的竞赛。成千上万的罗马人为了躲避征税人的追捕,越过边境到野蛮人中寻求庇护。为了遏制这种难以捉摸的流动性,并促进监管和征税,政府颁布法令,将农民约束在他的田地里,将工人约束在他的商店里,直到他的所有债务和税收都得到偿还。通过这种方式和其他方式,中世纪农奴制开始了。 43

China has had several attempts at state socialism. Szuma Ch’ien ( B.C. 145 B.C. ) informs us that to prevent private individuals from “reserving to their sole use the riches of the mountains and the sea in, order to gain a fortune, and from putting the lower classes into subjection to themselves,” 44 the Emperor Wu Ti (r. 140 B.C. – 87 B.C. ) nationalized the resources of the soil, extended governmental direction over transport and trade, laid a tax upon incomes, and established public works, including canals that bound the rivers together and irrigated the fields. The state accumulated stockpiles of goods, sold these when prices were rising, bought more when prices were falling; thus, says Szuma Ch’ien, “the rich merchants and large shop-keepers would be prevented from making big profits,… and prices would be regulated in the Empire.” 45 For a time, we are told, China prospered as never before. A combination of “acts of God” with human deviltry put an end to the experiment after the death of the Emperor. Floods alternated with droughts, created tragic shortages, and raised prices beyond control. Businessmen protested that taxes were making them support the lazy and the incompetent. Harassed by the high cost of living, the poor joined the rich in clamoring for a return to the old ways, and some proposed that the inventor of the new system be boiled alive. The reforms were one by one rescinded, and were almost forgotten when they were revived by a Chinese philosopher-king.

中国曾多次尝试过国家社会主义。司马迁 (公元 前145 年 )告诉我们,为了防止私人 "独占山海之利,以图富贵,并使下层民众臣服于自己"。 44 汉武帝( 公元前 140年- 公元前 87年)将土地资源收归国有,扩大政府对运输和贸易的指导,对收入征税,并建立公共工程,包括连接河流和灌溉田地的运河。国家积累货物库存,在价格上涨时出售这些货物,在价格下跌时购买更多的货物;因此,司马迁说,"富商和大店主 ,将被阻止赚取巨额利润,......帝国的价格将受到管制。" 45 我们被告知,有一段时间,中国前所未有地繁荣起来。皇帝去世后,"天意 "与人类的破坏行为相结合,结束了这种试验。洪水与干旱交替发生,造成了悲惨的短缺,并使价格上升到无法控制的程度。商人们抗议说,税收使他们支持懒惰和无能的人。在高额生活费用的困扰下,穷人和富人一起吵着要恢复旧的方式,有些人提议将新制度的发明者活活煮死。改革被逐一废除,当中国的一位哲学家国王恢复改革时,这些改革几乎被遗忘。

Wang Mang (r. A.D. 9–23) was an accomplished scholar, a patron of literature, a millionaire who scattered his riches among his friends and the poor. Having seized the throne, he surrounded himself with men trained in letters, science, and philosophy. He nationalized the land, divided it into equal tracts among the peasants, and put an end to slavery. Like Wu Ti, he tried to control prices by the accumulation or release of stockpiles. He made loans at low interest to private enterprise. The groups whose profits had been clipped by his legislation united to plot his fall; they were helped by drought and flood and foreign invasion. The rich Liu family put itself at the head of a general rebellion, slew Wang Mang, and repealed his legislation. Everything was as before. 46

王莽( 公元 9-23年)是一个有成就的学者,一个文学的赞助人,一个将财富分散给朋友和穷人的百万富翁。夺取王位后,他身边的人都受过文学、科学和哲学方面的训练。他将土地收归国有,将土地平均分配给农民,并结束了奴隶制。像吴逖一样,他试图通过积累或释放库存来控制价格。他向私营企业提供低息贷款。那些因他的立法而被削减利润的集团联合起来策划他的垮台;他们得到了干旱和洪水以及外国入侵的帮助。富裕的刘氏家族领导了一场总叛乱,杀死了王莽,并废除了他的立法。一切都像以前一样。 46

A thousand years later Wang An-shih, as premier (1068–85), undertook a pervasive governmental domination of the Chinese economy. “The state,” he held, “should take the entire management of commerce, industry, and agriculture into its own hands, with a view to succoring the working classes and preventing them from being ground into the dust by the rich.” 47 He rescued the peasants from the moneylenders by loans at low interest. He encouraged new settlers by advancing them seed and other aid, to be repaid out of the later yield of their land. He organized great engineering works to control floods and check unemployment. Boards were appointed in every district to regulate wages and prices. Commerce was nationalized. Pensions were provided for the aged, the unemployed, and the poor. Education and the examination system (by which admission to governmental office was determined) were reformed; “pupils threw away their textbooks of rhetoric,” says a Chinese historian, “and began to study primers of history, geography, and political economy.” 48

一千年后,王安石作为总理(1068-85),对中国经济进行了全面的政府统治。"他认为,"国家应该把商业、工业和农业的全部管理权掌握在自己手中,以帮助工人阶级,防止他们被富人磨成灰烬。" 47 他通过低息贷款将农民从放债人手中拯救出来。他鼓励新的定居者 ,向他们提供种子和其他援助,并从他们的土地后来的收益中予以偿还。他组织了巨大的工程,以控制洪水和遏制失业。每个地区都任命了委员会来管理工资和价格。商业被国有化了。为老年人、失业者和穷人提供养老金。教育和考试制度(决定是否进入政府机构)得到了改革;"学生们扔掉了他们的修辞学教科书,"一位中国历史学家说,"并开始学习历史、地理和政治经济学的初级课程。 48

What undermined the experiment? First, high taxes, laid upon all to finance a swelling band of governmental employees. Second, conscription of a male in every family to man the armies made necessary by barbarian invasions. Third, corruption in the bureaucracy; China, like other nations, was faced with a choice between private plunder and public graft. Conservatives, led by Wang An-shih’s brother, argued that human corruptibility and incompetence make governmental control of industry impracticable, and that the best economy is a laissez-faire system that relies on the natural impulses of men. The rich, stung by the high taxation of their fortunes and the monopoly of commerce by the government, poured out their resources in a campaign to discredit the new system, to obstruct its enforcement, and to bring it to an end. This movement, well organized, exerted constant pressure upon the Emperor. When another period of drought and flood was capped by the appearance of a terrifying comet, the Son of Heaven dismissed Wang An-shih, revoked his decrees, and called the opposition to power. 49

是什么破坏了这个实验?首先,向所有人征收高额税款,以资助不断膨胀的政府雇员队伍。第二,每个家庭都要征召一名男性,以便为野蛮人的入侵提供必要的军队。第三,官僚机构的腐败;像其他国家一样,中国面临着私人掠夺和公共贪污之间的选择。以王安石的弟弟为首的保守派认为,人类的腐败和无能使政府对工业的控制不可行,最好的经济是一个依靠人的自然冲动的 自由放任 制度。富人被政府对他们财富的高额征税和对商业的垄断所刺痛,在一场运动中倾注了他们的资源,以诋毁新制度,阻挠其实施,并使其结束。这场运动组织严密,对皇帝施加了持续的压力。当另一个干旱和洪水时期被一颗可怕的彗星的出现所覆盖时,天子解除了王安石的职务,废除了他的法令,并召集反对派掌权。 49

The longest-lasting regime of socialism yet known to history was set up by the Incas in what we now call Peru, at some time in the thirteenth century. Basing their power largely on popular belief that the earthly sovereign was the delegate of the Sun God, the Incas organized and directed all agriculture, labor, and trade. A governmental census kept account of materials, individuals, and income; professional “runners,” using a remarkable system of roads, maintained the network of communication indispensable to such detailed rule over so large a territory. Every person was an employee of the state, and seems to have accepted this condition cheerfully as a promise of security and food. This system endured till the conquest of Peru by Pizarro in 1533.

历史上已知的持续时间最长的社会主义政权是由印加人在我们现在称为秘鲁的地方建立的,时间在13世纪的某个时候。印加人的权力主要建立在民众的信仰上,即人间的君主是太阳神的代表,他们组织 ,指导所有的农业、劳动和贸易。政府的人口普查记录了材料、个人和收入情况;专业的 "跑腿 "人员利用出色的道路系统,维持着对如此大的领土进行如此详细的统治所不可或缺的通信网络。每个人都是国家的雇员,而且似乎都愉快地接受了这一条件,作为安全和食物的保证。这种制度一直持续到1533年皮萨罗征服秘鲁。

On the opposite slope of South America, in a Portuguese colony along the Uruguay River, 150 Jesuits organized 200,000 Indians into another socialistic society (c. 1620–1750). The ruling priests managed nearly all agriculture, commerce, and industry. They allowed each youth to choose among the trades they taught, but they required every able-bodied person to work eight hours a day. They provided for recreation, arranged sports, dances, and choral performances of a thousand voices, and trained orchestras that played European music. They served also as teachers, physicians, and judges, and devised a penal code that excluded capital punishment. By all accounts the natives were docile and content, and when the community was attacked it defended itself with an ardor and ability that surprised the assailants. In 1750 Portugal ceded to Spain territory including seven of the Jesuit settlements. A rumor having spread that the lands of these colonies contained gold, the Spanish in America insisted on immediate occupation; the Portuguese government under Pombal (then at odds with the Jesuits) ordered the priests and the natives to leave the settlements; and after some resistance by the Indians the experiment came to an end. 50

在南美洲的另一个山坡上,在乌拉圭河沿岸的葡萄牙殖民地,150名耶稣会士将20万印第安人组织到另一个社会主义社会(约1620-1750)。执政的牧师们管理着几乎所有的农业、商业和工业。他们允许每个年轻人在他们教授的行业中进行选择,但他们要求每个身体健康的人每天工作8小时。他们提供娱乐活动,安排运动、舞蹈和千人合唱表演,并训练演奏欧洲音乐的管弦乐队。他们还担任教师、医生和法官,并制定了一部排除死刑的刑法典。从各方面来看,当地人都很温顺和满足,当社区受到攻击时,他们以热情和能力进行自卫,让攻击者感到惊讶。1750年,葡萄牙将包括七个耶稣会定居点在内的领土割让给西班牙。有谣言说这些殖民地的土地上有黄金,在美洲的西班牙人坚持要立即占领;庞巴尔领导的葡萄牙政府(当时与耶稣会有矛盾)命令牧师和当地人离开定居点;在印第安人进行了一些抵抗后,试验结束了。 50

In the social revolt that accompanied the Protestant Reformation in Germany, communistic slogans based on the Bible were advanced by several rebel leaders. Thomas Münzer, a preacher, called upon the people to overthrow the princes, the clergy, and the capitalists, and to establish a “refined society” in which all things were to be in common. 51 He recruited an army of peasants, inspired them with accounts of communism among the Apostles, and led them to battle. They were defeated, five thousand of them were slain, Münzer was beheaded (1525). Hans Hut, accepting Münzer’s teachings, organized at Austerlitz an Anabaptist community that practiced communism for almost a century (c. 1530–1622). John of Leiden led a group of Anabaptists in capturing control of Münster, the capital of Westphalia; there, for fourteen months, they maintained a communistic regime (1534–35). 52

在伴随着德国新教改革的社会反动中,一些反叛领袖提出了基于《圣经》的共产主义口号。传教士托马斯-明泽(Thomas Münzer)呼吁 ,推翻王公贵族、神职人员和资本家,建立一个 "精致的社会",让所有东西都是共同的。 51 他招募了一支农民军队,用使徒中的共产主义故事激励他们,并带领他们战斗。他们被打败了,其中五千人被杀,明泽被斩首(1525)。汉斯-胡特接受了明泽的教义,在奥斯特利茨组织了一个再洗礼派团体,实行了近一个世纪的共产主义(约1530-1622)。莱顿的约翰带领一群再洗礼派成员夺取了威斯特伐利亚首府明斯特的控制权;在那里,他们维持了十四个月的共产主义政权(1534-35)。 52

In the seventeenth century a group of “Levellers” in Cromwell’s army begged him in vain to establish a communistic utopia in England. The socialist agitation subsided during the Restoration, but it rose again when the Industrial Revolution revealed the greed and brutality of early capitalism—child labor, woman labor, long hours, low wages, and disease-breeding factories and slums. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels gave the movement its Magna Carta in the Communist Manifesto of 1847, and its Bible in Das Kapital (1867–95). They expected that socialism would be effected first in England, because industry was there most developed and had reached a stage of centralized management that seemed to invite appropriation by the government. They did not live long enough to be surprised by the outbreak of Communism in Russia.

十七世纪,克伦威尔军队中的一群 "解放者 "徒劳地乞求他在英国建立一个共产主义的乌托邦。社会主义运动在复辟时期有所消退,但当工业革命揭示了早期资本主义的贪婪和残暴--童工、女工、长工时、低工资以及滋生疾病的工厂和贫民窟时,社会主义运动再次崛起。卡尔-马克思和弗里德里希-恩格斯在1847年的《 共产党宣言》 中给了这场运动大宪章,并在 《资本论 》(1867-95)中给了它的圣经。他们预计社会主义将首先在英国实现,因为那里的工业最发达,而且已经达到了集中管理的阶段,似乎可以由政府拨款。他们活得不够久,所以对共产主义在俄国的爆发感到惊讶。

Why did modern socialism come first in a Russia where capitalism was in its infancy and there were no large corporations to ease the transition to state control? Centuries of peasant poverty and reams of intellectual revolt had prepared the way, but the peasants had been freed from serfdom in 1861, and the intellectuals had been inclined toward an anarchism antipodal to an all-absorbing state. Probably the Russian Revolution of 1917 succeeded because the Czarist government had been defeated and disgraced by war and bad management; the Russian economy had collapsed in chaos, the peasants returned from the front carrying arms, and Lenin and Trotsky had been given safe conduct and bon voyage by the German government. The Revolution took a Communistic form because the new state was challenged by internal disorder and external attack; the people reacted as any nation will react under siege—it put aside all individual freedom until order and security could be restored. Here too Communism was a war economy. Perhaps it survives through continued fear of war; given a generation of peace it would presumably be eroded by the nature of man.

为什么现代社会主义首先出现在资本主义处于萌芽状态的俄罗斯,而且没有大型企业来缓解向国家控制的过渡?几个世纪的农民贫困和大量的知识分子的反抗已经准备好了,但是农民在1861年已经从农奴制中解放出来,而知识分子已经倾向于无政府主义,反对一个全盘吸收的国家。 1917年的俄国革命之所以成功,可能是因为沙皇政府被战争和糟糕的管理打败并蒙羞;俄国经济在混乱中崩溃,农民从前线回来时携带了武器,列宁和托洛茨基得到了德国政府的安全指引和顺利航行。革命采取了共产主义的形式,因为新的国家受到了内部混乱和外部攻击的挑战;人民的反应就像任何国家在被围困时的反应一样--在秩序和安全得以恢复之前,他们把所有的个人自由放在一边。在这里,共产主义也是一种战争经济。也许它是通过对战争的持续恐惧而生存的;如果有一代人的和平,它大概会被人类的本性所侵蚀。

Socialism in Russia is now restoring individualistic motives to give its system greater productive stimulus, and to allow its people more physical and intellectual liberty. Meanwhile capitalism undergoes a correlative process of limiting individualistic acquisition by semi-socialistic legislation and the redistribution of wealth through the “welfare state.” Marx was an unfaithful disciple of Hegel: he interpreted the Hegelian dialectic as implying that the struggle between capitalism and socialism would end in the complete victory of socialism; but if the Hegelian formula of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is applied to the Industrial Revolution as thesis, and to capitalism versus socialism as antithesis, the third condition would be a synthesis of capitalism and socialism; and to this reconciliation the Western world visibly moves. Year by year the role of Western governments in the economy rises, the share of the private sector declines. Capitalism retains the stimulus of private property, free enterprise, and competition, and produces a rich supply of goods; high taxation, falling heavily upon the upper classes, enables the government to provide for a self-limited population unprecedented services in education, health, and recreation. The fear of capitalism has compelled socialism to widen freedom, and the fear of socialism has compelled capitalism to increase equality. East is West and West is East, and soon the twain will meet.

俄罗斯的社会主义现在正在恢复个人主义动机,以使其系统具有更大的生产刺激性,并允许其人民享有更多的身体和智力自由。同时,资本主义经历了一个相关的过程,即通过半社会主义立法和通过 "福利国家 "重新分配财富来限制个人主义的获得。马克思是黑格尔的一个不忠实的弟子:他把黑格尔的辩证法解释为意味着资本主义和社会主义之间的斗争将以社会主义的完全胜利而告终;但如果把黑格尔的论题、反题和综合的公式应用于工业革命作为论题,把资本主义与社会主义作为反题,第三个条件将是资本主义和社会主义的综合;而西方世界明显地走向了这种和解。西方国家政府在经济中的作用逐年上升,私营部门的份额下降。资本主义保留了私有财产、自由企业和竞争的刺激,并产生了丰富的商品供应;大量落在上层阶级身上的高税收,使政府能够为自我限制的人口提供前所未有的教育、 健康和娱乐方面的服务。对资本主义的恐惧迫使社会主义扩大自由,对社会主义的恐惧又迫使资本主义增加平等。东方就是西方,西方就是东方,不久之后,二者就会相遇。

X. Government and History


Alexander Pope thought that only a fool would dispute over forms of government. History has a good word to say for all of them, and for government in general. Since men love freedom, and the freedom of individuals in society requires some regulation of conduct, the first condition of freedom is its limitation; make it absolute and it dies in chaos. So the prime task of government is to establish order; organized central force is the sole alternative to incalculable and disruptive force in private hands. Power naturally converges to a center, for it is ineffective when divided, diluted, and spread, as in Poland under the liberum veto; hence, the centralization of power in the monarchy by Richelieu or Bismarck, over the protest of feudal barons, has been praised by historians. A similar process has centered power in the federal government in the United States; it was of no use to talk of “states’ rights” when the economy was ignoring state boundaries and could be regulated only by some central authority. Today international government is developing as industry, commerce, and finance override frontiers and take international forms.

亚历山大-波普认为,只有傻瓜才会为政府的形式而争论。历史对所有这些形式,以及对一般的政府都有一个很好的评价。由于人们热爱自由,而社会中个人的自由需要某种行为规范,所以自由的首要条件是对它的限制;将它绝对化,它就会在混乱中死去。因此,政府的首要任务是建立秩序;有组织的中央力量是替代私人手中不可估量的破坏性力量的唯一选择。权力自然会汇聚到一个中心,因为当它被分割、稀释和扩散时,就像在波兰的 自由否决权 下一样,它是无效的 ; 因此,黎塞留或俾斯麦不顾封建男爵的抗议,将权力集中在君主制中,受到了历史学家的赞扬。在美国,一个类似的过程将权力集中在联邦政府;当经济无视州界,只能由某个中央机构来监管时,谈论 "州权 "是没有用的。今天,随着工业、商业和金融超越国界并采取国际形式,国际政府正在发展。

Monarchy seems to be the most natural kind of government, since it applies to the group the authority of the father in a family or of the chieftain in a warrior band. If we were to judge forms of government from their prevalence and duration in history we should have to give the palm to monarchy; democracies, by contrast, have been hectic interludes.

君主制似乎是最自然的一种政府,因为它将家庭中父亲的权威或战士队伍中酋长的权威适用于群体, 。如果我们要根据政府在历史上的普遍性和持续时间来判断政府的形式,我们应该把掌声送给君主制;相比之下,民主制只是匆匆的插曲。

After the breakdown of Roman democracy in the class wars of the Gracchi, Marius, and Caesar, Augustus organized, under what in effect was monarchical rule, the greatest achievement in the history of statesmanship—that Pax Romana which maintained peace from 30 B.C. to A.D. 180 throughout an empire ranging from the Atlantic to the Euphrates and from Scotland to the Black Sea. After him monarchy disgraced itself under Caligula, Nero, and Domitian; but after them came Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius—“the finest succession of good and great sovereigns,” Renan called them, “that the world has ever had.” 53 “If,” said Gibbon, “a man were called upon to fix the period during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would without hesitation name that which elapsed from the accession of Nerva to the death of Marcus Aurelius. Their united reigns are possibly the only period of history in which the happiness of a great people was the sole object of government.” 54 In that brilliant age, when Rome’s subjects complimented themselves on being under her rule, monarchy was adoptive: the emperor transmitted his authority not to his offspring but to the ablest man he could find; he adopted this man as his son, trained him in the functions of government, and gradually surrendered to him the reins of power. The system worked well, partly because neither Trajan nor Hadrian had a son, and the sons of Antoninus Pius died in childhood. Marcus Aurelius had a son, Commodus, who succeeded him because the philosopher failed to name another heir; soon chaos was king. *

在格拉基、马略和凯撒的阶级斗争中,罗马民主制度崩溃后,奥古斯都在实际上是君主制的统治下,组织了政治家历史上最伟大的成就--从 公元前 30年到 公元 180年,在从大西洋到幼发拉底河、从苏格兰到黑海的整个帝国内维持和平。在他之后,君主制在卡里古拉、尼禄和多米蒂安的统治下蒙羞;但在他们之后,出现了涅瓦、特拉扬、哈德良、安东尼-皮乌斯和马库斯-奥勒留--"雷南称他们是世界上有史以来最好的一连串优秀而伟大的君主"。 53 "吉本说:"如果要求一个人确定人类最幸福和最繁荣的时期,他会毫不犹豫地说出从涅尔瓦登基到马库斯-奥勒留去世这段时间。他们的联合统治可能是历史上唯一一个将一个伟大民族的幸福作为政府唯一目标的时期"。 54 在那个辉煌的时代,当罗马的臣民称赞自己在她的统治之下时,君主制是收养性的:皇帝不是把他的权力传给他的后代,而是传给他能找到的最有能力的人;他把这个人当作他的儿子,训练他的政府职能,并逐渐把权力交到他的手里。这个制度运作良好,部分原因是特拉扬和哈德良都没有儿子,而安东尼-皮乌斯的儿子们在童年时就死了。马库斯-奥勒留有一个儿子康莫德斯,他继承了他的职位,因为这位哲学家没有指定另一个继承人;很快就出现了混乱的国王。 *

All in all, monarchy has had a middling record. Its wars of succession brought mankind as much evil as the continuity or “legitimacy” of the monarchy brought good. When it is hereditary it is likely to be more prolific of stupidity, nepotism, irresponsibility, and extravagance than of nobility or statesmanship. Louis XIV has often been taken as the paragon of modern monarchs, but the people of France rejoiced at his death. The complexity of contemporary states seems to break down any single mind that tries to master it.

