Francis Fukuvama

Francis Fukuvama


目 录



By Way of an Introduction




1 Our Pessimism

1 我们的悲观主义

2 The Weakness of Strong States I

2 强国的弱点一

3 The Weakness of Strong States II, or, Eating Pineapples on the Moon

3 强国的弱点 II,或者,在月球上吃菠萝

4 The Worldwide Liberal Revolution

4 世界范围内的自由主义革命



5 An Idea for a Universal History

5 一个关于普遍历史的想法

6 The Mechanism of Desire

6 欲望的机制

7 No Barbarians at the Gates

7 门口没有野蛮人

8 Accumulation without End

8 积累无止境

9 The Victory of the VCR

9 录像机的胜利

10 In the Land of Education

10 在教育的土地上

11 The Former Question Answered

11 回答了以前的问题

12 No Democracy without Democrats

12 没有民主人士就没有民主

13 In the Beginning, a Battle to the Death for Pure Prestige

13 一开始,为了纯粹的声望而进行的生死之战

14 The First Man

14 第一个男人

15 A Vacation in Bulgaria

15 保加利亚的假期

16 The Beast with Red Cheeks

16 红脸蛋的怪兽

17 The Rise and Fall of Thymos

17 提摩斯的兴衰

18 Lordship and Bondage

18 领主地位与束缚

19 The Universal and Homogeneous State

19 普遍和同质的国家

20 The Coldest of All Cold Monsters

20 所有冷酷的怪物中最冷酷的怪物

21 The Thymotic Origins of Work

21 工作的渊源

22 Empires of Resentment, Empires of Deference

22 怨恨的帝国,蔑视的帝国

23 The Unreality of “Realism”

23“现实主义” 的不真实性

24 The Power of the Powerless

24 无力者的力量

25 National Interests

25 国家利益

26 Toward a Pacific Union

26 走向太平洋联盟

27 In the Realm of Freedom

27 在自由的领域里

28 Men without Chests

28 没有胸膛的人

29 Free and Unequal

29 自由和不平等

30 Perfect Rights and Defective Duties

30 完美的权利和有缺陷的义务

31 Immense Wars of the Spirit

31 精神的巨大战争









The “End of History” would never have existed, either as an article or as this present book, without the invitation to deliver a lecture by that title during the 1988-89 academic year, extended by Professors Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago. Both have been long-time teachers and friends from whom I have learned an enormous amount over the years—starting with, but by no means limited to, political philosophy. That original lecture became a well-known article due, in no small measure, to the efforts of Owen Harries, editor of the journal The National Interest, and to the work of that journal’s small staff. Erwin Glikes of the Free Press and Andrew Franklin of Hamish Hamilton provided crucial encouragement and advice in moving from the article to the book, and in the editing of the final manuscript.

如果没有芝加哥大学约翰-M-奥林民主理论与实践研究中心的内森·塔尔科夫教授和艾伦·布鲁姆教授在 1988-89 学年发出的邀请,“历史的终结” 就不会存在,无论是作为一篇文章还是作为这本书。两人都是长期的老师和朋友,多年来我从他们那里学到了大量的东西 —— 从政治哲学开始,但绝不限于此。那篇最初的演讲成为一篇著名的文章,在很大程度上是由于《国家利益》杂志的编辑欧文·哈里斯的努力,以及该杂志的小职员的工作。自由出版社的 Erwin Glikes 和 Hamish Hamilton 的 Andrew Franklin 在从文章到书的过程中,以及在最终手稿的编辑中,提供了至关重要的鼓励和建议。

The present volume has profited enormously from conversations and readings by any number of friends and colleagues. Most important of these has been Abram Shulsky, who will find many of his ideas and insights recorded here. I would like to pay special thanks to Irving Kristol, David Epstein, Alvin Bernstein, Henry Higuera, Yoshihisa Komori, Yoshio Fukuyama, and George Holmgren, all of whom took the time to read and comment on the manuscript. In addition, I would like to thank the many people— some of them known to me and many others not—who commented usefully on various aspects of the present thesis as it was presented in a variety of seminars and lectures in this country and abroad.

本卷从任何数量的朋友和同事的谈话和阅读中获益匪浅。其中最重要的是阿布拉姆·舒尔斯基(Abram Shulsky),他的许多想法和见解都会记录在这里。我想特别感谢欧文·克里斯托尔、大卫·爱泼斯坦、阿尔文·伯恩斯坦、亨利·希格拉、小森义久、福山义夫和乔治·霍尔姆格伦,他们都花时间阅读和评论了这份手稿。此外,我还要感谢许多人 —— 其中有些人我认识,有些人不认识 —— 他们在国内外的各种研讨会和讲座上对本论文的各个方面进行了有益的评论。

James Thomson, president of the RAND Corporation, was kind enough to provide me office space while drafting this book. Gary and Linda Armstrong took time out from writing their dissertations to help me in the collection of research materials, and provided valuable advice on a number of topics in the course of writing. Rosalie Fonoroff helped in the proofreading. In lieu of conventional thanks to a typist for helping to prepare the manuscript, I should perhaps acknowledge the work of the designers of the Intel 80386 microprocessor.

兰德公司总裁詹姆斯·汤姆森(James Thomson)在起草本书时为我提供了办公场所,非常感谢。加里和琳达·阿姆斯特朗从他们的论文写作中抽出时间来帮助我收集研究材料,并在写作过程中就一些主题提供了宝贵的建议。Rosalie Fonoroff 在校对方面提供了帮助。作为对帮助准备手稿的打字员的常规感谢,我也许应该感谢英特尔 80386 微处理器的设计者的工作。

Last but most important, it was my wife, Laura, who encouraged me to write both the original article and the present book, and who has stood by me through all of the subsequent criticism and controversy. She has been a careful reader of the manuscript, and has contributed in innumerable ways to its final form and content. My daughter Julia and my son David, the latter of whom chose to be born as the book was being written, helped too, simply by being there.




The distant origins of the present volume lie in an article entitled “The End of History?” which I wrote for the journal The National Interest in the summer of 1989. In it, I argued that a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world over the past few years, as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism. More than that, however, I argued that liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.” That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions. This was not to say that today’s stable democracies, like the United States, France, or Switzerland, were not without injustice or serious social problems. But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than of flaws in the principles themselves. While some presentday countries might fail to achieve stable liberal democracy, and others might lapse back into other, more primitive forms of rule like theocracy or military dictatorship, the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on.

本卷的遥远起源于我在 1989 年夏天为《国家利益》杂志写的一篇题为 “历史的终结” 的文章。在这篇文章中,我认为在过去的几年里,关于自由民主作为一种政府体系的合法性,已经在全世界范围内形成了显著的共识,因为它征服了世袭君主制、法西斯主义以及最近的共产主义等敌对的意识形态。然而,不仅如此,我认为自由民主可能构成 “人类意识形态进化的终点” 和 “人类政府的最终形式”,并因此构成 “历史的终结”。也就是说,早期的政府形式具有严重的缺陷和不合理性,导致其最终崩溃,而自由民主可以说是没有这种基本的内部矛盾。这并不是说今天的稳定的民主国家,如美国、法国或瑞士,并不是没有不公正或严重的社会问题。但是,这些问题是对现代民主所依据的自由和平等的双重原则的不完全实施,而不是原则本身的缺陷。虽然今天的一些国家可能无法实现稳定的自由民主,而另一些国家可能重新陷入其他更原始的统治形式,如神权或军事独裁,但自由民主的理想是无法改进的。

The original article excited an extraordinary amount of commentary and controversy, first in the United States, and then in a series of countries as different as England, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and South Korea. Criticism took every conceivable form, some of it based on simple misunderstanding of my original intent, and others penetrating more perceptively to the core of my argument. Many people were confused in the first instance by my use of the word “history.” Understanding history in a conventional sense as the occurrence of events, people pointed to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Chinese communist crackdown in Tiananmen Square, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as evidence that “history was continuing,” and that I was ipsofacto proven wrong.

原文引起了大量的评论和争论,首先是在美国,然后是在英国、法国、意大利、苏联、巴西、南非、日本和韩国等一系列不同国家。批评采取了各种可以想象的形式,有些是基于对我的原意的简单误解,有些则更敏锐地穿透了我的论点的核心。许多人首先被我使用的 “历史” 一词所迷惑。人们把传统意义上的历史理解为事件的发生,指出柏林墙的倒塌、中国共产党在天安门广场的镇压以及伊拉克对科威特的入侵都是 “历史在继续” 的证据,而我也因此被证明是错误的。

And yet what I suggested had come to an end was not the occurrence of events, even large and grave events, but History: that is, history understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process, when taking into account the experience of all peoples in all times. This understanding of History was most closely associated with the great German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel. It was made part of our daily intellectual atmosphere by Karl Marx, who borrowed this concept of History from Hegel, and is implicit in our use of words like “primitive” or “advanced,” “traditional” or “modern,” when referring to different types of human societies. For both of these thinkers, there was a coherent development of human societies from simple tribal ones based on slavery and subsistence agriculture, through various theocracies, monarchies, and feudal aristocracies, up through modern liberal democracy and technologically driven capitalism. This evolutionary process was neither random nor unintelligible, even if it did not proceed in a straight line, and even if it was possible to question whether man was happier or better off as a result of historical “progress.”

然而,我认为已经结束的不是事件的发生,甚至是大型和严重的事件,而是历史:也就是说,当考虑到所有时代所有民族的经验时,历史被理解为一个单一、连贯、进化的过程。这种对历史的理解与伟大的德国哲学家黑格尔(G·W. F·Hegel)关系最为密切。卡尔·马克思从黑格尔那里借用了这一历史概念,使之成为我们日常知识氛围的一部分,并隐含在我们在提及不同类型的人类社会时使用的 “原始” 或 “先进”、“传统” 或 “现代” 等词语之中。对这两位思想家来说,人类社会有一个连贯的发展,从基于奴隶制和自给自足的农业的简单部落,到各种神权制、君主制和封建贵族制,直至现代自由民主和技术驱动的资本主义。这个进化过程既不是随机的,也不是不可理解的,即使它不是以直线方式进行的,即使有可能质疑人类是否由于历史 “进步” 而变得更加幸福或更好。

Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human societies was not openended, but would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings. Both thinkers thus posited an “end of history”: for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a communist society. This did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end, that important events would no longer happen, or that newspapers reporting them would cease to be published. It meant, rather, that there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of the really big questions had been settled.

黑格尔和马克思都认为,人类社会的演变不是无止境的,而是在人类实现了满足其最深层和最基本的渴望的社会形式时才会结束。因此,两位思想家都提出了一个 “历史的终结”:对黑格尔来说,这就是自由主义国家,而对马克思来说,这就是共产主义社会。这并不意味着出生、生命和死亡的自然循环会结束,也不意味着重要事件不再发生,或者报道这些事件的报纸将停止出版。相反,这意味着在基本原则和制度的发展方面不会有进一步的进展,因为所有真正的大问题都已经解决。

The present book is not a restatement of my original article, nor is it an effort to continue the discussion with that article’s many critics and commentators. Least of all is it an account of the end of the Cold War, or any other pressing topic in contemporary politics. While this book is informed by recent world events, its subject returns to a very old question: Whether, at the end of the twentieth century, it makes sense for us once again to speak of a coherent and directional History of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy? The answer I arrive at is yes, for two separate reasons. One has to do with economics, and the other has to do with what is termed the “struggle for recognition.”

本书不是对我原来文章的重述,也不是为了继续与该文章的许多批评者和评论者进行讨论。它更不是对冷战结束或当代政治中任何其他紧迫话题的叙述。虽然这本书从最近的世界事件中获得了信息,但其主题又回到了一个非常古老的问题。在二十世纪末,我们再次谈论一部连贯的、有方向性的人类历史,并最终将人类的大部分引向自由民主,是否有意义?我得出的答案是肯定的,有两个不同的原因。一个与经济有关,另一个与所谓的 “争取承认的斗争” 有关。

It is of course not sufficient to appeal to the authority of Hegel, Marx, or any of their contemporary followers to establish the validity of a directional History. In the century and a half since they wrote, their intellectual legacy has been relentlessly assaulted from all directions. The most profound thinkers of the twentieth century have directly attacked the idea that history is a coherent or intelligible process; indeed, they have denied the possibility that any aspect of human life is philosophically intelligible. We in the West have become thoroughly pessimistic with regard to the possibility of overall progress in democratic institutions. This profound pessimism is not accidental, but born of the truly terrible political events of the first half of the twentieth century—two destructive world wars, the rise of totalitarian ideologies, and the turning of science against man in the form of nuclear weapons and environmental damage. The life experiences of the victims of this past century’s political violence—from the survivors of Hitlerism and Stalinism to the victims of Pol Pot—would deny that there has been such a thing as historical progress. Indeed, we have become so accustomed by now to expect that the future will contain bad news with respect to the health and security of decent, liberal, democratic political practices that we have problems recognizing good news when it comes.

当然,仅仅依靠黑格尔、马克思或其当代追随者的权威来确立方向性历史的有效性是不够的。在他们写作以来的一个半世纪里,他们的思想遗产受到了来自各个方向的无情攻击。二十世纪最深刻的思想家直接攻击了历史是一个连贯的或可理解的过程的想法;事实上,他们已经否认了人类生活的任何方面在哲学上是可理解的可能性。我们西方人对民主体制全面进步的可能性已经变得彻底悲观。这种深刻的悲观主义不是偶然的,而是源于二十世纪上半叶真正可怕的政治事件 —— 两次破坏性的世界大战,极权主义意识形态的兴起,以及科学以核武器和环境破坏的形式转向人类。过去这个世纪的政治暴力的受害者 —— 从希特勒主义和斯大林主义的幸存者到波尔布特的受害者 —— 的生活经历会否认有这样一种历史进步的东西。事实上,我们现在已经习惯于期待未来会有关于体面的、自由的、民主的政治实践的健康和安全的坏消息,以至于当好消息来临时,我们都难以辨认。

And yet, good news has come. The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the militaryauthoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics—the “free market”—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of World War II, part of the impoverished Third World. A liberal revolution in economic thinking has sometimes preceded, sometimes followed, the move toward political freedom around the globe.

然而,好消息已经传来。二十世纪最后一个季度最引人注目的发展是,世界上看似强大的独裁政权的核心部分暴露出巨大的弱点,无论是军事专制的右派,还是共产主义的极权主义的左派。从拉丁美洲到东欧,从苏联到中东和亚洲,强大的政府在过去 20 年中一直在失败。虽然他们并没有在所有情况下让位于稳定的自由民主国家,但自由民主仍然是跨越全球不同地区和文化的唯一一致的政治愿望。此外,自由主义的经济原则 —— “自由市场” —— 已经传播开来,并成功地创造了前所未有的物质繁荣,无论是在工业发达的国家还是在二战结束时属于贫困的第三世界的国家。在全球范围内,经济思想的自由革命有时是在走向政治自由之前,有时是在走向政治自由之后。

All of these developments, so much at odds with the terrible history of the first half of the century when totalitarian governments of the Right and Left were on the march, suggest the need to look again at the question of whether there is some deeper connecting thread underlying them, or whether they are merely accidental instances of good luck. By raising once again the question of whether there is such a thing as a Universal History of mankind, I am resuming a discussion that was begun in the early nineteenth century, but more or less abandoned in our time because of the enormity of events that mankind has experienced since then. While drawing on the ideas of philosophers like Kant and Hegel who have addressed this question before, I hope that the arguments presented here will stand on their own.

所有这些发展,与本世纪上半叶右翼和左翼极权主义政府大行其道的可怕历史如此不一致,表明有必要再次审视这样一个问题,即它们背后是否有一些更深刻的联系线索,或者它们是否只是运气好的偶然事例。通过再次提出是否存在这样一部人类普遍历史的问题,我正在恢复一场始于 19 世纪初的讨论,但在我们这个时代或多或少被放弃了,因为人类从那时起经历了巨大的事件。虽然借鉴了康德和黑格尔等哲学家的思想,他们以前也讨论过这个问题,但我希望这里提出的论点能够独立存在。

This volume immodestly presents not one but two separate efforts to outline such a Universal History. After establishing in Part I why we need to raise once again the possibility of Universal History, I propose an initial answer in Part II by attempting to use modern natural science as a regulator or mechanism to explain the directionality and coherence of History. Modern natural science is a useful starting point because it is the only important social activity that by common consensus is both cumulative and directional, even if its ultimate impact on human happiness is ambiguous. The progressive conquest of nature made possible with the development of the scientific method in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has proceeded according to certain definite rules laid down not by man, but by nature and nature’s laws.


The unfolding of modern natural science has had a uniform effect on all societies that have experienced it, for two reasons. In the first place, technology confers decisive military advantages on those countries that possess it, and given the continuing possibility of war in the international system of states, no state that values its independence can ignore the need for defensive modernization. Second, modern natural science establishes a uniform horizon of economic production possibilities. Technology makes possible the limitless accumulation of wealth, and thus the satisfaction of an everexpanding set of human desires. This process guarantees an increasing homogenizatioq of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances. All countries undergoing economic modernization must increasingly resemble one another: they must unify nationally on the basis of a centralized state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of social organization like tribe, sect, and family with economically rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for the universal education of their citizens. Such societies have become increasingly linked with one another through global markets and the spread of a universal consumer culture. Moreover, the logic of modern natural science would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism. The experiences of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries indicate that while highly centralized economies are sufficient to reach the level of industrialization represented by Europe in the 1950s, they are woefully inadequate in creating what have been termed complex “postindustrial” economies in which information and technological innovation play a much larger role.

现代自然科学的展开对所有经历过它的社会都产生了统一的影响,原因有二。首先,技术给那些拥有技术的国家带来了决定性的军事优势,鉴于国际国家体系中持续存在战争的可能性,任何重视其独立性的国家都不能忽视防御性现代化的需要。第二,现代自然科学为经济生产的可能性建立了一个统一的视野。技术使财富的无限积累成为可能,从而满足了人类不断扩大的欲望。这个过程保证了所有人类社会的日益同质化,无论其历史渊源或文化传承如何。所有正在经历经济现代化的国家必须越来越相似:它们必须在中央集权国家的基础上实现全国统一,实现城市化,用基于功能和效率的经济合理的社会组织形式取代传统的部落、教派和家庭,并为其公民提供普及教育。这些社会通过全球市场和普遍的消费文化的传播,彼此之间的联系越来越紧密。此外,现代自然科学的逻辑似乎决定了普遍向资本主义方向发展。苏联、中国和其他社会主义国家的经验表明,虽然高度集中的经济足以达到欧洲在 20 世纪 50 年代所代表的工业化水平,但它们在创造被称为复杂的 “后工业” 经济方面是远远不够的,在这种经济中信息和技术创新发挥着更大的作用。

But while the historical mechanism represented by modern natural science is sufficient to explain a great deal about the character of historical change and the growing uniformity of modern societies, it is not sufficient to account for the phenomenon of democracy. There is no question but that the world’s most developed countries are also its most successful democracies. But while modern natural science guides us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, it does not deliver us to the Promised Land itself, for there is no economically necessary reason why advanced industrialization should produce political liberty. Stable democracy has at times emerged in pre-industrial societies, as it did in the United States in 1776. On the other hand, there are many historical and contemporary examples of technologically advanced capitalism coexisting with political authoritarianism, from Meiji Japan and Bismarckian Germany to presentday Singapore and Thailand. In many cases, authoritarian states are capable of producing rates of economic growth unachievable in democratic societies.

但是,虽然现代自然科学所代表的历史机制足以解释历史变化的特点和现代社会日益统一的大量内容,但它并不足以解释民主现象。毫无疑问,世界上最发达的国家也是其最成功的民主国家。但是,虽然现代自然科学引导我们进入自由民主的应许之地的大门,但它并没有把我们送到应许之地本身,因为没有经济上的必要理由说明先进的工业化应该产生政治自由。稳定的民主有时会在前工业社会出现,就像 1776 年的美国一样。另一方面,历史上和当代都有许多技术先进的资本主义与政治威权主义并存的例子,从明治日本和俾斯麦德国到今天的新加坡和泰国。在许多情况下,威权主义国家能够产生民主社会无法实现的经济增长率。

Our first effort to establish the basis for a directional history is thus only partly successful. What we have called the “logic of modern natural science” is in effect an economic interpretation of historical change, but one which (unlike its Marxist variant) leads to capitalism rather than socialism as its final result. The logic of modern science can explain a great deal about our world: why we residents of developed democracies are office workers rather than peasants eking out a living on the land, why we are members of labor unions or professional organizations rather than tribes or clans, why we obey the authority of a bureaucratic superior rather than a priest, why we are literate and speak a common national language.

因此,我们为建立方向性历史的基础所做的第一次努力只是部分地成功了。我们所说的 “现代自然科学的逻辑” 实际上是对历史变化的经济解释,但这种解释(与马克思主义的变种不同)导致资本主义而不是社会主义成为其最终结果。现代科学的逻辑可以解释我们这个世界的很多事情:为什么我们发达的民主国家的居民是办公室工作人员而不是在土地上讨生活的农民,为什么我们是工会或专业组织的成员而不是部落或宗族,为什么我们服从官僚上级的权威而不是牧师,为什么我们识字并讲共同的民族语言。

But economic interpretations of history are incomplete and unsatisfying, because man is not simply an economic animal. In particular, such interpretations cannot really explain why we are democrats, that is, proponents of the principle of popular sovereignty and the guarantee of basic rights under a rule of law. It is for this reason that the book turns to a second, parallel account of the historical process in Part III, an account that seeks to recover the whole of man and notjust his economic side. To do this, we return to Hegel and Hegel’s non-materialist account of History, based on the “struggle for recognition.”