总而言之,君主制的记录不尽如人意。它的继承战争给人类带来的罪恶和君主制的连续性或 "合法性 "带来的好处一样多。当它是世袭的时候,它很可能更多的是愚蠢、裙带关系、不负责任和挥霍无度,而不是贵族和政治家的素质。路易十四经常被当作现代君主的典范,但法国人民在他去世时却欢欣鼓舞。当代国家的复杂性似乎会击垮任何试图掌握它的单一思维。

Hence most governments have been oligarchies—ruled by a minority, chosen either by birth, as in aristocracies, or by a religious organization, as in theocracies, or by wealth, as in democracies. It is unnatural (as even Rousseau saw) for a majority to rule, for a majority can seldom be organized for united and specific action, and a minority can. If the majority of abilities is contained in a minority of men, minority government is as inevitable as the concentration of wealth; the majority can do no more than periodically throw out one minority and set up another. The aristocrat holds that political selection by birth is the sanest alternative to selection by money or theology or violence. Aristocracy withdraws a few men from the exhausting and coarsening strife of economic competition, and trains them from birth, through example, surroundings, and minor office, for the tasks of government; these tasks require a special preparation that no ordinary family or background can provide. Aristocracy is not only a nursery of statesmanship, it is also a repository and vehicle of culture, manners, standards, and tastes, and serves thereby as a stabilizing barrier to social fads, artistic crazes, or neurotically rapid changes in the moral code. See what has happened to morals, manners, style, and art since the French Revolution.


Aristocracies have inspired, supported, and controlled art, but they have rarely produced it. The aristocrat looks upon artists as manual laborers; he prefers the art of life to the life of art, and would never think of reducing himself to the consuming toil that is usually the price of genius. He does not often produce literature, for he thinks of writing for publication as exhibitionism and salesmanship. The result has been, in modern aristocracies, a careless and dilettante hedonism, a lifelong holiday in which the privileges of place were enjoyed to the full, and the responsibilities were often ignored. Hence the decay of some aristocracies. Only three generations intervened between “L’état c’est moi” and “Après moi le déluge.”

贵族制度曾激励、支持和控制过艺术,但他们很少产生艺术。贵族把艺术家看成是 体力劳动者;他更喜欢生活中的艺术,而不是艺术中的生活,也不会想到把自己降低到通常是天才的代价的消耗性劳作。他不经常创作文学作品,因为他认为为出版而写作是炫耀主义和推销术。其结果是,在现代贵族制度中,出现了一种漫不经心的享乐主义,一种终生的假期,在这种假期中,地位的特权得到了充分的享受,而责任却常常被忽视。因此,一些贵族制度已经衰败。在 "L'état c'est moi " 和 "Après moi le déluge " 之间只间隔了三代人。

So the services of aristocracy did not save it when it monopolized privilege and power too narrowly, when it oppressed the people with selfish and myopic exploitation, when it retarded the growth of the nation by a blind addiction to ancestral ways, when it consumed the men and resources of the state in the lordly sport of dynastic or territorial wars. Then the excluded banded together in wild revolt; the new rich combined with the poor against obstruction and stagnation; the guillotine cut off a thousand noble heads; and democracy took its turn in the misgovernment of mankind.


Does history justify revolutions? This is an old debate, well illustrated by Luther’s bold break from the Catholic Church versus Erasmus’ plea for patient and orderly reform, or by Charles James Fox’s stand for the French Revolution versus Edmund Burke’s defense of “prescription” and continuity. In some cases outworn and inflexible institutions seem to require violent overthrow, as in Russia in 1917. But in most instances the effects achieved by the revolution would apparently have come without it through the gradual compulsion of economic developments. America would have become the dominant factor in the English-speaking world without any revolution. The French Revolution replaced the landowning aristocracy with the money-controlling business class as the ruling power; but a similar result occurred in nineteenth-century England without bloodshed, and without disturbing the public peace. To break sharply with the past is to court the madness that may follow the shock of sudden blows or mutilations. As the sanity of the individual lies in the continuity of his memories, so the sanity of a group lies in the continuity of its traditions; in either case a break in the chain invites a neurotic reaction, as in the Paris massacres of September, 1792. *

历史是否证明了革命的合理性?这是一个古老的争论,路德与天主教会的大胆决裂与伊拉斯谟对耐心和有序改革的恳求,或者查尔斯-詹姆斯-福克斯对法国大革命的立场与埃德蒙-伯克对 "处方 "和连续性的辩护,都很好地说明了这一点。在某些情况下,陈旧和僵化的机构似乎需要暴力推翻,如1917年的俄罗斯。但在大多数情况下,如果没有革命,通过经济发展的逐步推动,革命所取得的效果显然就会出现。如果没有任何革命,美国就会成为英语世界的主导因素。法国大革命用控制金钱的商业阶层取代了地主贵族,成为统治者;但类似的 ,在19世纪的英国发生了,没有流血,也没有扰乱公共秩序。与过去急剧决裂是为了寻求疯狂,这种疯狂可能是在突然的打击或残害之后发生的。正如个人的理智在于其记忆的连续性,一个群体的理智也在于其传统的连续性;在任何一种情况下,链条的断裂都会招致神经质的反应,如1792年9月的巴黎大屠杀。 *

Since wealth is an order and procedure of production and exchange rather than an accumulation of (mostly perishable) goods, and is a trust (the “credit system”) in men and institutions rather than in the intrinsic value of paper money or checks, violent revolutions do not so much redistribute wealth as destroy it. There may be a redivision of the land, but the natural inequality of men soon re-creates an inequality of possessions and privileges, and raises to power a new minority with essentially the same instincts as in the old. The only real revolution is in the enlightenment of the mind and the improvement of character, the only real emancipation is individual, and the only real revolutionists are philosophers and saints.


In strict usage of the term, democracy has existed only in modern times, for the most part since the French Revolution. As male adult suffrage in the United States it began under Andrew Jackson; as adult suffrage it began in our youth. In ancient Attica, out of a total population of 315,000 souls, 115,000 were slaves, and only 43,000 were citizens with the right to vote. 55 Women, nearly all working-men, nearly all shopkeepers and tradesmen, and all resident aliens were excluded from the franchise. The citizen minority was divided into two factions: the oligarchic—chiefly the landed aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie; and the democratic—small landowners and small businessmen, and citizens who had lapsed into wage labor but still retained the franchise. During the ascendancy of Pericles (460–430 B.C. ) the aristocracy prevailed, and Athens had her supreme age in literature, drama, and art. After his death, and the disgrace of the aristocracy through the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C. ), the demos, or lower class of citizens, rose to power, much to the disgust of Socrates and Plato. From Solon to the Roman conquest of Greece (146 B.C. ) the conflict of oligarchs and democrats was waged with books, plays, orations, votes, ostracism, assassination, and civil war. At Gorcyra (now Corfu), in 427 B.C. , the ruling oligarchy assassinated sixty leaders of the popular party; the democrats overturned the oligarchs, tried fifty of them before a kind of Committee of Public Safety, executed all fifty, and starved hundreds of aristocratic prisoners to death. Thucydides’ description reminds us of Paris in 1792–93.

从这个词的严格用法来看,民主只存在于现代,大部分是在法国大革命后。在美国,作为男性成年人的选举权,它开始于安德鲁-杰克逊时期;作为成年人的选举权,它开始于我们的青年时期。在古代阿提卡,在315,000人的总人口中,115,000人是奴隶,只有43,000人是有选举权的公民。 55 妇女、几乎所有的工人、几乎所有的店主和商人,以及所有的居民外国人都被排除在选举权之外。少数公民分为两派:寡头派--主要是土地贵族和上层资产阶级;民主派--小地主和 小商人,以及已经沦为雇佣劳动但仍保留选举权的公民。在伯里克利执政期间( 公元前 460-430年),贵族阶层占了上风,雅典在文学、戏剧和艺术方面迎来了她最辉煌的时代。他死后,雅典在伯罗奔尼撒战争( 公元前 431-404年)中战败,贵族阶层蒙羞, Demos, 即下层公民崛起,令苏格拉底和柏拉图非常反感。从索伦到罗马征服希腊( 公元前 146年),寡头和民主派的冲突通过书籍、戏剧、演说、投票、排斥、暗杀和内战来进行。 公元前 427年,在戈尔西拉(现在的科孚岛),执政的寡头集团暗杀了60名人民党的领导人;民主派推翻了寡头集团,在一种公共安全委员会面前审判了其中的50人,处决了所有50人,并将数百名贵族囚犯饿死。修昔底德的描述让我们想起了1792-93年的巴黎。

During seven days the Corcyreans were engaged in butchering those of their fellow citizens whom they regarded as their enemies…. Death raged in every shape, and, as usually happens at such times, there was no length to which violence did not go; sons were killed by their fathers, and suppliants were dragged from the altar or slain on it…. Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places where it arrived last, from having heard what had been done before, carried to a still greater excess the… atrocity of their reprisals…. Corcyra gave the first example of these crimes,… of the revenge exacted by the governed (who had never experienced equitable treatment, or, indeed, aught but violence, from their rulers) and… of the savage and pitiless excesses into which men were hurried by their passions…. Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two [warring groups]…. The whole Hellenic world was convulsed. 56

在七天的时间里,科西雷人一直在屠杀那些被他们视为敌人的同胞....。死亡以各种形式肆虐,而且,正如在这种时候通常发生的那样,没有什么暴力是不会发生的;儿子被他们的父亲杀死,支持者被从祭坛上拖下来或在祭坛上被杀死....。革命就这样从一个城市发展到另一个城市,而最后到达的地方,由于听说了以前所做的事情,其报复的......暴行变得更加严重....。科西拉是这些罪行的第一个例子,......被统治者的报复(他们从未经历过公平的待遇,或者说,除了暴力,他们的统治者没有任何东西),以及......人们被他们的激情所驱使的野蛮和无情的过度行为....。与此同时,公民中的温和派在两个[交战团体]之间丧生....整个希腊世界都被惊动了。 56

In his Republic Plato made his mouthpiece, Socrates, condemn the triumphant democracy of Athens as a chaos of class violence, cultural decadence, and moral degeneration. The democrats

在他的 《共和国》 中,柏拉图让他的喉舌苏格拉底谴责雅典胜利的民主制度是阶级暴力、文化堕落和道德败坏的混乱局面。民主党人

contemptuously rejected temperance as unmanliness…. Insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage…. The father gets accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a level with his father, having no shame or fear of his parents…. The teacher fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors…. The old do not like to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they imitate the young…. Nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other…. The citizens chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length… they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten…. And this is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs dictatorship [ tyrannis ]…. The excessive increase of anything causes a reaction in the opposite direction;… dictatorship naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty. 57

轻蔑地拒绝节制,认为它是不礼貌的行为....他们把无礼称为教养,把无政府称为自由,把浪费称为华丽,把无礼称为勇气....。父亲习惯于降到儿子的水平,害怕他们,而儿子则与父亲平起平坐,对父母毫无羞耻和恐惧....。老师惧怕和奉承他的学生,而学生则鄙视他们的主人和导师....。老人不喜欢被认为是呆板和权威,因此他们模仿年轻人....。我也不能忘记讲述两性之间的自由和平等....。公民们对最起码的权威感到不耐烦,最后......他们甚至不再关心成文或不成文的法律了....这就是独裁 [暴政 ]产生的公平和光荣的开端 ....任何事物的过度增长都会引起相反方向的反应;......独裁自然产生于民主,最严重的暴政和奴隶制产生于最极端的自由形式。 57

By the time of Plato’s death (347 B.C. ) his hostile analysis of Athenian democracy was approaching apparent confirmation by history. Athens recovered wealth, but this was now commercial rather than landed wealth; industrialists, merchants, and bankers were at the top of the reshuffled heap. The change produced a feverish struggle for money, a pleonexia, as the Greeks called it—an appetite for more and more. The nouveaux riches ( neoplutoi ) built gaudy mansions, bedecked their women with costly robes and jewelry, spoiled them with dozens of servants, rivaled one another in the feasts with which they regaled their guests. The gap between the rich and the poor widened; Athens was divided, as Plato put it, into “two cities:… one the city of the poor, the other of the rich, the one at war with the other.” 58 The poor schemed to despoil the rich by legislation, taxation, and revolution; the rich organized themselves for protection against the poor. The members of some oligarchic organizations, says Aristotle, took a solemn oath: “I will be an adversary of the people” (i.e., the commonalty), “and in the Council I will do it all the evil that I can.” 59 “The rich have become so unsocial,” wrote Isocrates about 366 B.C. , “that those who own property had rather throw their possessions into the sea than lend aid to the needy, while those who are in poorer circumstances would less gladly find a treasure than seize the possessions of the rich.” 60 The poorer citizens captured control of the Assembly, and began to vote the money of the rich into the coffers of the state, for redistribution among the people through governmental enterprises and subsidies. The politicians strained their ingenuity to discover new sources of public revenue. In some cities the decentralizing of wealth was more direct: the debtors in Mytilene massacred their creditors en masse; the democrats of Argos fell upon the rich, killed hundreds of them, and confiscated their property. The moneyed families of otherwise hostile Greek states leagued themselves secretly for mutual aid against popular revolts. The middle classes, as well as the rich, began to distrust democracy as empowered envy, and the poor distrusted it as a sham equality of votes nullified by a gaping inequality of wealth. The rising bitterness of the class war left Greece internally as well as internationally divided when Philip of Macedon pounced down upon it in 338 B.C. , and many rich Greeks welcomed his coming as preferable to revolution. Athenian democracy disappeared under Macedonian dictatorship. 61

到柏拉图去世时( 公元前 347年),他对雅典民主的敌意分析已接近历史的确认。雅典恢复了财富,但现在是商业财富而不是土地财富;工业家、商人和银行家处于重新洗牌的顶端。这种变化产生了对金钱的狂热争夺,希腊人称之为 pleonexia --对越来越多的欲望。 新贵 们 (neoplutoi )建造了华丽的豪宅,用昂贵的长袍和珠宝来装饰他们的女人,用几十个仆人来宠爱他们,在招待客人的宴会上相互竞争。穷人和富人之间的差距越来越大;正如柏拉图所说,雅典被分为 "两个城市:......一个是穷人的城市,另一个是富人的城市,一个在与另一个交战。" 58 穷人谋划着通过立法、征税和革命来掠夺富人;富人则组织起来保护自己,对抗穷人。亚里士多德说,一些寡头组织的成员发出了庄严的誓言。"我将成为人民( )的对手"(即平民),"在议会中,我将尽我所能为它作恶。" 59 "富人已经变得如此不合群,"伊索克拉底大约在 公元前 366年写道,"那些拥有财产的人宁愿把他们的财产扔进大海,也不愿意向有需要的人提供援助,而那些处境较差的人更不愿意找到一个宝藏,而不愿意夺取富人的财产。" 60 较穷的公民夺取了议会的控制权,并开始将富人的钱投进国库,通过政府企业和补贴在人民中重新分配。政治家们竭力发挥他们的聪明才智,发现新的公共收入来源。在一些城市,财富的分散化更为直接:米蒂利尼的债务人集体屠杀了他们的债权人;阿尔戈斯的民主党人扑向富人,杀死了数百人,并没收了他们的财产。其他敌对的希腊国家的有钱人家族秘密地联合起来,相互帮助,共同对抗民众的反抗。中产阶级和富人开始不信任民主,认为它是嫉妒的产物,而穷人则不信任它,认为它是一个被巨大的财富不平等所掩盖的虚假的投票平等。 公元前 338年,当马其顿的菲利普扑向希腊时,阶级斗争的激烈程度使希腊在内部和国际上都出现了分裂,许多富有的希腊人欢迎他的到来,认为这比革命要好。雅典的民主在马其顿的独裁统治下消失了。 61

Plato’s reduction of political evolution to a sequence of monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and dictatorship found another illustration in the history of Rome. During the third and second centuries before Christ a Roman oligarchy organized a foreign policy and a disciplined army, and conquered and exploited the Mediterranean world. The wealth so won was absorbed by the patricians, and the commerce so developed raised to luxurious opulence the upper middle class. Conquered Greeks, Orientals, and Africans were brought to Italy to serve as slaves on the latifundia; the native farmers, displaced from the soil, joined the restless, breeding proletariat in the cities, to enjoy the monthly dole of grain that Caius Gracchus had secured for the poor in 12 3 B.C. Generals and proconsuls returned from the provinces loaded with spoils for themselves and the ruling class; millionaires multiplied; mobile money replaced land as the source or instrument of political power; rival factions competed in the wholesale purchase of candidates and votes; in 53 B.C. one group of voters received ten million sesterces for its support. 62 When money failed, murder was available: citizens who had voted the wrong way were in some instances beaten close to death and their houses were set on fire. Antiquity had never known so rich, so powerful, and so corrupt a government. 63 The aristocrats engaged Pompey to maintain their ascendancy; the commoners cast in their lot with Caesar; ordeal of battle replaced the auctioning of victory; Caesar won, and established a popular dictatorship. Aristocrats killed him, but ended by accepting the dictatorship of his grandnephew and stepson Augustus (27 B.C. ). Democracy ended, monarchy was restored; the Platonic wheel had come full turn.

柏拉图将政治演变简化为君主制、贵族制、民主制和独裁制的顺序,在罗马的历史上找到了另一种说明。在公元前三世纪和二世纪,罗马的寡头政治组织了一个外交政策和一支纪律严明的军队,并征服和开发了地中海世界。赢得的财富被贵族们吸收,如此发展的商业使中上层阶级达到了奢华的境界。 被征服的希腊人、东方人和非洲人被带到意大利,作为奴隶服役 ; 被赶出土地的本地农民加入了城市中不安分的、正在繁殖的无产阶级,享受凯厄斯-格拉丘斯在 公元前 123年为穷人争取的每月粮食救济。将军和执政官从各省满载而归,为他们自己和统治阶级带来了战利品;百万富翁成倍增加;流动资金取代土地成为政治权力的来源或工具;敌对派别竞相大肆购买候选人和选票; 公元前 53年,一个选民团体因其支持而获得1000万塞斯特尔。 62 当钱不够用时,可以利用谋杀:投错票的公民在某些情况下会被殴打至死,他们的房子被放火烧掉。古代从未见过如此富有、如此强大、如此腐败的政府。 63 贵族们与庞培合作,以维持他们的地位;平民们则投向凯撒;战斗的考验取代了胜利的拍卖;凯撒赢了,并建立了一个民众独裁政权。贵族们杀了他,但最后接受了他的孙子和继子奥古斯都的独裁统治( 公元前 27年)。民主制结束了,君主制恢复了;柏拉图式的车轮转了一圈。

We may infer, from these classic examples, that ancient democracy, corroded with slavery, venality, and war, did not deserve the name, and offers no fair test of popular government. In America democracy had a wider base. It began with the advantage of a British heritage: Anglo-Saxon law, which, from Magna Carta onward, had defended the citizens against the state; and Protestantism, which had opened the way to religious and mental liberty. The American Revolution was not only a revolt of colonials against a distant government; it was also an uprising of a native middle class against an imported aristocracy. The rebellion was eased and quickened by an abundance of free land and a minimum of legislation. Men who owned the soil they tilled, and (within the limits of nature) controlled the conditions under which they lived, had an economic footing for political freedom; their personality and character were rooted in the earth. It was such men who made Jefferson president—Jefferson who was as skeptical as Voltaire and as revolutionary as Rousseau. A government that governed least was admirably suited to liberate those individualistic energies that transformed America from a wilderness to a material utopia, and from the child and ward to the rival and guardian of Western Europe. And while rural isolation enhanced the freedom of the individual, national isolation provided liberty and security within protective seas. These and a hundred other conditions gave to America a democracy more basic and universal than history had ever seen.

我们可以从这些经典的例子中推断出,被奴隶制、腐败和战争腐蚀的古代民主不配拥有这个名字,也没有对民众政府提供公平的测试。在美国,民主有一个更广泛的基础。它以英国遗产的优势开始。盎格鲁-撒克逊人的法律,从《大宪章》开始,就保护公民不受国家的侵害;新教,为宗教和精神自由开辟了道路。美国革命不仅是殖民者对一个遥远政府的反抗;也是本土中产阶级对外来贵族的起义。大量的自由土地和最低限度的立法缓解和加快了叛乱。那些 ,拥有他们所耕种的土地,并(在自然界的范围内)控制他们生活的条件的人,有了政治自由的经济基础;他们的个性和性格都扎根于土地。正是这样的人使杰斐逊成为总统--杰斐逊像伏尔泰一样持怀疑态度,像卢梭一样具有革命性。一个管理最少的政府非常适合解放那些个人主义的能量,这些能量将美国从荒野变成了物质乌托邦,从孩子和被监护人变成了西欧的对手和监护人。农村的孤立增强了个人的自由,而国家的孤立则在保护性的海洋中提供了自由和安全。这些和其他一百个条件给了美国一个比历史上任何时候都更基本和普遍的民主。

Many of these formative conditions have disappeared. Personal isolation is gone through the growth of cities. Personal independence is gone through the dependence of the worker upon tools and capital that he does not own, and upon conditions that he cannot control. War becomes more consuming, and the individual is helpless to understand its causes or to escape its effects. Free land is gone, though home ownership spreads—with a minimum of land. The once self-employed shopkeeper is in the toils of the big distributor, and may echo Marx’s complaint that everything is in chains. Economic freedom, even in the middle classes, becomes more and more exceptional, making political freedom a consolatory pretense. And all this has come about not (as we thought in our hot youth) through the perversity of the rich, but through the impersonal fatality of economic development, and through the nature of man. Every advance in the complexity of the economy puts an added premium upon superior ability, and intensifies the concentration of wealth, responsibility, and political power.


Democracy is the most difficult of all forms of government, since it requires the widest spread of intelligence, and we forgot to make ourselves intelligent when we made ourselves sovereign. Education has spread, but intelligence is perpetually retarded by the fertility of the simple. A cynic remarked that “you mustn’t enthrone ignorance just because there is so much of it.” However, ignorance is not long enthroned, for it lends itself to manipulation by the forces that mold public opinion. It may be true, as Lincoln supposed, that “you can’t fool all the people all the time,” but you can fool enough of them to rule a large country.

民主是所有政府形式中最困难的,因为 ,它需要最广泛的智力传播,而我们在使自己成为主权国家时忘记了使自己变得聪明。教育已经普及,但智力却永远被简单的多产所阻滞。一个愤世嫉俗的人说:"你不能因为有这么多的无知就封杀它"。然而,无知并没有被长期封存,因为它容易被塑造公众舆论的力量所操纵。正如林肯所说,"你不可能一直愚弄所有的人",但你可以愚弄足够多的人去统治一个大国。

Is democracy responsible for the current debasement of art? The debasement, of course, is not unquestioned; it is a matter of subjective judgment; and those of us who shudder at its excesses—its meaningless blotches of color, its collages of debris, its Babels of cacophony—are doubtless imprisoned in our past and dull to the courage of experiment. The producers of such nonsense are appealing not to the, general public—which scorns them as lunatics, degenerates, or charlatans—but to gullible middle-class purchasers who are hypnotized by auctioneers and are thrilled by the new, however deformed. Democracy is responsible for this collapse only in the sense that it has not been able to develop standards and tastes to replace those with which aristocracies once kept the imagination and individualism of artists within the bounds of intelligible communication, the illumination of life, and the harmony of parts in a logical sequence and a coherent whole. If art now seems to lose itself in bizarreries, this is not only because it is vulgarized by mass suggestion or domination, but also because it has exhausted the possibilities of old schools and forms, and flounders for a time in the search for new patterns and styles, new rules and disciplines.

民主要对当前的艺术贬值负责吗?当然,这种贬低不是毫无疑问的;它是一个主观判断的问题;而我们中那些对其过度行为--其无意义的色彩斑点、其碎片拼贴、其喧嚣的巴贝尔--感到不寒而栗的人,无疑是被禁锢在我们的过去,对实验的勇气感到迟钝。这种无稽之谈的制造者不是在向普通大众呼吁--他们把他们当作疯子、堕落者或骗子来蔑视--而是在向那些被拍卖商催眠、被新事物刺激的轻信的中产阶级购买者呼吁,无论多么畸形的事物。民主对这种崩溃负有责任,因为它没有能力制定标准和品味来取代那些曾经让艺术家的想象力和个人主义保持在可理解的交流范围内的标准和品味,对生活的照亮,以及在一个逻辑顺序和一个连贯的整体中部分的和谐。如果艺术现在似乎在 怪诞 中失去了自我 , 这不仅是因为它被大众的暗示或支配所庸俗化,而且还因为它已经用尽了旧的流派和形式的可能性,并在寻找新的模式和风格、新的规则和纪律时一度陷入困境。

All deductions having been made, democracy has done less harm, and more good, than any other form of government. It gave to human existence a zest and camaraderie that outweighed its pitfalls and defects. It gave to thought and science and enterprise the freedom essential to their operation and growth. It broke down the walls of privilege and class, and in each generation it raised up ability from every rank and place. Under its stimulus Athens and Rome became the most creative cities in history, and America in two centuries has provided abundance for an unprecedentedly large proportion of its population. Democracy has now dedicated itself resolutely to the spread and lengthening of education, and to the maintenance of public health. If equality of educational opportunity can be established, democracy will be real and justified. For this is the vital truth beneath its catchwords: that though men cannot be equal, their access to education and opportunity can be made more nearly equal. The rights of man are not rights to office and power, but the rights of entry into every avenue that may nourish and test a man’s fitness for office and power. A right is not a gift of God or nature but a privilege which it is good for the group that the individual should have.

综上所述,民主比任何其他形式的政府都做得更少,更多的好处。它给人类 ,使其存在的热情和友谊超过了它的陷阱和缺陷。它为思想、科学和企业提供了其运作和发展所必需的自由。它打破了特权和阶级的围墙,在每一代人中,它提高了每个等级和地点的能力。在它的刺激下,雅典和罗马成为历史上最具创造力的城市,而美国在两个世纪内为其人口中前所未有的大部分提供了丰富的资源。现在,民主已经坚定地致力于传播和延长教育,并维护公共健康。如果能够建立教育机会的平等,民主将是真实和合理的。因为这是其口号下的重要真理:虽然人不能平等,但他们获得教育和机会的机会可以更接近平等。人的权利不是获得职位和权力的权利,而是进入可能滋养和检验一个人是否适合担任职位和权力的每条途径的权利。权利不是上帝或自然界的恩赐,而是个人应该拥有的对群体有益的特权。

In England and the United States, in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, in Switzerland and Canada, democracy is today sounder than ever before. It has defended itself with courage and energy against the assaults of foreign dictatorship, and has not yielded to dictatorship at home. But if war continues to absorb and dominate it, or if the itch to rule the world requires a large military establishment and appropriation, the freedoms of democracy may one by one succumb to the discipline of arms and strife. If race or class war divides us into hostile camps, changing political argument into blind hate, one side or the other may overturn the hustings with the rule of the sword. If our economy of freedom fails to distribute wealth as ably as it has created it, the road to dictatorship will be open to any man who can persuasively promise security to all; and a martial government, under whatever charming phrases, will engulf the democratic world.

在英国和美国,在丹麦、挪威和瑞典,在瑞士和加拿大,民主今天比以往任何时候都更加健全。它以勇气和精力抵御外国独裁者的攻击,在国内也没有向独裁者屈服。但是,如果战争继续吸收和支配它,或者如果统治世界的欲望需要大量的军事设施和拨款,民主的自由可能会一个接一个地屈服于武器和争斗的纪律。如果种族或阶级战争把我们分成敌对阵营,把政治争论变成盲目的仇恨,那么一方或另一方可能会用剑的规则来颠覆竞选活动。如果我们的自由经济不能像它所创造的那样有效地分配财富,那么通向独裁的道路就会向任何能够有说服力地向所有人承诺安全的人开放, ;而一个武断的政府,不管用什么迷人的措辞,都会吞噬民主世界。

XI. History and War


War is one of the constants of history, and has not diminished with civilization or democracy. In the last 3,421 years of recorded history only 268 have seen no war. We have acknowledged war as at present the ultimate form of competition and natural selection in the human species. “Polemos pater panton” said Heracleitus; war, or competition, is the father of all things, the potent source of ideas, inventions, institutions, and states. Peace is an unstable equilibrium, which can be preserved only by acknowledged supremacy or equal power.

战争是历史的常态之一,并没有随着文明或民主的发展而减弱。在过去3421年的历史记录中,只有268年没有发生过战争。我们已经承认战争是目前人类竞争和自然选择的最终形式。Heracleitus说: "Polemos pater panton" ;战争,或竞争,是万物之父,是思想、发明、制度和国家的有力来源。和平是一种不稳定的平衡,只有通过公认的至高无上的地位或平等的权力才能保存下来。

The causes of war are the same as the causes of competition among individuals: acquisitiveness, pugnacity, and pride; the desire for food, land, materials, fuels, mastery. The state has our instincts without our restraints. The individual submits to restraints laid upon him by morals and laws, and agrees to replace combat with conference, because the state guarantees him basic protection in his life, property, and legal rights. The state itself acknowledges no substantial restraints, either because it is strong enough to defy any interference with its will or because there is no superstate to offer it basic protection, and no international law or moral code wielding effective force.


In the individual, pride gives added vigor in the competitions of life; in the state, nationalism gives added force in diplomacy and war. When the states of Europe freed themselves from papal overlordship and protection, each state encouraged nationalism as a supplement to its army and navy. If it foresaw conflict with any particular country it fomented, in its people, hatred of that country, and formulated catchwords to bring that hatred to a lethal point; meanwhile it stressed its love of peace.

在个人方面,自豪感为 生活的竞争增添了活力;在国家方面,民族主义为外交和战争增添了力量。当欧洲各国从教皇的统治和保护中解放出来时,每个国家都鼓励民族主义作为其陆军和海军的补充。如果它预见到与任何特定国家的冲突,它就会在其人民中煽动对该国的仇恨,并制定口号使这种仇恨达到致命的地步;同时,它强调其对和平的热爱。

This conscription of the soul to international phobia occurred only in the most elemental conflicts, and was seldom resorted to in Europe between the Religious Wars of the sixteenth century and the Wars of the French Revolution. During that interval the peoples of conflicting states were allowed to respect one another’s achievements and civilization; Englishmen traveled safely in France while France was at war with England; and the French and Frederick the Great continued to admire each other while they fought each other in the Seven Years’ War. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries war was a contest of aristocracies rather than of peoples. In the twentieth century the improvement of communication, transport, weapons, and means of indoctrination made war a struggle of peoples, involving civilians as well as combatants, and winning victory through the wholesale destruction of property and life. One war can now destroy the labor of centuries in building cities, creating art, and developing habits of civilization. In apologetic consolation war now promotes science and technology, whose deadly inventions, if they are not forgotten in universal destitution and barbarism, may later enlarge the material achievements of peace.


In every century the generals and the rulers (with rare exceptions like Ashoka and Augustus) have smiled at the philosophers’ timid dislike of war. In the military interpretation of history war is the final arbiter, and is accepted as natural and necessary by all but cowards and simpletons. What but the victory of Charles Martel at Tours (732) kept France and Spain from becoming Mohammedan? What would have happened to our classic heritage if it had not been protected by arms against Mongol and Tatar invasions? We laugh at generals who die in bed (forgetting that they are more valuable alive than dead), but we build statues to them when they turn back a Hitler or a Genghis Khan. It is pitiful (says the general) that so many young men die in battle, but more of them die in automobile accidents than in war, and many of them riot and rot for lack of discipline; they need an outlet for their combativeness, their adventurousness, their weariness with prosaic routine; if they must die sooner or later why not let them die for their country in the anesthesia of battle and the aura of glory? Even a philosopher, if he knows history, will admit that a long peace may fatally weaken the martial muscles of a nation. In the present inadequacy of international law and sentiment a nation must be ready at any moment to defend itself; and when its essential interests are involved it must be allowed to use any means it considers necessary to its survival. The Ten Commandments must be silent when self-preservation is at stake.

在每一个世纪,将军和统治者(除了阿育王和奥古斯都这样的罕见例外)都对哲学家们对战争的胆怯厌恶报以微笑。在对历史的军事解释中,战争是最终的仲裁者,除了懦夫和傻瓜之外,所有人都认为战争是自然和必要的。除了查理-马特尔在 图尔(732)的胜利外,还有什么能使法国和西班牙不成为穆罕默德的国家?如果我们的经典遗产没有得到武器的保护,不受蒙古人和鞑靼人的入侵,那么我们的经典遗产会发生什么?我们嘲笑那些死在床上的将军(忘记了他们活着比死了更有价值),但当他们击退希特勒或成吉思汗时,我们却为他们建立了雕像。这么多年轻人死在战场上是很可怜的(将军说),但他们中死于车祸的比死于战争的多,他们中的许多人因为缺乏纪律而暴乱和腐烂;他们需要为他们的战斗力、他们的冒险精神、他们对平淡无奇的日常生活的厌倦找到一个出口;如果他们迟早要死,为什么不让他们在战斗的麻醉和荣耀的光环下为他们的国家而死?即使是哲学家,如果他了解历史,也会承认,长期的和平可能会致命地削弱一个国家的军事力量。在目前国际法和情感不足的情况下,一个国家必须随时准备好保卫自己;当它的基本利益受到影响时,必须允许它使用它认为对其生存有必要的任何手段。当自我保护受到威胁时,"十诫 "必须保持沉默。

It is clear (continues the general) that the United States must assume today the task that Great Britain performed so well in the nineteenth century—the protection of Western civilization from external danger. Communist governments, armed with old birth rates and new weapons, have repeatedly proclaimed their resolve to destroy the economy and independence of non-Communist states. Young nations, longing for an Industrial Revolution to give them economic wealth and military power, are impressed by the rapid industrialization of Russia under governmental management; Western capitalism might be more productive in the end, but it seems slower in development; the new governors, eager to control the resources and manhood of their states, are a likely prey to Communist propaganda, infiltration, and subversion. Unless this spreading process is halted it is only a matter of time before nearly all Asia, Africa, and South America will be under Communist leadership, and Australia, New Zealand, North America, and Western Europe will be surrounded by enemies on every side. Imagine the effect of such a condition upon Japan, the Philippines, and India, and upon the powerful Communist Party of Italy; imagine the effect of a Communist victory in Italy upon the Communist movement in France. Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and West Germany would be left at the mercy of an overwhelmingly Communist Continent. Should North America, now at the height of its power, accept such a future as inevitable, withdraw within its frontiers, and let itself be encircled by hostile states controlling its access to materials and markets, and compelling it, like any besieged people, to imitate its enemies and establish governmental dictatorship over every phase of its once free and stimulating life? Should the leaders of America consider only the reluctance of this epicurean generation to face so great an issue, or should they consider also what future generations of Americans would wish that these leaders had done? Is it not wiser to resist at once, to carry the war to the enemy, to fight on foreign soil, to sacrifice, if it need be, a hundred thousand American lives and perhaps a million noncombatants, but to leave America free to live its own life in security and freedom? Is not such a farsighted policy fully in accord with the lessons of history?

很明显(将军继续说),美国今天必须承担英国在19世纪出色完成的任务--保护西方文明免受外部危险。共产主义政府以旧的出生率和新的武器为武器,一再宣称他们决心摧毁非共产主义国家的经济和独立。年轻的国家渴望工业革命给他们带来经济财富和军事力量,他们对俄罗斯在政府管理下的快速工业化印象深刻;西方资本主义最终可能更有生产力,但它的发展似乎更慢;新的治理者渴望控制他们国家的资源和男子气概,是共产主义宣传、渗透和颠覆的可能猎物。除非这一蔓延过程被制止,否则 ,几乎所有亚洲、非洲和南美洲都将在共产党的领导下,澳大利亚、新西兰、北美和西欧将被四面八方的敌人包围,这只是时间问题。想象一下这种状况对日本、菲律宾和印度,以及对强大的意大利共产党的影响;想象一下共产党在意大利的胜利对法国的共产主义运动的影响。大不列颠、斯堪的纳维亚、荷兰和西德将被留在一个压倒性的共产主义大陆上任人宰割。现在正处于权力巅峰的北美是否应该接受这样一个不可避免的未来,退回到自己的边界内,让自己被敌对国家包围,控制其获得材料和市场,并迫使它像任何被围困的人民一样,模仿其敌人,在其曾经自由和刺激的生活的每个阶段建立政府的独裁统治?美国的领导人是否应该只考虑这一代史诗般的人不愿意面对如此重大的问题,或者他们也应该考虑未来几代美国人希望这些领导人做什么?立即进行抵抗,把战争进行到敌人面前,在外国土地上作战,必要时牺牲十万美国人的生命,也许还有一百万非战斗人员,但让美国自由地在安全和自由中生活,这不是更明智的做法吗?这样一个有远见的政策难道不完全符合历史的教训吗?

The philosopher answers: Yes, and the devastating results will be in accord with history, except that they will be multiplied in proportion to the increased number and mobility of the engaged forces, and the unparalleled destructiveness of the weapons used. There is something greater than history. Somewhere, sometime, in the name of humanity, we must challenge a thousand evil precedents, and dare to apply the Golden Rule to nations, as the Buddhist King Ashoka did (262 B.C. ), 64 or at least do what Augustus did when he bade Tiberius desist from further invasion of Germany ( A.D. 9). 65 Let us refuse, at whatever cost to ourselves, to make a hundred Hiroshimas in China. “Magnanimity in politics,” said Edmund Burke, “is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go ill together.” 66 Imagine an American President saying to the leaders of China and Russia:

哲学家回答说。是的,破坏性的结果将与历史相一致,只是它们将随着交战部队数量和机动性的增加以及所使用武器的无与伦比的破坏性而成倍增加。有比历史更伟大的东西。在某个地方,某个时候,以人类的名义,我们必须挑战无数邪恶的先例,敢于将黄金法则应用于国家,就像佛教国王阿育王( 公元前 262年)那样。 64 或者至少像奥古斯都那样,要求提比略 ,停止对德国的进一步入侵 (公元 9年)。 65 让我们不惜一切代价,拒绝在中国制造一百个 "广岛"。埃德蒙-伯克说:"政治上的宽宏大量,""很少是最真实的智慧,一个伟大的帝国和渺小的心灵是不相容的。" 66 想象一下,一位美国总统对中国和俄罗斯的领导人说。

“If we should follow the usual course of history we should make war upon you for fear of what you may do a generation hence. Or we should follow the dismal precedent of the Holy Alliance of 1815, and dedicate our wealth and our soundest youth to suppressing any revolt against the existing order anywhere. But we are willing to try a new approach. We respect your peoples and your civilizations as among the most creative in history. We shall try to understand your feelings, and your desire to develop your own institutions without fear of attack. We must not allow our mutual fears to lead us into war, for the unparalleled murderousness of our weapons and yours brings into the situation an element unfamiliar to history. We propose to send representatives to join with yours in a persistent conference for the adjustment of our differences, the cessation of hostilities and subversion, and the reduction of our armaments. Wherever, outside our borders, we may find ourselves competing with you for the allegiance of a people, we are willing to submit to a full and fair election of the population concerned. Let us open our doors to each other, and organize cultural exchanges that will promote mutual appreciation and understanding. We are not afraid that your economic system will displace ours, nor need you fear that ours will displace yours; we believe that each system will learn from the other and be able to live with it in co-operation and peace. Perhaps each of us, while maintaining adequate defenses, can arrange nonaggression and nonsubversion pacts with other states, and from these accords a world order may take form within which each nation will remain sovereign and unique, limited only by agreements freely signed. We ask you to join us in this defiance of history, this resolve to extend courtesy and civilization to the relations among states. We pledge our honor before all mankind to enter into this venture in full sincerity and trust. If we lose in the historic gamble, the results could not be worse than those that we may expect from a continuation of traditional policies. If you and we succeed, we shall merit a place for centuries to come in the grateful memory of mankind.”

"如果我们按照通常的历史进程,我们应该向你们开战,因为担心你们在一代人之后会做什么。或者我们应该遵循1815年神圣联盟的令人沮丧的先例,把我们的财富和我们最健全的青年奉献给镇压任何地方对现有秩序的反抗。但我们愿意尝试一种新的方法。我们尊重你们的人民和你们的文明,因为它们是历史上最具创造性的文明之一。我们将努力理解你们的感情,以及你们在不担心受到攻击的情况下发展自己的机构的愿望。我们决不能让我们的相互恐惧把我们带入战争,因为我们的武器和你们的武器的无与伦比的杀伤力给这种情况带来了历史上不熟悉的因素。我们建议派代表与你们的代表一起参加一个持久的会议,以调整我们的分歧,停止敌对行动和颠覆,并削减我们的军备。无论在哪里,在我们的边界之外,我们可能会发现自己与你们争夺一个民族的忠诚,我们都愿意接受有关人口的全面和公平的选举。让我们向对方敞开大门,组织文化交流,促进相互欣赏和理解。我们不担心你们的经济体系会取代我们的经济体系,你们也不必担心我们的经济体系会取代你们的经济体系;我们相信每个体系都会向对方学习,并能够与之合作和和平共处。也许我们中的每一个人,在保持足够的防御能力的同时,可以与其他国家安排互不侵犯和互不颠覆的协议,从这些协议中可以形成一个世界秩序,其中每个国家将保持 ,只受自由签署的协议的限制,保持主权和独特。我们要求你们与我们一起蔑视历史,决心将礼节和文明扩展到国家之间的关系。我们在全人类面前保证我们的荣誉,以充分的诚意和信任进入这项事业。如果我们在这场历史性的赌博中输了,其结果不会比我们继续执行传统政策所带来的结果更糟糕。如果你和我们都成功了,我们将在未来几个世纪里在人类的感恩记忆中占有一席之地。"

The general smiles. “You have forgotten all the lessons of history,” he says, “and all that nature of man which you described. Some conflicts are too fundamental to be resolved by negotiation; and during the prolonged negotiations (if history may be our guide) subversion would go on. A world order will come not by a gentlemen’s agreement, but through so decisive a victory by one of the great powers that it will be able to dictate and enforce international law, as Rome did from Augustus to Aurelius. Such interludes of widespread peace are unnatural and exceptional; they will soon be ended by changes in the distribution of military power. You have told us that man is a competitive animal, that his states must be like himself, and that natural selection now operates on an international plane. States will unite in basic co-operation only when they are in common attacked from without. Perhaps we are now restlessly moving toward that higher plateau of competition; we may make contact with ambitious species on other planets or stars; soon thereafter there will be interplanetary war. Then, and only then, will we of this earth be one.”


XII. Growth and Decay


We have defined civilization as “social order promoting cultural creation.” 67 It is political order secured through custom, morals, and law, and economic order secured through a continuity of production and exchange; it is cultural creation through freedom and facilities for the origination, expression, testing, and fruition of ideas, letters, manners, and arts. It is an intricate and precarious web of human relationships, laboriously built and readily destroyed.