但对历史的经济解释是不完整的,也是不令人满意的,因为人不仅仅是一种经济动物。特别是,这种解释不能真正解释为什么我们是民主人士,也就是人民主权原则和法治下基本权利保障的支持者。正是由于这个原因,本书在第三部分转向了对历史进程的第二种平行描述,这种描述试图恢复人的整体,而不仅仅是他的经济方面。为此,我们回到了黑格尔和黑格尔基于 “为承认而斗争” 的非物质主义历史论述。

According to Hegel, human beings like animals have natural needs and desires for objects outside themselves such as food, drink, shelter, and above all the preservation of their own bodies. Man differs fundamentally from the animals, however, because in addition he desires the desire of other men, that is, he wants to be “recognized.” In particular, he wants to be recognized as a human being, that is, as a being with a certain worth or dignity. This worth in the first instance is related to his willingness to risk his life in a struggle over pure prestige. For only man is able to overcome his most basic animal instincts—chief among them his instinct for selfpreservation—for the sake of higher, abstract principles and goals. According to Hegel, the desire for recognition initially drives two primordial combatants to seek to make the other “recognize” their humanness by staking their lives in a mortal battle. When the natural fear of death leads one combatant to submit, the relationship of master and slave is born. The stakes in this bloody battle at the beginning of history are not food, shelter, or security, but pure prestige. And precisely because the goal of the battle is not determined by biology, Hegel sees in it the first glimmer of human freedom.

根据黑格尔的观点,人类和动物一样,对自身以外的物体有自然的需求和欲望,如食物、饮料、住所,首先是对自己身体的保护。然而,人与动物有根本的不同,因为除此之外,他还渴望得到其他人的欲望,也就是说,他希望被 “承认”。特别是,他希望被承认为一个人,也就是说,作为一个有一定价值或尊严的人。这种价值首先与他愿意冒着生命危险为纯粹的声望而斗争有关。因为只有人能够为了更高的、抽象的原则和目标而克服他最基本的动物本能 —— 其中主要是自我保护的本能。根据黑格尔的说法,对承认的渴望最初驱使两个原始的战斗者通过把他们的生命押在一场致命的战斗中来寻求使对方 “承认” 他们的人性。当对死亡的自然恐惧导致一个战斗者屈服时,主人和奴隶的关系就诞生了。在历史之初的这场血战中,赌注不是食物、住所或安全,而是纯粹的威信。正因为这场战斗的目标不是由生物学决定的,黑格尔在其中看到了人类自由的第一道曙光。

The desire for recognition may at first appear to be an unfamiliar concept, but it is as old as the tradition of Western political philosophy, and constitutes a thoroughly familiar part of the human personality. It was first described by Plato in the Republic, when he noted that there were three parts to the soul, a desiring part, a reasoning part, and a part that he called thymos, or “spiritedness.” Much of human behavior can be explained as a combination of the first two parts, desire and reason: desire induces men to seek things outside themselves, while reason or calculation shows them the best way to get them. But in addition, human beings seek recognition of their own worth, or of the people, things, or principles that they invest with worth. The propensity to invest the self with a certain value, and to demand recognition for that value, is what in today’s popular language we would call “selfesteem.” The propensity to feel selfesteem arises out of the part of the soul called thymos. It is like an innate human sense of justice. People believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people treat them as though they are worth less than that, they experience the emotion of anger. Conversely, when people fail to live up to their own sense of worth, they feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in proportion to their worth, they feel pride. The desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life. According to Hegel, they are what drives the whole historical process.

对承认的渴望起初可能是一个陌生的概念,但它与西方政治哲学的传统一样古老,并构成了人类人格中一个完全熟悉的部分。柏拉图在《共和国》中首次描述了这一点,当时他指出,灵魂有三个部分,一个是欲望的部分,一个是推理的部分,还有一个部分他称之为 thymos,或 “spiritedness”。人类的许多行为可以解释为前两部分的结合,即欲望和理性:欲望促使人们寻求自身以外的东西,而理性或计算则向他们展示获得这些东西的最佳途径。但除此之外,人类还寻求对自身价值的认可,或对他们赋予价值的人、事或原则的认可。为自我赋予某种价值,并要求承认这种价值的倾向,在今天的流行语言中,我们称之为 “自尊”。感受自尊的倾向产生于灵魂的一部分,称为 thymos。它就像人类天生的正义感。人们相信他们有一定的价值,当其他人对待他们时,好像他们的价值低于这个价值,他们就会体验到愤怒的情绪。相反,当人们未能达到自己的价值感时,他们会感到羞愧,而当他们被正确地按照自己的价值进行评价时,他们会感到自豪。对认可的渴望,以及随之而来的愤怒、羞愧和自豪的情绪,是人类人格中对政治生活至关重要的部分。按照黑格尔的说法,它们是推动整个历史进程的因素。

By Hegel’s account, the desire to be recognized as a human being with dignity drove man at the beginning of history into a bloody battle to the death for prestige. The outcome of this battle was a division of human society into a class of masters, who were willing to risk their lives, and a class of slaves, who gave in to their natural fear of death. But the relationship of lordship and bondage, which took a wide variety of forms in all of the unequal, aristocratic societies that have characterized the greater part of human history, failed ultimately to satisfy the desire for recognition of either the masters or the slaves. The slave, of course, was not acknowledged as a human being in any way whatsoever. But the recognition enjoyed by the master was deficient as well, because he was not recognized by other masters, but slaves whose humanity was as yet incomplete. Dissatisfaction with the flawed recognition available in aristocratic societies constituted a “contradiction” that engendered further stages of history.

按照黑格尔的说法,被承认为有尊严的人的愿望,在历史之初就驱使人类为争取声望而进行了一场血腥的生死之战。这场战斗的结果是将人类社会划分为一个愿意冒生命危险的主人阶层和一个屈服于对死亡的自然恐惧的奴隶阶层。但是,在人类历史上大部分时间里,在所有不平等的贵族社会中,领主和奴役的关系采取了各种各样的形式,最终未能满足主人或奴隶的认可欲望。当然,奴隶在任何方面都不被承认为人。但是,主人享有的承认也是有缺陷的,因为他没有得到其他主人的承认,而是得到了人性尚不完整的奴隶的承认。对贵族社会有缺陷的承认的不满,构成了一种 “矛盾”,引发了历史的更多阶段。

Hegel believed that the “contradiction” inherent in the relationship of lordship and bondage was finally overcome as a result of the French and, one would have to add, American revolutions. These democratic revolutions abolished the distinction between master and slave by making the former slaves their own masters and by establishing the principles of popular sovereignty and the rule of law. The inherently unequal recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the granting of rights.

黑格尔认为,由于法国革命以及不得不说的美国革命,领主与奴役关系中固有的 “矛盾” 最终被克服。这些民主革命废除了主人和奴隶之间的区别,使以前的奴隶成为自己的主人,并确立了人民主权和法治的原则。对主人和奴隶本质上的不平等承认被普遍和对等的承认所取代,每个公民都承认其他每个公民的尊严和人性,而这种尊严反过来又被国家通过授予权利的方式所承认。

This Hegelian understanding of the meaning of contemporary liberal democracy differs in a significant way from the AngloSaxon understanding that was the theoretical basis of liberalism in countries like Britain and the United States. In that tradition, the prideful quest for recognition was to be subordinated to enlightened selfinterest—desire combined with reason—and particularly the desire for selfpreservation of the body. While Hobbes, Locke, and the American Founding Fathers like Jefferson and Madison believed that rights to a large extent existed as a means of preserving a private sphere where men can enrich themselves and satisfy the desiring parts of their souls,3 Hegel saw rights as ends in themselves, because what truly satisfies human beings is not so much material prosperity as recognition of their status and dignity. With the American and French revolutions, Hegel asserted that history comes to an end because the longing that had driven the historical process—the struggle for recognition—has now been satisfied in a society characterized by universal and reciprocal recognition. No other arrangement of human social institutions is better able to satisfy this longing, and hence no further progressive historical change is possible.

黑格尔对当代自由民主意义的这种理解,与作为英国和美国等国自由主义理论基础的盎格鲁·撒克逊人的理解有很大不同。在那个传统中,对认可的骄傲追求要服从于开明的自我利益 —— 欲望与理性的结合,特别是对身体自我保护的渴望。虽然霍布斯、洛克以及杰斐逊和麦迪逊等美国开国元勋认为,权利在很大程度上是作为维护私人领域的一种手段而存在的,在那里人们可以充实自己并满足他们灵魂中的欲望部分,3 但黑格尔认为权利本身就是目的,因为真正使人类满足的不是物质上的繁荣,而是对其地位和尊严的承认。随着美国和法国革命的发生,黑格尔断言,历史走到了尽头,因为推动历史进程的渴望 —— 争取承认的斗争 —— 现在在一个以普遍和互惠承认为特征的社会中得到了满足。没有其他人类社会制度的安排能够更好地满足这种渴望,因此不可能有进一步的进步的历史变化。

The desire for recognition, then, can provide the missing link between liberal economics and liberal politics that was missing from the economic account of History in Part II. Desire and reason are together sufficient to explain the process of industrialization, and a large part of economic life more generally. But they cannot explain the striving for liberal democracy, which ultimately arises out of thymos, the part of the soul that demands recognition. The social changes that accompany advanced industrialization, in particular universal education, appear to liberate a certain demand for recognition that did not exist among poorer and less educated people. As standards of living increase, as populations become more cosmopolitan and better educated, and as society as a whole achieves a greater equality of condition, people begin to demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status. If people were nothing more than desire and reason, they would be content to live in marketoriented authoritarian states like Franco’s Spain, or a South Korea or Brazil under military rule. But they also have a thymotic pride in their own selfworth, and this leads them to demand democratic governments that treat them like adults rather than children, recognizing their autonomy as free individuals. Communism is being superseded by liberal democracy in our time because of the realization that the former provides a gravely defective form of recognition.

那么,对承认的欲望可以提供自由主义经济学和自由主义政治之间缺失的环节,而这一环节在第二部分对《历史》的经济描述中是缺失的。欲望和理性加在一起,足以解释工业化的进程,以及更普遍的经济生活的很大一部分。但它们不能解释对自由民主的追求,而自由民主最终产生于 thymos,即灵魂中要求得到承认的部分。伴随着先进的工业化的社会变革,特别是普及教育,似乎解放了某种对认可的需求,而这种需求在较贫穷和受教育程度较低的人中并不存在。随着生活水平的提高,随着人口变得更加国际化和受过更好的教育,随着整个社会实现了更大的条件平等,人们开始要求的不仅仅是更多的财富,而是对其地位的认可。如果人们除了欲望和理性之外一无所有,他们会满足于生活在以市场为导向的专制国家,如佛朗哥的西班牙,或军事统治下的韩国或巴西。但他们对自己的自我价值也有一种胸有成竹的自豪感,这使他们要求民主政府像对待成年人而不是孩子一样对待他们,承认他们作为自由个体的自主权。在我们的时代,共产主义正在被自由民主所取代,因为人们认识到前者提供了一种严重缺陷的承认形式。

An understanding of the importance of the desire for recognition as the motor of history allows us to reinterpret many phenomena that are otherwise seemingly familiar to us, such as culture, religion, work, nationalism, and war. Part IV is an attempt to do precisely this, and to project into the future some of the different ways that the desire for recognition will be manifest. A religious believer, for example, seeks recognition for his particular gods or sacred practices, while a nationalist demands recognition for his particular linguistic, cultural, or ethnic group. Both of these forms of recognition are less rational than the universal recognition of the liberal state, because they are based on arbitrary distinctions between sacred and profane, or between human social groups. For this reason, religion, nationalism, and a people’s complex of ethical habits and customs (more broadly “culture”) have traditionally been interpreted as obstacles to the establishment of successful democratic political institutions and free-market economies.

对承认的欲望作为历史动力的重要性的理解,使我们能够重新解释许多原本对我们来说似乎很熟悉的现象,如文化、宗教、工作、民族主义和战争。第四部分正是试图做到这一点,并向未来投射出对承认的欲望的一些不同表现方式。例如,一个宗教信徒寻求对其特定神灵或神圣习俗的认可,而一个民族主义者则要求对其特定的语言、文化或种族群体的认可。这两种形式的承认都不如自由国家的普遍承认合理,因为它们都是建立在神圣与非神圣,或人类社会群体之间的任意区分上的。由于这个原因,宗教、民族主义和一个民族的道德习惯和风俗的综合体(更广义的 “文化”)传统上被解释为建立成功的民主政治机构和自由市场经济的障碍。

But the truth is considerably more complicated, for the success of liberal politics and liberal economics frequently rests on irrational forms of recognition that liberalism was supposed to overcome. For democracy to work, citizens need to develop an irrational pride in their own democratic institutions, and must also develop what Tocqueville called the “art of associating,” which rests on prideful attachment to small communities. These communities are frequently based on religion, ethnicity, or other forms of recognition that fall short of the universal recognition on which the liberal state is based. The same is true for liberal economics. Labor has traditionally been understood in the Western liberal economic tradition as an essentially unpleasant activity undertaken for the sake of the satisfaction of human desires and the relief of human pain. But in certain cultures with a strong work ethic, such as that of the Protestant entrepreneurs who created European capitalism, or of the elites who modernized Japan after the Meiji restoration, work was also undertaken for the sake of recognition. To this day, the work ethic in many Asian countries is sustained not so much by material incentives, as by the recognition provided for work by overlapping social groups, from the family to the nation, on which these societies are based. This suggests that liberal economics succeeds not simply on the basis of liberal principles, but requires irrational forms of thymos as well.

但事实要复杂得多,因为自由主义政治和自由主义经济的成功经常依赖于非理性的认可形式,而自由主义本来是要克服这种认可的。为了使民主制度发挥作用,公民需要对自己的民主制度产生非理性的自豪感,还必须发展托克维尔所说的 “交往的艺术”,这种艺术建立在对小社区的自豪感上。这些社区经常基于宗教、种族或其他形式的认可,而这些认可并没有达到自由主义国家所基于的普遍认可。自由主义经济学的情况也是如此。在西方自由主义经济传统中,劳动历来被理解为一种本质上不愉快的活动,是为了满足人类的欲望和减轻人类的痛苦而进行的。但在某些具有强烈工作伦理的文化中,如创造了欧洲资本主义的新教企业家,或明治维新后使日本现代化的精英们,工作也是为了获得认可而进行。时至今日,许多亚洲国家的工作伦理与其说是靠物质激励,不如说是靠从家庭到国家等重叠的社会群体对工作的认可,而这些社会正是建立在这种认可之上的。这表明,自由主义经济学的成功不仅仅是建立在自由主义原则的基础上,而且还需要非理性形式的 thymos。

The struggle for recognition provides us with insight into the nature of international politics. The desire for recognition that led to the original bloody battle for prestige between two individual combatants leads logically to imperialism and world empire. The relationship of lordship and bondage on a domestic level is naturally replicated on the level of states, where nations as a whole seek recognition and enter into bloody battles for supremacy. Nationalism, a modern yet not-fully-rational form of recognition, has been the vehicle for the struggle for recognition over the past hundred years, and the source of this century’s most intense conflicts. This is the world of “power politics,” described by such foreign policy “realists” as Henry Kissinger.

争取承认的斗争使我们对国际政治的性质有了深入的了解。对承认的渴望导致了两个个体战斗者之间最初的血腥争夺战,这顺理成章地导致了帝国主义和世界帝国。国内层面上的领主和奴役关系自然会在国家层面上得到复制,国家作为一个整体寻求承认,并为争夺最高地位而进行血腥的战斗。民族主义是一种现代的但并不完全理性的承认形式,在过去的一百年里一直是争取承认的工具,也是本世纪最激烈冲突的根源。这就是亨利·基辛格等外交政策 “现实主义者” 所描述的 “权力政治” 的世界。

But if war is fundamentally driven by the desire for recognition, it stands to reason that the liberal revolution which abolishes the relationship of lordship and bondage by making former slaves their own masters should have a similar effect on the relationship between states. Liberal democracy replaces the irrational desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational desire to be recognized as equal. A world made up of liberal democracies, then, should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy. And indeed, there is substantial empirical evidence from the past couple of hundred years that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that are not democracies and do not share their fundamental values. Nationalism is currently on the rise in regions like Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union where peoples have long been denied their national identities, and yet within the world’s oldest and most secure nationalities, nationalism is undergoing a process of change. The demand for national recognition in Western Europe has been domesticated and made compatible with universal recognition, much like religion three or four centuries before.


The fifth and final part of this book addresses the question of the “end of history,” and the creature who emerges at the end, the “last man.” In the course of the original debate over the National Interest article, many people assumed that the possibility of the end of history revolved around the question of whether there were viable alternatives to liberal democracy visible in the world today. There was a great deal of controversy over such questions as whether communism was truly dead, whether religion or ultranationalism might make a comeback, and the like. But the deeper and more profound question concerns the goodness of liberal democracy itself, and not only whether it will succeed against its presentday rivals. Assuming that liberal democracy is, for the moment, safe from external enemies, could we assume that successful democratic societies could remain that way indefinitely? Or is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system? There is no doubt that contemporary democracies face any number of serious problems, from drugs, homelessness, and crime to environmental damage and the frivolity of consumerism. But these problems are not obviously insoluble on the basis of liberal principles, nor so serious that they would necessarily lead to the collapse of society as a whole, as communism collapsed in the 1980s.

本书的第五部分,也是最后一部分,讨论了 “历史的终结” 问题,以及在终结时出现的生物,即 “最后的人”。在最初关于《国家利益》一文的辩论过程中,许多人认为历史终结的可能性是围绕着当今世界上是否有可行的自由民主替代方案的问题。在诸如共产主义是否真正死亡,宗教或极端民族主义是否可能卷土重来等问题上,存在着大量的争议。但更深层次的问题是关于自由民主本身的好坏,而不仅仅是它是否会在与当今对手的竞争中取得成功。假设自由民主暂时不受外敌影响,我们是否可以认为成功的民主社会可以无限期地保持这种状态?或者说,自由民主是否受到严重的内部矛盾的困扰,这些矛盾如此严重,以至于最终会破坏它作为一种政治制度的地位?毫无疑问,当代民主国家面临任何数量的严重问题,从毒品、无家可归、犯罪到环境破坏和消费主义的轻浮。但这些问题在自由主义原则的基础上显然不是无法解决的,也没有严重到一定会导致整个社会的崩溃,就像共产主义在 1980 年代崩溃那样。

Writing in the twentieth century, Hegel’s great interpreter, Alexandre Kojève, asserted intransigently that history had ended because what he called the “universal and homogeneous state”— what we can understand as liberal democracy—definitely solved the question of recognition by replacing the relationship of lordship and bondage with universal and equal recognition. What man had been seeking throughout the course of history—what had driven the prior “stages of history”—was recognition. In the modern world, he finally found it, and was “completely satisfied.” This claim was made seriously by Kojève, and it deserves to be taken seriously by us. For it is possible to understand the problem of politics over the millennia of human history as the effort to solve the problem of recognition. Recognition is the central problem of politics because it is the origin of tyranny, imperialism, and the desire to dominate. But while it has a dark side, it cannot simply be abolished from political life, because it is simultaneously the psychological ground for political virtues like courage, publicspiritedness, and justice. All political communities must make use of the desire for recognition, while at the same time protecting themselves from its destructive effects. If contemporary constitutional government has indeed found a formula whereby all are recognized in a way that nonetheless avoids the emergence of tyranny, then it would indeed have a special claim to stability and longevity among the regimes that have emerged on earth.

黑格尔的伟大解释者亚历山大·科耶夫在二十世纪的著作中顽固地断言,历史已经结束,因为他所谓的 “普遍和同质的国家” —— 我们可以理解为自由民主 —— 通过用普遍和平等的承认取代领主和奴役的关系而明确地解决了承认的问题。在整个历史进程中,人类一直在寻求的东西 —— 推动先前 “历史阶段” 的东西 —— 就是承认。在现代世界,他终于找到了它,并且 “完全满意”。科耶夫认真地提出了这一主张,它值得我们认真对待。因为我们有可能把人类历史上几千年的政治问题理解为解决承认问题的努力。承认是政治的核心问题,因为它是暴政、帝国主义和统治欲望的起源。但是,虽然它有黑暗的一面,却不能简单地从政治生活中废除,因为它同时也是勇气、公益心和正义等政治美德的心理基础。所有的政治团体都必须利用承认的欲望,同时保护自己免受其破坏性影响。如果当代宪政确实找到了一个公式,使所有人都能以一种避免出现暴政的方式得到承认,那么在地球上已经出现的政权中,它确实有一个稳定和长寿的特殊要求。

But is the recognition available to citizens of contemporary liberal democracies “completely satisfying?” The longterm future of liberal democracy, and the alternatives to it that may one day arise, depend above all on the answer to this question. In Part V we sketch two broad responses, from the Left and the Right, respectively. The Left would say that universal recognition in liberal democracy is necessarily incomplete because capitalism creates economic inequality and requires a division of labor that ipsofacto implies unequal recognition. In this respect, a nation’s absolute level of prosperity provides no solution, because there will continue to be those who are relatively poor and therefore invisible as human beings to their fellow citizens. Liberal democracy, in other words, continues to recognize equal people unequally.