我们已将文明定义为 "促进文化创造的社会秩序"。 67 它是通过习俗、道德和法律保障的政治秩序,以及通过生产和交换的连续性保障的经济秩序;它是通过自由和为思想、文字、礼仪和艺术的起源、表达、测试和成果提供的设施进行的文化创造。它是一个错综复杂而又不稳定的人类关系网,费力地建立,也容易被破坏。

Why is it that history is littered with the ruins of civilizations, and seems to tell us, like Shelley’s “Ozymandias,” that death is the destiny of all? Are there any regularities, in this process of growth and decay, which may enable us to predict, from the course of past civilizations, the future of our own?


Certain imaginative spirits have thought so, even to predicting the future in detail. In his Fourth Eclogue Virgil announced that some day, the ingenuity of change having been exhausted, the whole universe, by design or accident, will fall into a condition precisely the same as in some forgotten antiquity, and will then repeat, by deterministic fatality and in every particular, all those events that had followed that condition before.


Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo


delectos heroas; erunt etiam altera bella,


atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles—

atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles...

“there will then be another [prophet] Tiphys, and another Argo will carry [Jason and other] beloved heroes; there will also be other wars, and great Achilles will again be sent to Troy.” 68 Friedrich Nietzsche went insane with this vision of “eternal recurrence.” There is nothing so foolish but it can be found in the philosophers.

"然后会有另一个[先知]提比斯,另一个阿尔戈号将载着[杰森和其他]心爱的英雄;也会有其他战争,伟大的阿喀琉斯将再次被派往特洛伊。" 68 弗里德里希-尼采因这种 "永恒的重复 "的愿景而发疯了。没有什么是如此愚蠢的,但它可以在哲学家身上找到。

History repeats itself, but only in outline and in the large. We may reasonably expect that in the future, as in the past, some new states will rise, some old states will subside; that new civilizations will begin with pasture and agriculture, expand into commerce and industry, and luxuriate with finance; that thought (as Vico and Comte argued) will pass, by and large, from supernatural to legendary to naturalistic explanations; that new theories, inventions, discoveries, and errors will agitate the intellectual currents; that new generations will rebel against the old and pass from rebellion to conformity and reaction; that experiments in morals will loosen tradition and frighten its beneficiaries; and that the excitement of innovation will be forgotten in the unconcern of time. History repeats itself in the large because human nature changes with geological leisureliness, and man is equipped to respond in stereotyped ways to frequently occurring situations and stimuli like hunger, danger, and sex. But in a developed and complex civilization individuals are more differentiated and unique than in a primitive society, and many situations contain novel circumstances requiring modifications of instinctive response; custom recedes, reasoning spreads; the results are less predictable. There is no certainty that the future will repeat the past. Every year is an adventure.


Some masterminds have sought to constrain the loose regularities of history into majestic paradigms. The founder of French socialism, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (i760–1825), divided the past and the future into an alternation of “organic” and “critical” periods:

一些主事者试图将历史的松散规律性约束为宏大的范式。法国社会主义的创始人, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (i760-1825),将过去和未来分为 "有机 "和 "关键 "时期的交替。

The law of human development… reveals two distinct and alternative states of society: one, the organic, in which all human actions are classed, foreseen, and regulated by a general theory, and the purpose of social activity is clearly defined; the other, the critical, in which all community of thought, all communal action, all coordination have ceased, and the society is only an agglomeration of separate individuals in conflict with one another.


Each of these states or conditions has occupied two periods of history. One organic period preceded that Greek era which we call the age of philosophy, but which we shall more justly call the age of criticism. Later a new doctrine arose, ran through different phases of elaboration and completion, and finally established its political power over Western civilization. The constitution of the Church began a new organic epoch, which ended in the fifteenth century, when the Reformers sounded the arrival of that age of criticism which has continued to our time….


In the organic ages all basic problems [theological, political, economic, moral] have received at least provisional solutions. But soon the progress achieved by the help of these solutions, and under the protection of the institutions realized through them, rendered them inadequate, and evoked novelties. Critical epochs—periods of debate, protest,… and transition, replaced the old mood with doubt, individualism, and indifference to the great problems…. In organic periods men are busy building; in critical periods they are busy destroying. 69

在有机时代,所有的基本问题[神学、政治、经济、道德]至少都得到了暂时的解决。但很快,在这些解决方案的帮助下,在通过这些解决方案实现的制度的保护下,所取得的进展使它们变得不充分,并引起了新的变化。关键时期--辩论、抗议......和过渡时期,用怀疑、个人主义和对重大问题的漠不关心取代了旧的情绪....。在有机时期,人们忙于建设;在关键时期,他们忙于破坏。 69

Saint-Simon believed that the establishment of socialism would begin a new organic age of unified belief, organization, co-operation, and stability. If Communism should prove to be the triumphant new order of life Saint-Simon’s analysis and prediction would be justified.


Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) varied Saint-Simon’s scheme by dividing history into separate civilizations, each with an independent life span and trajectory composed of four seasons but essentially two periods: one of centripetal organization unifying a culture in all its phases into a unique, coherent, and artistic form; the other a period of centrifugal disorganization in which creed and culture decompose in division and criticism, and end in a chaos of individualism, skepticism, and artistic aberrations. Whereas Saint-Simon looked forward to socialism as the new synthesis, Spengler (like Talleyrand) looked backward to aristocracy as the age in which life and thought were consistent and orderly and constituted a work of living art.

奥斯瓦尔德-斯宾格勒(1880-1936)改变了圣西蒙的方案,将历史分为不同的文明,每个文明都有独立的寿命和轨迹,由四季组成,但基本上是两个 :一个是向心的组织,将一个文化的所有阶段统一成一个独特的、连贯的和艺术的形式;另一个是离心的无组织时期,信条和文化在分裂和批评中分解,并以个人主义、怀疑主义和艺术反常的混乱结束。圣西门期待社会主义成为新的综合体,而斯宾格勒(像塔列朗一样)则期待贵族制度成为生活和思想一致、有序并构成活生生的艺术作品的时代。

For Western existence the distinction lies about the year 1800—on one side of that frontier, life in fullness and sureness of itself, formed by growth from within, in one great, uninterrupted evolution from Gothic childhood to Goethe and Napoleon; and on the other the autumnal, artificial, rootless life of our great cities, under forms fashioned by the intellect…. He who does not understand that this outcome is obligatory and insusceptible of modification must forgo all desire to comprehend history. 70

对于西方的存在来说,区别大约在于1800年--在那条边界的一边,生命是充实和确定的,由内部生长形成,在一个伟大的、不间断的进化中,从哥特式的童年到歌德和拿破仑;在另一边,我们大城市的秋天的、人工的、无根的生命,在智力....。如果他不明白这种结果是强制性的,而且无法修改,就必须放弃理解历史的所有愿望。 70

On one point all are agreed: civilizations begin, flourish, decline, and disappear—or linger on as stagnant pools left by once life-giving streams. What are the causes of development, and what are the causes of decay?


No student takes seriously the seventeenth-century notion that states arose out of a “social contract” among individuals or between the people and a ruler. Probably most states (i.e., societies politically organized) took form through the conquest of one group by another, and the establishment of a continuing force over the conquered by the conqueror; his decrees were their first laws; and these, added to the customs of the people, created *a new social order. Some states of Latin America obviously began in this way. When the masters organized the work of their subjects to take advantage of some physical boon (like the rivers of Egypt or Asia), economic prevision and provision constituted another basis for civilization. A dangerous tension between rulers and ruled might raise intellectual and emotional activity above the daily drift of primitive tribes. Further stimulation to growth could come from any challenging change in the surroundings, 71 such as external invasion or a continuing shortage of rain—challenges that might be met by military improvements or the construction of irrigation canals.

没有学生认真对待十七世纪的观念,即国家产生于个人之间或人民与统治者之间的 "社会契约"。可能大多数国家(即有政治组织的社会)都是通过一个群体对另一个群体的征服,以及征服者对被征服者建立持续的力量而形成的;他的法令是他们最初的法律;这些法令加上人民的习俗,创造了*新的社会秩序。拉丁美洲的一些国家显然是以这种方式开始的。当主人组织他们的臣民工作以利用一些物质上的好处(如埃及或亚洲的河流)时,经济上的预测和供给构成了文明的另一个基础。统治者和被统治者之间危险的 紧张关系可能会使智力和情感活动高于原始部落的日常漂泊。对增长的进一步刺激可能来自于周围环境的任何挑战性变化。 71 例如,外部入侵或持续缺雨--这些挑战可以通过军事改进或灌溉渠的建设来应对。

If we put the problem further back, and ask what determines whether a challenge will or will not be met, the answer is that this depends upon the presence or absence of initiative and of creative individuals with clarity of mind and energy of will (which is almost a definition of genius), capable of effective responses to new situations (which is almost a definition of intelligence). If we ask what makes a creative individual, we are thrown back from history to psychology and biology—to the influence of environment and the gamble and secret of the chromosomes. In any case a challenge successfully met (as by the United States in 1917, 1933, and 1941), if it does not exhaust the victor (like England in 1945), raises the temper and level of a nation, and makes it abler to meet further challenges.


If these are the sources of growth, what are the causes of decay? Shall we suppose, with Spengler and many others, that each civilization is an organism, naturally and yet mysteriously endowed with the power of development and the fatality of death? It is tempting to explain the behavior of groups through analogy with physiology or physics, and to ascribe the deterioration of a society to some inherent limit in its loan and tenure of life, or some irreparable running down of internal force. Such analogies may offer provisional illumination, as when we compare the association of individuals with an aggregation of cells, or the circulation of money from banker back to banker with the systole and diastole of the heart. But a group is no organism physically added to its constituent individuals; it has no brain or stomach of its own; it must think or feel with the brains or nerves of its members. When the group or a civilization declines, it is through no mystic limitation of a corporate life, but through the failure of its political or intellectual leaders to meet the challenges of change.

如果这些是增长的源泉,那么衰败的原因是什么?我们是否应该和斯宾格勒以及其他许多人一样,假设每个文明都是一个有机体,自然而神秘地被赋予了发展的力量和死亡的致命性?通过与生理学或物理学的类比来解释群体的行为是很诱人的,并将一个社会的恶化归因于其贷款和寿命的某种内在限制,或某种不可修复的内部力量的耗尽。这样的类比可能会提供暂时的启示,比如当我们把个人的联系与细胞的聚集相比较,或者把金钱从银行家到银行家的流通与心脏的收缩和舒张相比较。但是,一个团体并不是在其组成个体的基础上增加的有机体;它没有自己的大脑或胃;它必须用其成员的大脑或神经来思考或感受 。当群体或文明衰落时,它不是由于企业生命的神秘限制,而是由于其政治或知识领袖未能迎接变革的挑战。

The challenges may come from a dozen sources, and may by repetition or combination rise to a destructive intensity. Rainfall or oases may fail and leave the earth parched to sterility. The soil may be exhausted by incompetent husbandry or improvident usage. The replacement of free with slave labor may reduce the incentives to production, leaving lands unfilled and cities unfed. A change in the instruments or routes of trade—as by the conquest of the ocean or the air—may leave old centers of civilization becalmed and decadent, like Pisa or Venice after 1492. Taxes may mount to the point of discouraging capital investment and productive stimulus. Foreign markets and materials may be lost to more enterprising competition; excess of imports over exports may drain precious metal from domestic reserves. The concentration of wealth may disrupt the nation in class or race war. The concentration of population and poverty in great cities may compel a government to choose between enfeebling the economy with a dole and running the risk of riot and revolution.


Since inequality grows in an expanding economy, a society may find itself divided between a cultured minority and a majority of men and women too unfortunate by nature or circumstance to inherit or develop standards of excellence and taste. As this majority grows it acts as a cultural drag upon the minority; its ways of speech, dress, recreation, feeling, judgment, and thought spread upward, and internal barbarization by the majority is part of the price that the minority pays for its control of educational and economic opportunity.


As education spreads, theologies lose credence, and receive an external conformity without influence upon conduct or hope. Life and ideas become increasingly secular, ignoring supernatural explanations and fears. The moral code loses aura and force as its human origin is revealed, and as divine surveillance and sanctions are removed. In ancient Greece the philosophers destroyed the old faith among the educated classes; in many nations of modern Europe the philosophers achieved similar results. Protagoras became Voltaire, Diogenes Rousseau, Democritus Hobbes, Plato Kant, Thrasymachus Nietzsche, Aristotle Spencer, Epicurus Diderot. In antiquity and modernity alike, analytical thought dissolved the religion that had buttressed the moral code. New religions came, but they were divorced from the ruling classes, and gave no service to the state. An age of weary skepticism and epicureanism followed the triumph of rationalism over mythology in the last century before Christianity, and follows a similar victory today in the first century after Christianity.

随着教育的普及,神学失去了可信度,得到的是外部的顺应,对行为和希望没有影响。生活和思想变得越来越世俗,忽视了超自然的解释 和恐惧。道德准则失去了光环和力量,因为它的人类起源被揭示,神圣的监督和制裁被取消。在古希腊,哲学家们摧毁了受教育阶层的旧信仰;在现代欧洲的许多国家,哲学家们取得了类似的结果。普罗塔戈拉成为伏尔泰,第欧根尼-卢梭,德谟克利特-霍布斯,柏拉图-康德,斯拉西马库斯-尼采,亚里士多德-斯宾塞,伊壁鸠鲁-狄德罗。无论在古代还是现代,分析性思维都溶解了支撑道德准则的宗教。新的宗教出现了,但它们脱离了统治阶级,没有为国家提供服务。在基督教之前的最后一个世纪,理性主义战胜了神话,之后是一个疲惫的怀疑主义和享乐主义的时代,今天在基督教之后的第一个世纪也取得了类似的胜利。

Caught in the relaxing interval between one moral code and the next, an unmoored generation surrenders itself to luxury, corruption, and a restless disorder of family and morals, in all but a remnant clinging desperately to old restraints and ways. Few souls feel any longer that “it is beautiful and honorable to die for one’s country.” A failure of leadership may allow a state to weaken itself with internal strife. At the end of the process a decisive defeat in war may bring a final blow, or barbarian invasion from without may combine with barbarism welling up from within to bring the civilization to a close.

在一个道德规范和下一个道德规范之间的宽松间隔中,不受约束的一代人向奢侈、腐败以及家庭和道德的无序状态投降,除了拼命坚持旧的约束和方式的残余分子外,其他的人都在投降。很少有人再觉得 "为国捐躯是美丽和光荣的"。领导层的失败可能会让一个国家因内斗而削弱自己。在这个过程的最后,战争中的决定性失败可能带来最后的打击,或者来自外部的野蛮人入侵可能与内部涌现的野蛮人相结合,使文明走向终结。

Is this a depressing picture? Not quite. Life has no inherent claim to eternity, whether in individuals or in states. Death is natural, and if it comes in due time it is forgivable and useful, and the mature mind will take no offense from its coming. But do civilizations die? Again, not quite. Greek civilization is not really dead; only its frame is gone and its habitat has changed and spread; it survives in the memory of the race, and in such abundance that no one life, however full and long, could absorb it all. Homer has more readers now than in his own day and land. The Greek poets and philosophers are in every library and college; at this moment Plato is being studied by a hundred thousand discoverers of the “dear delight” of philosophy overspreading life with understanding thought. This selective survival of creative minds is the most real and beneficent of immortalities.

这是一张令人沮丧的照片吗?不尽然。无论是在个人还是在国家中,生命都没有固有的对永恒的要求。死亡是自然的,如果它在适当的时候到来,它是可以被原谅的,也是有用的,成熟的心灵不会因为它的到来而受到冒犯。但文明会死亡吗?同样,也不尽然。希腊文明并没有真正死去;只是它的框架消失了,它的栖息地发生了变化和传播;它在种族的记忆中幸存下来,而且是如此丰富,以至于没有一个人的生命,无论多么充实和漫长,能够吸收它的全部。荷马现在的读者比他自己的时代和土地上的 。希腊诗人和哲学家在每个图书馆和学院都有;此刻,柏拉图正被十万个发现哲学的 "亲爱的快乐 "的人研究,他们用理解的思想覆盖了生活。这种创造性思维的选择性生存是最真实和有益的不朽。

Nations die. Old regions grow arid, or suffer other change. Resilient man picks up his tools and his arts, and moves on, taking his memories with him. If education has deepened and broadened those memories, civilization migrates with him, and builds somewhere another home. In the new land he need not begin entirely anew, nor make his way without friendly aid; communication and transport bind him, as in a nourishing placenta, with his mother country. Rome imported Greek civilization and transmitted it to Western Europe; America profited from European civilization and prepares to pass it on, with a technique of transmission never equaled before.


Civilizations are the generations of the racial soul. As life overrides death with reproduction, so an aging culture hands its patrimony down to its heirs across the years and the seas. Even as these lines are being written, commerce and print, wires and waves and invisible Mercuries of the air are binding nations and civilizations together, preserving for all what each has given to the heritage of mankind.


XIII. Is Progress Real? 72

XIII.进步是真实的吗? 72

Against this panorama of nations, morals, and religions rising and falling, the idea of progress finds itself in dubious shape. Is it only the vain and traditional boast of each “modern” generation? Since we have admitted no substantial change in man’s nature during historic times, all technological advances will have to be written off as merely new means of achieving old ends—the acquisition of goods, the pursuit of one sex by the other (or by the same), the overcoming of competition, the fighting of wars. One of the discouraging discoveries of our disillusioning century is that science is neutral: it will kill for us as readily as it will heal, and will destroy for us more readily than it can build. How inadequate now seems the proud motto of Francis Bacon, “Knowledge is power”! Sometimes we feel that the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, which stressed mythology and art rather than science and power, may have been wiser than we, who repeatedly enlarge our instrumentalities without improving our purposes.

在这种国家、道德和宗教兴衰的全景下,进步的概念发现自己处于可疑的状态。难道它只是每一代 "现代 "人的虚荣和传统的吹嘘?既然我们不承认人类的本性在历史上有任何实质性的改变,那么所有的技术进步都将不得不被注销,因为这只是实现旧目的的新手段--获取货物,由另一性别(或由同一性别)追求某一性别,克服竞争,进行战争。我们这个令人沮丧的世纪的一个发现是,科学是中立的:它为我们杀人和治病一样容易,为我们破坏比它能建设更容易。弗朗西斯-培根引以为豪的座右铭 "知识就是力量",现在看来是多么的不充分啊有时我们觉得,强调神话和艺术而不是科学和权力的中世纪和文艺复兴时期,可能比我们更明智,因为我们一再扩大我们的工具,却没有改善我们的目的。

Our progress in science and technique has involved some tincture of evil with good. Our comforts and conveniences may have weakened our physical stamina and our moral fiber. We have immensely developed our means of locomotion, but some of us use them to facilitate crime and to kill our fellow men or ourselves. We double, triple, centuple our speed, but we shatter our nerves in the process, and are the same trousered apes at two thousand miles an hour as when we had legs. We applaud the cures and incisions of modern medicine if they bring no side effects worse than the malady; we appreciate the assiduity of our physicians in their mad race with the resilience of microbes and the inventiveness of disease; we are grateful for the added years that medical science gives us if they are not a burdensome prolongation of illness, disability, and gloom. We have multiplied a hundred times our ability to learn and report the events of the day and the planet, but at times we envy our ancestors, whose peace was only gently disturbed by the news of their village. We have laudably bettered the conditions of life for skilled workingmen and the middle class, but we have allowed our cities to fester with dark ghettos and slimy slums.

我们在科学和技术方面的进步涉及到一些恶与善的成分。我们的舒适和便利可能削弱了我们的身体耐力和道德品质。 我们已经极大地发展了我们的运动手段,但我们中的一些人利用它们来促进犯罪和杀害我们的同伴或我们自己。我们把速度提高了一倍、两倍、三倍,但在这个过程中我们的神经被打碎了,在每小时两千英里的时候,我们还是和有腿的时候一样的长裤猿人。如果现代医学的治疗和手术没有带来比疾病更严重的副作用,我们就会为之喝彩;我们赞赏我们的医生在与微生物的韧性和疾病的创造性进行疯狂竞赛时的勤奋;我们感谢医学科学给我们带来的额外年限,如果它们不是疾病、残疾和阴霾的繁重延长。我们学习和报告当天和地球事件的能力增加了一百倍,但有时我们羡慕我们的祖先,他们的平静只被村里的消息轻轻扰乱。我们已经值得称赞地改善了熟练工人和中产阶级的生活条件,但我们却允许我们的城市在黑暗的贫民区和肮脏的贫民窟中发酵。

We frolic in our emancipation from theology, but have we developed a natural ethic—a moral code independent of religion—strong enough to keep our instincts of acquisition, pugnacity, and sex from debasing our civilization into a mire of greed, crime, and promiscuity? Have we really outgrown intolerance, or merely transferred it from religious to national, ideological, or racial hostilities? Are our manners better than before, or worse? “Manners,” said a nineteenth-century traveler, “get regularly worse as you go from the East to the West; it is bad in Asia, not so good in Europe, and altogether bad in the western states of America”; 73 and now the East imitates the West. Have our laws offered the criminal too much protection against society and the state? Have we given ourselves more freedom than our intelligence can digest? Or are we nearing such moral and social disorder that frightened parents will run back to Mother Church and beg her to discipline their children, at whatever cost to intellectual liberty? Has all the progress of philosophy since Descartes been a mistake through its failure to recognize the role of myth in the consolation and control of man? “He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow, and in much wisdom is much grief.” 74

我们在从神学中解放出来的过程中嬉戏,但我们是否已经发展出一种自然伦理--一种独立于宗教的道德准则--足以使我们的获取、争斗和性的本能不至于使我们的文明堕入贪婪、犯罪和淫乱的泥潭?我们真的已经摆脱了不宽容,还是仅仅把它从宗教转移到了国家、意识形态或种族敌对中?我们的礼仪是比以前更好,还是更差?"十九世纪的一位旅行者说:"从东方到西方,礼仪经常变坏;在亚洲很糟糕,在欧洲不那么好,而在美国西部各州则完全糟糕。 73 而现在,东方模仿西方。我们的法律是否为罪犯提供了过多的保护,使其不受社会和国家的影响?我们给予自己的自由是否超过了我们的智力所能消化的范围?或者,我们是否正在接近这样的道德和社会混乱,以至于受惊的父母会跑回教会之母,求她管教他们的孩子,不惜牺牲 智力自由?自笛卡尔以来,哲学的所有进步都是一个错误,因为它没有认识到神话在安慰和控制人类方面的作用?"增加知识的人就会增加忧伤,而在许多智慧中就会有许多忧伤"。 74

Has there been any progress at all in philosophy since Confucius? Or in literature since Aeschylus? Are we sure that our music, with its complex forms and powerful orchestras, is more profound than Palestrina, or more musical and inspiring than the monodie airs that medieval Arabs sang to the strumming of their simple instruments? (Edward Lane said of the Cairo musicians, “I have been more charmed with their songs… than with any other music that I have ever enjoyed.” 75 ) How does our contemporary architecture—bold, original, and impressive as it is—compare with the temples of ancient Egypt or Greece, or our sculpture with the statues of Chephren and Hermes, or our bas-reliefs with those of Persepolis or the Parthenon, or our paintings with those of the van Eycks or Holbein? If “the replacement of chaos with order is the essence of art and civilization,” 76 is contemporary painting in America and Western Europe the replacement of order with chaos, and a vivid symbol of our civilization’s relapse into confused and structureless decay?