但是,当代自由民主国家的公民所能得到的承认是否 “完全令人满意”?自由民主的长期未来,以及有朝一日可能出现的替代方案,首先取决于对这个问题的回答。在第五部分,我们勾勒出两个广泛的答案,分别来自左派和右派。左派会说,自由民主中的普遍承认必然是不完整的,因为资本主义造成了经济上的不平等,并要求进行劳动分工,这当然就意味着不平等的承认。在这方面,一个国家的绝对繁荣水平并没有提供解决方案,因为仍会有一些人相对贫穷,因此对他们的同胞来说是不可见的人。换句话说,自由民主继续不平等地承认平等的人。

The second, and in my view more powerful, criticism of universal recognition comes from the Right that was profoundly concerned with the leveling effects of the French Revolution’s commitment to human equality. This Right found its most brilliant spokesman in the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, whose views were in some respects anticipated by that great observer of democratic societies, Alexis de Tocqueville. Nietzsche believed that modern democracy represented not the self-mastery of former slaves, but the unconditional victory of the slave and a kind of slavish morality. The typical citizen of a liberal democracy was a “last man” who, schooled by the founders of modern liberalism, gave up prideful belief in his or her own superior worth in favor of comfortable selfpreservation. Liberal democracy produced “men without chests,” composed of desire and reason but lacking thymos, clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of longterm selfinterest. The last man had no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such desire no excellence or achievement was possible. Content with his happiness and unable to feel any sense of shame for being unable to rise above those wants, the last man ceased to be human.

第二种,而且在我看来更有力的,对普遍承认的批评来自右派,他们深切关注法国大革命对人类平等的承诺所产生的平权效应。这个右派在哲学家弗里德里希·尼采那里找到了它最杰出的代言人,他的观点在某些方面被民主社会的伟大观察家亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔所预见。尼采认为,现代民主不是代表前奴隶的自我管理,而是代表奴隶的无条件胜利和一种奴性的道德。自由主义民主的典型公民是一个 “最后的人”,在现代自由主义创始人的教育下,他们放弃了对自己优越价值的骄傲信念,而选择了舒适的自我保护。自由民主产生了 “没有胸膛的人”,他们由欲望和理性组成,但缺乏胸怀,善于通过长期的自我利益的计算,找到新的方法来满足大量的小需求。最后一个人没有被公认为比别人更伟大的欲望,没有这种欲望,就不可能有卓越或成就。他满足于自己的幸福,无法为自己无法超越这些欲望而感到羞耻,最后一个人就不再是人类了。

Following Nietzsche’s line of thought, we are compelled to ask the following questions: Is not the man who is completely satisfied by nothing more than universal and equal recognition something less than a full human being, indeed, an object of contempt, a “last man” with neither striving nor aspiration? Is there not a side of the human personality that deliberately seeks out struggle, danger, risk, and daring, and will this side not remain unfulfilled by the “peace and prosperity” of contemporary liberal democracy? Does not the satisfaction of certain human beings depend on recognition that is inherently unequal? Indeed, does not the desire for unequal recognition constitute the basis of a livable life, not just for bygone aristocratic societies, but also in modern liberal democracies? Will not their future survival depend, to some extent, on the degree to which their citizens seek to be recognized not just as equal, but as superior to others? And might not the fear of becoming contemptible “last men” not lead men to assert themselves in new and unforeseen ways, even to the point of becoming once again bestial “first men” engaged in bloody prestige battles, this time with modern weapons?

按照尼采的思路,我们不得不提出以下问题。难道那些只对普遍和平等的承认感到完全满足的人就不是一个完整的人,实际上是一个被蔑视的对象,一个既没有努力也没有追求的 “最后的人”?难道人的个性中不存在故意寻求斗争、危险、风险和胆量的一面,而这一面不会因为当代自由民主的 “和平与繁荣” 而得不到满足?某些人的满足难道不取决于本质上不平等的承认吗?事实上,对不平等承认的渴望难道不构成宜居生活的基础,不仅对过去的贵族社会,而且对现代的自由民主国家?难道他们未来的生存在某种程度上不取决于他们的公民在多大程度上寻求被承认为不仅是平等的,而且是优于他人的?对成为可鄙的 “最后的人” 的恐惧难道不会导致人们以新的和不可预见的方式坚持自己,甚至再次成为兽性的 “第一个人”,参与血腥的声望之战,这次是用现代武器?

This books seeks to address these questions. They arise naturally once we ask whether there is such a thing as progress, and whether we can construct a coherent and directional Universal History of mankind. Totalitarianisms of the Right and Left have kept us too busy to consider the latter question seriously for the better part of this century. But the fading of these totalitarianisms, as the century comes to an end, invites us to raise this old question one more time.




As decent and sober a thinker as Immanuel Kant could still seriously believe that war served the purposes of Providence. After Hiroshima, all war is known to be at best a necessary evil. As saintly a theologian as St. Thomas Aquinas could in all seriousness argue that tyrants serve providential ends, for if it were not for tyrants there would be no opportunity for martyrdom. After Auschwitz, anyone using this argument would be guilty of blasphemy… . After these dread events, occurring in the heart of the modern, enlightened, technological world, can one still believe in the God who is necessary Progress any more than in the God who manifests His Power in the form of

像伊曼纽尔·康德这样正派和清醒的思想家仍然可以认真地相信,战争是为天主的目的服务的。广岛事件后,人们知道所有的战争充其量是一种必要的罪恶。像圣托马斯·阿奎那这样圣洁的神学家可以严肃地认为,暴君为天意服务,因为如果没有暴君,就不会有殉道的机会。在奥斯威辛集中营之后,任何使用这一论点的人都会犯渎神罪。. . . 在这些可怕的事件发生在现代的、开明的、技术的世界中心之后,人们还能相信有必要取得进展的上帝吗,还能相信以超然的天意表现其力量的上帝吗?

super-intending Providence?


—Emile Fackenheim, God’s Presence in History1

-埃米尔·法肯海姆,上帝在历史中的存在 1

The twentieth century, it is safe to say, has made all of us into deep historical pessimists.


As individuals, we can of course be optimistic concerning our personal prospects for health and happiness. By longstanding tradition, Americans as a people are said to be continually hopeful about the future. But when we come to larger questions, such as whether there has been or will be progress in history, the verdict is decidedly different. The soberest and most thoughtful minds of this century have seen no reason to think that the world is moving toward what we in the West consider decent and humane political institutions—that is, liberal democracy. Our deepest thinkers have concluded that there is no such thing as History—that is, a meaningful order to the broad sweep of human events. Our own experience has taught us, seemingly, that the future is more likely than not to contain new and unimagined evils, from fanatical dictatorships and bloody genocides to the banalization of life through modern consumerism, and that unprecedented disasters await us from nuclear winter to global warming.

作为个人,我们当然可以对我们个人的健康和幸福前景持乐观态度。根据长期的传统,美国人作为一个民族,据说对未来不断充满希望。但是,当我们谈到更大的问题时,例如历史上是否有或将有进步,结论就明显不同。本世纪最清醒和最有思想的人认为,没有理由认为世界正在朝着我们西方人认为的体面和人道的政治机构 —— 即自由民主 —— 发展。我们最深刻的思想家已经得出结论,不存在所谓的历史,也就是说,不存在对广泛的人类事件有意义的秩序。我们自己的经验似乎告诉我们,未来更有可能包含新的和无法想象的邪恶,从狂热的独裁和血腥的种族灭绝到通过现代消费主义使生活平庸化,从核冬天到全球变暖,前所未有的灾难在等待着我们。

The pessimism of the twentieth century stands in sharp contrast to the optimism of the previous one. Though Europe began the nineteenth century convulsed by war and revolution, it was by and large a century of peace and unprecedented increases in material wellbeing. There were two broad grounds for optimism. The first was the belief that modern science would improve human life by conquering disease and poverty. Nature, long man’s adversary, would be mastered by modern technology and made to serve the end of human happiness. Second, free democratic governments would continue to spread to more and more countries around the world. The “Spirit of 1776,” or the ideals of the French Revolution, would vanquish the world’s tyrants, autocrats, and superstitious priests. Blind obedience to authority would be replaced by rational selfgovernment, in which all men, free and equal, would have to obey no masters but themselves. In light of the broad movement of civilization, even bloody wars like those of Napoleon could be interpreted by philosophers as socially progressive in their results, because they fostered the spread of republican government. A number of theories, some serious and the others less so, were put forward to explain how human history constituted a coherent whole, whose twists and turns could be understood as leading to the good things of the modern era. In 1880 a certain Robert Mackenzie was able to write:

二十世纪的悲观主义与前一个世纪的乐观主义形成了鲜明的对比。尽管欧洲在十九世纪开始时受到战争和革命的冲击,但总的来说,这是一个和平的世纪,物质生活得到了前所未有的改善。乐观主义有两个广泛的理由。首先是相信现代科学将通过征服疾病和贫困来改善人类生活。大自然,这个长期以来人类的对手,将被现代技术所掌握,并使其为人类幸福的目标服务。第二,自由民主政府将继续向世界上越来越多的国家传播。1776 年的精神",或法国大革命的理想,将战胜世界上的暴君、专制者和迷信的牧师。对权威的盲目服从将被理性的自治所取代,在这种情况下,所有的人都是自由和平等的,除了他们自己,不需要服从任何主人。鉴于文明的广泛运动,即使是像拿破仑那样的血腥战争,也可以被哲学家解释为其结果是社会进步的,因为它们促进了共和政府的传播。人们提出了一些理论,有些是严肃的,有些则不那么严肃,以解释人类历史如何构成一个连贯的整体,其曲折可以理解为导致现代的美好事物。1880 年,某位罗伯特·麦肯锡能够写道。

Human history is a record of progress—a record of accumulating knowledge and increasing wisdom, of continual advancement from a lower to a higher platform of intelligence and wellbeing. Each generation passes on to the next the treasures which it inherited, beneficially modified by its own experience, enlarged by the fruits of all the victories which itself has gained… . The growth of man’s wellbeing, rescued from the mischievous tampering of self-willed princes, is left now to the beneficent regulation of great providential laws.

人类历史是一个进步的记录 —— 一个不断积累知识和增加智慧的记录,一个不断从较低的智力和福利平台向更高的平台迈进的记录。每一代人都把自己继承的财富传给下一代,这些财富被自己的经验有益地修改,被自己获得的所有胜利的成果扩大。. . . 人类福祉的增长,从自以为是的王公贵族的恶作剧中解救出来,现在留给了伟大的天意法则的有益调节。

Under the heading of “torture,” the famous eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica published in 1910-11 explained that “the whole subject is one of only historical interest as far as Europe is concerned.“3 On the very eve of World W ar I, the journalist Norman Angell published his book The Great Illusion, in which he argued that free trade had rendered territorial aggrandizement obsolete, and that war had become economically irra­tional.

在 “酷刑” 的标题下,1910-11 年出版的著名的《大英百科全书》第 11 版解释说,“就欧洲而言,整个主题只具有历史意义。”3 在第一次世界大战前夕,记者诺曼·安格尔出版了他的《大幻觉》一书,他在书中认为,自由贸易已经使领土扩张变得过时,战争在经济上变得不合理。

The extreme pessimism of our own century is due at least in part to the cruelty with which these earlier expectations were shattered. The First World W ar was a critical event in the undermining of Europe’s self-confidence. The war of course brought down the old political order represented by the German, Austrian, and Russian monarchies, but its deeper impact was psychological. Four years of indescribably horrible trench warfare, in which tens of thousands died in a single day over a few yards of devastated territory, was, in the words of Paul Fussell, “a hideous embarrassment to the prevailing Meliorist myth which had dominated public consciousness for a century,” reversing “the idea of Progress.“5 The virtues of loyalty, hard work, perseverance, and patriotism were brought to bear in the systematic and pointless slaughter of other men, thereby discrediting the entire bourgeois world which had created these values. As Paul, the young soldier hero of Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, explains, “For us lads of eighteen [our teachers at school] ought to have been mediators and guides to the world of maturity, the world of work, of duty, of culture, of progress—to the future… . But the first death we saw shattered this belief.” In words echoed by young Americans during the Vietnam War,he concluded that “our generation was more to be trusted than theirs.“7 The notion that the industrial progress of Europe could be turned to war without moral redemption or meaning led to bitter denunciations of all attempts to find larger patterns or meaning in history. Thus, the renowned British historian H. A. L. Fisher could write in 1934 that “Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave.”

我们这个世纪的极端悲观主义至少有一部分原因是这些早期的期望被残酷地打破了。第一次世界大战是破坏欧洲自信心的一个关键事件。这场战争当然使德、奥、俄三国君主制所代表的旧政治秩序崩溃,但其更深层次的影响是心理上的。四年难以形容的可怕的战壕战争,在一天之内就有数万人死在几码的被破坏的领土上,用保罗·福塞尔的话说,“对一个世纪以来主导公众意识的盛行的梅利奥主义神话是一个可怕的尴尬”,它颠覆了 “进步的理念”。“5 忠诚、勤奋、坚韧和爱国主义的美德被用来系统地、毫无意义地屠杀其他人,从而使创造这些价值观的整个资产阶级世界失去信誉。正如埃里希·马里亚·雷马克(Erich Maria Remarque)的《西线无声》中的年轻士兵英雄保罗(Paul)所解释的那样”,对于我们这些 18 岁的小伙子来说,我们在学校的老师应该是通往成熟世界、工作世界、责任世界、文化世界、进步世界和未来世界的调解人和向导。. . . 但我们看到的第一起死亡事件打破了这一信念 “。在越南战争期间,美国年轻人也曾说过这样的话,他的结论是:” 我们这一代人比他们这一代人更值得信任。“7 欧洲的工业进步可以在没有道德救赎或意义的情况下转为战争,这种观念导致了对所有试图在历史中寻找更大模式或意义的努力的严厉谴责。因此,著名的英国历史学家 H·A.L·Fisher 在 1934 年写道:” 比我更聪明、更有学问的人在历史中发现了一个情节、一个节奏、一个预先确定的模式。这些和谐对我来说是隐蔽的。我只能看到一个紧急情况接着另一个紧急情况,就像波浪接着波浪一样"。

The First World W ar was, as it turned out, only a foretaste of the new forms of evil that were soon to emerge. If modern science made possible weapons of unprecedented destructiveness like the machine gun and the bomber, modern politics created a state of unprecedented power, for which a new word, totalitarianism, had to be coined. Backed by efficient police power, mass political parties, and radical ideologies that sought to control all aspects of human life, this new type of state embarked on a project no less ambitious than world domination. The genocides perpetrated by the totalitarian regimes of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia were without precedent in human historv, and in many respects were made possible by modernity itself. There have of course been many bloody tyrannies before the twentieth century, but Hitler and Stalin put both modern technology and modern political organization in the service of evil. It had previously been beyond the technical ability of “traditional” tyrannies to contemplate something so ambitious as the elimination of an entire class of people like the Jews of Europe or the kulaks in the Soviet Union. Yet this was precisely the task made possible by the technical and social advances of the previous century. The wars unleashed by these totalitarian ideologies were also of a new sort, involving the mass destruction of civilian populations and economic resources—hence the term, “total war.” T o defend themselves from this threat, liberal democracies were led to adopt military strategies like the bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima that in earlier ages would have been called genocidal.

事实证明,第一次世界大战只是对即将出现的新的邪恶形式的一个预示。如果说现代科学使机枪和轰炸机等具有空前破坏力的武器成为可能,那么现代政治则创造了一种空前的权力状态,为此不得不创造一个新词 —— 极权主义。在高效的警察力量、大规模的政党和试图控制人类生活各个方面的激进意识形态的支持下,这种新型的国家开始了一个不亚于统治世界的雄心勃勃的计划。希特勒的德国和斯大林的俄罗斯的极权主义政权所犯下的种族灭绝行为在人类历史上是没有先例的,而且在许多方面是由现代性本身促成的。当然,在二十世纪之前有许多血腥的暴政,但希特勒和斯大林把现代技术和现代政治组织都用于邪恶的服务。以前,“传统” 暴政的技术能力无法考虑像欧洲的犹太人或苏联的库拉克那样消灭整个阶层的雄心壮志。然而,这正是上个世纪的技术和社会进步所带来的任务。这些极权主义意识形态所发动的战争也是一种新的战争,涉及对平民人口和经济资源的大规模破坏 —— 因此被称为 “全面战争”。为了保护自己免受这种威胁,自由民主国家被引导采取军事战略,如轰炸德累斯顿或广岛,这在以前的时代会被称为种族灭绝。

Nineteenth-century theories of progress associated human evil with a backward state of social development. While Stalinism did arise in a backward, semi-European country known for its despotic government, the Holocaust emerged in a country with the most advanced industrial economy and one of the most cultured and well-educated populations in Europe. If such events could happen in Germany, why then could they not happen in any other advanced country? And if economic development, education, and culture were not a guarantee against a phenomenon like nazism, what was the point of historical progress?


The experience of the twentieth century made highly problematic the claims of progress on the basis of science and technology. For the ability of technology to better human life is critically dependent on a parallel moral progress in man. Without the latter, the power of technology will simply be turned to evil purposes, and mankind will be worse off than it was previously. The total wars of the twentieth century would not have been possible without the basic advances of the Industrial Revolution: iron, steel, the internal combustion engine, and the airplane. And since Hiroshima, mankind has lived under the shadow of the most terrible technological advance of all, that of nuclear weapons. The fantastic economic growth made possible by modern science had a dark side, for it has led to severe environmental damage to many parts of the planet, and raised the possibility of an eventual global ecological catastrophe. It is frequently asserted that global information technology and instant communications have promoted democratic ideals, as in the case of CNN’s worldwide broadcasting of the occupation of Tienanmen Square in 1989, or of the revolutions in Eastern Europe later that year. But communications technology itself is value-neutral. A yatollah Khomeini’s reactionary ideas were imported into Iran prior to the 1978 revolution on cassette tape recorders that the Shah’s economic modernization of the country had made widely available. If television and instant global communications had existed in the 1930s, they would have been used to great effect by Nazi propagandists like Leni Riefenstahl and Joseph Goebbels to promote fascist rather than democratic ideas.

二十世纪的经验使基于科学和技术的进步的主张变得非常有问题。因为技术改善人类生活的能力在很大程度上取决于人的道德进步。如果没有后者,技术的力量就会被用于邪恶的目的,人类就会变得比以前更糟糕。如果没有工业革命的基本进展:铁、钢、内燃机和飞机,二十世纪的全面战争是不可能的。而自广岛事件以来,人类一直生活在最可怕的技术进步 —— 核武器 —— 的阴影下。现代科学所带来的梦幻般的经济增长也有黑暗的一面,因为它导致了地球上许多地方的环境遭到严重破坏,并提出了最终发生全球生态灾难的可能性。人们经常断言,全球信息技术和即时通讯促进了民主理想,比如 1989 年 CNN 对占领天安门广场的全球广播,或者当年晚些时候东欧的革命。但通信技术本身是价值中立的。1978 年革命前,霍梅尼的反动思想通过卡带式录音机传入伊朗,而伊朗国王的经济现代化使之广泛普及。如果电视和全球即时通讯在 20 世纪 30 年代就已经存在,那么像莱尼·里芬斯塔尔和约瑟夫·戈培尔这样的纳粹宣传家就会利用它们来宣传法西斯主义而不是民主思想。

The traumatic events of the twentieth century formed the backdrop to a profound intellectual crisis as well. It is possible to speak of historical progress only if one knows where mankind is going. Most nineteenth-century Europeans thought that progress meant progress toward democracy. But for most of this century, there has been no consensus on this question. Liberal democracy was challenged by two major rival ideologies—fascism and communism—which offered radically different visions of a good society. People in the West themselves came to question whether liberal democracy was in fact a general aspiration of all mankind, and whether their earlier confidence that it was did not reflect a narrow ethnocentrism on their part. As Europeans were forced to confront the non-European world, first as colonial masters, then as patrons during the Cold W ar and theoretical equals in a world of sovereign nation states, they came to question the universality of their own ideals. The suicidal self-destructiveness of the European state system in two world wars gave lie to the notion of superior W estern rationality, while the distinction between civilized and barbarian that was instinctive to Europeans in the nineteenth century was much harder to make after the Nazi death camps. Instead of human history leading in a single direction, there seemed to be as many goals as there were peoples or civilizations, with liberal democracy having no particular privilege among them.

二十世纪的创伤性事件也形成了深刻的思想危机的背景。只有当人们知道人类要去哪里时,才有可能谈论历史进步。大多数十九世纪的欧洲人认为,进步意味着向民主迈进。但在本世纪的大部分时间里,人们对这个问题没有达成共识。自由民主受到了两大敌对意识形态的挑战 —— 法西斯主义和共产主义 —— 它们对一个好的社会提出了截然不同的愿景。西方人自己也开始怀疑自由民主是否真的是全人类的普遍愿望,以及他们先前对自由民主的自信是否反映了他们狭隘的民族中心主义。当欧洲人被迫面对非欧洲世界时,首先是作为殖民者,然后是作为冷战时期的赞助者,以及在一个主权民族国家的世界中理论上的平等者,他们开始质疑自己的理想的普遍性。欧洲国家体系在两次世界大战中的自杀性自毁,使西方优越理性的概念不攻自破,而 19 世纪欧洲人本能的对文明和野蛮的区分,在纳粹死亡集中营之后就更难做到了。人类历史并不是朝着一个方向发展的,似乎有多少个民族或文明就有多少个目标,而自由民主在这些目标中并没有特别的特权。

In our own time, one of the clearest manifestations of our pessimism was the almost universal belief in the permanence of a vigorous, communist-totalitarian alternative to W estern liberal democracy. When he was secretary of state in the 1970s, Henry Kissinger warned his countrymen that “today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the [communist] challenge is unending… . W e must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries— without escape and without respite… . This condition will not go away.“11 According to Kissinger, it was Utopian to try to reform the fundamental political and social structures of hostile powers like the USSR. Political maturity meant acceptance of the world as it was and not the way we wanted it to be, which meant coming to terms with Brezhnev’s Soviet Union. And while the conflict between communism and democracy could be moderated, it and the possibility of apocalyptic war could never be overcome completely.

在我们这个时代,我们的悲观主义最明显的表现之一是,几乎所有人都相信一个强有力的、共产主义极权主义的西方自由民主的替代品是永久性的。亨利·基辛格在 20 世纪 70 年代担任国务卿时,警告他的同胞:“今天,在我们的历史上第一次,我们面临着严峻的现实,即共产主义挑战是无止境的。. . . 我们必须学会执行外交政策,就像其他国家这么多世纪以来不得不执行的那样 —— 没有逃避,没有喘息。. . . 这种情况不会消失。”11 基辛格认为,试图改革像苏联这样的敌对国家的基本政治和社会结构是乌托邦式的。政治上的成熟意味着接受世界的本来面目,而不是我们希望的样子,这意味着与勃列日涅夫的苏联达成协议。虽然共产主义和民主之间的冲突可以得到缓和,但它和世界末日战争的可能性永远不可能被完全克服。

Kissinger’s view was by no means unique. Virtually everyone professionally engaged in the study of politics and foreign policy believed in the permanence of communism; its worldwide collapse in the late 1980s was therefore almost totally unanticipated. This failure was not simply a matter of ideological dogma interfering with a “dispassionate” view of events. It affected people across the political spectrum, right, left, and center, journalists as well as scholars, and politicians both East and W est. The roots of a blindness so pervasive were much more profound than mere partisanship, and lay in the extraordinary historical pessimism engendered by the events of this century.

基辛格的观点绝非独一无二。几乎所有从事政治和外交政策研究的专业人员都相信共产主义是永久性的;因此,它在 20 世纪 80 年代末的全球崩溃几乎是完全没有预料到的。这一失败并不只是意识形态教条干扰了对事件的 “冷静” 看法的问题。它影响了整个政治光谱的人,右派、左派和中间派,记者和学者,以及东方和西方的政治家。如此普遍的盲目性的根源比单纯的党派关系要深刻得多,它在于本世纪的事件所产生的非凡的历史悲观主义。

As recently as 1983,Jean-François Revel declared that “democracy may, after all, turn out to have been a historical accident, a brief parenthesis that is closing before our eyes . . ,“1 3 The Right, of course, had never believed that communism had achieved any degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the populations it controlled, and saw quite clearly the economic failings of socialist societies. But much of the Right believed that a “failed society” like the Soviet Union had nonetheless found the key to power through the invention of Leninist totalitarianism, by which a small band of “bureaucrat-dictators” could bring to bear the power of modern organization and technology and rule over large populations more or less indefinitely. Totalitarianism had succeeded not just in intimidating subject populations, but in forcing them to internalize the values of their communist masters. This was one of the distinctions that Jeanne Kirkpatrick, in a famous 1979 article, drew between traditional authoritarian regimes of the Right and radical totalitarianisms of the Left. While the former “leave in place existing allocations of wealth, power, status” and “worship traditional gods and observe traditional taboos,” radical totalitarianisms of the Left seek to “claim jurisdiction over the whole of the society” and violate “internalized values and habits.” A totalitarian state, in contrast to a merely authoritarian one, was able to control its underlying society so ruthlessly that it was fundamentally invulnerable to change or reform: thus “the history of this century provides no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves.”

就在 1983 年,让·弗朗索瓦·雷维尔宣称,“民主毕竟可能是一个历史意外,是一个正在我们眼前关闭的短暂的括号…… ”1 3 当然,右派从来都不相信共产主义在它所控制的民众眼中取得了任何程度的合法性,并清楚地看到社会主义社会的经济失败。但大部分右派认为,像苏联这样一个 “失败的社会” 却通过发明列宁主义极权主义找到了权力的关键,通过这种极权主义,一小群 “官僚独裁者” 可以发挥现代组织和技术的力量,或多或少地对大量人口进行无限期统治。极权主义不仅成功地恫吓了臣民,而且迫使他们内化了共产主义主人的价值观。这是珍妮·柯克帕特里克(Jeanne Kirkpatrick)在 1979 年的一篇著名文章中对右派的传统专制政权和左派的激进极权主义所做的区分之一。前者 “保留现有的财富、权力、地位的分配”,“崇拜传统的神,遵守传统的禁忌”,而左派的激进极权主义则试图 “要求对整个社会进行管辖”,违反 “内在的价值观和习惯”。极权主义国家与单纯的威权主义国家相比,能够无情地控制其背后的社会,以至于从根本上无法改变或改革:因此,“本世纪的历史没有提供任何理由来期望激进的极权主义政权会自我转变”。

Underlying this belief in the dynamism of totalitarian states was a profound lack of confidence in democracy. This lack of confidence was manifested in Kirkpatrick’s view that few of the currently non-democratic countries in the Third World would be able to democratize successfully (the possibility of a communist regime democratizing being discounted entirely), and in Revel’s belief that the strong and established democracies of Europe and North America lacked the inner conviction to defend themselves. Citing the numerous economic, social, and cultural requirements for successful democratization, Kirkpatrick criticized as typically American the idea that it was possible to democratize governments anytime and anywhere. The idea that there could be a democratic center in the Third World was a trap and an illusion; experience taught us that the world was divided between authoritarianisms of the Right and totalitarianisms of the Left. Revel, for his part, repeated in a much more extreme form the criticism originally made by Tocqueville that democracies have great difficulties sustaining serious and longterm foreign policies. They are hamstrung by their very democratic nature: by the plurality of the voices, the self-doubt and self-criticism that characterize democratic debate. Hence, “As things stand, relatively minor causes of discontent corrode, disturb, unsettle, paralyze, the democracies faster and more deeply than horrendous famine and constant poverty do the Communist regimes, whose subject peoples have no real rights or means of redressing their wrongs. Societies of which permanent criticism is an integral feature are the only livable ones, but they are also the most fragile.”


The Left came to a similar conclusion by a different route. By the 1980s, most “progressives” in Europe and America no longer believed that Soviet communism represented their future, as did many such thinkers through the end of World War II. Yet there persisted a belief on the Left in the legitimacy of MarxismLeninism for other people, a legitimacy which usually increased in proportion to geographical and cultural distance. Thus, while Soviet-style communism was not necessarily a realistic choice for people in the United States or Britain, it was held to be an authentic alternative for the Russians, with their traditions of autocracy and central control, not to mention the Chinese, who allegedly turned to it to overcome a legacy of foreign domination, backwardness, and humiliation. The same was said to be true for the Cubans and Nicaraguans, who had been victimized by American imperialism, and for the Vietnamese, for whom communism was regarded as a virtual national tradition. Many on the Left shared the view that a radical socialist regime in the Third World could legitimate itself, even in the absence of free elections and open discussion, by engaging in land reform, providing free health care, and raising literacy levels. Given these views, it is not surprising that there were few people on the Left who predicted revolutionary instability in the Soviet bloc or in China.

左派通过不同的途径得出了类似的结论。到 20 世纪 80 年代,欧洲和美国的大多数 “进步人士” 不再相信苏维埃共产主义代表他们的未来,就像许多这样的思想家在二战结束时一样。然而,在左派中仍然存在着对马克思列宁主义对其他人的合法性的信念,这种合法性通常会随着地理和文化距离的增加而增加。因此,虽然苏式共产主义对美国或英国人来说不一定是一个现实的选择,但对具有专制和中央控制传统的俄罗斯人来说,它被认为是一个真实的选择,更不用说中国人了,据说他们转向它来克服外国统治、落后和屈辱的遗产。古巴人和尼加拉瓜人也是如此,他们是美帝国主义的受害者,越南人也是如此,对他们来说,共产主义被认为是一种虚拟的民族传统。许多左翼人士都认为,第三世界的激进社会主义政权即使在没有自由选举和公开讨论的情况下,也可以通过进行土地改革、提供免费医疗服务和提高识字率来使自己合法化。鉴于这些观点,左派中很少有人预测苏联集团或中国的革命不稳定就不足为奇了。

Indeed, the belief in the legitimacy and permanence of communism took on a number of bizarre forms in the waning days of the Cold W ar . One prominent student of the Soviet Union maintained that the Soviet system had, under Brezhnev, achieved what he called “institutional pluralism,” and that “the Soviet leadership almost seems to have made the Soviet Union closer to the spirit of the pluralist model of American political science than is the United States… ,” Soviet society, pre-Gorbachev, was “not inert and passive but participatory in almost all sense of the term,” with a greater proportion of Soviet citizens “participating” in politics than in the United States. The same kind of thinking characterized some scholarship on Eastern Europe, where, despite the obviously imposed nature of communism, many scholars saw a tremendous social stability. One specialist asserted in 1987 that “if we were now to compare [the states of Eastern Europe] to many countries in the world—for example to a number of Latin American cases—they would seem to be epitomes of stability,” and criticized the traditional image of “an ‘illegitimate’ party … counterpoised against a necessarily hostile and unbelieving populace.”

事实上,对共产主义的合法性和持久性的信念在冷战的尾声中呈现出一些奇怪的形式。一位研究苏联的著名学生坚持认为,在勃列日涅夫的领导下,苏联体制已经实现了他所谓的 “体制多元化”,“苏联的领导层几乎似乎使苏联比美国更接近美国政治学的多元化模式的精神。. . 在戈尔巴乔夫之前,苏联社会” 不是惰性和被动的,而是几乎所有意义上的参与性 “,苏联公民” 参与 “政治的比例高于美国。同样的想法也是一些关于东欧的学术研究的特点,在那里,尽管共产主义有明显的强加性质,许多学者看到了巨大的社会稳定性。一位专家在 1987 年断言”,如果我们现在将东欧国家与世界上许多国家进行比较 —— 例如与一些拉丁美洲国家进行比较 —— 它们似乎是稳定的缩影,“并批评了” 一个 ‘非法’ 的政党…… 与一个必然敌对和不相信的民众抗衡 "的传统形象。

While some of these views simply represented projection of the recent past into the future, many of them rested on a judgment concerning the legitimacy of communism in the East. That is, for all of the undeniable problems of their societies, communist rulers had worked out a “social contract” with their peoples, of the sort satirized in the Soviet saying that “they pretend to pay us and we pretend to work.“2 0 These regimes were neither productive nor dynamic, but were said to govern with a certain degree of consent from their populations because they provided security and stability. As the political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote in 1968:

虽然其中一些观点只是代表了对最近的过去向未来的投射,但其中许多观点是基于对共产主义在东方的合法性的判断。也就是说,尽管他们的社会存在着不可否认的问题,但共产主义统治者已经与他们的人民达成了 “社会契约”,就像苏联人所说的 “他们假装付钱给我们,我们假装工作” 这样的讽刺。正如政治学家塞缪尔·亨廷顿在 1968 年所写的那样。

The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the society and of the traditions and principles upon which the political community is based.


Huntington had no particular sympathy for communism, but believed that the weight of evidence forced us to conclude that it had managed to earn a degree of popular approval over the years.


The pessimism of the present with regard to the possibility of progress in history was born out of two separate but parallel crises: the crisis of twentieth-century politics, and the intellectual crisis of Western rationalism. The former killed tens of millions of people and forced hundreds of millions to live under new and more brutal forms of slavery; the latter left liberal democracy without the intellectual resources with which to defend itself. The two were interrelated and cannot be understood separately from one another. On the one hand, the lack of intellectual consensus made the wars and revolutions of this century more ideological and therefore more extreme than they would otherwise have been. The Russian and Chinese revolutions and the Nazi conquests during the Second World W ar saw the return, in a magnified form, of the kind of brutality that characterized the religious wars of the sixteenth century, for what was at stake was notjust territory and resources, but the value systems and ways of life of entire populations. On the other hand, the violence of those ideologically driven conflicts and their terrible outcomes had a devastating effect on the self-confidence of liberal democracies, whose isolation in a world of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes led to serious doubts about the universality of liberal notions of right.

当代人对历史进步的可能性的悲观情绪产生于两个独立但平行的危机:20 世纪政治的危机和西方理性主义的知识危机。前者杀死了数千万人,并迫使数亿人生活在新的、更残酷的奴隶制形式之下;后者则使自由民主没有知识资源来捍卫自己。这两者是相互关联的,不能彼此分开理解。一方面,由于缺乏知识界的共识,本世纪的战争和革命更加意识形态化,因此比原来更加极端。俄国和中国的革命以及纳粹在第二次世界大战期间的征服,都看到了十六世纪宗教战争中的那种残暴的回归,因为所涉及的不仅仅是领土和资源,还有整个人口的价值体系和生活方式。另一方面,这些由意识形态驱动的冲突的暴力及其可怕的结果对自由民主国家的自信心产生了毁灭性的影响,他们在极权主义和独裁政权的世界中的孤立导致了对自由权利概念的普遍性的严重怀疑。

And yet, despite the powerful reasons for pessimism given us by our experience in the first half of this century, events in its second half have been pointing in a very different and unexpected direction. As we reach the 1990s, the world as a whole has not revealed new evils, but has gotten better in certain distinct ways. Chief among the surprises that have occurred in the recent past was the totally unexpected collapse of communism throughout much of the world in the late 1980s. But this development, striking as it was, was only part of a larger pattern of events that had been taking shape since World W ar II. Authoritarian dictatorships of all kinds, both on the Right and on the Left, have been collapsing. In some cases, the collapse has led to the establishment of prosperous and stable liberal democracies. In others, authoritarianism has been followed by instability, or by yet another form of dictatorship. But whether successful democracy eventually emerged, authoritarians of all stripes have been undergoing a severe crisis in virtually every part of the globe. If the early twentieth century’s major political innovation was the invention of the strong states of totalitarian Germany or Russia, then the past few decades have revealed a tremendous weakness at their core. And this weakness, so massive and unexpected, suggests that the pessimistic lessons about history that our century supposedly taught us need to be rethought from the beginning.

然而,尽管本世纪上半叶的经验给我们提供了悲观的有力理由,但下半叶的事件却一直指向一个非常不同的、出乎意料的方向。当我们进入 20 世纪 90 年代时,整个世界并没有暴露出新的罪恶,而是在某些明显的方面得到了改善。在最近发生的意外中,最主要的是 1980 年代末共产主义在世界大部分地区完全意外地崩溃了。但这一发展,尽管引人注目,只是自二战以来一直在形成的一个更大的事件模式的一部分。各种类型的专制独裁政权,无论是右派还是左派,都在不断崩溃。在某些情况下,这种崩溃导致了繁荣和稳定的自由民主国家的建立。在另一些情况下,威权主义之后是不稳定,或者是另一种形式的独裁统治。但是,无论最终是否出现了成功的民主,各种类型的专制主义在全球几乎每个地方都经历了严重的危机。如果说二十世纪初的主要政治创新是发明了极权主义的德国或俄罗斯的强势国家,那么过去几十年则暴露了其核心的巨大弱点。而这个弱点,如此大规模和出乎意料,表明我们这个世纪所谓教给我们的关于历史的悲观教训,需要从头开始反思了。

Chapter 2: The Weakness of Strong States I


The current crisis of authoritarianism did not begin with Gorbachev’s perestroïka or the fall of the Berlin Wall. It started over one and a half decades earlier, with the fall of a series of rightwing authoritarian governments in Southern Europe. In 1974 the Caetano regime in Portugal was ousted in an army coup. After a period of instability verging on civil war, the socialist Mario Soares was elected prime minister in April 1976, and the country has seen peaceful democratic rule ever since. The colonels who had been ruling Greece since 1967 were ousted also in 1974, giving way to the popularly elected Karamanlis regime. And in 1975, General Francisco Franco died in Spain, paving the way for a remarkably peaceful transition to democracy two years later. In addition, the Turkish militarytook over the country in September 1980 as a result of the terrorism engulfing its society, but returned the country to civilian rule by 1983. Since then, all of these countries have held regular, free, multiparty elections.

目前的威权主义危机并不是从戈尔巴乔夫的改革或柏林墙的倒塌开始的。它开始于 15 年前,随着南欧一系列右翼威权政府的倒台。1974 年,葡萄牙的卡埃塔诺政权在一次军队政变中被推翻。经过一段濒临内战的不稳定时期,社会主义者马里奥·苏亚雷斯于 1976 年 4 月当选为总理,此后该国一直处于和平的民主统治中。自 1967 年以来一直统治希腊的上校们也在 1974 年被赶下台,让位于民选的卡拉曼利斯政权。1975 年,弗朗西斯科·佛朗哥将军在西班牙去世,为两年后向民主的显著和平过渡铺平了道路。此外,由于恐怖主义席卷社会,土耳其军方于 1980 年 9 月接管了该国,但到 1983 年该国又恢复了文官统治。从那时起,所有这些国家都举行了定期、自由、多党的选举。

The transformation that occurred in Southern Europe in less than a decade was remarkable. These countries had earlier been seen as the black sheep of Europe, condemned by their religious and authoritarian traditions to reside outside the mainstream of democratic Western European development. And yet by the 1980s each country had made a successful transition to functioning and stable democracy, so stable in fact that (with the possible exception of Turkey) the people living in them could hardly imagine the situation being otherwise.

在不到十年的时间里,南欧发生的转变是引人注目的。这些国家早先被视为欧洲的害群之马,因其宗教和独裁传统而被置于西欧民主发展的主流之外。然而,到 20 世纪 80 年代,每个国家都成功地过渡到正常运作和稳定的民主制度,事实上是如此稳定,以至于(土耳其可能是例外)生活在这些国家的人几乎无法想象情况会是如此。

A similar set of democratic transitions took place in Latin America in the 1980s. This began in 1980 with the restoration of a democratically elected government in Peru after twelve years of military rule. The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas W ar precipitated the downfall of the military junta in Argentina, and the rise of the democratically elected Alfonsin government. The Argentine transition was quickly followed by others throughout Latin America, with military regimes stepping down in Uruguay and Brazil in 1983 and 1984, respectively. By the end of the decade the dictatorships of Stroessner in Paraguay and Pinochet in Chile had given way to popularly elected governments, and in early 1990 even Nicaragua’s Sandinista government had fallen to a coalition led by Violetta Chamorro in a free election. Many observers felt less confident about the permanence of the new Latin American democracies than they did about those in Southern Europe. De­mocracies have come and gone in this region, and virtually all of the new democracies were in a state of acute economic crisis whose most visible manifestation was the debt crisis. Countries like Peru and Colombia, moreover, faced severe internal challenge from insurgency and drugs. Nonetheless, these new democracies proved remarkably resilient, as if their earlier experience of authoritarianism had inoculated them against too easy a return to military rule. The fact remained that, from a low point in the early 1970s when only a handful of Latin American countries were democratic, by the beginning of the 1990s Cuba and Guyana were the only countries in the Western Hemisphere not permitting reasonably free elections.

1980 年代,拉丁美洲也发生了一系列类似的民主过渡。这始于 1980 年,秘鲁在经历了 12 年的军事统治后恢复了民选政府。1982 年的福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯战争促使阿根廷军政府垮台,民选的阿尔方辛政府崛起。阿根廷的转型很快被整个拉丁美洲的其他国家所效仿,乌拉圭和巴西的军事政权分别于 1983 年和 1984 年下台。到了十年末,巴拉圭的斯特罗斯纳和智利的皮诺切特的独裁政权已经让位于民选政府,1990 年初,甚至尼加拉瓜的桑地诺政府也在一次自由选举中败给了维奥莱塔·查莫罗领导的联盟。与南欧的民主国家相比,许多观察家对新的拉丁美洲民主国家的持久性感到不太自信。该地区的民主政体来来去去,几乎所有的新民主政体都处于严重的经济危机状态,最明显的表现就是债务危机。此外,像秘鲁和哥伦比亚这样的国家还面临着来自叛乱和毒品的严重内部挑战。然而,这些新的民主国家被证明具有明显的复原力,似乎他们早先的专制主义经历使他们不会轻易回到军事统治中去。事实是,从 20 世纪 70 年代初的低谷,当时只有少数几个拉丁美洲国家是民主的,到 90 年代初,古巴和圭亚那是西半球唯一不允许合理自由选举的国家。

There were comparable developments in East Asia. In 1986 the Marcos dictatorship was overthrown in the Philippines, and replaced by President Corazon Aquino who was brought into office on a tide of popular support. The following year, General Chun stepped down in South Korea and permitted the election of Roh Tae Woo as president. While the Taiwanese political system was not reformed in such a dramatic way, there was considerable democratic ferment below the surface after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. With the passing of much of the old guard in the ruling Guomindang party, there has been growing participation by other sectors of Taiwanese society in the Nationalist Parliament, including many native Taiwanese. And finally, the authoritarian government of Burma has been rocked by prodemocracy ferment.