自孔子以来,在哲学方面是否有任何进步?或者说,自埃斯库罗斯以来,文学有什么进步吗?我们是否确定我们的音乐,及其复杂的形式和强大的管弦乐队,比帕莱斯特里纳更深刻,或者比中世纪阿拉伯人随着他们简单乐器的敲击而唱的monodie歌曲更有音乐感和启发性?(爱德华-莱恩在谈到开罗的音乐家时说:"我被他们的歌声所吸引......比我所欣赏的任何其他音乐都要好"。 75 我们的当代建筑--大胆、原创、令人印象深刻--与古埃及或希腊的神庙相比,我们的雕塑与Chephren和Hermes的雕像相比,我们的浮雕与波斯波利斯或帕台农神庙的浮雕相比,我们的绘画与van Eycks或Holbein的绘画相比,又如何呢?如果 "用秩序取代混乱是艺术和文明的本质",那么 76 美国和西欧的当代绘画是否就是以混乱取代秩序,并成为我们的文明重新陷入混乱和无结构的衰败的生动象征?

History is so indifferently rich that a case for almost any conclusion from it can be made by a selection of instances. Choosing our evidence with a brighter bias, we might evolve some more comforting reflections. But perhaps we should first define what progress means to us. If it means increase in happiness its case is lost almost at first sight. Our capacity for fretting is endless, and no matter how many difficulties we surmount, how many ideals we realize, we shall always find an excuse for being magnificently miserable; there is a stealthy pleasure in rejecting mankind or the universe as unworthy of our approval. It seems silly to define progress in terms that would make the average child a higher, more advanced product of life than the adult or the sage—for certainly the child is the happiest of the three. Is a more objective definition possible? We shall here define progress as the increasing control of the environment by life. It is a test that may hold for the lowliest organism as well as for man.

历史是如此冷漠地丰富,几乎任何结论都可以通过选择一些实例来证明。在选择证据时,如果有更多的偏见,我们可能会演变出一些更令人欣慰的反思。但也许我们应该首先定义进步对我们意味着什么。如果它意味着幸福的增加,那么它的案例几乎一目了然。我们烦恼的能力是无穷无尽的,无论我们克服了多少困难,实现了多少理想,我们总能为自己的巨大痛苦找到借口;拒绝人类或宇宙是一种隐秘的快乐,因为它不值得我们赞同。用使普通儿童成为比 、成人或圣人更高的、更先进的生活产品的术语来定义进步似乎是愚蠢的,因为儿童当然是这三者中最幸福的。是否可能有一个更客观的定义?我们将在这里把进步定义为生命对环境的控制越来越强。这是一个对最低级的生物体和人类都适用的测试。

We must not demand of progress that it should be continuous or universal. Obviously there are retrogressions, just as there are periods of failure, fatigue, and rest in a developing individual; if the present stage is an advance in control of the environment, progress is real. We may presume that at almost any time in history some nations were progressing and some were declining, as Russia progresses and England loses ground today. The same nation may be progressing in one field of human activity and retrogressing in another, as America is now progressing in technology and receding in the graphic arts. If we find that the type of genius prevalent in young countries like America and Australia tends to the practical, inventive, scientific, executive kinds rather than to the painter of pictures or poems, the carver of statues or words, we must understand that each age and place needs and elicits some types of ability rather than others in its pursuit of environmental control. We should not compare the work of one land and time with the winnowed best of all the collected past. Our problem is whether the average man has increased his ability to control the conditions of his life.


If we take a long-range view and compare our modern existence, precarious, chaotic, and murderous as it is, with the ignorance, superstition, violence, and diseases of primitive peoples, we do not come off quite forlorn. The lowliest strata in civilized states may still differ only slightly from barbarians, but above those levels thousands, millions have reached mental and moral levels rarely found among primitive men. Under the complex strains of city life we sometimes take imaginative refuge in the supposed simplicity of pre-civilized ways; but in our less romantic moments we know that this is a flight reaction from our actual tasks, and that the idolizing of savages, like many other young moods, is an impatient expression of adolescent maladaptation, of conscious ability not yet matured and comfortably placed. The “friendly and flowing savage” would be delightful but for his scalpel, his insects, and his dirt. A study of surviving primitive tribes reveals their high rate of infantile mortality, their short tenure of life, their lesser stamina and speed, their greater susceptibility to disease. 77 If the prolongation of life indicates better control of the environment, then the tables of mortality proclaim the advance of man, for longevity in European and American whites has tripled in the last three centuries. Some time ago a convention of morticians discussed the danger threatening their industry from the increasing tardiness of men in keeping their rendezvous with death. 78 But if undertakers are miserable progress is real.

如果我们用长远的眼光,把我们的现代生存,不稳定的、混乱的和凶残的,与原始人的无知、迷信、暴力和疾病相比较,我们并不感到很悲哀。文明国家中最低级的阶层可能仍然与野蛮人只有些许差别,但在这些阶层之上,成千上万的人已经达到了原始人中很少见的精神和道德水平。在城市生活的复杂压力下,我们有时会在所谓的前文明的简单方式中采取想象力的庇护;但在我们不那么浪漫的时刻,我们知道这是一种逃离的反应, ,从我们的实际任务中,对野蛮人的崇拜,像许多其他年轻的情绪一样,是青春期不适应的急躁表达,是尚未成熟和舒适的意识能力。如果不是因为他的手术刀、他的昆虫和他的污垢,"友好的、流动的野蛮人 "是令人愉快的。对幸存的原始部落的研究表明,他们的婴儿死亡率很高,他们的寿命很短,他们的耐力和速度较差,他们对疾病的敏感性较大。 77 如果说生命的延长表明对环境有更好的控制,那么死亡率的表格则宣告了人类的进步,因为在过去的三个世纪里,欧洲和美国白人的寿命增加了两倍。前段时间,一个殡葬业者的会议讨论了他们的行业面临的危险,即人们在与死亡的约会中越来越迟钝。 78 但是,如果殡仪员是悲惨的,那么进步是真实的。

In the debate between ancients and moderns it is not at all clear that the ancients carry off the prize. Shall we count it a trivial achievement that famine has been eliminated in modern states, and that one country can now grow enough food to overfeed itself and yet send hundreds of millions of bushels of wheat to nations in need? Are we ready to scuttle the science that has so diminished superstition, obscurantism, and religious intolerance, or the technology that has spread food, home ownership, comfort, education, and leisure beyond any precedent? Would we really prefer the Athenian agora or the Roman comitia to the British Parliament or the United States Congress, or be content under a narrow franchise like Attica’s, or the selection of rulers by a praetorian guard? Would we rather have lived under the laws of the Athenian Republic or the Roman Empire than under constitutions that give us habeas corpus, trial by jury, religious and intellectual freedom, and the emancipation of women? Are our morals, lax though they are, worse than those of the ambisexual Alcibiades, or has any American President imitated Pericles, who lived with a learned courtesan? Are we ashamed of our great universities, our many publishing houses, our bountiful public libraries? There were great dramatists in Athens, but was any greater than Shakespeare, and was Aristophanes as profound and humane as Molière? Was the oratory of Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Aeschines superior to that of Chatham, Burke, and Sheridan? Shall we place Gibbon below Herodotus or Thucydides? Is there anything in ancient prose fiction comparable to the scope and depth of the modern novel? We may grant the superiority of the ancients in art, though some of us might still prefer Notre Dame de Paris to the Parthenon. If the Founding Fathers of the United States could return to America, or Fox and Bentham to England, or Voltaire and Diderot to France, would they not reproach us as ingrates for our blindness to our good fortune in living today and not yesterday—not even under Pericles or Augustus?

在古人和现代人之间的辩论中,古人是否得奖一点也不清楚。现代国家已经消除了饥荒,一个国家现在可以种植足够多的粮食,并向有需要的国家运送数亿蒲式耳的小麦,难道我们应该把这看作是一项微不足道的成就?我们是否已经准备好放弃那些使迷信、蒙昧主义和宗教不容忍大为减少的科学,或者那些使食物、房屋所有权、舒适、教育和休闲的传播超出任何先例的技术?难道我们真的宁愿选择雅典的广场或罗马的议会,而不是英国的议会或美国的国会,或者满足于像阿提卡那样狭隘的选举权,或者由禁卫军挑选统治者?难道我们宁愿生活在雅典共和国或罗马帝国的法律之下,也不愿生活在给予我们人身保护令、陪审团审判、宗教和知识自由以及妇女解放的宪法之下吗?我们的道德,尽管很宽松,是否比那些双性恋的阿尔西比阿德更糟糕,或者是否有任何美国总统 ,模仿与一个博学的宫女生活在一起的伯里克利?我们是否为我们伟大的大学,我们众多的出版社,我们丰富的公共图书馆感到羞愧?雅典有伟大的戏剧家,但有比莎士比亚更伟大的吗?阿里斯托芬和莫里哀一样深刻而富有人情味吗?德摩斯梯尼、伊索克拉底和埃斯钦斯的演说是否比查塔姆、伯克和谢里丹的演说更出色?我们应该把吉本放在希罗多德或修昔底德之下吗?在古代散文小说中,有什么可以与现代小说的范围和深度相媲美的吗?我们可以承认古人在艺术方面的优越性,尽管我们中的一些人可能仍然喜欢巴黎圣母院而不是帕台农神庙。如果美国的开国元勋们能够回到美国,或者福克斯和边沁回到英国,或者伏尔泰和狄德罗回到法国,他们会不会责备我们是忘恩负义之徒,因为我们对生活在今天而不是昨天--甚至在伯里克利或奥古斯都统治下的幸运视而不见?

We should not be greatly disturbed by the probability that our civilization will die like any other. As Frederick asked his retreating troops at Kolin, “Would you live forever?” 79 Perhaps it is desirable that life should take fresh forms, that new civilizations and centers should have their turn. Meanwhile the effort to meet the challenge of the rising East may reinvigorate the West.

我们不应该为我们的文明会像其他文明一样死去的概率而感到极大的不安。正如腓特烈在科林问他撤退的部队:"你们会永远活着吗?" 79 也许,生命应该采取新的形式,新的文明和中心应该有它们的轮回,这是可取的。同时,迎接东方崛起的挑战的努力可能会重振西方的活力。

We have said that a great civilization does not entirely die— non omnis moritur. Some precious achievements have survived all the vicissitudes of rising and falling states: the making of fire and light, of the wheel and other basic tools; language, writing, art, and song; agriculture, the family, and parental care; social organization, morality, and charity; and the use of teaching to transmit the lore of the family and the race. These are the elements of civilization, and they have been tenaciously maintained through the perilous passage from one civilization to the next. They are the connective tissue of human history.

我们说过,一个伟大的文明不会完全消亡-- non omnis moritur。 一些珍贵的成就在国家兴衰的所有沧桑中幸存下来:火和光的制造,车轮和其他基本工具的制造;语言、文字、艺术和歌曲;农业、家庭和父母的照顾;社会组织、道德和慈善;以及利用教学来传播家庭和种族的知识。这些都是文明的要素,它们在从一个文明到另一个文明的危险过程中得到了顽强的维护。它们是人类历史的连接组织。

If education is the transmission of civilization, we are unquestionably progressing. Civilization is not inherited; it has to be learned and earned by each generation anew; if the transmission should be interrupted for one century, civilization would die, and we should be savages again. So our finest contemporary achievement is our unprecedented expenditure of wealth and toil in the provision of higher education for all. Once colleges were luxuries, designed for the male half of the leisure class; today universities are so numerous that he who runs may become a Ph.D. We may not have excelled the selected geniuses of antiquity, but we have raised the level and average of knowledge beyond any age in history.


None but a child will complain that our teachers have not yet eradicated the errors and superstitions of ten thousand years. The great experiment has just begun, and it may yet be defeated by the high birth rate of unwilling or indoctrinated ignorance. But what would be the full fruitage of instruction if every child should be schooled till at least his twentieth year, and should find free access to the universities, libraries, and museums that harbor and offer the intellectual and artistic treasures of the race? Consider education not as the painful accumulation of facts and dates and reigns, nor merely the necessary preparation of the individual to earn his keep in the world, but as the transmission of our mental, moral, technical, and aesthetic heritage as fully as possible to as many as possible, for the enlargement of man’s understanding, control, embellishment, and enjoyment of life.


The heritage that we can now more fully transmit is richer than ever before. It is richer than that of Pericles, for it includes all the Greek flowering that followed him; richer than Leonardo’s, for it includes him and the Italian Renaissance; richer than Voltaire’s, for it embraces all the French Enlightenment and its ecumenical dissemination. If progress is real despite our whining, it is not because we are born any healthier, better, or wiser than infants were in the past, but because we are born to a richer heritage, born on a higher level of that pedestal which the accumulation of knowledge and art raises as the ground and support of our being. The heritage rises, and man rises in proportion as he receives it.

我们现在可以更充分地传递的遗产比以往任何时候都要丰富。它比伯里克利的遗产更丰富,因为它包括他之后的所有希腊之花;比莱昂纳多的遗产更丰富,因为它包括他和意大利文艺复兴;比伏尔泰的遗产更丰富,因为它包含了所有法国启蒙运动及其普世传播。如果进步是真实的,尽管我们在抱怨,这不是因为我们 ,比过去的婴儿更健康、更好或更聪明,而是因为我们出生在一个更丰富的遗产,出生在一个更高的台阶上,知识和艺术的积累提高了我们存在的基础和支持。遗产上升了,人也随着接受遗产的比例上升了。

History is, above all else, the creation and recording of that heritage; progress is its increasing abundance, preservation, transmission, and use. To those of us who study history not merely as a warning reminder of man’s follies and crimes, but also as an encouraging remembrance of generative souls, the past ceases to be a depressing chamber of horrors; it becomes a celestial city, a spacious country of the mind, wherein a thousand saints, statesmen, inventors, scientists, poets, artists, musicians, lovers, and philosophers still live and speak, teach and carve and sing. The historian will not mourn because he can see no meaning in human existence except that which man puts into it; let it be our pride that we ourselves may put meaning into our lives, and sometimes a significance that transcends death. If a man is fortunate he will, before he dies, gather up as much as he can of his civilized heritage and transmit it to his children. And to his final breath he will be grateful for this inexhaustible legacy, knowing that it is our nourishing mother and our lasting life.


WILL and ARIEL DURANT , after spending over fifty years completing the critically acclaimed series The Story of Civilization, were awarded the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction in 1968. In 1977, the Durants were presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Champions of human rights and social reform, the Durants continue to educate and entertain readers the world over. For more information on their work, visit .

威尔 和 阿里尔-杜兰特 花了50多年时间完成了广受好评的《文明的故事》系列,于1968年获得普利策普通非小说奖。1977年,杜兰特夫妇被授予总统自由勋章。 杜兰特夫妇是人权和社会改革的倡导者,他们继续教育和娱乐着全世界的读者。 有关他们工作的更多信息,请访问。







封面艺术 © 阿贾克斯保卫希腊船只对抗特洛伊人,英国学校复制的希腊花瓶(彩色平印)(20世纪)私人收藏/古代艺术和建筑收藏有限公司/布里奇曼艺术图书馆



The Story of Philosophy




The Pleasures of Philosophy


Heroes of History


The Greatest Minds and Ideas of All Time




I. Our Oriental Heritage

I. 我们的东方遗产

II. The Life of Greece

II. 希腊的生活

III. Caesar and Christ

III. 凯撒和基督

IV. The Age of Faith

IV. 信仰的时代

V. The Renaissance

V. 文艺复兴

VI. The Reformation

VI. 改革开放



VII. The Age of Reason Begins

VII. 理性的时代开始了

VIII. The Age of Louis XIV

VIII. 路易十四的时代

IX. The Age of Voltaire

IX. 伏尔泰的时代

X. Rousseau and Revolution

X. 卢梭和革命

XI. The Age of Napoleon

十一. 拿破仑的时代

A Dual Biography


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Guide to Books


mentioned in the Notes


A RISTOTLE , Politics. Everyman’s Library.

ARISTOTLE , 政治。 Everyman's Library.

B AGEHOT , W ALTER , Physics and Politics. Boston, 1956.

BAGEHOT, WALTER, Physics and Politics. 波士顿,1956年。

C ARTER , T HOMAS F., The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward. New York, 1925.

CARTER , THOMAS F., The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward. 纽约,1925年。

C OXE , W ILLIAM , History of the House of Austria, 3 V . London, 1847.

科克斯 ,威廉,《 奥地利家族的历史》, 3V。伦敦,1847年。

D URANT , W ILL , The Mansions of Philosophy. New York, 1929.

DURANT, WILL, The Mansions of Philosophy. New York, 1929.

D URANT , W ILL and A RIEL , The Story of Civilization:

DURANT, WILL and ARIEL , The Story of Civilization:

    I. Our Oriental Heritage. New York, 1935.

I. Our Oriental Heritage. 纽约,1935年。

   II. The Life of Greece. New York, 1939.

II. 希腊的生活》。 纽约,1939年。

  III. Caesar and Christ. New York, 1944.

III. 凯撒和基督。 纽约,1944年。

  IV. The Age of Faith. New York, 1950.

IV. The Age of Faith. New York, 1950.

   V. The Renaissance. New York, 1953.

V. The Renaissance. New York, 1953.

  VI. The Reformation. New York, 1957.

VI. The Reformation. New York, 1957.

 VII. The Age of Reason Begins. New York, 1961.

VII. 理性的时代开始了。 纽约,1961年。

VIII. The Age of Louis XIV. New York, 1963.

VIII. 路易十四的时代。 纽约,1963年。

  IX. The Age of Voltaire. New York, 1965.

IX. 伏尔泰的时代》。 New York, 1965.

   X. Rousseau and Revolution. New York, 1967.

X. Rousseau and Revolution. New York, 1967.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1966 edition.

大英百科全书》, 1966年版。

G IBBON , E DWARD , The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. Milman, 6v. New York: Nottingham Society, n.d.

GIBBON, EDWARD , The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed.Milman, 6v.纽约。诺丁汉协会,未发表。

G OBINEAU , J. A. DE , The Inequality of Human Races. London, 1915.

GOBINEAU , J. A. DE , The Inequality of Human Races .伦敦,1915年。

G OMME , A. W., The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. Oxford, 1933.

GOMME, A. W., The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. Oxford, 1933.

G OWEN , H. H., AND H ALL , J OSEF , Outline History of China. New York, 1927.

GOWEN, H. H., AND HALL, JOSEF, Outline History of China. New York, 1927.

G RANET , M ARCEL , Chinese Civilization. New York, 1930.

GRANET , MARCEL , 中国文明。 New York, 1930.

I SOCRATES , Works. Loeb Library.

伊索克拉特 , 作品。 Loeb图书馆。

K AUTSKY , K ARL , Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation. London, 1897.

KAUTSKY, KARL, 《 改革时期中欧的共产主义》。 伦敦,1897年。

L ANE , E DWARD , Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, 2 V . London, 1846.

LANE , EDWARD , Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, 2V.伦敦,1846年。

L EMAÎTRE , J ULES , Jean Jacques Rousseau. New York, 1907.

LEMAÎTRE, JULES, Jean Jacques Rousseau. 纽约,1907年。

P ASCAL , B LAISE , Pensées. Everyman’s Library.

PASCAL, BLAISE , Pensées. Everyman's Library.

P AUL -L OUIS , Ancient Rome at Work. London, 1927.

PAUL-LOUIS ,《 工作中的古罗马》。 伦敦,1927年。

P LATO , Dialogues, tr. Jowett, 4 V . New York: Jefferson Press, n.d.

PLATO , Dialogues, tr. Jowett, 4V.纽约。杰斐逊出版社,未发表。

P LUTARCH , Lives, 3 V. Everyman’s Library.

普鲁塔克 , 《生活 》,3V 。 Everyman's Library.

R ENAN , E RNEST , The Apostles. London: Methuen, n.d.

RENAN , ERNEST , The Apostles. 伦敦。Methuen, n.d.

———, Marc Aurèle. Paris: Calman-Lévy, n.d.

-----,马克-奥莱尔。巴 黎。Calman-Lévy, n.d.

S ÉDILLOT , R ENÉ , L’Histoire n’a pas de sens. Paris, 1965.

SÉDILLOT, RENÉ , L'Histoire n'a pas de sens. 巴黎,1965年。

S EEBOHM , F REDERICK , The Age of Johnson. London, 1899.

SEEBOHM, FREDERICK , The Age of Johnson. 伦敦,1899。

S IEGFRIED , A NDRÉ , America Comes of Age. New York, 1927.

SIEGFRIED , ANDRÉ ,《 美国时代的到来》。 纽约,1927年。

S PENGLER , O SWALD , The Decline of the West, 2 V. New York, 1927.

SPENGLER , OSWALD , The Decline of the West, 2V . New York, 1927.

T HUCYDIDES , History of the Peloponnesian War. Everyman’s Library.

THUCYDIDES , 《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》。 Everyman's Library.

T ODD , A. J., Theories of Social Progress. New York, 1934.

TODD, A. J., Theories of Social Progress. New York, 1934.

T OYNBEE , A RNOLD J., A Study of History, IOV . London, 1934f.

TOYNBEE , ARNOLD J., A Study of History, IOV .伦敦,1934f.





1. Sédillot, René, L’Histoire n’a pas de sens.

1. Sédillot, René, L'Histoire n'a pas de sens.

2. Durant, Our Oriental Heritage, 12.

2. 杜兰特,《 我们的东方遗产》, 12。

3. Age of Faith, 979.

3. 信仰的时代, 979。

4. Sédillot, 167.

4. Sédillot, 167.

5. The Reformation, viii.

5. The Reformation, viii.

6. The Age of Reason Begins, 267.

6. 理性时代的开始, 267。



7. Pascal, Pensées, No. 347.

7. Pascal, Pensées, No. 347.

8. Plato, Phaedo, No. 109.

8. 柏拉图, 《斐多》, 第109号。



9. Caesar and Christ, 193, 223,666.

9. 凯撒和基督, 193,223,666。



10. Gobineau, Inequality of Human Races, XV, 210.

10. Gobineau,《 人类种族的不平等》, 第十五章,210。

11. Ibid., 211.

11. 同上。 211.

12. Ibid., 36–7.

12. 同上, 36-7。

13. In Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress, 276.

13. 在Todd, A. J., Theories of Social Progress, 276.

14. See Our Oriental Heritage, 934–38.

14. 见 《我们的东方遗产》, 934-38。



15. Caesar and Christ, 211.

15. 凯撒和基督, 211。

16. The Renaissance, 576.

16. 文艺复兴, 576。

17. Our Oriental Heritage, 275.

17. 我们的东方遗产》, 275页。

18. The Reformation, 761.

18. 改革, 761。

19. The Age of Reason Begins, 394.

19. 理性时代的开始, 394。

20. The Age of Voltaire, 64.

20. 伏尔泰的时代》, 64。

21. Our Oriental Heritage, 265.

21. 我们的东方遗产》, 265页。

22. The Reformation, 763.

22. 改革, 763。

23. The Age of Voltaire, 487.

23. 伏尔泰的时代》, 487。

24. Gibbon, Edward, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, I, 314.

24. 吉本,爱德华,《 罗马帝国的衰落与灭亡》, I, 314。



25. Caesar and Christ, 296–97.

25. 凯撒和基督, 296-97。

26. The Age of Faith, 525–26.

26. 信仰的时代》, 525-26。

27. Plato, Laivs, No. 948.

27. 柏拉图, Laivs, 第948号。

28. Our Oriental Heritage, 205–13.

28. 我们的东方遗产》, 205-13。

29. Ibid., 416–19,434, 504.

29. 同上, 416-19,434,504。

30. Renan, The Apostles, xxxiii.

30. 勒南,《 使徒》,第三十三章。

31. Lemaître, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 9.

31. Lemaître, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 9.

32. Durant, The Mansions of Philosophy, 568.

32. Durant, The Mansions of Philosophy, 568.



33. The Reformation, 752.

33. 宗教改革, 752.

34. The Age of Louis XIV, 720.

34. 路易十四的时代》, 720页。

35. Plutarch, Life of Solon.

35. 普鲁塔克,《 索隆的生活》。

36. The Life of Greece, 112–18.

36. 希腊的生活》, 112-18。

37. Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus.

37. 普鲁塔克, 提比略-格拉丘斯。

38. Caesar and Christ, 111–22, 14244,180–208.

38. 凯撒和基督, 111-22,14244,180-208。



39. Encyclopaedia Britannica, II, 962b.

39. 大英百科全书》, 二,962b。

40. Our Oriental Heritage, 231. We have revised the date there given for Hammurabi.

40. 我们的东方遗产》, 231页。我们修改了那里给出的汉谟拉比的日期。

41. The Life of Greece, 587–92.

41. 希腊的生活》, 587-92。

42. Paul-Louis, Ancient Rome at Work, 283–85.

42. 保罗-路易斯,《 工作中的古罗马》, 283-85。

43. Caesar and Christ, 641 f.

43. 凯撒和基督, 641页。

44. Szuma Ch’ien in Granet, Marcel, Chinese Civilization, 113.

44. Szuma Ch'ien in Granet, Marcel, Chinese Civilization, 113.

45. Ibid.

45. 同上。

46. Our Oriental Heritage, 700f. The dates there given are being revised for a new edition.

46. 我们的东方遗产》,700页。 那里给出的日期正在为新版本进行修订。

47. Gowen and Hall, Outline History of China, 142.

47. Gowen and Hall, Outline History of China, 142.

48. In Carter, Thomas, The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward, 183.

48. 在卡特,托马斯,《 中国印刷术的发明及其向西传播》, 183。

49. Our Oriental Heritage, 724–26.

49. 我们的东方遗产》, 724-26。

50. The Age of Reason Begins, 249–51

50. 理性时代的开始, 249-51

51. Kautsky, Karl, Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation, 121, 130.

51. 卡尔-考茨基,《 改革时期中欧的共产主义》, 121,130。

52. The Reformation, 383, 391, 398–401.

52. 宗教改革, 383, 391, 398-401.



53. Renan, Marc Aurele, 479.

53. 雷南, 马克-奥雷尔, 479。

54. Gibbon, Decline and Fall, 1,31.

54. 吉本,《 衰落与毁灭》, 1,31。

55. Gomme, A. W., The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. , 21, 26, 47; Life of Greece, 254.

55. Gomme, A. W., The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B .C. , 21, 26, 47; Life of Greece, 254.

56. Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, iii 10; Life of Greece, 284.

56. 修昔底德, 伯罗奔尼撒战争, 三10; 希腊的生活, 284。

57. Plato, The Republic, Nos. 56064.

57. 柏拉图, 《共和国》, 第56064号。

58. lbid, No. 422.

58. lbid, 第422号。

59. Aristotle, Politics, No. 1310.

59. 亚里士多德,《 政治学》, 第1310期。

60. Isocrates, Works, “Archidamus,” No. 67.

60. 伊索克拉底, 作品, "阿基达摩斯",第67号。

61. This paragraph has been copied from The Life of Greece, 46466.

61. 本段抄自 《希腊的生活》, 46466。

62. Caesar and Christ, 128–30.

62. 凯撒和基督, 128-30。

63. Ibid.

63. 同上。



64. Our Oriental Heritage, 446.

64. 我们的东方遗产》, 446页。

65. Caesar and Christ, 218.

65. 凯撒和基督, 218。

66. In Seebohm, The Age of Johnson, xiii.

66. 在Seebohm, The Age of Johnson, xiii.



67. Our Oriental Heritage, I.

67. 我们的东方遗产,I.

68. See The Mansions of Philosophy, 355; Toynbee, A Study of History, IV, 27f.

68. 见 《哲学的大厦》, 355;汤因比,《 历史研究》, 四,27f。

69. Quoted from Bazard’s Exposition de la doctrine Saint-Simonienne, in Toynbee, I, 199.

69. 引自Bazard的 Exposition de la doctrine Saint-Simonienne, in Toynbee, I, 199.

70. Spengler, Decline of the West, 1 353, 90, 38.

70. 斯宾格勒,《 西方的衰落》,1 353,90,38。

71. This is the initial theory of Toynbee’s Study of History, I, 271f.

71. 这就是汤因比《 历史研究 》的最初理论 , I,271f。



72. This section appropriates some passages from an essay on the same subject in The Mansions of Philosophy.

72. 本节挪用了 《哲学的大厦》 中关于同一主题的文章中的一些段落。

73. Anon, in Bagehot, Physics and Politics, 110.

73. Anon, in Bagehot, Physics and Politics, 110.

74. Ecclesiastes, i, 18.

74. 传道书》,一,18。

75. Lane, Edward, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, II, 66.

75. 莱恩,爱德华, 现代埃及人的礼仪和习俗,二,66。

76. Our Oriental Heritage, 237.

76. 我们的东方遗产》, 237页。

77. Todd, Theories of Social Progress, 135.

77. 托德,《 社会进步的理论》, 135。

78. Siegfried, André, America Comes of Age, 176.

78. Siegfried, André, America Comes of Age, 176.

79. Rousseau and Revolution, Ch. II, Sec. iii, William Coxe, History of the House of Austria, III, 379.

79. 卢梭与革命》, 第二章,第三节,威廉-考克斯,《 奥地利家族史》, 三,379。

* We should add that some historians consider the age of the Antonines as an unsuccessful “rally” in the decay of Rome. See Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1934 f.), IV, 60.

* 我们应该补充的是,一些历史学家认为安东尼时代是罗马衰落过程中一次不成功的 "反弹"。见Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London, 1934 f.), IV, 60.

* See Taine’s unforgettable description in The French Revolution (New York, 1931), II, 209–33.

* 见泰因在 《法国大革命》 (纽约,1931年)中的难忘描述,二,209-33。



Dates in parentheses following a name are of birth and death except when preceded by r., when they indicate duration of reign for popes and rulers of states. A single date preceded by ft. denotes a floruit. A footnote is indicated by an asterisk. All dates are A.D. unless otherwise noted.

名字后面括号里的日期是出生和死亡日期,除非前面有r.,否则表示教皇和国家统治者的在位时间。单个日期前面加上 ft. 前面的单一日期是指一个 花名。 脚注则用星号表示。除非另有说明,所有日期均为 公元 。

Abélard, Pierre (1079–1142), 53

Abélard, Pierre (1079-1142), 53

Achaeans, 27

阿凯亚人, 27

Actium, 57

阿克托姆, 57

Aeschines (389–314 B.C. ), 100

Aeschines( 公元前 389-314年), 100 岁。

Aeschylus (525–456 B.C. ), 97

埃斯库罗斯( 公元前 525-456年), 97年

Africa, 30 , 84

非洲, 30 , 84

agriculture, 16 –17, 110

农业, 16-17 ,110

     mechanization, technological advances, 22 , 54 , 58

机械化,技术进步, 22 , 54 , 58

     a stage in economic history, 37 , 38 , 39 , 41 , 47 , 88

经济史上的一个阶段, 37 , 38 , 39 , 41 , 47 , 88

     state ownership or control of, 59 –64 passim

国家所有权或控制权, 59-64 页

airplane, impact on civilization, 16

飞机,对文明的影响, 16

Alcibiades (c. 450–404 B.C. ), 39, 99

Alcibiades(约 公元前 450-404年),39, 99

Alexander the Great, King of Macedon (r. 336–323 B.C. ), 12

亚历山大大帝,马其顿国王( 公元前 336-323年),12

Alexandria, 60

亚历山大, 60 岁

Alpine peoples, 27 , 28

阿尔卑斯山民族, 27 , 28

America, 28 , 39 , 40 , 53 , 94

美国, 28 , 39 , 40 , 53 , 94

     contemporary painting in, 97

当代绘画, 97

     progress in, 97– 99

的进展, 97- 99

      see also N ORTH A MERICA

另见 北美洲





American Revolution, 76

美国革命, 76

Amon, religion of, 49

阿蒙的宗教, 49

Anabaptists, 65

再洗礼派, 65

anarchism, 65

无政府主义, 65

Angkor Wat, 29

吴哥窟, 29

Angles, 27 , 30

角度, 27 , 30

Anglican Church, 50

英国圣公会, 50

Anglo-Saxon law, 76

盎格鲁-撒克逊法律, 76

Anglo-Saxons in America, 23 , 27 , 31 , 48

美国的盎格鲁-撒克逊人, 23 , 27 , 31 , 48

Antoninus Pius, Emperor of Rome (r. 138–161), 69

安东尼努斯-皮乌斯,罗马皇帝(r. 138-161), 69

Antony, Mark (83–30 B.C. ), 39 , 56 –57

安东尼,马克( 公元前 83-30), 39 , 56-57

Arabs, 97

阿拉伯人, 97

architecture, 97

建筑, 97

Aretino, Pietro (1492–1556), 40

Aretino, Pietro (1492-1556), 40

Argos, 75

阿尔戈斯, 75

Ariosto, Lodovico (1474–1533), 40

Ariosto, Lodovico (1474-1533), 40

aristocracy, 70 –71, 75 , 76 , 82

贵族阶层, 70-71 , 75 , 76 , 82

     and French Revolution, 57

和法国革命, 57

     and government, 70 , 73 , 75 , 76 , 90

和政府, 70 , 73 , 75 , 76 , 90

     and the arts, 70 , 73 , 78

和艺术, 70 , 73 , 78

Aristophanes (450?–385 B.C. ), 100

Aristophanes (450?-385 B .C ), 100

Aristotle (384–322 B.C. ), 74 , 93

亚里士多德( 公元前 384-322年), 74 , 93

art and artists, 29 , 31 , 70 –71, 78 , 95

艺术和艺术家, 29 、 31 、 70-71 、 78 、 95

     of Periclean Athens, 73

雅典时期, 73

     an aspect of civilization, 87 , 97 , 100 , 102

文明的一个方面, 87 , 97 , 100 , 102

Aryan race, 25 –28 passim

雅利安人种, 25-28 页

Ashoka, King of Magadha (r. 273–232 B.C. ), 82 , 84

阿育王,摩揭陀国王( 公元前 273-232年), 82 , 84

Asia, 15 , 53 , 84 , 90 , 96

亚洲, 15 , 53 , 84 , 90 , 96

Asia Minor, 27 , 29

小亚细亚, 27 , 29

Assyria, 29 , 40

亚述, 29 , 40

atheism, 49 , 50

无神论, 49 , 50

Athens, 27 , 29 , 73 , 100

雅典, 27 , 29 , 73 , 100

     democracy of, 26 , 73 –75, 79 , 99

的民主, 26 , 73-75 , 79 , 99

     class war in, 55 –56, 73

的阶级斗争, 55-56 , 73

     and Peloponnesian War, 27 , 73

和伯罗奔尼撒战争, 27 , 73

Atlantic Ocean, 16

大西洋, 16

Attica, 27 , 72 , 99

阿提卡, 27 , 72 , 99

Augsburg, 54

奥格斯堡, 54

Augustus, Caius Octavius, Emperor of Rome (r. 27 B.C-A.D. 14), 23 , 76 , 82 , 100

奥古斯都,卡厄斯-屋大维,罗马皇帝( 公元前 27年 -公元 14年), 23 , 76 , 82 , 100

     and war, 39 , 52 –53, 57 , 60 , 82 , 84 –85

和战争, 39 , 52-53 , 57 , 60 , 82 , 84-85

     and conquest of Egypt, 52 –53, 60

和对埃及的征服, 52-53 , 60

     and Pax Romana, 57 , 69 , 86

和大同世界, 57 , 69 , 86

Aurelius, Marcus, see M ARCUS A URELIUS A NTONINUS


Austerlitz, 65

奥斯特里茨, 65

Australia, 28 , 84 , 97

澳大利亚, 28 , 84 , 97

Austria, 15

奥地利, 15

Aztecs, 28

阿兹特克人, 28 岁

Babylonia, 29 , 44 , 59

巴比伦, 29 , 44 , 59

Bach, Johann Christian (1735–82), 41

巴赫,约翰-克里斯蒂安(1735-82), 41

Bacon, Francis (1561–1626), 46 –47, 95

培根,弗朗西斯(1561-1626), 46-47 , 95

Balkans, the, 27 , 29

巴尔干半岛, 27 , 29

bankers and banking, 53 , 54 , 59 , 74 , 91

银行家和银行业务, 53 , 54 , 59 , 74 , 91

Bayle, Pierre (1647–1706), 47

Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 47

Berkeley, George (1685–1753), 16

Berkeley, George (1685-1753), 16

Bernhardi, Friedrich von (1849–1930), 26

伯恩哈迪,弗里德里希-冯(1849-1930), 26

Bible, 24 , 29 , 47 , 60 , 64

圣经, 24 , 29 , 47 , 60 , 64

biology and history, 18 –24, 46

生物学和历史, 18-24 , 46

birth control, 22 –23, 38 , 39 , 52

节育, 22-23 , 38 , 39 , 52

birth rate, 21 , 22 , 23 , 28 , 83 , 101

出生率, 21 , 22 , 23 , 28 , 83 , 101

Bismarck, Otto von (1815–98), 68

俾斯麦,奥托-冯(1815-98), 68

Black, Joseph (1728–99), 41

布莱克,约瑟夫(1728-99), 41

Boswell, James (1740–95), 41

博斯韦尔,詹姆斯(1740-95), 41

Brazil, 16

巴西, 16岁

Buckle, Henry Thomas (1821–62), 15

Buckle, Henry Thomas (1821-62), 15

Buddha (563?–?483 B.C. ), 49 , 53

佛陀( 公元前 563-483年), 49 , 53

Burke, Edmund (1729–97), 71 , 85 , 100

Burke, Edmund (1729-97), 71 , 85 , 100

Caesar, Caius Julius (100–44 B.C. ), 21 , 23 , 39 , 56 , 69 , 76

凯撒,凯乌斯-朱利叶斯( 公元前 100-44), 21 , 23 , 39 , 56 , 69 , 76

Cairo, 97

开罗, 97

Caligula (Caius Caesar Germanicus). Emperor of Rome (r. 37–41), 69

卡里古拉(Caius Caesar Germanicus)。罗马皇帝(R. 37-41), 69

Calvin, John (1509–64), 20 , 23

卡尔文,约翰(1509-64), 20 , 23

Canada, 22 , 79

加拿大, 22 , 79

Canossa, 45

卡诺萨, 45 岁

capitalism and capitalists, 47 , 48 , 54 , 58 –59, 65 , 66 , 67 , 83

资本主义和资本家, 47 、 48 、 54 、 58-59 、 65 、 66 、 67 、 83

Carlyle, Thomas (1795–1881), 34

卡莱尔,托马斯(1795-1881), 34

Carthage, 29

迦太基, 29

caste system, 27

种姓制度, 27

Catholicism, 23 , 24 , 47 , 49

天主教, 23 , 24 , 47 , 49

      see also R OMAN C ATHOLIC C HURCH

另见 罗马 天主教 教会

Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina 108?–62 B.C. ), 56

卡蒂伦(Lucius Sergius Catilina, 公元前 108年-62年), 56 岁。

Celts, 30

凯尔特人, 30岁

Central America, 15

中美洲, 15

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart (1855–1927), 26

张伯伦,休斯顿-斯图尔特(1855-1927), 26

character and history, 32 –36

特征和历史, 32-36

Charlemagne, King of the Franks (r. 768–814), Emperor of the West (r. 800–814), 28