在东亚也有类似的发展。1986 年,菲律宾的马科斯独裁政权被推翻,取而代之的是科拉松·阿基诺总统,他是在民众支持的浪潮中上任的。第二年,韩国的秦将军下台,允许卢泰愚当选为总统。虽然台湾的政治制度没有以如此戏剧性的方式进行改革,但在 1988 年 1 月蒋经国去世后,在表面之下有相当大的民主发酵。随着执政的国民党内大部分守旧派的逝去,台湾社会的其他阶层越来越多地参与到国民党议会中,包括许多台湾本地人。最后,缅甸的威权政府也被民主运动所震撼。

In February 1990, the Afrikaner-dominated government of F. W. de Klerk in South Africa announced the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress and the South African Communist party. He thereby inaugurated a period of negotiations on a transition to power sharing between blacks and whites, and eventual majority rule.

1990 年 2 月,南非由非裔主导的 F·W·德克勒克政府宣布释放纳尔逊·曼德拉,并解除对非洲人国民大会和南非共产党的禁制。由此,他开启了一个关于黑人和白人分享权力的过渡期,以及最终的多数人统治的谈判。

In retrospect, we have had difficulty perceiving the depths of the crisis in which dictatorships found themselves due to a mistaken belief in the ability of authoritarian systems to perpetuate themselves, or more broadly, in the viability of strong states. The state in a liberal democracy is by definition weak: preservation of a sphere of individual rights means a sharp delimitation of its power. Authoritarianregimes on the Right and Left, by contrast, have sought to use the power of the state to encroach on the private sphere and to control it for various purposes—whether to build military strength, to promote an egalitarian social order, or to bring about rapid economic growth. What was lost in the realm of individual liberty was to be regained at the level of national purpose.

回过头来看,我们很难觉察到独裁政权所处危机的深度,这是因为我们错误地相信专制制度有能力延续下去,或者更广泛地说,相信强大国家的生存能力。自由民主的国家从定义上来说是软弱的:维护个人权利的范围意味着对其权力进行严格的划分。相比之下,右翼和左翼的专制政权都试图利用国家权力来侵犯私人领域,并出于各种目的对其进行控制 —— 无论是为了建立军事力量,还是为了促进平等的社会秩序,或者是为了实现快速的经济增长。在个人自由领域失去的东西要在国家目的层面上重新获得。

The critical weakness that eventually toppled these strong states was in the last analysis a failure of legitimacy—that is, a crisis on the level of ideas. Legitimacy is not justice or right in an absolute sense; it is a relative concept that exists in people’s subjective perceptions. All regimes capable of effective action must be based on some principle of legitimacy. There is no such thing as a dictator who rules purely “by force,” as is commonly said, for instance, of Hitler. A tyrant can rule his children, old men, or perhaps his wife by force, if he is physically stronger than they are, but he is not likely to be able to rule more than two or three people in this fashion and certainly not a nation of millions. When we say that a dictator like Hitler ruled “by force,” what we mean is that Hitler’s supporters, including the Nazi Party, the Gestapo, and the W ehrmacht, were able to physically intimidate the larger population. But what made these supporters loyal to Hitler? Certainly not his ability to intimidate them physically: ultimately it rested upon their belief in his legitimate authority. Security apparatuses can themselves be controlled by intimidation, but at some point in the system, the dictator must have loyal subordinates who believe in his legitimate authority. Similarly for the most lowly and corrupt mafia chieftain: he would not be a capo if his “family” did not accept, on some grounds, his “legitimacy.” As Socrates explains in Plato’s Republic, even among a band of robbers there must be some principle of justice that permits them to divide their spoils. Legitimacy is thus crucial to even the most unjust and bloody-minded dictatorship.

最终推翻这些强国的关键弱点归根结底是合法性的失败 —— 也就是说,是思想层面的危机。合法性不是绝对意义上的正义或正确;它是一个相对的概念,存在于人们的主观认识中。所有能够采取有效行动的政权都必须以某种合法性原则为基础。不存在一个纯粹 “靠武力” 统治的独裁者,例如人们通常所说的希特勒。一个暴君可以用武力统治他的孩子、老人,或者也许是他的妻子,如果他的身体比他们强壮的话,但他不可能以这种方式统治超过两三个人,当然也不可能统治一个数百万人的国家。当我们说像希特勒这样的独裁者 “用武力” 进行统治时,我们的意思是,希特勒的支持者,包括纳粹党、盖世太保和德国国防军,能够对更多的人进行人身恐吓。但是,是什么让这些支持者忠于希特勒?当然不是他从肉体上恐吓他们的能力:最终取决于他们对他合法权威的信念。安全机构本身可以通过恐吓来控制,但在系统中的某一点上,独裁者必须有忠诚的下属,相信他的合法权威。同样,对于最低级和腐败的黑手党首领来说:如果他的 “家人” 不以某种理由接受他的 “合法地位”,他就不会成为一个 capo。正如苏格拉底在柏拉图的《共和国》中解释的那样,即使在一帮强盗中,也必须有一些正义的原则,允许他们分赃。因此,合法性对于即使是最不公正和最血腥的独裁统治也是至关重要的。

It is clearly not the case that a regime needs to establish legitimate authority for the greater part of its population in order to survive. There are numerous contemporary examples of minority dictatorships that are actively hated by large parts of their populations, but have succeeded in staying in power for decades. Such is the case of the A/a^’-dominated regime in Syria, or Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist faction in Iraq. It goes without saying that Latin America’s various military juntas and oligarchies have ruled without broad popular support. A lack of legitimacy among the population as a whole does not spell a crisis of legitimacy for the regime unless it begins to infect the elites tied to the regime itself, and particularly those that hold the monopoly of coercive power, such as the ruling party, the armed forces, and the police. When we speak of a crisis of legitimacy in an authoritarian system, then, we speak of a crisis within those elites whose cohesion is essential for the regime to act effectively.

一个政权要想生存,显然不需要为其大部分人口建立合法的权威。当代有许多少数派独裁政权的例子,他们被大部分人口积极憎恨,但却成功地保持了几十年的权力。叙利亚的 A/a^'主导的政权或伊拉克的萨达姆·侯赛因的复兴党就是这样的例子。不言而喻,拉丁美洲的各种军事政体和寡头统治都没有得到民众的广泛支持。在全体民众中缺乏合法性并不意味着政权的合法性危机,除非它开始感染与政权本身相关的精英,特别是那些垄断强制力的精英,如执政党、武装部队和警察。因此,当我们谈论专制制度的合法性危机时,我们谈论的是这些精英内部的危机,他们的凝聚力对于政权的有效运作至关重要。

A dictator’s legitimacy can spring from a variety of sources: from personal loyalty on the part of a pampered army, to an elaborate ideology that justifies his right to rule. In this century, the most important systematic attempt to establish a coherent, rightwing, non-democratic, non-egalitarian principle of legitimacy was fascism. Fascism was not a “universal” doctrine like liberalism or communism, insofar as it denied the existence of a common humanity or equality of human rights. Fascist ultranationalism maintained that the ultimate source of legitimacy was race or nation, specifically, the right of “master races” like the Germans to rule other people. Power and will were extolled over reason or equality, and were considered titles to rule in themselves. Nazism’s assertion of German racial superiority had to be actively proven through conflict with other cultures. War was therefore a normal rather than a pathological condition.

一个独裁者的合法性可以来自不同的来源:从被宠爱的军队的个人忠诚,到证明其统治权的精心设计的意识形态。在本世纪,建立一个连贯的、右翼的、非民主的、非平等主义的合法性原则的最重要的系统尝试是法西斯主义。法西斯主义不是像自由主义或共产主义那样的 “普遍” 学说,因为它否认存在共同的人性或人权的平等。法西斯极端民族主义认为,合法性的最终来源是种族或民族,特别是像德国人这样的 “主宰种族” 统治其他民族的权利。权力和意志比理性或平等更受推崇,并被认为是统治本身的头衔。纳粹主义对德国种族优越性的主张必须通过与其他文化的冲突来积极证明。因此,战争是一种正常的,而不是一种病态的状况。

Fascism was not around long enough to suffer an internal crisis of legitimacy, but was defeated by force of arms. Hitler and his remaining followers went to their deaths in their Berlin bunker believing to the last in the Tightness of the Nazi cause and in Hitler’s legitimate authority. The appeal of fascism was undermined in most people’s eyes retrospectively, as a consequence of that defeat. That is, Hitler had based his claim to legitimacy on the promise of world domination; what the Germans got instead was horrifying devastation and occupation by supposedly inferior races. Fascism was highly appealing not only to Germans but to many people around the world when it was mainly a matter of torchlight parades and bloodless victories, but made much less sense when its inherent militarism was carried to its logical conclusion. Fascism suffered, one might say, from an internal contradiction: its very emphasis on militarism and war led it inevitably into a self-destructive conflict with the international system. A s a result, it has not been a serious ideological competitor to liberal democracy since the end of the Second World War.


Of course, we could ask how legitimate fascism would be today if Hitler had not been defeated. But fascism’s internal contradiction went deeper than the likelihood that it would be defeated militarily by the international system. If Hitler had emerged victorious, fascism would nonetheless have lost its inner raison d’être in the peace of a universal empire where German nationhood could no longer be asserted through war and conquest.


After Hitler’s defeat, what remained as an alternative to liberal democracy on the Right was a group of persistent but in the end unsystematic military dictatorships. Most of these regimes had no grander vision than the preservation of a traditional social order, and their chief weakness was the lack of a plausible longterm basis of legitimacy. None was able to formulate, as Hitler did, a coherent doctrine of nation that could justify perpetual authoritarian rule. All of them had to accept the principle of democracy and popular sovereignty, and argue that for various reasons their countries were not ready for democracy, either because of a threat from communism, terrorism, or the economic mismanagement of the previous democratic regime. Each had to justify itself as transitional, pending the ultimate return of democracy.


The weakness implied by the lack of a coherent source of legitimacy did not, however, spell the quick or inevitable collapse of rightwing authoritarian governments. Democratic regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe had serious weaknesses as well, in terms of their ability to deal with a variety of serious social and economic problems. Few had been able to generate rapid economic growth, and many were plagued by terrorism. But the lack of legitimacy became a crucial source of weakness for rightwing authoritarianism when, as was almost always inevitably the case, these regimes faced a crisis or failure in some area of policy.


Legitimate regimes have a fund of goodwill that excuses them from short-term mistakes, even serious ones, and failure can be expiated by the removal of a prime minister or cabinet. In illegitimate regimes, on the other hand, failure frequently precipitates an overturning of the regime itself.


An example of this was Portugal. The dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and his successor, Marcello Caetano, had a superficial stability that prompted some observers to describe the Portuguese people as “passive, fatalistic and endlessly melancholy.“6 Just like the Germans and the Japanese before them, the Portuguese people proved wrong those outside Western observers who earlier deemed them unready for democracy. The Caetano dictatorship collapsed in April 1974 when its own military turned against it and formed the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA). Their immediate motive was Portugal’s deepening and unwinnable colonial war in Africa, which consumed a quarter of the Portuguese budget and the energies of a large part of the Portuguese military. The transition to democracy was not a smooth one because the MFA was by no means uniformly suffused with democratic ideas. A significant part of the officer corps was influenced by the strict Stalinist Portuguese Communist party of Àlvaro Cunhal. But in contrast to the 1930s, the center and democratic right proved unexpectedly resilient: after a stormy period of political and social turmoil, Mario Soares’ moderate Socialist party won a plurality of votes in April 1976. This occurred to no small degree as a result of assistance from outside organizations, ranging from the German Social Democratic party to the American CIA. But outside help would have proved feckless had Portugal not possessed a surprisingly strong civil society— political parties, unions, the Church—which were able to mobilize and control broad popular support for democracy. The allure of modern West European consumer civilization also played a role; in the words of one observer, “Workers … [who] might have marched in demonstrations and chanted slogans of Socialist revolution … spent their money on the clothes, appliances, and artifacts of West European consumer societies to whose standard of living they aspired.”

这方面的一个例子是葡萄牙。安东尼奥·德奥利维拉·萨拉扎及其继任者马塞洛·卡埃塔诺的独裁统治有一种表面上的稳定,促使一些观察家将葡萄牙人民描述为 “消极、宿命和无尽的忧郁。”6 就像之前的德国人和日本人一样,葡萄牙人民证明了那些先前认为他们不准备接受民主的外部西方观察家是错误的。1974 年 4 月,卡埃塔诺独裁政权崩溃了,因为它自己的军队转向反对它,并成立了武装部队运动(MFA)。他们的直接动机是葡萄牙在非洲的殖民战争不断深化且无法取胜,这消耗了葡萄牙四分之一的预算和大部分葡萄牙军队的精力。向民主的过渡并不顺利,因为外交部并没有统一的民主思想。军官队伍的很大一部分受到阿尔瓦罗·库尼亚尔的严格的斯大林主义葡萄牙共产党的影响。但与 1930 年代相比,中央和民主右派被证明具有出乎意料的弹性:在经历了政治和社会动荡的暴风雨时期后,马里奥·苏亚雷斯的温和社会主义党在 1976 年 4 月赢得了多数选票。这在很大程度上是由于外部组织的援助,从德国社会民主党到美国中央情报局。但是,如果葡萄牙没有一个令人惊讶的强大的公民社会 —— 政党、工会、教会 —— 能够动员和控制民众对民主的广泛支持,那么外部的帮助将证明是无用的。现代西欧消费文明的诱惑力也发挥了作用;用一位观察家的话说,“工人…… [他们可能会参加示威游行,高呼社会主义革命的口号…… 把钱花在西欧消费社会的衣服、电器和工艺品上,他们渴望达到这样的生活水平。”

The Spanish transition to democracy the following year was perhaps the purest recent case of the failure of authoritarian legitimacy. General Francisco Franco was, in many ways, the last exponent of the nineteenth-century European conservatism that based itself on throne and altar, the same conservatism that went down to defeat in the French Revolution. But Catholic consciousness in Spain was in the process of changing dramatically from the 1930s: the church as a whole had liberalized after Vatican II in the 1960s, and important parts of Spanish Catholicism adopted the Christian democracy of Western Europe. Not only did the Spanish church discover that there was no necessary conflict between Christianity and democracy, it increasingly took on the role of human rights advocate and critic of the Francoist dictatorship. This new consciousness was reflected in the Opus Dei movement of Catholic lay technocrats, many of whom entered the administration after 1957 and had been intimately involved with the subsequent economic liberalization. Thus, when Franco died in November 1975,important parts of his regime were prepared to accept the legitimacy of a series of negotiated “pacts” that peacefully dissolved all important Francoist institutions, legalized an opposition that included the Spanish Communist party, and permitted elections for a constituent assembly that would write a fully democratic constitution. This could not have happened if important elements of the old regime (most importantly, King Juan Carlos) had not believed that Francoism was an anachronism in a democratic Europe, a Europe that Spain had come to resemble increasingly on a social and economic plane. The last Francoist Cortes did a remarkable thing: it overwhelmingly passed a law in November 1976 that in effect constituted its own suicide by stipulating that the next Cortes be democratically elected. As in Portugal, the Spanish population as a whole provided the ultimate ground for democracy by supporting a democratic center, first by giving strong support to the December 1976 referendum approving democratic elections, and then by calmly voting Suarez’s center-right party into office in June 1977.

次年,西班牙向民主的过渡也许是最近最纯粹的威权合法性失败的案例。弗朗西斯科·佛朗哥将军在许多方面都是十九世纪欧洲保守主义的最后表现者,这种保守主义以王位和祭坛为基础,也就是在法国大革命中败下阵来的那种保守主义。但是,西班牙的天主教意识从 1930 年代开始就在发生着巨大的变化:1960 年代梵蒂冈二世之后,教会整体上已经自由化,西班牙天主教的重要部分采用了西欧的基督教民主。西班牙教会不仅发现基督教与民主之间没有必然的冲突,而且越来越多地承担起人权倡导者和佛朗哥独裁政权的批评者的角色。这种新的意识反映在天主教非专业技术官僚的 Opus Dei 运动中,其中许多人在 1957 年后进入政府,并密切参与了随后的经济自由化进程。因此,当佛朗哥于 1975 年 11 月去世时,他的政权的重要部分准备接受一系列谈判达成的 “协议” 的合法性,这些协议和平地解散了所有重要的佛朗哥机构,使包括西班牙共产党在内的反对派合法化,并允许选举一个制宪会议,以制定一部完全民主的宪法。如果旧政权的重要成员(最重要的是胡安·卡洛斯国王)不相信佛朗哥主义在民主的欧洲是不合时宜的,而西班牙在社会和经济方面已经越来越像一个欧洲,那么这就不可能发生。最后一届佛朗哥主义的议会做了一件了不起的事情:它在 1976 年 11 月以压倒性优势通过了一项法律,规定下一届议会由民主选举产生,这实际上是它自己的自杀。和葡萄牙一样,西班牙全体人民通过支持一个民主中心,为民主提供了最终的基础,首先是大力支持 1976 年 12 月的全民公决,批准民主选举,然后在 1977 年 6 月平静地投票给苏亚雷斯的中右翼党。

In the cases of the Greek and Argentine turns to democracy in 1974 and 1983,respectively, the military in both countries was not forcibly ousted from power. They gave way to civilian authority

在希腊和阿根廷分别于 1974 年和 1983 年转向民主的情况下,这两个国家的军队没有被强行赶下台。他们让位给了文职政府

instead through inner divisions within their ranks, reflecting a loss of belief in their right to rule. As in Portugal, external failure was the proximate cause. The Greek colonels who came to power in 1967 had never sought legitimation on grounds other than democracy, arguing only that they were preparing the way for the restoration of a “healthy” and “regenerated” political system. The military regime was thus vulnerable when it discredited itself by supporting a Greek Cypriot bid for unity with the mainland, leading to the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey and the possibility of full-scale war. The major aim of the military junta that took over power in Argentina from President Isabella Perôn in 1976 was to rid Argentine society of terrorism; it accomplished this in a brutal war and thereby undercut its chief raison d’être. The military junta’s decision to invade the Falklands/Malvinas was subsequently sufficient to discredit it by provoking an unnecessary war which it could not subsequently win.

而是通过军队内部的分裂,反映出对其统治权的信念的丧失。与葡萄牙一样,外部失败是近因。1967 年上台的希腊上校从未以民主以外的理由寻求合法化,他们只是争辩说,他们正在为恢复一个 “健康的” 和 “再生的” 政治制度做准备。因此,当军政府通过支持希族塞人争取与大陆统一而使自己名誉扫地,导致土耳其占领塞浦路斯并有可能发生全面战争时,它就很脆弱。1976 年,军政府从伊莎贝拉·佩罗恩总统手中接过阿根廷政权,其主要目的是使阿根廷社会摆脱恐怖主义;它通过一场残酷的战争实现了这一目标,从而削弱了其存在的主要理由。军政府入侵福克兰群岛/马尔维纳斯群岛的决定后来足以使其丧失信誉,因为它挑起了一场不必要的战争,而它后来又无法赢得战争。

In other cases, strong military governments proved ineffective in dealing with the economic and social problems that had delegitimized their democratic predecessors. The Peruvian military turned over power to a civilian government in 1980 in the face of a rapidly accelerating economic crisis, in which the government of General Francisco Morales Bermudez found it could not cope with a series of strikes and intractable social problems. The Brazilian military presided over a period of remarkable economic growth from 1968 to 1973, but in the face of a world oil crisis and slowdown, Brazil’s military rulers found they had no particular gift for economic management. By the time the last military president, Joâo Figueiredo, stepped down in favor of an elected civilian president, many in the military were relieved, and even ashamed of the mistakes they had made. The Uruguayan military initially took power to wage a “dirty war” against the Tupemaros insurgency in 1973-74. Uruguay had a relatively strong democratic tradition, however, which is perhaps what persuaded the Uruguayan military to put the institutionalization of its rule to the test through a plebiscite in 1980. It lost, and by 1983 had voluntarily stepped aside.