查理曼,法兰克人国王(768-814年),西方皇帝(800-814年), 28 岁

Charles Martel (688?–741), 82

查尔斯-马泰尔(688?-741), 82 岁

Chatham, William Pitt, Earl of (1708–1778), 100

Chatham, William Pitt, Earl of (1708-1778), 100

Chaumette, Pierre Gaspard (1763–94), 49

Chaumette, Pierre Gaspard (1763-94), 49

Chephren (or Khafre), King of Egypt r. c. 2850 B.C. ), 97

Chephren(或Khafre),埃及国王,约 公元前 2850年), 97 岁。

China, 15 , 16 , 28 , 61 , 62 –63, 85

中国, 15 , 16 , 28 , 61 , 62-63 , 85

Christianity, 29 , 46 , 47 , 50 , 93

基督教, 29 , 46 , 47 , 50 , 93

Churchill, Winston (1874–1965), 35

温斯顿-丘吉尔(1874-1965), 35

Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106–43 B.C. ), 56

西塞罗,马库斯-图利乌斯( 公元前 106-43), 56 岁

Cimmerians, 27

Cimmerians, 27

civilization, 13 , 17 , 20 , 41 , 54 , 88 , 97 , 100 , 101

文明, 13 , 17 , 20 , 41 , 54 , 88 , 97 , 100 , 101

     climate and, 15

气候和, 15

     airplane’s effect on, 16

飞机的影响, 16

     birth rate and, 21

出生率和, 21

     race and, 25 , 26 , 28 –31

种族和, 25 , 26 , 28-31

     growth and decay of, 41 , 87 , 88 , 91 –94

增长和衰落, 41 , 87 , 88 , 91-94

     war and, 42 , 81 , 82

战争和, 42 , 81 , 82

     definition of, 87

的定义, 87

     Spengler’s view of, 89 –90

斯宾格勒的观点, 89-90

classes, 34 , 55 –56

类, 34 , 55-56

     conflict between, 36 , 43 , 52 –53, 62 –63, 69 , 73 , 75 , 79 , 92

之间的冲突, 36 , 43 , 52-53 , 62-63 , 69 , 73 , 75 , 79 , 92

Cleland, John (fl. c. 1749), 40

Cleland, John (fl. c. 1749), 40

Cleopatra VII, Queen of Egypt (r. 51–49, 48–30 B.C. ), 52

埃及女王克里奥帕特拉七世(统治时期: 公元前 51-49年,48-30年), 52

climate and history, 14 , 15 , 30 , 92

气候和历史, 14 , 15 , 30 , 92

Clovis I, King of the Franks (r. 481–511), 28

弗兰克斯国王克洛维斯一世(481-511年), 28

Columbus, Christopher (1446?–1506), 16

哥伦布,克里斯托弗(1446?-1506), 16

Commodus, Lucius Aelius Aurelius, Emperor of Rome (r. 180–192), 69

Commodus,Lucius Aelius Aurelius,罗马皇帝(180-192), 69

Communism, 54 , 64 –65, 83 –84

共产主义, 54 , 64-65 , 83-84

     and religion, 43 , 48 , 49 , 51 , 64 –65

和宗教, 43 , 48 , 49 , 51 , 64-65

     in Russia, 65 –66, 83

在俄罗斯, 65-66 , 83

     in Europe, 84 , 89

在欧洲, 84 , 89

Communist Manifesto, 65

共产党宣言》。 65

competition, 18 , 70 , 81 , 86 , 92 , 95

竞争, 18 , 70 , 81 , 86 , 92 , 95

     first biological lesson of history, 19 , 20 , 21

历史上的第一堂生物课, 19 、 20 、 21

     as a spur to capitalist achievement, 58 , 59 , 66

作为对资本主义成就的鞭策, 58 、 59 、 66

Compte, Auguste (1798–1857), 88

Compte, Auguste (1798-1857), 88

Concordat of 1807, 49

1807年的协约, 49

Confucius (551–479 B.C. ), 97

孔子( 公元前 551-479年), 97

Constantine I the Great, Emperor of Rome (r. 306?–337), 45

君士坦丁一世大帝,罗马皇帝(306?-337年), 45 岁

Copernicus, Nicolaus (1473–1543), 46

哥白尼(Nicolaus)(1473-1543), 46

Corcyra (Corfu), 73

科西拉(科孚岛), 73

Cowper, William (1731–1800), 12

考珀,威廉(1731-1800), 12

Crete, 27 , 29

克里特岛, 27 , 29

Cromwell, Oliver, Lord Protector of England (r. 1653–58), 65

克伦威尔,奥利弗,英国护国公(1653-58), 65

Crotona, Greek colony at, 29

Crotona,希腊殖民地, 29

Crusades, the, 28 , 53

十字军东征, 28 , 53

Danes, 30

丹麦人, 30岁

Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), 26

但丁-阿利吉耶里(1265-1321), 26 岁

Dardanelles, 52

达达尼尔海峡, 52

Declaration of Independence, 19

独立宣言》, 19

Declaration of the Rights of Man, 19

人的权利宣言》, 19

deists, English, 47

神学家,英国, 47

Delian Confederacy, 52

Delian Confederacy, 52

democracy, 52 , 58 , 69 –81 passim; in Athens, 26 , 73 –75

民主, 52 , 58 , 69-81 passim; 在雅典, 26 , 73-75

     and concentration of wealth, 55 , 70

和财富的集中, 55 , 70

     in America, 72 , 77–79

在美国, 72 ,77-79

     and education, 79

和教育, 79

Democritus (fl. 400 B.C. ), 93

德谟克利特(约 公元前 400年), 93 岁

Demosthenes (385?—322 B.C. ), 100

Demosthenes (385?-322 B .C ), 100

Denmark, 79

丹麦, 79

Descartes, René (1596–1650), 97

笛卡尔,勒内(1596-1650), 97

Desmoulins, Camille (1760–94), 28

Desmoulins, Camille (1760-94), 28

dictatorship, 75 , 76 , 79

独裁统治, 75 , 76 , 79

Diderot, Denis (1713–84), 93 , 100

狄德罗,丹尼斯(1713-84), 93 , 100

Diocletian, Emperor of Rome (r. 284–305), 60 –61

戴克里先,罗马皇帝(284-305年), 60-61

Diogenes (412?–323 B.C. ), 93

第欧根尼( 公元前 412年-323年), 93 岁。

Domitian, Emperor of Rome (r. 81–96), 69

多米蒂安,罗马皇帝(81-96年), 69 岁

Donation of Constantine, 45

康斯坦丁的捐赠, 45

Donne, John (1573–1631), 46

多恩,约翰(1573-1631), 46

Dorians, 27 , 29

Dorians, 27 , 29

drama, 73 , 100

戏剧, 73 , 100

Dravidic peoples, 28 –29

Dravidic peoples, 28-29

Durazzo, Greek colony at, 29

杜拉索,希腊殖民地, 29

Dürer, Albrecht (1471–1528), 53

Dürer, Albrecht (1471-1528), 53

East, the, 23 , 53 , 67 , 96 , 100

东方, 23 , 53 , 67 , 96 , 100

economic development, 20 , 58 , 63 , 71 , 77

经济发展, 20 , 58 , 63 , 71 , 77

     three stages in history of, 37 –39

历史上的三个阶段, 37-39

economics and history of man, 52 –57

经济学和人的历史, 52-57

      see also C APITALISM

另见 资本主义



Edictum de pretiis (Diocletian), 60

诏书 》(戴克里先), 60

Edison, Thomas Alva (1847–1931), 35

爱迪生,托马斯-阿尔瓦(1847-1931), 35

education, 22 , 99

教育, 22 , 99

     and intelligence, 23 , 78

和智力, 23 , 78

     and race hate, 31

和种族仇恨, 31

     and religion, 39 , 48 , 49 , 92

和宗教, 39 , 48 , 49 , 92

     in 11 th-century China, 63

在 11世纪的 中国, 63

     government support of, 66 –67, 79

政府的支持, 66-67 , 79

     and civilization, 94 , iqi

和文明, 94 ,Iqi

Egypt, 13 , 29 , 97

埃及, 13 , 29 , 97

     geographical advantages, 15 , 25 , 90

地理优势, 15 , 25 , 90

     religion of, 44 , 49

的宗教, 44 , 49

     Roman conquest of, 52 , 60

罗马人对其的征服, 52 , 60

     state-controlled economy of, 59 –60

国家控制的经济, 59-60

Engels, Friedrich (1820–95), 65

恩格斯,弗里德里希(1820-95), 65

England, 16 , 27 , 28 , 84 , 91 , 100

英国, 16 , 27 , 28 , 84 , 91 , 100

     economic aspects, 16 , 20 , 22 , 72 , 98

经济方面, 16 , 20 , 22 , 72 , 98

     and France, 21 , 82

和法国, 21 , 82

     and Western civilization, 30 , 31 , 83 , 84

和西方文明, 30 , 31 , 83 , 84

     morals and religion in, 40 , 42 , 47 , 50

道德和宗教, 40 , 42 , 47 , 50

     and Levellers’ Utopian aims, 65

和征收者的乌托邦目标, 65

     democracy in, 79 , 84 , 99

民主在, 79 , 84 , 99

English people, 27 , 28 , 30 , 34 , 82

英国人, 27 , 28 , 30 , 34 , 82

Enlightenment, French, 24 , 47 , 101

启蒙运动,法国, 24 , 47 , 101

Enlightenment, Greek, 49

启蒙运动,希腊, 49

Ephesus, 29

以弗所, 29

Epicurus (342?–270 B.C. ), 93

伊壁鸠鲁( 公元前 342-270年), 93 岁

equality and freedom, opposites, 20

平等和自由,对立面, 20

Erasmus, Desiderius (1466?–1536), 71

Erasmus, Desiderius (1466?-1536), 71

Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (Gobineau), 25

关于人类种族不平等的论文》 (戈比诺), 25 页

Essay on Population (Malthus), 21

人口论》 (马尔萨斯), 21

Etruria, 29

Etruria, 29

Europe, 16 , 40 , 82 –84, 94 , 96 , 99

欧洲, 16 , 40 , 82-84 , 94 , 96 , 99

     birth rate in, 22 , 28

出生率, 22 , 28

     racial differences in, 27 –29

种族 差异, 27-29

     morals and religion in, 29 , 39 , 40 , 93

道德和宗教, 29 , 39 , 40 , 93

      see also W ESTERN E UROPE

另见 西欧

evolution, 18 , 34

进化, 18 , 34

Eyck, Hubert van (1366?–1426), 97 Eyck, Jan van (1370?–1440), 97

Eyck, Hubert van (1366?-1426), 97 Eyck, Jan van (1370?-1440), 97

False Decretals, 45

虚假的信条, 45

Farinelli, Carlo Broschi (1705–82), 41

Farinelli, Carlo Broschi (1705-82), 41

Florence, 16 , 28 , 53 , 54

佛罗伦萨, 16 , 28 , 53 , 54

food supply and population, 21 –22

粮食供应和人口, 21-22

Ford, Henry (1863–1947), 35

福特,亨利(1863-1947), 35

Fox, Charles James (1749–1806), 71 , 100

福克斯,查尔斯-詹姆斯(1749-1806), 71 , 100

France, 16 , 21 , 27 , 28 , 70 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 100

法国, 16 , 21 , 27 , 28 , 70 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 100

     population and food supply, 21 –22

人口和粮食供应, 21-22

     and the Church, 23 , 24 , 45 , 48 –51

和教会, 23 , 24 , 45 , 48-51

     Religious Wars of, 45 , 82

的宗教战争, 45 , 82

Franks, 21 , 27 , 28

弗兰克斯, 21 , 27 , 28

Frederick II the Great, King of Prussia (r. 1740–86), 12, 82 , 100

普鲁士国王腓特烈二世(1740-86年),12, 82 , 100

freedom and equality, opposites, 20

自由和平等,对立面, 20

French Revolution, 19 , 28 , 53 , 57 , 70 , 71 , 72

法国革命, 19 , 28 , 53 , 57 , 70 , 71 , 72

     religious issue in, 47 , 50

宗教问题, 47 , 50

     and September Massacres, 53 , 72

和九月大屠杀, 53 , 72

     Wars of the, 82

的战争, 82

French Revolution, The (Taine), 72 *

法国大革命, (泰恩), 72* 。

Fugger family, 54

福格尔家族, 54

Gama, Vasco da (1469?–1524), 16

加玛,瓦斯科-达(1469?-1524), 16 岁

gambling, 40

赌博, 40

Gaul, 21 , 27 , 28

高卢, 21 , 27 , 28

Genghis Khan, Mongol ruler (r. 1206–1227), 46 , 83

成吉思汗,蒙古统治者(1206-1227), 46 , 83

Genoa, 16

热那亚, 16

geography and history, 15 –17, 29 , 30

地理和历史, 15-17 , 29 , 30

geology and history, 14

地质学和历史, 14

Germany, 15 , 21 , 23 , 27 , 64 , 65 , 85

德国, 15 , 21 , 23 , 27 , 64 , 65 , 85

     food supply and birth rate, 22

粮食供应和出生率, 22

     racist theories, 26 –27

种族主义理论, 26-27

     the Church and Thirty Years’ War, 45

教会与三十年战争, 45

     West Germany, 84

西德, 84

Gibbon, Edward (1737–94), 41 , 69 , 100

吉本,爱德华(1737-94), 41 , 69 , 100

Gobineau, Comte Joseph-Arthur de 1816–82), 25

Gobineau, Comte Joseph-Arthur de 1816-82), 25

God, death of, 47 , 48 , 49

上帝的死亡, 47 , 48 , 49

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832), 90

歌德,约翰-沃尔夫冈-冯(1749-1832), 90

Golden Rule, 84

黄金法则, 84

Gordon riots (London, 1780), 53

戈登骚乱(伦敦,1780), 53

Goths, 27

Goths, 27

government and history, 68 –80

政府和历史, 68-80

Gracchus, Caius Sempronius (153–121 B.C. ), 56 , 69 , 76

Gracchus, Caius Sempronius ( 公元前 153-121), 56 , 69 , 76

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius (162?–133 B.C. ), 56 , 69

Gracchus, Tiberius Sempronius (162?-133 B.C ), 56 , 69

Grant, Madison (1865–1937), 27 –28

格兰特,麦迪逊(1865-1937), 27-28

Great Britain, see E NGLAND

大不列颠, 见 ENGLAND

Greece, 23 , 34 , 52 , 94

希腊, 23 , 34 , 52 , 94

     colonies of, 16 , 29

殖民地, 16 , 29

     conquest of, 23 , 27 , 76

征服, 23 , 27 , 76

     culture and civilization, 28 , 29 , 93 , 94 , 97 , 101

文化和文明, 28 , 29 , 93 , 94 , 97 , 101

     morals and religion, 40 , 41 , 49 , 93

道德和宗教, 40 、 41 、 49 、 93

     political struggles in, 73 –75

的政治斗争, 73-75

      see also A THENS

另见 《雅典》杂志

Gregory VII (Hildebrand), Pope (r. 1073–85), 45

格雷戈里七世(Hildebrand),教皇(1073-85年), 45 岁。

growth and decay, 87 –94

增长和衰落, 87-94

Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (Chamberlain), 26

新世纪的基础 (张伯伦), 26

Hadrian, Emperor of Rome (r. 117–138), 69

哈德良,罗马皇帝(117-138年), 69 岁

Hammurabi, King of Babylonia (r. 1750?–?1708 B.C. ), 44 , 59

汉谟拉比,巴比伦尼亚国王( 公元前 1750?-?1708年), 44 , 59

Haydn, Franz Joseph (1732–1809), 41

海顿,弗朗茨-约瑟夫(1732-1809), 41

Hébert, Jacques René (1757–94), 49

Hébert, Jacques René (1757-94), 49

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770–1831), 66

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831), 66

hell, disappearance of idea of, 47 –48

地狱观念的消失, 47-48

Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor (r. 1056–1106), 45

亨利四世,神圣罗马皇帝(1056-1106年), 45

Heracleitus (6th-5th century B.C. ), 29 , 81

Heracleitus( 公元前 6-5世纪), 29 , 81

Hermes, statue of, 97

赫尔墨斯的雕像, 97

Herodotus (5th century B.C. ), 100

希罗多德( 公元前 5世纪), 100

Hiroshima, 85

广岛, 85

Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945), 27 , 53 , 83

希特勒,阿道夫(1889-1945), 27 , 53 , 83

Hobbes, Thomas (1588–1679), 93

霍布斯,托马斯(1588-1679), 93

Holbein, Hans, the Younger (1497?–1543), 97

霍尔拜因,小汉斯(1497?-1543), 97

Holy Alliance of 1815, 85

1815年的神圣联盟, 85

Homer (9th century B.C. ), 93

荷马( 公元前 9世纪), 93 岁

homosexualism, 40

同性恋主义, 40

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus 65–8 B.C. ), 53

贺拉斯(Quintus Horatius Flaccus 公元前 65-8年), 53 岁

human nature, 11 , 32 –36, 88 , 95

人性, 11 , 32-36 , 88 , 95

hunting, a stage in economic history, 37 –38

狩猎,经济史上的一个阶段, 37-38

Hut, Hans (fl. 1530), 65

胡特,汉斯(1530年), 65

Ikhnaton (Amenhotep IV), King of Egypt (r. 1380?–1362 B.C. ), 49

埃及国王伊赫纳顿(阿门霍特普四世)( 公元前 1380?-1362年), 49 岁

Ilium, 52

Ilium, 52

Incas, 28 , 63 –64

印加人, 28 , 63-64

India, 15 , 27 , 28 –29, 49 , 53 , 84

印度, 15 , 27 , 28-29 , 49 , 53 , 84

Indians, North American, 25 , 26

印第安人,北美, 25 , 26

Indians, South American, 64

印第安人,南美人, 64

      see also I NCAS


Industrial Revolution, 39 , 48 , 52 , 65 , 66 ,

工业革命, 39 , 48 , 52 , 65 , 66 。

industry, a stage in economic history, 37 –38, 39 , 47 , 88

工业,经济史上的一个阶段, 37-38 , 39 , 47 , 88

inequality of men, 20 , 43 , 72 , 92

男人的不平等, 20 , 43 , 72 , 92

Innocent III (Giovanni Lotario de’ Conti), Pope (r. 1198–1216), 45

英诺森三世(Giovanni Lotario de' Conti),教皇(1198-1216年), 45 岁。

Inquisition, 45

宗教裁判所, 45

international law, 81 , 83 , 86

国际法, 81 , 83 , 86

Islam, 29

伊斯兰教, 29

Isocrates (436–338 B.C. ), 75 , 100

伊索克拉底( 公元前 436-338年), 75 , 100

Israel, 17

以色列, 17岁

Italy, 15 , 23 , 27 , 28 , 30 , ioi

意大利、 15 、 23 、 27 、 28 、 30 、IOI

     morals and religion, 40 , 41 , 48

道德和宗教, 40 , 41 , 48

     Communist Party in, 84

共产党在, 84

Jackson, Andrew (1767–1845), 72

杰克逊,安德鲁(1767-1845), 72

Jacqueries, 57

Jacqueries, 57

Japan, 16 , 53 , 84

日本, 16 , 53 , 84

Jefferson, Thomas (1743–1826), 77

杰斐逊,托马斯(1743-1826), 77

Jesuits, 45 , 64

耶稣会士, 45 , 64

Jesus Christ, 12 , 15 , 26 , 28 , 46 , 48

耶稣基督, 12 , 15 , 26 , 28 , 46 , 48

Jews, 29 , 37 , 44

犹太人, 29 , 37 , 44

John of Leiden (1509–36), 65

莱顿的约翰(1509-36), 65

Jutes, 30

朱特, 30

Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), 93

康德,伊曼纽尔(1724-1804), 93

Kapital, Das (Marx), 65

Kapital, Das (Marx), 65

Keats, John (1795–1821), 53

济慈,约翰(1795-1821), 53

Khmers, 29 Koran, 24 , 29

高棉人, 29 《古兰经》, 24 , 29

labor and unemployment, 60 , 62 , 63

劳动和失业, 60 , 62 , 63

laissez-faire, 30 , 63

放任自流, 30 , 63

Lane, Edward (1801–76), 97

莱恩,爱德华(1801-76), 97

language, 31 , 100

语言, 31 , 100

Latin America, 26 , 90

拉丁美洲, 26 , 90

      see also S OUTH A MERICA

另见 南美

law, 19 , 35 , 37 , 44 , 48 , 50 , 76 , 81 , 87

法律, 19 , 35 , 37 , 44 , 48 , 50 , 76 , 81 , 87

      see also I NTERNATIONAL L AW

另见 《 国际法 》 。

Lenin, Nikolai (1870–1924), 35 , 66

列宁,尼古拉(1870-1924), 35 , 66

Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), 101

达芬奇(1452-1519), 101

Lesbos, 29

莱斯博斯, 29

Levellers, 65

征收者, 65

liberum veto, 68

自由否决权。 68

Lincoln, Abraham (1809–65), 78

林肯,亚伯拉罕(1809-65), 78

literature, 31 , 40 , 52 , 60

文学, 31 , 40 , 52 , 60

     Greek, 41 , 73 , 97

希腊语, 41 , 73 , 97

     and the Church, 49

和教会, 49

     and the aristocracy, 52 , 71

和贵族阶层, 52 , 71

Litta, Conte Cavaliere Agostino (fl. 1755), 41

Litta, Conte Cavaliere Agostino (fl. 1755), 41

Liu family (fl. A.U. 20 ), 62

刘氏家族(花期: 公元 20年 ), 62 岁

Lombards, 28

伦巴第, 28

London, 53 , 54

伦敦, 53 , 54

Louis XIV, King of France (r. 1643–1715), 70

法国国王路易十四(1643-1715年), 70 岁

Lucretius (96?–55 B.C ), 43

Lucretius (96?-55 B .C ), 43 .