在其他情况下,强大的军政府在处理经济和社会问题时被证明是无效的,这些问题曾使他们的民主前任失去了合法性。1980 年,面对迅速加速的经济危机,秘鲁军方将权力移交给文职政府,弗朗西斯科·莫拉莱斯·贝穆德斯将军的政府发现它无法应对一系列的罢工和棘手的社会问题。1968 年至 1973 年,巴西军方主持了一段显著的经济增长,但面对世界石油危机和经济放缓,巴西的军事统治者发现他们没有经济管理的特殊天赋。当最后一任军方总统若奥·菲格雷多(Joâo Figueiredo)下台,改由民选的文职总统担任时,许多军方人员都松了一口气,甚至对他们所犯的错误感到羞愧。乌拉圭军方最初掌权是为了在 1973-74 年对 Tupemaros 叛乱发动 “肮脏战争”。然而,乌拉圭有一个相对强大的民主传统,这也许是说服乌拉圭军方在 1980 年通过公民投票对其统治的制度化进行测试的原因。它输了,到 1983 年,它自愿退位。

Architects of the apartheid system in South Africa, like former Prime Minister H. F. Verwoerd, denied the liberal premise of universal human equality, and believed that there was a natural division and hierarchy between mankind’s races. Apartheid was an effort to permit the industrial development of South Africa based on the use of black labor, while at the same time seeking to reverse and prevent the urbanization of South Africa’s blacks that is the natural concomitant of any process of industrialization. Such an effort at social engineering was both monumental in its ambition and, in retrospect, monumentally foolish in its ultimate aim: by 1981,almost eighteen million blacks were arrested under the socalled “pass-laws” for the crime of wanting to live near their places of employment. The impossibility of defying the laws of modern economics had, by the late 1980s, led to a revolution in Afrikaner thinking that caused F.W. de Klerk, well before he became state president, to assert that “the economy demands the permanent presence of millions of blacks in urban areas” and that “it does not help to bluff ourselves about this.“1 9 The apartheid system’s loss of legitimacy among whites was thus ultimately based on its ineffectiveness, and has led to an acceptance on the part of a majority of Afrikaners of a new system of power sharing with blacks.

南非种族隔离制度的设计者,如前总理 H·F.Verwoerd,否定了人类普遍平等的自由主义前提,认为人类的种族之间存在着自然的划分和等级。种族隔离是一种努力,它允许南非在使用黑人劳动力的基础上进行工业发展,同时寻求扭转和阻止南非黑人的城市化,而城市化是任何工业化进程的自然伴随物。这种社会工程的努力在其雄心上是巨大的,但回过头来看,在其最终目标上也是非常愚蠢的:到 1981 年,几乎有 1800 万黑人根据所谓的 “通行证法” 被捕,罪名是想住在他们工作地点附近。到 80 年代末,违背现代经济规律的不可能性已经导致了非洲人思想的革命,这使得 F·W·德克勒克在成为国家总统之前就断言,“经济需要数百万黑人在城市地区长期存在”,“在这方面自欺欺人是没有用的。”1 9 因此,种族隔离制度在白人中失去了合法性,最终是基于它的无效性,并导致大多数非洲人接受了与黑人分享权力的新制度。

While recognizing the real differences that exist between these cases, there was a remarkable consistency in the democratic tran­sitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and South Africa. Apart from Somoza in Nicaragua, there was not one single instance in which the old regime was forced from power through violent upheaval or revolution. What permitted regime change was the voluntary decision on the part of at least certain members of the old regime to give up power in favor of a democratically elected government. While this willing retreat from power was always provoked by some immediate crisis, it was ultimately made possible by a growing belief that democracy was the only legitimate source of authority in the modern world. Once they accomplished the limited aims they set for themselves—eliminating terrorism, restoring social order, ending economic chaos, and so forth—authoritarians of the Right in Latin America and Europe found themselves unable to justify their continuation in power, and lost confidence in themselves. It is difficult to kill people in the name of throne and altar if the king himself seeks to be no more than the titular monarch of a democratic country, or if the Church is in the forefront of the struggle for human rights. So much, then, for that bit of conventional wisdom that maintains that “nobody gives up power voluntarily.”

虽然认识到这些案例之间存在的实际差异,但南欧、拉丁美洲和南非的民主过渡有一个显著的一致性。除了尼加拉瓜的索摩查之外,没有一个例子是通过暴力动乱或革命迫使旧政权下台的。允许政权更迭的是,至少旧政权的某些成员自愿决定放弃权力,支持民主选举的政府。虽然这种自愿放弃权力的行为总是由一些直接的危机引起的,但它最终是由于人们越来越相信民主是现代世界唯一合法的权力来源而成为可能。一旦他们完成了为自己设定的有限目标 —— 消除恐怖主义、恢复社会秩序、结束经济混乱等等 —— 拉丁美洲和欧洲的右派专制者就会发现他们无法证明自己继续执政的合理性,并对自己失去信心。如果国王本人只想成为一个民主国家的名义上的君主,或者如果教会站在人权斗争的最前沿,就很难以王位和祭坛的名义杀人。那么,那些认为 “没有人自愿放弃权力” 的传统智慧就这么多了。

It goes without saying that many of the old authoritarians were not converted to democracy overnight, and that they were frequently victims of their own incompetence and miscalculation. Neither General Pinochet in Chile nor the Sandinistas in Nicaragua expected to lose the elections to which they submitted themselves. But the fact is that even the most die-hard dictators believed they had to endow themselves with at least a patina of democratic legitimacy by staging an election. And in many cases, the relinquishing of power by strong men in uniform was done at considerable personal risk, since they thereby lost their chief protection against the vengeance of those whom they had mistreated. It is perhaps not surprising that rightwing authoritarians were swept from power by the idea of democracy. The power of most strong states on the Right was actually relatively limited when it came to the economy or society as a whole. Their leaders represented traditional social groups who were becoming increasingly marginal to their societies, and the generals and colonels who ruled were generally bereft of ideas and intellect. But what about those communist totalitarian powers of the Left? Had they not redefined the very meaning of the term “strong state,” and

不言而喻,许多老牌独裁者并不是一夜之间转变为民主的,他们往往是自己无能和误判的受害者。智利的皮诺切特将军和尼加拉瓜的桑地诺主义者都没有想到会在他们自己参加的选举中失败。但事实是,即使是最顽固的独裁者也认为他们必须通过举行选举,至少给自己披上一层民主合法性的外衣。在许多情况下,穿制服的强人放弃权力是冒着相当大的个人风险的,因为他们因此失去了对那些被他们虐待过的人的复仇的主要保护。右翼专制者被民主理念扫地出门也许并不奇怪。当涉及到经济或整个社会时,大多数右派强国的权力实际上是相对有限的。他们的领导人所代表的传统社会群体在社会中越来越边缘化,而统治者的将军和上校一般都是没有思想和智力的。但是,那些左派的共产主义极权主义势力呢?难道他们没有重新定义 “强国” 这个词的含义,并且

discovered a formula for self-perpetuating power?


Chapter 3: The Weakness of Strong States II, or, Eating Pineapples on the Moon

3 强国的弱点 II,或者,在月球上吃菠萝

All right, then, here are some excerpts from a Kuybyshev ninth-grader,as recently as the 1960s: “It is 1981. Communism: Communism is the abundance of material and cultural blessings… . All of the city transportation is electrified, and harmful enterprises are removed beyond the city limits… . We are on the Moon, we are walking by flower bushes and fruit trees …”

好吧,那么,这里有一些来自库伊比舍夫九年级学生的摘录,就在上世纪 60 年代。“现在是 1981 年。共产主义。共产主义是丰富的物质和文化的祝福。. . . 所有的城市交通都是电气化的,有害的企业被清除到城市范围之外。. . . 我们在月球上,我们在花丛和果树旁行走…… ”

So how many years does that make it that we have been eating pineapples on the Moon? If only we could someday eat our fill of tomatoes here on earth!


—Audrey Nuikin, ‘The Bee and the Communist Ideal”1


Totalitarianism was a concept developed in the West after World War II to describe the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, which were tyrannies of a very different character from the traditional authoritarianisms of the nineteenth century. Hitler and Stalin redefined the meaning of a strong state by the very audacity of their social and political agendas. Traditional despotisms like Franco’s Spain or the various military dictatorships of Latin America never sought to crush “civil society”—that is, society’s sphere of private interests—but only to control it. Franco’s Falangist party or the Peronist movement in Argentina failed to develop systematic ideologies and made only half-hearted efforts to change popular values and attitudes.

极权主义是西方在二战后提出的一个概念,用来描述苏联和纳粹德国,这两个国家的暴政与十九世纪的传统独裁主义性质截然不同。希特勒和斯大林通过其社会和政治议程的大胆性重新定义了强国的含义。像佛朗哥的西班牙或拉丁美洲的各种军事独裁政权这样的传统专制主义从来没有试图粉碎 “公民社会”,即社会的私人利益领域,而只是为了控制它。佛朗哥的法朗士党或阿根廷的贝隆主义运动未能发展出系统的意识形态,在改变大众的价值观和态度方面只做了半心半意的努力。

The totalitarian state, by contrast, was based on an explicit ideology that provided a comprehensive view of human life. Totalitarianism sought to destroy civil society in its entirety, in its search for “total” control over the lives of its citizens. From the moment the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917,the Soviet state systematically attacked all potential competing sources of authority in Russian society, including opposition political parties, the press, trade unions, private enterprises, and the Church. While institutions remained at the end of the 1930s bearing some of those names, all were ghostly shadows of their former selves, organized and completely controlled by the regime. What was left was a society whose members were reduced to “atoms,” unconnected to any “mediating institutions” short of an all-powerful government.

相比之下,极权主义国家以明确的意识形态为基础,对人类生活有全面的看法。极权主义在寻求对公民生活的 “全面” 控制的过程中,试图从整体上摧毁公民社会。从 1917 年布尔什维克夺取政权的那一刻起,苏维埃国家就系统地攻击了俄罗斯社会中所有潜在的竞争性权力来源,包括反对派政党、新闻界、工会、私营企业和教会。虽然在 20 世纪 30 年代末仍有一些带有这些名称的机构存在,但所有这些机构都是它们以前的幽灵般的影子,由政权组织并完全控制。剩下的是一个社会,其成员沦为 “原子”,与任何 “中介机构” 都没有联系,只有一个全能的政府。

The totalitarian state hoped to remake Soviet man himself by changing the very structure of his beliefs and values through control of the press, education, and propaganda. This extended down to a human being’s most personal and intimate relations, those of the family. The young Pavel Morozov, who denounced his parents to Stalin’s police, was for many years held up by the regime as a model Soviet child. In Mikhail Heller’s words, “The human relations that make up the society’s fabric—the family, religion, historical memory, language—become targets, as society is systematically and methodically atomized, and the individual’s close relationships are supplanted by others chosen for him, and approved by the state.”

极权主义国家希望通过控制新闻、教育和宣传,改变苏维埃人的信仰和价值观的结构,从而重塑苏维埃人自己。这也延伸到了人的最个人和最亲密的关系,即家庭关系。年轻的帕维尔·莫罗佐夫向斯大林的警察告发了他的父母,多年来被该政权捧为苏联的模范儿童。用米哈伊尔·海勒的话说,“构成社会结构的人际关系 —— 家庭、宗教、历史记忆、语言 —— 成了目标,因为社会被系统地、有条不紊地原子化了,个人的亲密关系被为他选择的、由国家批准的其他关系所取代了。”

Ken Kesey’s 1962 novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, provides an illustration of the totalitarian aspiration. The book centers around the inmates of an insane asylum who lead lives of childish inanity under the eyes of a tyrannical Big Nurse. The novel’s hero, McMurphy, tries to liberate them by breaking the asylum’s rules and eventually leading the inmates to freedom. But he discovers in the process that none of the inmates is being kept there against his will; in the end, all are afraid of the world outside and remain voluntarily incarcerated, in a relationship of secure dependence on Big Nurse. This then was the ultimate goal of totalitarianism: not simply to deprive the new Soviet man of his freedom, but to make him fear freedom in favor of security, and to affirm the goodness of his chains even in the absence of coercion.

肯·凯西(Ken Kesey)1962 年的小说《飞越疯人院》(One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest)对极权主义的愿望作了说明。这本书围绕着一个精神病院的囚犯,他们在暴虐的大护士的眼皮底下过着幼稚的不正常生活。小说的主人公麦克墨菲试图通过打破精神病院的规则来解放他们,并最终带领囚犯们获得自由。但他在这个过程中发现,没有一个囚犯是违背自己的意愿被关在那里的;最后,所有的人都害怕外面的世界,仍然自愿被监禁,与大护士保持着安全的依赖关系。这就是极权主义的最终目的:不是简单地剥夺新苏维埃人的自由,而是让他害怕自由,支持安全,即使在没有强制的情况下,也要肯定他的锁链是好的。

Many people believed that the efficacy of Soviet totalitarianism would be buttressed by the authoritarian traditions of the Russian people predating Bolshevism. A European view of the Russians popular in the nineteenth century was exemplified by the French traveler Custine, who characterized them as a race “broken to slavery, [who] have … taken seriously only terror and ambition.“4 W estern confidence in the stability of Soviet communism rested on a belief, conscious or not, that the Russian people were not interested in or ready for democracy. Soviet rule, after all, was not imposed on the Russians by an external power in 1917, as it was in Eastern Europe after World War II, and it had survived for six or seven decades after the Bolshevik Revolution, weathering famine, upheaval, and invasion. This suggested that the system had won a certain degree of legitimacy among the broader population, and certainly within ruling elites, reflecting that society’s own natural inclinations toward authoritarianism. Thus, while Western observers were perfectly ready to credit the Polish people with a desire to overturn communism if given the chance, the same was not held to be true of the Russians. They were, in other words, contented inmates of the asylum, held there not by bars and straightjackets but by their own craving for security, order, authority, and some extra benefits that the Soviet regime had managed to throw in like imperial grandeur and superpower status. The strong Soviet state looked very strong indeed, nowhere more so than in the global strategic competition with the United States.

许多人认为,苏维埃极权主义的效力将得到布尔什维克主义之前的俄罗斯人民的专制传统的支持。十九世纪流行的欧洲人对俄国人的看法,以法国旅行家库斯廷为例,他把俄国人描述为一个 “被打垮的奴隶,他们…… 只认真对待恐怖和野心” 的种族。4 西方人对苏维埃共产主义的稳定性的信心,是基于这样一种信念,不管是否有意识,俄国人民对民主不感兴趣,也没有准备好。苏联的统治毕竟不是 1917 年由外部势力强加给俄罗斯人的,就像二战后东欧的情况一样,而且在布尔什维克革命后,它已经生存了六七十年,经历了饥荒、动乱和入侵。这表明该制度在广大民众中赢得了一定程度的合法性,当然在统治精英中也是如此,这反映了该社会本身对专制主义的自然倾向。因此,尽管西方观察家们完全准备好相信波兰人民如果有机会就会推翻共产主义的愿望,但俄罗斯人的情况却并非如此。换句话说,他们是精神病院里心满意足的囚犯,他们不是被铁栅栏和紧身衣关在那里,而是被他们自己对安全、秩序、权威以及苏维埃政权设法扔进来的一些额外好处(如帝国的宏伟和超级大国的地位)的渴望关在那里。强大的苏维埃国家看起来确实非常强大,在与美国的全球战略竞争中更是如此。

The totalitarian state, it was believed, could not only perpetuate itself indefinitely, it could replicate itself throughout the world like a virus. When communism was exported to East Germany, Cuba, Vietnam, or Ethiopia, it came complete with a vanguard party, centralized ministries, a police apparatus, and an ideology to govern all aspects of life. These institutions appeared to be effective, regardless of the national or cultural traditions of the countries in question.


What happened to this self-perpetuating mechanism of power?


The year 1989—thetwo hundredth anniversaryof the French Revolution, and of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution— marked the decisive collapse of communism as a factor in world history.

1989 年是法国大革命和美国宪法批准 200 周年,标志着共产主义作为世界历史的一个因素决定性的崩溃。

Since the early 1980s, so rapid and continuous has the pace of change been in the communist world that at times we tend to take change for granted, and forget the magnitude of what has happened. It would, therefore, be useful to review the major milestones of this period:

自 20 世纪 80 年代初以来,共产主义世界的变革步伐如此迅速和持续,以至于有时我们倾向于认为变革是理所当然的,而忘记了已经发生的事情的严重性。因此,回顾一下这一时期的主要里程碑将是有益的。

• In the early 1980s, the Chinese communist leadership began permitting peasants, who constituted 80 percent of China’s population, to grow and sell their own food. Agriculture was in effect de-collectivized, and capitalist market relationships began reappearing not only throughout the countryside, but in urban industry as well.

- 1980 年代初,中国共产党领导层开始允许占中国人口 80% 的农民种植和销售自己的食物。农业实际上是去集体化的,资本主义市场关系开始重新出现,不仅在农村,而且在城市工业。

• In 1986, the Soviet press began to publish articles critical of the crimes of the Stalin era, a subject which had not been broached since Khrushchev’s ouster in the early 1960s. Press freedom expanded rapidly thereafter, as one taboo after another was broken. By 1989, Gorbachev and the rest of the Soviet leadership could be attacked openly in the press, and in 1990 and 1991 large demonstrations occurred across the Soviet Union calling for his resignation.

- 1986 年,苏联新闻界开始发表批评斯大林时代罪行的文章,这是自 1960 年代初赫鲁晓夫下台后从未被提及的话题。此后,随着一个又一个禁忌被打破,新闻自由迅速扩大。到 1989 年,戈尔巴乔夫和其他苏联领导人可以在新闻界公开受到攻击,1990 年和 1991 年,整个苏联发生了要求他辞职的大规模示威活动。

• In March 1989, elections were held for a newly restructured Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet. Further elections took place the next year in each of the USSR’s fifteen constituent republics, and on a local level. The Communist party tried to rig these elections in its favor, but even so did not manage to prevent any number of local parliaments from coming under the control of non-communist deputies.

- 1989 年 3 月,为新改组的人民代表大会和最高苏维埃举行了选举。第二年,在苏联的 15 个加盟共和国中的每一个,以及在地方一级,都举行了进一步的选举。共产党试图对这些选举进行有利的操纵,但即使如此,也未能阻止任何数量的地方议会被非共产党的代表所控制。

• In the spring of 1989, Beijing was temporarily taken over by tens of thousands of students calling for an end to corruption and for the establishment of democracy in China. They were eventually crushed ruthlessly by the Chinese army in June, but not before they were able to publicly call into question the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist party.

- 1989 年春天,北京被数万名要求结束腐败和在中国建立民主的学生暂时占领。他们最终在 6 月被中国军队无情地镇压,但在此之前,他们已经能够公开质疑中国共产党的合法性。

• In February 1989, the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan. This, as it turned out, was only the first of a series of withdrawals.

- 1989 年 2 月,红军从阿富汗撤军。事实证明,这只是一系列撤军中的第一次。

• In early 1989, reformers in the Hungarian Socialist Workers party announced plans for free, multiparty elections the following year. In April 1989, a round table agreement led to a power-sharing agreement between the Polish Workers party and the Solidarity trade union. As a result of elections—which the Polish communists also tried unsuccessfully to rig—a Solidarity government came to power in July.

- 1989 年初,匈牙利社会主义工人党的改革者宣布了在下一年进行自由、多党选举的计划。1989 年 4 月,一项圆桌会议协议促成了波兰工人党和团结工会之间的权力分享协议。作为选举的结果 —— 波兰共产党人也试图操纵选举,但没有成功 —— 团结工会政府于 7 月上台。

• In July and August 1989, tens and then hundreds of thousands of East Germans began fleeing into West Germany, leading to a crisis that rapidly led to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the East German state.

- 1989 年 7 月和 8 月,数万乃至数十万东德人开始逃往西德,导致了一场危机,并迅速导致柏林墙被推倒和东德国家的瓦解。

• The East German collapse then triggered the fall of communist governments in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. By early 1991, all formerly communist states in Eastern Europe, including Albania and the major republics of Yugoslavia, had held reasonably free, multiparty elections. Communists were initially turned out of office everywhere except in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania, while in Bulgaria, the elected Communist government was soon forced to step down. The political basis for the Warsaw Pact disappeared, and Soviet forces began to withdraw from Eastern Europe.

- 东德的崩溃随后引发了捷克斯洛伐克、保加利亚和罗马尼亚的共产主义政府的垮台。到 1991 年初,东欧的所有前共产主义国家,包括阿尔巴尼亚和南斯拉夫的主要共和国,都举行了合理的自由、多党选举。除了罗马尼亚、保加利亚、塞尔维亚和阿尔巴尼亚,其他地方的共产党人最初都被赶下台,而在保加利亚,当选的共产党政府很快就被迫下台。华沙条约》的政治基础消失了,苏联军队开始从东欧撤出。

• In January 1990, Article Six of the Soviet Constitution, guaranteeing the Communist party a “leading role,” was revoked.

- 1990 年 1 月,保证共产党具有 “领导作用” 的苏联宪法第六条被废除。

• In the wake of the abolition of Article Six, a number of non-communist political parties were established in the Soviet Union, and came to power in a number of Soviet Republics. Most striking was the election of Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian Republic in the spring of 1990, who with many of his supporters in the Russian Parliament subsequently left the Communist party. This same group then began advocating the restoration of private property and markets.

- 在废除第六条之后,苏联成立了一些非共产主义政党,并在一些苏维埃共和国上台。最引人注目的是鲍里斯·叶利钦在 1990 年春天当选为俄罗斯共和国总统,他和他在俄罗斯议会的许多支持者随后离开了共产党。随后,这批人开始主张恢复私有财产和市场。

• Freely elected parliaments in every constituent republic, including Russia and the Ukraine, declared their “sovereignty” in the course of 1990. The parliaments in the Baltic states went well beyond this to declare their complete independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990. This did not lead to an immediate crackdown, as many had anticipated, but to a power struggle within Russia over whether or not to preserve the old Union.