Luther, Martin (1483–1546), 23 , 40 , 71

路德,马丁(1483-1546), 23 , 40 , 71

Lycurgus (9th century B.C. ), 29

Lycurgus( 公元前 9世纪), 29 岁

Macedonia, 27 , 75

马其顿, 27 , 75

machines and mechanization, 39 , 47 , 54 , 58

机器和机械化, 39 , 47 , 54 , 58

Madras, 29

马德拉斯, 29

Magna Carta, 76

大宪章》, 76

Maistre, Comte Joseph de (1753–1821), 51

麦斯特,约瑟夫-德伯爵(1753-1821), 51

majorities and minorities, 35 , 55 , 70 , 92

多数派和少数派, 35 , 55 , 70 , 92

Málaga, Greek colony at, 29

马拉加,希腊的殖民地, 29

Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766–1834), 21 –22

马尔萨斯,托马斯-罗伯特(1766-1834), 21-22

Mandura, 29

曼杜拉, 29 岁

Manichaean religion, 46

摩尼教的宗教, 46

manners, 70 , 87 , 96

礼仪, 70 , 87 , 96

Mantua, Duke of (fl. c. 1520–50), 40

曼图亚公爵(约1520-50), 40

Mao Tse-tung (1893– ), 35

毛泽东(1893-), 35

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Emperor of Rome (r. 161–180), 42 , 69 , 86

马库斯-奥雷利乌斯-安东尼,罗马皇帝(161-180年), 42 , 69 , 86

Marius, Caius (157–86 B.C. ), 39 , 56 , 69

马略,凯厄斯( 公元前 157-86), 39 , 56 , 69

Marseilles, Greek colony at, 29

马赛,希腊人的殖民地, 29

Marx, Karl (1818–83), 35 , 52 , 53 , 65 , 66 , 77

马克思,卡尔(1818-83), 35 , 52 , 53 , 65 , 66 , 77

Mayan culture, 28

玛雅文化, 28

Medici, house of, 53 , 54 medicine, 96

美第奇家族, 53 , 54 医学, 96

Mediterranean peoples, 27 , 28 , 75

地中海人民, 27 、 28 、 75

Mediterranean Sea, 16 , 27 , 29 , 75

地中海, 16 , 27 , 29 , 75

Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Cleland), 40

一个快乐女人的回忆录》 (克莱兰), 40

Menés, King of Egypt (r. c. 3500 B.C. ), 44

梅内斯,埃及国王(约 公元前 3500年), 44

Mesopotamia, 15

美索不达米亚, 15

Michelangelo Buonarroti (1475–1564), 48

米开朗基罗-布纳罗蒂(1475-1564), 48 岁

Middle Ages, 44 , 95

中世纪, 44 , 95

Milan, 28

米兰, 28

Miletus, 29

米利都, 29

Moguls, 53

大亨们, 53

Mohammed (570–632), 29 , 35

穆罕默德(570-632), 29 , 35

Mohammedans (Moslems), 24 , 29 , 53 , 83

Mohammedans (Moslems), 24 , 29 , 53 , 83

Molière (Jean Baptiste Poquelin; 1622–1673). 100

莫里哀(Jean Baptiste Poquelin;1622-1673)。 100

Monaco, Greek colony at, 29

摩纳哥,希腊的殖民地, 29

monarchy, 68 –70, 75 , 76

君主制, 68-70 , 75 , 76

money, 54 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 76 , 91

钱, 54 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 76 , 91

Mongols, 53 , 83

蒙古人, 53 , 83

monogamy, 38

一夫一妻制, 38

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de (1533–1592), 40

Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de (1533-1592), 40

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brede et de (1689–1755), 5

孟德斯鸠,夏尔-路易-德-桑塔特,拉布雷德和德男爵(1689-1755), 5

Moors, 53

摩尔人, 53 岁

morals, 31 , 35 , 37 –42, 60 , 70

道德, 31 , 35 , 37-42 , 60 , 70

     and religion, 43 –51, 93 , 96

和宗教, 43-51 , 93 , 96

     contemporary relaxation of, 42 , 52 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 99

当代的放松, 42 , 52 , 88 , 95 , 96 , 99

     and the state, 81 , 87

和国家, 81 , 87

Morgans of New York, 54

纽约的摩根斯公司, 54

Morse, Samuel F. B. (1791–1872), 35

莫尔斯,塞缪尔-F-B.(1791-1872), 35

Moses, 44

摩西, 44 岁

Moslems, see M OHAMMEDANS


Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus (1756–91), 41

莫扎特,沃尔夫冈-阿玛迪斯(1756-91), 41

Münster, Westphalia, 65

威斯特法伦州明斯特, 65

Münzer, Thomas (1489?–1525), 64 –65

Münzer, Thomas (1489?-1525), 64-65

music, 64 , 97

音乐, 64 , 97

Mycenaea, 29

Mycenaea, 29

Mytilene, 75

米提林, 75

Naples, Greek colony at, 29

那不勒斯,希腊的殖民地, 29

Napoleon I, Emperor of the French (r. 1804–14, 1815), 35 , 43 , 49 , 90

拿破仑一世,法国皇帝(1804-14,1815年), 35 , 43 , 49 , 90

Napoleonic Wars, 28

拿破仑战争, 28

nationalism, 45 , 53 , 82

民族主义, 45 , 53 , 82

Negroes, 30

黑人, 30

Neolithic Age, 38

新石器时代, 38

Nero, Emperor of Rome (r. 54–68), 69

尼禄,罗马皇帝(54-68年), 69 岁

Nerva, Marcus Cocceius, Emperor of Rome (r. 96–98), 69

内尔瓦,马库斯-科切乌斯,罗马皇帝(96-98年), 69 岁

Netherlands, the, 84

荷兰, 84

New England, 31

新英格兰, 31

New Zealand, 84

新西兰, 84

Nice, Greek colony at, 29

尼斯,希腊人的殖民地, 29

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844–1900), 23 , 88 , 93

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900), 23 , 88 , 93

Nineveh, 40

尼尼微, 40

Nordic race, 27 –28

北欧赛, 27-28

Normans, 27 –28, 30

诺曼人, 27-28 , 30

North America, 22 , 25 , 28 , 30 , 84

北美洲, 22 , 25 , 28 , 30 , 84

Norway, 79

挪威, 79

Notre Dame de Paris, 100

巴黎圣母院, 100

Numa Pompilius, legendary King of Rome (r. 715–673 B.C. ), 44

努马-庞皮利乌斯,传说中的罗马国王( 公元前 715-673年), 44 岁

Nuremberg, 53

纽伦堡, 53

Octavius, see A UGUSTUS


oligarchy, 70 , 73 , 74 , 75

寡头政治, 70 , 73 , 74 , 75

Oscans, 27

Oscans, 27

“Ozymandias” (Shelley), 87

"Ozymandias"(雪莱), 87

Pacific Ocean, 16

太平洋, 16

paganism, 50

异教, 50

painting, 97

绘画, 97

      see also ART

另见 艺术

Palestine, 29

巴勒斯坦, 29

Palestrina, Giovanni Pierluigi da (1526?–1594), 97

帕莱斯特里纳,乔瓦尼-皮尔路易吉-达(1526?-1594), 97

Palmyra, 16

帕尔米拉, 16 岁

pantheism, 47

泛神论, 47

Paris, 49 , 54

巴黎, 49 , 54

     and French Revolution, 47 , 53 , 72 , 73

和法国革命, 47 , 53 , 72 , 73

Parthenon, 52 , 97 , 100

帕台农神庙, 52 , 97 , 100

Pascal, Blaise (1623–62), 14

帕斯卡尔,布莱斯(1623-62), 14

Passing of the Great Race, The (Grant), 27

大赛的逝去, (格兰特), 27

Pasteur, Louis (1822–95), 35

Pasteur, Louis (1822-95), 35

Paul, Saint (d. 67?), 26

圣保罗(卒于67年), 26

Pax Romana, 57 , 69

大同协会, 57 , 69

Péguy, Charles Pierre (1873–1914), 12

贝吉,查尔斯-皮埃尔(1873-1914), 12

Peloponnesian War, 27 , 39 , 73

伯罗奔尼撒战争, 27 , 39 , 73

Pentateuch, 60

五经》, 60

Pericles (495?–429 B.C. ), 73 , 100 , 101

伯里克利( 公元前 495年-429年), 73 , 100 , 101

Persepolis, 97

波斯波利斯, 97

Persia, 27 , 53

波斯, 27 , 53

Peru, 63 –64

秘鲁, 63-64

Petra, 16

佩特拉, 16岁

Petronius, Caius (d. 66?), 43

贝特罗尼乌斯,凯厄斯(卒于66年), 43

Philip II, King of Macedon (r. 350–336 B.C. ), 75

马其顿国王腓力二世( 公元前 350-336年), 75 岁

Philippines, 84

菲律宾, 84

philosophy, 39 , 62 , 88 , 94 , 97

哲学, 39 , 62 , 88 , 94 , 97

     history and, 12 –13

历史和, 12-13

     and religion, 45 , 46 , 49 , 93

和宗教, 45 、 46 、 49 、 93

Phoenicia, 29

腓尼基, 29

Phrygians, 27

弗里吉亚人, 27

Pisa, 16 , 92

比萨, 16 , 92

Pitt, William (The Elder), see Earl of C HATHAM

皮特,威廉(老), 见夏特姆 伯爵

Pius VII (Luigi Barnaba Chiaramonti), Pope (r. 1800–23), 49

皮乌斯七世(Luigi Barnaba Chiaramonti),教皇(1800-23年), 49 岁。

Pizarro, Francisco (1471–1541), 64

Pizarro, Francisco (1471-1541), 64

Plato (427?–347 B.C. ), 16 , 34 , 48 , 93 , 94

柏拉图( 公元前 427-347年), 16 , 34 , 48 , 93 , 94 。

     political views, 73 –76

政治观点, 73-76

Plutarch (46?–?120), 55

Plutarch (46?-?120), 55

Poland, 68

波兰, 68

Pombal, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello, Marqués de (1699–1782), 64

Pombal, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Mello, Marquis de (1699-1782), 64

Pompey the Great (106–48 B.C. ), 39 , 76

庞培大帝( 公元前 106-48), 39 , 76

Pope, Alexander (1688–1744), 68

波普,亚历山大(1688-1744), 68

population, 21 –22, 66

人口, 21-22 , 66

Portugal, 64

葡萄牙, 64

Presbyterians, 47 –48

长老会, 47-48

prices and price control, 59 –61

价格和价格控制, 59-61

progress, 95 –102

进展, 95-102

     definition of, 97 –98

的定义, 97-98

proletariat, 76

无产阶级, 76

prostitution, 40

卖淫, 40

Protagoras (5th century B.C. ), 93

普罗塔戈拉( 公元前 5世纪), 93 年

Protestantism, 76

新教, 76

Protestant Reformation, see R EFORMATION


Protestant sects, 47

新教派别, 47

Ptolemies, 59 –60

托勒密王朝, 59-60

Puchberg, Michael (fl. 1788), 41

Puchberg, Michael (fl. 1788), 41

puritanism, 50

清教主义, 50

race, 25 –31, 79

种族, 25-31 , 79

Reformation, Protestant, 24 , 47 , 49 , 57 , 64

新教改革, 24 , 47 , 49 , 57 , 64

Reggio Calabria, Greek colony at, 29

雷焦卡拉布里亚的希腊殖民地, 29

religion, 31 , 43 –51, 51 , 93 , 95 , 96 , 99

宗教, 31 , 43-51 , 51 , 93 , 95 , 96 , 99

Religious Wars, French, 45 , 82

宗教战争,法国, 45 , 82

Renaissance, 16 , 28 , 40 , 53 , 95 , 101

文艺复兴时期, 16 , 28 , 40 , 53 , 95 , 101

Renan, Ernest (1823–92), 50 , 69

勒南,欧内斯特(1823-92), 50 , 69

Republic (Plato), 73 –74

共和国 (柏拉图), 73-74

Restoration England, 40 , 65

复兴时期的英国, 40 , 65

revolution, 54 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 75

革命, 54 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 75

Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis de, Cardinal (1585–1642), 68

Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis de, Cardinal (1585-1642), 68

Robespierre, Maximilien de (1758–94), 49

罗伯斯庇尔,马克西米利安-德(1758-94), 49

Roman Catholic Church, 23 , 46 , 49 , 57 , 71 , 89 , 96

罗马天主教会, 23 , 46 , 49 , 57 , 71 , 89 , 96

     in the U.S., 23 , 48

在美国, 23 , 48

     and the state, 44 , 45

和国家, 44 , 45

     in France, 47 , 50

在法国, 47 , 50

Rome (empire), 23 , 39 , 40 , 44 , 75 , 76 , 99

罗马(帝国), 23 , 39 , 40 , 44 , 75 , 76 , 99

     fall of, 21 , 27 , 42 , 54

沦陷, 21 , 27 , 42 , 54

     civilization of, 28 , 29 , 79 , 94

的文明, 28 , 29 , 79 , 94

     morals in, 40 , 41 , 76

道德的, 40 , 41 , 76

     conquest of Egypt, 52 –53, 60

征服埃及, 52-53 , 60

     class strife in, 55 –57, 69

阶级纷争, 55-57 , 69

     socialism in, 60 –61

社会主义的, 60-61

     and the Pax Romana, 69 , 86

和大同世界, 69 , 86

     conquest of Greece, 73

征服希腊, 73

Rosenberg, Alfred (1893–1946), 26

罗森伯格,阿尔弗雷德(1893-1946), 26

Rothschild family, 54

罗思柴尔德家族, 54

Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712–78), 49 , 53 , 70 , 77 , 93

卢梭,让-雅克(1712-78), 49 , 53 , 70 , 77 , 93

Russia, 16 , 53 , 65 , 66 , 71 , 98

俄罗斯, 16 , 53 , 65 , 66 , 71 , 98

     Communist society, 20 , 51

共产主义社会, 20 , 51

     early history, 27 –28

早期历史, 27-28

     industrialization of, 83

工业化, 83

Russian Revolution, 53 , 65 , 66 , 71

俄罗斯革命, 53 , 65 , 66 , 71

Sahara, 15

撒哈拉, 15

Saint-Simon, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de (1760–1825), 89 –90

圣西门,克劳德-亨利-德-鲁弗洛伊伯爵(1760-1825), 89-90

Salamis, Battle of (480 B.C. ), 16

萨拉米斯之战( 公元前 480年), 16

Sanskrit, 27

梵语, 27

Sappho (b. 612? B.C. ), 29

萨福(生于 公元前 612年), 29 岁。

Saxons, 27 , 30

撒克逊人, 27 , 30

Scandinavia, 27 , 84

斯堪的纳维亚半岛, 27 , 84

Scarlatti, Domenico (1685–1757), 41

斯卡拉蒂,多梅尼科(1685-1757), 41

science, 12 , 60 , 62 , 99

科学, 12 , 60 , 62 , 99

     and religion, 39 , 47

和宗教, 39 , 47

     and war, 49 , 82 , 95 –96

和战争, 49 , 82 , 95-96

sculpture, 97

雕塑, 97

Scythians, 27

Scythians, 27

Semites, 29

闪族人, 29

September Massacres (1792), 53 , 72

九月大屠杀(1792), 53 , 72

serfdom, 61 , 65

农奴制, 61 , 65

Seven Years’ War, 82

七年战争, 82

sex, 22 , 35 , 36 , 38 , 39 , 42 , 88 , 96

性别, 22 , 35 , 36 , 38 , 39 , 42 , 88 , 96

Shakespeare, William (1564–1616), 100

莎士比亚,威廉(1564-1616), 100

Shamash, 44

沙马什, 44 岁

Shelley, Percy Bysshe (1792–1822), 87

雪莱,珀西-比希(1792-1822), 87

Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1751–1816), 100

Sheridan, Richard Brinsley (1751-1816), 100

Sicily, 28

西西里岛, 28

Sistine Chapel, 48

西斯廷教堂, 48

slavery, 44 , 45 , 54 , 62 , 72 , 76 , 92

奴隶制, 44 , 45 , 54 , 62 , 72 , 76 , 92

social contract, 90

社会契约, 90

socialism, 52 , 58 –67, 88 , 89 , 90

社会主义, 52 , 58-67 , 88 , 89 , 90

Socrates (470?–399 B.C. ), 39 , 73

苏格拉底( 公元前 470?-399年), 39 , 73

Solon (638?–?558 B.C. ), 29 , 55 –56, 57 , 73

索隆( 公元前 638-558年), 29 , 55-56 , 57 , 73 。

Sophists, 41 , 49

诡辩家, 41 , 49

South America, 30 , 53 , 84

南美洲, 30 , 53 , 84

Spain, 24 , 53 , 64 , 83

西班牙, 24 , 53 , 64 , 83

Spanish Armada, 16

西班牙舰队, 16

Sparta, 27 , 29

斯巴达, 27 , 29

Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903), 93

斯宾塞,赫伯特(1820-1903), 93

Spengler, Oswald (1880–1936), 89 –90, 91

Spengler, Oswald (1880-1936), 89-90 , 91

states, rise of, 90 –91

国家的崛起, 90-91

Study of History, A (Toynbee), 69 *

历史研究,A (汤因比), 69* 。

Sulla, Lucius Cornelius (138–78 B.C. ), 39

Sulla, Lucius Cornelius ( 公元前 138-78), 39

Sumeria, 13 , 59

苏美尔, 13 , 59

Sweden, 79

瑞典, 79

Switzerland, 23 , 79

瑞士, 23 , 79

Sylvester I, Pope (r. 314–335), 45

西尔维斯特一世,教皇(314-335), 45

Syracuse, Greek colony at, 29

锡拉库扎,希腊人的殖民地, 29

Syria, 29

叙利亚, 29 岁

Szuma Ch’ien ( B.C. 145 B.C. ), 61

司马迁 (公元 前145 年 ), 61 岁。

Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828–93), 72 *

Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828-93), 72* .

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de (1754–1838), 90

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de (1754-1838), 90

Taranto, Greek colony at, 29

塔兰托,希腊的殖民地, 29

Tatars, 83

鞑靼人, 83

taxation, 56 , 59 –63, 66 , 92

税收, 56 , 59-63 , 66 , 92

Ten Commandments, 40 , 44

十诫, 40 , 44

Teutons, 26 , 30

日耳曼人, 26 , 30

Thales of Miletus (fl. 600 B.C. ), 29

米利都的泰勒斯(约 公元前 600年), 29 岁

Thirty Years’ War, 28 , 45

三十年战争, 28 , 45

Thrasymachus (fl. 5th century B.C. ), 39 , 93

Thrasymachus(约 公元前 5世纪), 39 , 93

Thucydides (471?–?400 B.C. ), 73 , 100

修昔底德( 公元前 471?-400年), 73 , 100

Tiberius, Emperor of Rome (r. 14–37), 84

Tiberius,罗马皇帝(14-37年), 84

Tours, battle of (732), 24 , 83

图尔之战(732), 24 , 83

Toynbee, Arnold J. (1889– ), 69 *

Toynbee, Arnold J. (1889-), 69* .

trade routes, 15 , 16 , 53 , 92

贸易路线, 15 , 16 , 53 , 92

Trajan, Emperor of Rome (r. 98–117), 69

特拉扬,罗马皇帝(98-117年), 69 岁

Treitschke, Heinrich von (1834–96), 26

Treitschke, Heinrich von (1834-96), 26

Trichinopoly, 29

三联生活周刊, 29

Trotsky, Leon (1877–1940), 66

托洛茨基, Leon (1877-1940), 66

Umbrians, 27

Umbrians, 27

United States of America, 20 , 21 , 26 , 30 , 31 , 42 , 71 , 100

美国, 20 , 21 , 26 , 30 , 31 , 42 , 71 , 100

     industrial development, 16 , 39 , 40

工业发展, 16 , 39 , 40

     agriculture and food supply, 22

农业和粮食供应, 22

     morals and religion, 39 , 40 , 48 , 50 , 51 , 96

道德和宗教, 39 , 40 , 48 , 50 , 51 , 96

     concentration of wealth in, 55 , 57

财富的集中, 55 , 57

     democracy in, 68 , 76 , 79 , 91 , 94 , 96 , 99

民主, 68 , 76 , 79 , 91 , 94 , 96 , 99

     and Western civilization, 83 , 84 , 85 , 91 , 94 , 97

和西方文明, 83 、 84 、 85 、 91 、 94 、 97

Vandals, 27

破坏者, 27

Varangians, 28

瓦兰吉亚人, 28 岁

Venice, 16 , 92

威尼斯, 16 , 92

Vico, Giovanni Battista (1668–1744), 88

维科,乔瓦尼-巴蒂斯塔(1668-1744), 88

Vinci, Leonardo da, see L EONARDO DA V INCI

达-芬奇, 见 莱昂纳多 -达-芬奇

Virgil (70–19 B.C. ), 53 , 87

维吉尔( 公元前 70-19年), 53 , 87

Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet; 1694–1778), 23 , 40 , 49 , 53 , 77 , 92 , 100 , 101

伏尔泰(François-Marie Arouet;1694-1778), 23 , 40 , 49 , 53 , 77 , 92 , 100 , 101

Wagner, Richard (1813–83), 26

瓦格纳,理查德(1813-83), 26

Wang An-shih (premier 1068–85), 62 –63

王安石(总理1068-85), 62-63

Wang Mang, Emperor of China (r. 923), 62

王莽,中国皇帝(923年), 62 岁

war, 18 –22 passim, 55 , 60 , 61 , 66 , 70 , 76 , 77 , 79 , 81 –86, 93

战争, 18-22 通, 55 , 60 , 61 , 66 , 70 , 76 , 77 , 79 , 81-86 , 93

     air power in, 16

空中力量, 16

     and morals and religion, 23 , 24 , 39 , 40 , 42 , 44 , 47 , 49

和道德和 宗教, 23 , 24 , 39 , 40 , 42 , 44 , 47 , 49

     causes of, 53 , 81 , 82

的原因, 53 , 81 , 82

     and science, 82 , 95

和科学, 82 , 95

Watt, James (1736–1819), 41

瓦特,詹姆斯(1736-1819), 41

wealth, concentration of, 55 –58, 70 , 72 , 77 , 92

财富的集中, 55-58 , 70 , 72 , 77 , 92

West, the, 53 , 67 , 96 , 100

西方人, 53 , 67 , 96 , 100

     decline of, 16

的下降, 16

Western Europe, 29 , 40 , 45 , 84

西欧, 29 , 40 , 45 , 84

     civilization of 28 –30, 49 , 83 , 94 , 97

28-30 、 49 、 83 、 94 、 97 的文明程度

     U. S. and, 77 , 83

U.美国和, 77 , 83

West Germany, 84

西德, 84

Westminster Confession, 48

威斯敏斯特忏悔录》, 48

Westphalia, 65

威斯特法伦, 65

Wittenberg, University of, 40

维滕贝格大学, 40

women, 38 , 39 , 40 , 65 , 72

妇女, 38 , 39 , 40 , 65 , 72

World War I, 28

第一次世界大战, 28

Wright brothers, 35

莱特兄弟, 35

Wu Ti, Emperor of China (r. 140–87 B.C. ), 61 –62

中国皇帝吴逖( 公元前 140-87年), 61-62 岁

Zoroastrianism, 46

琐罗亚斯德教, 46

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Copyright © 1968 by Will and Ariel Durant

Copyright © 1968年,威尔和阿里尔-杜兰特版权所有。

Copyright renewed © 1996 by Monica Ariel Mihell and Will James Durant Easton

Copyright renewed © 1996 by Monica Ariel Mihell and Will James Durant Easton

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data


Durant, Will.


   Lessons of history / Will & Ariel Durant.

历史的教训 / Will & Ariel Durant.

      p. cm.

p. cm.

   Originally published: 1968.


   Includes bibliographical references and index.


1. History—Philosophy. I. Durant, Ariel. II. Title.

1.历史-哲学。I. 杜兰特,阿里尔。II.标题。

   D16.8.D84 2010

D16.8.D84 2010

   901—dc22                                           2009016081


ISBN 978-1-4391-4995-9

ISBN 978-1-4391-4995-9

ISBN 978-1-4391-7019-9 (ebook)

ISBN 978-1-4391-7019-9 (电子书)