- 包括俄罗斯和乌克兰在内的每个组成共和国的自由选举的议会都在 1990 年期间宣布其 “主权”。波罗的海国家的议会远远超过了这一点,于 1990 年 3 月宣布它们从苏联完全独立。这并没有像许多人预料的那样立即导致镇压,而是导致俄罗斯内部关于是否保留旧联盟的权力斗争。

• In June 1991,Russia held its first completely free popular election, and elected Yeltsin president of the Russian Federation. This reflected the rapidly accelerating devolution of power from Moscow to the periphery.

- 1991 年 6 月,俄罗斯举行了第一次完全自由的民众选举,并选举叶利钦为俄罗斯联邦总统。这反映了权力从莫斯科向周边地区的迅速加速下放。

• In August 1991, a coup against Gorbachev by a group of communist hardliners collapsed. This occurred partly as a result of the plotters’ incompetence and lack of resolve, but also because of a remarkable outpouring of support, led by Boris Yeltsin, for democratic institutions on the part of the allegedly passive and authority-craving Soviet people.

- 1991 年 8 月,一群共产主义强硬派对戈尔巴乔夫发动的政变失败了。发生这种情况的部分原因是策划者的无能和缺乏决心,但也是因为在鲍里斯·叶利钦的领导下,据称是被动和渴望权威的苏联人民对民主制度的支持出现了显著的高潮。

A sober student of communist affairs back in 1980 would have said that none of these events was likely or even possible in the coming decade. This judgment would have been based on the view that any one of the above developments would have undermined a key element of communist totalitarian power, thereby dealing a mortal blow to the system as a whole. And, indeed, the final curtain came down when the old USSR dissolved itself and the communist party was banned in Russia following the failure of the August 1991 coup. How, then, were earlier expectations belied, and what accounts for the extraordinary weaknesses of this strong state, revealed to us since the onset of perestroïka?

在 1980 年,一个对共产主义事务有清醒认识的学生会说,这些事件在未来十年都不可能发生,甚至不可能发生。这种判断的依据是,上述任何一个发展都会破坏共产主义极权的一个关键因素,从而对整个体系造成致命的打击。而事实上,在 1991 年 8 月政变失败后,旧苏联自行解体,共产党在俄罗斯被取缔,最后的大幕落下了。那么,早先的期望是如何落空的呢?是什么原因导致了这个强大的国家自改革开放以来向我们暴露出非凡的弱点?

The most basic weakness whose full gravity escaped the attention of Western observers was economic. It was much more difficult to tolerate economic failure in the Soviet system because the regime itself had explicitly based its claims to legitimacy on its ability to deliver its people a high material standard of living. Hard as it is to recall now, economic growth had actually been considered a strength of the Soviet state up through the early 1970s: between 1928 and 1955, Soviet GNP had increased at a yearly rate of 4. to 6. percent, and had grown half again as fast as U.S. GNP in the two decades thereafter, giving real credence to Khrushchev’s threat to overtake and then bury the United States. But by the mid1970s, this rate of growth had slowed to a range estimated by the CIA at 2. to 2. percent per annum between 1975 and 1985. There is increasing evidence that these figures overstate growth considerably by not taking hidden inflation into account; various reformist Soviet economists have asserted that 7 growth in this period was 0. to 1. percent, or even zero. Flat

最基本的弱点是经济上的,其严重性没有引起西方观察家的注意。在苏联体系中,要容忍经济上的失败要困难得多,因为这个政权本身就明确地将其合法性的要求建立在为人民提供高物质生活标准的能力之上。尽管现在很难回忆起,经济增长实际上一直被认为是苏联国家的优势,直到 1970 年代初:在 1928 年至 1955 年期间,苏联的国民生产总值以每年 4% 至 6% 的速度增长,在此后的 20 年里,其增长速度是美国国民生产总值的一半,这让赫鲁晓夫威胁要超越美国,然后埋葬美国的说法真正得到了证实。但到了 70 年代中期,这一增长速度已经放缓,据中情局估计,1975 年至 1985 年期间的年增长率为 2% 至 2%。越来越多的证据表明,这些数字由于没有考虑到隐藏的通货膨胀而大大夸大了增长;各种改革派的苏联经济学家断言,这一时期的增长率为 0 到 1%,甚至是零。平坦的

overall GNP growth, coupled with yearly increases in defense spending through the early 1980s of 2 to 3 percent, meant that the civilian economy was actually shrinking at an appreciable rate for the decade before Gorbachev came to power. Anyone who has stayed in a Soviet hotel, shopped in a Soviet department store, or traveled in the countryside where one can find the most abject poverty, should have realized that there were very serious problems with the Soviet economy not entirely reflected in official statistics.

国民生产总值的总体增长,加上 80 年代初国防开支每年增加 2% 到 3%,意味着在戈尔巴乔夫上台前的十年里,民用经济实际上在以可观的速度萎缩。任何一个住过苏联旅馆、在苏联百货商店购物、或在可以找到最赤贫的农村旅行的人都应该意识到,苏联经济存在着非常严重的问题,并没有完全反映在官方统计中。

As important was the way the economic crisis was interpreted. By the late 1980s, a remarkable intellectual revolution had occurred within the Soviet economic establishment. The old guard from the Brezhnev days was replaced within three or four years of Gorbachev’s rise by reformist economists like Abel Aganbegyan, Nikolay Petrakov, Stanislav Shatalin, Oleg Bogomolov, Leonid Abalkin, Grigory Yavlinsky, and Nikolay Shmelev. All of these men understood—albeit imperfectly, in some cases—the basic principles of liberal economic theory, and were convinced that the centralized Soviet administrative-command system was at the root of the USSR’s economic decline.

同样重要的是对经济危机的解释方式。到 20 世纪 80 年代末,苏联经济机构内部发生了一场引人注目的知识革命。勃列日涅夫时代的守旧派在戈尔巴乔夫上台后的三四年内被改革派经济学家取代,如阿贝尔·阿甘贝吉安、尼古拉·彼得拉科夫、斯坦尼斯拉夫·沙塔林、奥列格·博戈莫洛夫、列昂尼德·阿巴尔金、格里高利·亚夫林斯基和尼古拉·什梅廖夫。所有这些人都理解 —— 尽管在某些情况下并不完美 —— 自由主义经济理论的基本原则,并确信中央集权的苏联行政·指挥系统是苏联经济衰退的根源所在。

It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the subsequent course of perestroïka simply in terms of economic imperatives. Gorbachev himself pointed out, the Soviet Union in 1985 was not in a crisis situation, but one of “pre-crisis.” Other states have weathered far more serious economic difficulties. During the Great Depression, for example, real U.S. GNP fell by nearly a third, but this did not lead to a general discrediting of the American system. The grave weaknesses of the Soviet economy had been recognized for some time, and there was a panoply of traditional reforms that could have been attempted to stem the decline.

然而,如果仅仅从经济需要的角度来解释改革开放的后续进程,那将是一个错误。戈尔巴乔夫自己指出,1985 年的苏联不是处于危机状态,而是处于 “危机前” 状态。其他国家经受过更严重的经济困难。例如,在大萧条期间,美国的实际国民生产总值下降了近三分之一,但这并没有导致对美国制度的普遍诋毁。苏联经济的严重弱点已经被认识了一段时间,而且有一系列的传统改革可以被尝试来阻止衰退。

To understand the true weaknesses of the Soviet state, then, the economic problem has to be put in the context of a much larger crisis, that of the legitimacy of the system as a whole. Economic failure was only one of a number of failures in the Soviet system, that had the effect of catalyzing rejection of the belief system and exposing the weakness of the underlying structure. The most fundamental failure of totalitarianism was its failure to control thought. Soviet citizens, as it turned out, had all along retained an ability to think for themselves. Many understood, despite years of government propaganda, that their government was lying to them. People remained enormously angry at the personal sufferings they had endured under Stalinism. Virtually every family had lost members or friends during collectivization, or the Great Terror of the 1930s, or during the war, whose costs had been made much greater by Stalin’s foreign policy mistakes. They knew that these victims had been unjustly persecuted, and that the Soviet regime had never owned up to its responsibility for such horrendous crimes. People understood as well that a new kind of class system had arisen in this supposedly classless society, a class of party functionaries who were as corrupt and privileged as anyone under the old regime, but far more hypocritical.

为了理解苏联国家的真正弱点,经济问题必须放在一个更大的危机背景下,即整个体系的合法性问题。经济上的失败只是苏维埃制度中一系列失败中的一个,这些失败产生了催化对信仰体系的拒绝,并暴露了基础结构的弱点。极权主义最根本的失败是它未能控制思想。事实证明,苏联公民一直以来都保留着自我思考的能力。尽管政府进行了多年的宣传,但许多人明白,他们的政府在欺骗他们。人们对他们在斯大林主义下所承受的个人痛苦仍然非常愤怒。几乎每个家庭都在集体化、1930 年代的大恐怖或战争中失去了成员或朋友,而斯大林的外交政策错误使得战争的代价更大。他们知道,这些受害者受到了不公正的迫害,而苏维埃政权从未承担过对这些可怕罪行的责任。人们也明白,在这个所谓的无阶级社会中出现了一种新的阶级制度,一个由党的职能人员组成的阶级,他们和旧政权下的任何人一样腐败和享有特权,但却更加虚伪。

As evidence for this, consider the use of words in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union, such as “democratization” (demokratizatsiya), used incessantly by Gorbachev to define his own aims. Lenin, of course, maintained that the Soviet Union had achieved a truer form of democracy through the dictatorship of the party than the “formal” democracies of the West. Yet nobody in the contemporary Soviet Union who uses the term “democratization” has any illusions that it means anything other than Western democracy, and not Leninist centralism. Similarly for Soviets the term “economic” (as in “economic considerations” or “economically optimal”) today means “efficient” as defined by capitalist laws of supply and demand. And any number of Soviet young people, despairing of the deteriorating quality of life in the USSR, will tell you that their only desire is to live in a “normal” country, that is to say, a liberal democracy undistorted by the ideology of MarxismLeninism. As one Soviet friend told me in 1988,she has had a hard time getting her children to do their homework since “everybody knows” that democracy means “you can do whatever you wish.”

作为这方面的证据,可以考虑一下戈尔巴乔夫的苏联的用词,如 “民主化”(demokratizatsiya),戈尔巴乔夫不停地用它来定义自己的目标。当然,列宁认为,与西方的 “正式” 民主国家相比,苏联通过党的专政实现了更真实的民主形式。然而,在当代苏联,使用 “民主化” 一词的人都不会幻想它意味着西方民主以外的东西,而不是列宁式的中央集权。同样,对苏联人来说,“经济”(如 “经济上的考虑” 或 “经济上的最佳”)一词今天意味着资本主义供求法则所定义的 “有效”。任何数量的苏联年轻人,对苏联不断恶化的生活质量感到绝望,都会告诉你,他们唯一的愿望是生活在一个 “正常” 的国家,也就是说,一个没有被马克思列宁主义意识形态扭曲的自由民主。正如一位苏联朋友在 1988 年告诉我的那样,她很难让她的孩子做作业,因为 “每个人都知道”,民主意味着 “你可以做任何你想做的事情”。

More importantly, the people who felt anger were not just the system’s victims, but its beneficiaries as well. A leksandr Y akovlev, the Politburo member from 1986 to 1990 who was the architect of the policy ofglasnost’, Eduard Shevardnadze, the foreign minister who articulated the policy of “new thinking,” and Boris Yeltsin, the president of Russia, all spent their careers in the heart of the Communist party’s apparatus. Like the members of the Francoist Cortes, or the Argentine and Greek generals who voluntarily gave up power, these individuals knew that there was a very deep sickness at the heart of the Soviet system, and were put in positions of major responsibility where they could do something about it. The reform efforts of the late 1980s were not imposed on the Soviet Union from the outside, though competition with the United States underlined the need for reform. Instead, they came about as a result of an internal crisis of confidence that had infected a broad segment of the Soviet elite over the preceding generation.

更重要的是,感到愤怒的人不仅仅是这个系统的受害者,也是它的受益者。1986 年至 1990 年的政治局委员,Glasnost 政策的设计者 A leksandr Y akovlev,阐述 “新思维” 政策的外交部长 Eduard Shevardnadze,以及俄罗斯总统 Boris Yeltsin,都在共产党机构的核心地带度过了他们的职业生涯。就像佛朗哥议会的成员,或者自愿放弃权力的阿根廷和希腊将军一样,这些人知道苏联系统的核心有一个非常深刻的病症,并被置于重要的责任位置,他们可以对此有所作为。20 世纪 80 年代末的改革努力不是从外部强加给苏联的,尽管与美国的竞争强调了改革的必要性。相反,它们是由于内部的信任危机而产生的,这种危机在前一代人中已经感染了广泛的苏联精英阶层。

The undermining of the system’s legitimacy was not planned ahead of time, nor did it occur overnight. Gorbachev initially used glasnost’ and democratization as tools to consolidate his own leadership position, and later to mobilize popular opposition to the entrenched economic bureaucracy. In doing so he was not deviating from the tactics that Khrushchev had used in the 1950s. But these initial acts of largely symbolic political liberalization soon took on a life of their own and became changes sought for their own sake. Gorbachev’s initial call for glasnost’ and perestroïka struck an immediate responsive chord among the host of intellectuals, who did not need to be convinced of the system’s defects. And it turned out that there was only one consistent set of standards by which the old system was measured and found a failure: those of liberal democracy, that is, the productivity of marketoriented economics and the freedom of democratic politics.

对制度合法性的破坏并不是提前计划好的,也不是一夜之间发生的。戈尔巴乔夫最初将 “开放” 和民主化作为巩固自己领导地位的工具,后来又动员民众反对根深蒂固的经济官僚机构。他这样做并没有偏离赫鲁晓夫在 1950 年代使用过的策略。但是,这些最初的主要是象征性的政治自由化行为很快就有了自己的生命,并成为为其自身而寻求的变革。戈尔巴乔夫最初发出的 “开放” 和 “改革” 的呼吁在众多知识分子中立即引起了共鸣,他们不需要被说服体制的缺陷。事实证明,只有一套一致的标准来衡量旧制度,并发现它是失败的:自由民主的标准,即市场导向的经济生产力和民主政治的自由。

The Soviet people, humiliated by their rulers and despised not only by the rest of Europe but by their own intellectuals as passive accomplices of authoritarianism, proved everyone wrong. After 1989, civil society began reconstituting itself from the clear-cut ground of totalitarianism, through the formation of tens of thousands of new associations—political parties, labor unions, new journals and newspapers, ecology clubs, literary societies, churches, nationalist groups, and the like. The Soviet people’s supposed acceptance of the legitimacy of the old authoritarian social contract was belied by the enormous majorities that voted against representatives of the old communist apparatus at every available opportunity. The political maturity of the Russian people, in particular, was nowhere more evident than in their selection of a Boris Y eltsin as their first popularly elected president, rather than a semi-fascist demagogue like Serbia’s Milosevic, or a half-hearted democrat like Gorbachev. This maturity was further demonstrated when the Russian people rose to Yeltsin’s call to defend their new democratic institutions against the conservative coup launched in August 1981. Like the Eastern Europeans before them, they proved not inert and atomized, but spontaneously ready to defend their dignity and rights.

苏联人民被他们的统治者羞辱,不仅被欧洲其他国家,而且被他们自己的知识分子鄙视为专制主义的消极帮凶,但他们证明所有人都错了。1989 年后,公民社会开始从极权主义的明确基础上进行自我重建,形成了数以万计的新协会 —— 政党、工会、新期刊和报纸、生态学俱乐部、文学社、教堂、民族主义团体等等。苏联人民所谓的接受旧的专制社会契约的合法性,被一有机会就投票反对旧的共产主义机器的代表的巨大多数所掩盖。尤其是俄罗斯人民的政治成熟度,在他们选择鲍里斯·叶利钦作为他们的第一位民选总统,而不是像塞尔维亚的米洛舍维奇那样的半法西斯主义煽动者,或者像戈尔巴乔夫那样的半心半意的民主人士时,体现得最为明显。当俄罗斯人民响应叶利钦的号召,捍卫他们新的民主体制,反对 1981 年 8 月发动的保守派政变时,这种成熟性得到了进一步的证明。像之前的东欧人一样,他们被证明不是惰性和原子化的,而是自发地准备捍卫他们的尊严和权利。

So massive a disillusionment with the Soviet Union’s underlying belief structure could not have occurred overnight, suggesting that totalitarianism as a system had failed well before the 1980s. And indeed, the beginning of the end of totalitarianism can probably be traced all the way back to the period following the death of Stalin in 1953, when the regime ended the use of indiscrimi­nate terror . After Khrushchev’s socalled “secret speech” in 1956 and the closing of Stalin’s Gulag, the regime could no longer rely on pure coercion to enforce its policies, and increasingly had to resort to cajolery, cooptation, and bribery to get people to go along with its goals. The transition away from pure terror was in some sense inevitable, because under the Stalinist system, no one in the leadership itself could ever feel secure—not Stalin’s police chiefs Yezhov and Beria, who were both executed, not his foreign minister Molotov, whose wife was sent to the Gulag, not his successor Khrushchev, who vividly described how an odd glance from Stalin could make a member of the Politburo fear for his life—not Stalin himself, who was constantly fearful of plots. The dismantling of a system of terror so deadly to its practitioners therefore became almost mandatory once Stalin’s death made it possible for the top leadership to do so.

对苏联的基本信仰结构如此大规模的幻灭不可能在一夜之间发生,这表明极权主义作为一种制度早在 20 世纪 80 年代之前就已经失败。事实上,极权主义结束的开始可能可以一直追溯到 1953 年斯大林去世后的时期,当时该政权结束了不分青红皂白的恐怖手段。在赫鲁晓夫于 1956 年发表所谓的 “秘密讲话” 和关闭斯大林的古拉格之后,该政权不能再依靠纯粹的胁迫来执行其政策,而不得不越来越多地采用劝说、拉拢和贿赂的方式来使人们配合其目标。摆脱纯粹的恐怖在某种意义上是不可避免的,因为在斯大林体制下,领导层中没有人能够感到安全 —— 斯大林的警察局长叶若夫和贝利亚都被处决了,他的外交部长莫洛托夫也是如此,他的妻子被送进了古拉格监狱,他的继任者赫鲁晓夫也是如此,他生动地描述了斯大林的一个奇怪的眼神会使政治局成员担心自己的生命,而斯大林本人则一直担心会有阴谋。因此,一旦斯大林去世,最高领导层就有可能拆除一个对其执行者如此致命的恐怖系统,这几乎成为强制性的。

The Soviet regime’s decision not to kill people indiscriminately changed the balance of power between state and society in favor of the latter, and meant that henceforth the Soviet state would not remain in control of all aspects of Soviet life. Consumer demand, or the black market, or local political machines, could no longer be simply crushed or manipulated. Intimidation by the police remained an important weapon of the state, but it was often held in the background and had to be supplemented by other policy instruments like the promise of more consumer goods. Prior to Gorbachev, as much as 20 percent of Soviet GNP was produced in or filtered through the black market, totally outside the control of central planners.

苏联政权不滥杀无辜的决定改变了国家和社会之间的权力平衡,有利于后者,也意味着从此以后,苏联国家不会继续控制苏联生活的所有方面。消费者的需求,或黑市,或地方政治机器,都不再是简单的压制或操纵。警察的恐吓仍然是国家的一个重要武器,但它往往是在后台进行的,必须由其他政策工具来补充,比如承诺提供更多的消费品。在戈尔巴乔夫之前,多达 20% 的苏联国民生产总值是在黑市生产或通过黑市过滤的,完全不受中央计划者的控制。

An example of the center’s weakening control was the emergence of a number of “mafias” in the non-Russian republics of the USSR during the 1960s and 70s, such as the infamous “cotton mafia” that prospered in Uzbekistan under the leadership of Communist party first secretary Rashidov. Protected by his personal relationship with Soviet president Brezhnev, Brezhnev’s daughter Galina, and her husband Churbanov (a police official in Moscow), Rashidov was able to preside over a corrupt bureaucratic empire for many years. This group of officials succeeded in cooking the books on cotton production in the republic, funneling vast amounts of resources into personal bank accounts, and running the local party organization with virtually no oversight from Moscow. Mafias of varying sorts proliferated throughout Soviet society in this period, primarily in the non-Russian republics, but also in places like Moscow and Leningrad as well.

中央控制力减弱的一个例子是,20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代,在苏联的非俄罗斯共和国出现了一些 “黑手党”,如臭名昭著的 “棉花黑手党”,它在共产党第一书记拉希多夫的领导下在乌兹别克斯坦蓬勃发展。在他与苏联总统勃列日涅夫、勃列日涅夫的女儿加林娜及其丈夫丘尔巴诺夫(莫斯科的一名警察官员)的私人关系的保护下,拉希多夫能够主持一个腐败的官僚帝国多年。这群官员成功地篡改了共和国棉花生产的账目,将大量资源注入个人银行账户,并在几乎没有莫斯科监督的情况下管理地方党组织。这一时期,不同种类的黑手党在整个苏联社会激增,主要是在非俄罗斯的共和国,但也在莫斯科和列宁格勒等地。

Such a system cannot be described as totalitarian; nor is it just another form of authoritarianism like the dictatorships of Latin America. Perhaps the best label to describe the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Brezhnev era is that used by Vaclav Havel, who called these regimes “post-totalitarian,” indicating that while they were no longer bloody police states of the 1930s and 40s, they still lived under the shadow of earlier totalitarian practice. Totalitarianism was not sufficient to kill the democratic idea in these societies, but its legacy constrained their ability to democratize subsequently.

这样的制度不能被描述为极权主义;也不是像拉丁美洲的独裁政权那样只是另一种形式的独裁主义。也许描述勃列日涅夫时代的苏联和东欧的最好标签是瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔使用的,他称这些政权为 “后极权主义”,表明虽然它们不再是 1930 和 40 年代的血腥警察国家,但它们仍然生活在早期极权主义做法的阴影之下。极权主义并不足以扼杀这些社会的民主理念,但其遗留问题限制了它们随后的民主化能力。

Totalitarianism failed as well in the People’s Republic of China and the countries of Eastern Europe. Central government control over the Chinese economy even at the height of the PRC’s “Stalinist” period had never been as complete as in the Soviet Union, with perhaps a quarter of the economy never having come under the purview of the national plan. When Deng Xiaoping set the country on the course of economic reform in 1978,many Chinese still had a vivid memory of markets and entrepreneurship from the 1950s, so it is perhaps not surprising that they were able to take advantage of economic liberalization in the following decade. While continuing to pay lip service to Mao and MarxismLeninism, Deng effectively restored private property in the countryside and opened up the country to the global capitalist economy. Initiation of the economic reform constituted an early and clear-sighted recognition by the communist leadership of the failure of socialist central planning.

极权主义在中华人民共和国和东欧国家也是失败的。即使在中国的 “斯大林主义” 时期,中央政府对中国经济的控制也从未像苏联那样彻底,可能有四分之一的经济从未在国家计划的范围内。当邓小平在 1978 年让国家走上经济改革的道路时,许多中国人对 1950 年代的市场和企业家精神仍然记忆犹新,因此,他们能够在接下来的十年里利用经济自由化,也许并不令人惊讶。在继续为毛泽东和马克思列宁主义提供口头服务的同时,邓小平有效地恢复了农村的私有财产,并向全球资本主义经济开放。经济改革的启动构成了共产党领导层对社会主义中央计划失败的早期和清醒的认识。

A totalitarian state that permits an extensive private sector is by definition no longer totalitarian. Civil society—in the form of spontaneous business organizations, entrepreneurs, informal societies, and so on—regenerated itself very quickly in China in the atmosphere of relative freedom that prevailed between 1978 and the 1989 crackdown. The Chinese leadership calculated that it could guarantee its own legitimacy by taking on the role of agent of China’s modernization and reform, rather than by dogged defense of Marxist orthodoxies.

一个极权国家如果允许有广泛的私营部门,根据定义就不再是极权国家了。在 1978 年至 1989 年镇压期间,公民社会 —— 自发的商业组织、企业家、非正式社会等形式,在中国的相对自由的氛围中很快就得到了恢复。中国领导层认为,通过担任中国现代化和改革的代理人,而不是死守马克思主义的正统观念,可以保证自己的合法性。

But legitimacy was as difficult to achieve as in the Soviet case. Economic modernization required an opening of Chinese society to foreign ideas and influences; it devolved power from the state to civil society; it offered opportunities for corruption and other social abuses that are difficult to correct in one-party political systems; and it created an increasingly well-educated and cosmopolitan elite in the large cities that served as the functional equivalent of a middle class. It was the latter whose children organized the protests that began in Tienanmen Square in April 1989 on the anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s death. These students, some of whom had studied in the W est and who were familiar with political practices outside of China, were no longer satisfied with the Chinese Communist party’s lopsided reform that permitted considerable economic freedom but no political freedom whatsoever.

但是,合法性的实现与苏联的情况一样困难。经济现代化要求中国社会向外国思想和影响开放;它将权力从国家下放到民间社会;它为腐败和其他社会弊端提供了机会,而这些弊端在一党制政治体系中是很难纠正的;它在大城市中创造了越来越多受过良好教育的世界性精英,他们在功能上相当于一个中产阶级。正是后者的孩子们组织了 1989 年 4 月胡耀邦逝世周年之际在天安门广场开始的抗议活动。这些学生,其中一些曾在西方国家学习,熟悉中国以外的政治实践,不再满足于中国共产党的片面改革,即允许有相当的经济自由,但没有任何政治自由。

There are those who have suggested that the student protests in Tienanmen Square were less the expression of a spontaneous demand for political participation than the reflection of a power struggle taking place for Deng’s mantle between Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng. This might well be so: Zhao was clearly more sympathetic to the student protesters than the rest of the leadership, and he made a desperate bid to save himself by appealing to them prior to the June 4 crackdown. But the fact that the protests were the product of political manipulation from above does not mean that they were not the expression of a more fundamental dissatisfaction in Chinese society with the existing political system. Moreover, succession is a vulnerability of all would-be totalitarianisms. With no commonly accepted constitutional mechanism for succession to power, contenders for leadership are constantly tempted to play the reform card as a means of getting the better of their rivals. But playing this card almost inevitably unleashes new forces and attitudes in society that then escape the control of the manipulator.

有些人认为,天安门广场的学生抗议与其说是对政治参与的自发要求的表达,不如说是赵紫阳和李鹏之间为争夺邓小平的衣钵而发生的权力斗争的反映。这很可能是事实。赵紫阳显然比其他领导层更同情学生抗议者,他在 6 月 4 日镇压之前不顾一切地呼吁他们,以拯救自己。但是,抗议活动是上层政治操纵的产物,并不意味着它们不是中国社会对现有政治制度更根本不满的表现。此外,继承是所有可能的极权主义的一个弱点。由于没有公认的权力继承的宪法机制,领导权的竞争者总是想打改革牌,以此来压倒对手。但打这张牌几乎不可避免地会在社会中释放出新的力量和态度,从而摆脱操纵者的控制。

After the events of 1989,China has become just another Asian authoritarian state. It lacks internal legitimacy for a broad sector of its own elite, particularly among the young who will someday inherit the country, and is not guided by a coherent ideology. The PRC will no longer serve as a model for revolutionaries around the world, as it once did under Mao, all the more so when it is compared to the fast-growing capitalist states of the region.

在 1989 年的事件之后,中国已经成为另一个亚洲的威权国家。它在自己的广大精英阶层中缺乏内部合法性,特别是在有朝一日将继承国家的年轻人中,而且没有一个连贯的意识形态指导。中国将不再像毛泽东时代那样成为全世界革命者的榜样,当它与该地区快速发展的资本主义国家相比较时,情况就更加如此。

As late as the summer of 1989, when the East German refugee crisis was just beginning, many people in the West speculated that socialism had taken root in East Germany and other parts of Eastern Europe, and that given their freedom, the peoples of these countries would choose a “humane” leftwing alternative that was neither communism nor capitalist democracy. This proved to be a total illusion. The failure of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, where Soviet institutions were forcibly imposed on unwilling populations, came much more quickly than it did in either the Soviet Union or China. This perhaps should not have been surprising. Civil society had been destroyed in a less thoroughgoing way, depending on the specific country in question: in Poland, for example, agriculture had not been collectivized as it had in neighboring Ukraine and Belorussia, and the Church was left more or less independent. In addition to all of the reasons that the Soviet population had for resisting communist values, the force of local nationalism served to keep alive the memory of pre-communist society, and permitted its rapid regeneration after the upheavals of late 1989.Once the Soviets indicated they would not intervene to prop up local allies in Eastern Europe, the only surprising outcome was the totality of the demoralization of the communist apparatuses in all of the Eastern European countries, and the fact that hardly anyone in the old guard was willing to lift a finger in self-defense.

早在 1989 年夏天,当东德的难民危机刚刚开始时,西方的许多人就猜测,社会主义已经在东德和东欧其他地区扎根,如果有自由,这些国家的人民会选择一种既不是共产主义也不是资本主义民主的 “人性化” 左翼选择。事实证明,这完全是一种幻觉。东欧的极权主义失败了,在那里,苏维埃机构被强行强加给不情愿的民众,比在苏联或中国的失败要快得多。这也许并不令人惊讶。公民社会被破坏得不那么彻底,这取决于有关的具体国家:例如,在波兰,农业没有像邻国乌克兰和白俄罗斯那样被集体化,教会或多或少保持了独立。除了苏联人民抵制共产主义价值观的所有理由外,地方民族主义的力量还有助于保持对前共产主义社会的记忆,并允许其在 1989 年底的动荡后迅速恢复。一旦苏联表示他们不会干预以支持东欧的地方盟友,唯一令人惊讶的结果是所有东欧国家的共产主义机构都士气低落,而且守旧派中几乎没有人愿意为自卫伸出手指。

In sub-Saharan Africa, African socialism and the post-colonial tradition of strong one-party states had become almost totally discredited by the end of the 1980s, as much of the region experienced economic collapse and civil war. Most disastrous was the experience of rigidly Marxist states like Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Functioning democracies emerged in Botswana, Gambia, Senegal, Mauritius, and Namibia, while authoritarian rulers were compelled to promise free elections in a host of other African countries.

在撒哈拉以南非洲,非洲社会主义和强大的一党制国家的后殖民主义传统在 20 世纪 80 年代末几乎完全丧失信誉,因为该地区大部分地区经历了经济崩溃和内战。最具灾难性的是埃塞俄比亚、安哥拉和莫桑比克等僵化的马克思主义国家的经历。在博茨瓦纳、冈比亚、塞内加尔、毛里求斯和纳米比亚出现了有效的民主制度,而在其他许多非洲国家,独裁统治者被迫承诺进行自由选举。

China, of course, continues to be ruled by a communist government, as do Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. But a very great change took place in the perception of communism after the sudden collapse of six communist regimes in Eastern Europe between July and December 1989. Communism, which had once portrayed itself as a higher and more advanced form of civilization than liberal democracy, would henceforth be associated with a high degree of political and economic backwardness. While communist power persists in the world, it has ceased to reflect a dynamic and appealing idea. Those who call themselves communists now find themselves fighting continuous rearguard actions to preserve something of their former position and power. Communists now find themselves in the unenviable position of defending an old and reactionarysocial order whose time has long since passed, like the monarchists who managed to survive into the twentieth century. The ideological threat they once posed to liberal democracy is finished, and with the withdrawal of the Red Army from Eastern Europe, much of the military threat will be gone as well.

当然,中国继续由一个共产主义政府统治,古巴、朝鲜和越南也是如此。但是,在 1989 年 7 月至 12 月期间,东欧的六个共产主义政权突然崩溃,人们对共产主义的看法发生了非常大的变化。共产主义曾经把自己描绘成比自由民主更高更先进的文明形式,从此以后,它将与高度的政治和经济落后相联系。虽然共产主义政权在世界上依然存在,但它已不再反映出一种充满活力和吸引力的理念。那些自称是共产主义者的人现在发现自己在不断地进行后卫行动,以保持他们以前的一些地位和权力。共产主义者现在发现自己处于一个令人羡慕的位置,那就是捍卫一个古老而反动的社会秩序,其时代早已过去,就像那些设法生存到 20 世纪的君主主义者一样。他们曾经对自由民主构成的意识形态威胁已经结束,随着红军从东欧的撤出,大部分的军事威胁也将消失。

While democratic ideas undermined the legitimacy of communist regimes around the world, democracy itself has had tremendous difficulties in establishing itself. The student protests in China were crushed by the party and army, and some of Deng’s earlier economic reforms were subsequently rescinded. The future of democracy is far from secure in the Soviet Union’s fifteen republics. Bulgaria and Romania have seen continuous political turmoil since their former communist rulers were turned out of office. The Yugoslav state has experienced civil war and disintegration. Only Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the former East Germany appear poised to make a transition to stable democracy and market economies in the next decade, though even in these cases the economic problems they face are proving much larger than previously expected.

虽然民主思想破坏了世界各地共产主义政权的合法性,但民主本身在建立时却遇到了巨大的困难。中国的学生抗议活动被党和军队镇压,邓小平早期的一些经济改革随后被取消。在苏联的 15 个共和国中,民主的未来远远没有保障。保加利亚和罗马尼亚自其前共产主义统治者被赶下台后,政治动荡不断。南斯拉夫国家经历了内战和解体。只有匈牙利、捷克斯洛伐克、波兰和前东德似乎准备在未来十年内向稳定的民主和市场经济过渡,尽管即使在这些情况下,它们所面临的经济问题也被证明比以前的预期大得多。

The argument has been made that even though communism is dead, it is rapidly being replaced by an intolerant and aggressive nationalism. It is premature to commemorate the passing of the strong state—so the argument goes—for where communist totalitarianism fails to survive, it will simply be replaced by nationalist authoritarianism, or perhaps even by fascism of a Russian or Serbian variety. This part of the world will be neither peaceful nor democratic any time in the near future, and according to this school of thought will turn out to be just as dangerous to existing Western democracies as the old Soviet Union was.


But we should not be surprised if all of the formerly communist countries do not make a rapid and smooth transition to stable democracy; in fact, it would be very surprising if this did happen. There are enormous obstacles that need to be overcome before successful democracies can arise. For example, the old Soviet Union was simply incapable of democratizing. A USSR free enough to be considered a genuine democracy would immediately split up along national and ethnic lines into a series of smaller states. This does not mean, however, that individual parts of the USSR, including the Russian Federation or the Ukraine, could not democratize. But democratization will have to be preceded by a painful process of national separation, one that will not be accomplished quickly or without bloodshed. This process began with the renegotiation of the Union Treaty among nine of the USSR’s fifteen republics in April 1 9 9 1 , and accelerated rapidly after the failed August coup.

但是,如果所有的前共产主义国家都不能迅速、顺利地过渡到稳定的民主制度,我们也不应该感到惊讶;事实上,如果真的出现这种情况,那将是非常令人惊讶的。在成功的民主国家出现之前,有巨大的障碍需要克服。例如,旧苏联根本没有能力实现民主化。一个自由到足以被认为是真正的民主国家的苏联会立即按照民族和种族的界限分裂成一系列的小国家。然而,这并不意味着苏联的个别地区,包括俄罗斯联邦或乌克兰,不可能实现民主化。但是,在民主化之前,必须要有一个痛苦的民族分离过程,这个过程不会迅速完成,也不会没有流血事件。这个过程从 1911 年 4 月苏联 15 个共和国中的 9 个重新谈判联盟条约开始,并在 8 月政变失败后迅速加快。

Moreover, there is no inherent contradiction between democracy and at least some of the newly emerging nationalisms. While stable liberal democracy is highly unlikely to be established in Uzbekistan or Tadjkistan anytime soon, there is no reason to think that Lithuania or Estonia will be less liberal than Sweden or Finland once given their national independence. Nor is it the case that the new nationalisms being unleashed are necessarily expansionist or aggressive. One of the most remarkable developments of the late 1980s to early 1990s has been the evolution of the mainstream of Russian nationalism in the direction of a “small Russia” concept, evident not just in the thinking of liberals like Boris Yeltsin, but among conservative nationalists like Eduard Volodin and Victor Astaf yev.

此外,民主与至少一些新出现的民族主义之间并不存在固有的矛盾。虽然稳定的自由民主制度不太可能很快在乌兹别克斯坦或塔吉克斯坦建立,但没有理由认为立陶宛或爱沙尼亚一旦获得国家独立,其自由度会比瑞典或芬兰低。也不是说正在释放的新民族主义一定是扩张主义或侵略性的。20 世纪 80 年代末至 90 年代初最引人注目的发展之一是俄罗斯民族主义的主流朝着 “小俄罗斯” 的方向演变,这不仅体现在叶利钦这样的自由主义者的思想中,也体现在爱德华·沃洛金和维克多·阿斯塔夫耶夫这样的保守的民族主义者中。

We should be careful to distinguish transitional conditions from permanent ones. In parts of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we are likely to see Marxist-Leninists replaced by a variety of dictators, nationalists, and colonels; even communists may stage comebacks in certain areas. But the authoritarianism they represent will remain localized and unsystematic. Like the various military dictators in Latin America, they will eventually have to confront the fact that they have no longterm source of legitimacy, and no good formula for solving the longterm economic and political problems they will face. The only coherent ideology that enjoys widespread legitimacy in this part of the world remains liberal democracy. While many of the peoples of this region may not make the transition to democracy in this generation, they may well do so in the next. Western Europe’s transition to liberal democracy was long and hard as well, a fact that did not prevent every country in that region from eventually completing the journey.


Communist totalitarianism was supposed to be a formula for halting the natural and organic processes of social evolution and replacing them with a series of forced revolutions from above: the destruction of old social classes, rapid industrialization, and the collectivization of agriculture. This type of largescale social engineering was supposed to have set communist societies apart from non-totalitarian ones, because social change originated in the state rather than in society. The normal rules of economic and political modernization, held by social scientists to be virtually universal in “normal” societies, were suspended. The reform processes of the 1980s in the Soviet Union and China will have revealed something very important about human social evolution, even if they do not succeed in the near term. For while totalitarianism managed to destroy the visible institutions of prerevolutionary Russian and Chinese society, it was utterly ineffective in its aspirations to create a new man of either the Soviet or Maoist variety. Elites in both countries emerged from the Brezhnev and Mao eras looking far more like their Western counterparts at a comparable level of economic development than anyone had anticipated. Their most advanced elites were able to appreciate, if not exactly able to share, the common consumer culture of Western Europe, America, and Japan, and many of their political ideas as well. While retaining numerous uniquely “post-totalitarian” traits, people in the Soviet Union and PRC turned out not to be the atomized, dependent, authority-craving children that earlier W estern theories projected them to be. They proved instead to be adults who could tell truth from falsehood, right from wrong, and who sought, like other adults in the old age of mankind, recognition of their adulthood and autonomy.

共产主义极权主义被认为是一种停止社会进化的自然和有机过程的公式,并以一系列来自上层的强制革命取而代之:摧毁旧的社会阶级、快速工业化和农业的集体化。这种大规模的社会工程被认为使共产主义社会有别于非极权主义社会,因为社会变革起源于国家而不是社会。社会科学家认为在 “正常” 社会中几乎普遍存在的经济和政治现代化的正常规则被中止。苏联和中国 20 世纪 80 年代的改革进程将揭示出关于人类社会进化的一些非常重要的东西,即使它们在短期内没有成功。因为虽然极权主义成功地摧毁了革命前的俄罗斯和中国社会的可见机构,但它在创造苏维埃或毛泽东式的新人的愿望上完全没有效果。在勃列日涅夫和毛泽东时代,这两个国家的精英们在经济发展水平相当的情况下,看起来比任何人都更像他们的西方同行。他们最先进的精英能够欣赏,即使不完全能够分享西欧、美国和日本的共同消费文化,以及他们的许多政治理念。虽然保留了许多独特的 “后极权主义” 特征,但苏联和中国的人民并不是早期西方理论所预测的那种原子化的、依赖的、渴望权威的孩子。相反,他们被证明是能够分辨真假和是非的成年人,并且像其他成年人一样,在人类的晚年寻求对其成年和自主权的认可。

Chapter 4 The Worldwide Liberal Revolution

第 4 章 世界范围内的自由主义革命

We stand at the gates of an important epoch, a time of ferment, when spirit moves forward in a leap, transcends its previous shape and takes on a new one. All the mass of previous representations, concepts, and bonds linking our world together are dissolving and collapsing like a dream picture. A new phase of the spirit is preparing itself. Philosophy especially has to welcome its appearance and acknowledge it, while others, who oppose it impotently, cling to the past.


—G. W. F. Hegel, in a lecture on September 18, 1806

-黑格尔(G·W. F·Hegel)在 1806 年 9 月 18 日的演讲中说

On both the communist Left and the authoritarian Right there has been a bankruptcy of serious ideas capable of sustaining the internal political cohesion of strong governments, whether based on “monolithic” parties, military juntas, or personalistic dictatorships. The absence of legitimate authority has meant that when an authoritarian government met with failure in some area of policy, there was no higher principle to which the regime could appeal. Some have compared legitimacy to a kind of cash reserve. All governments, democratic and authoritarian, have their ups and downs; but only legitimate governments have this reserve to draw on in times of crisis.

在共产主义左派和专制主义右派中,能够维持强大政府内部政治凝聚力的严肃思想已经破产,无论是基于 “一元化” 政党、军事联合政府,还是基于个人主义的独裁政权。合法权威的缺失意味着,当专制政府在某些政策领域遭遇失败时,没有更高的原则可以让该政权求助。有人将合法性比作一种现金储备。所有的政府,不管是民主的还是专制的,都会有起伏;但只有合法的政府才有这种储备,可以在危机时动用。

The weakness of authoritarian states of the Right lay in their failure to control civil society. Coming to power with a certain mandate to restore order or to impose “economic discipline,” many found themselves no more successful than their democratic predecessors in stimulating steady economic growth or in creating a sense of social order. And those that were successful were hoisted on their own petard. For the societies on top of which they sat began to outgrow them as they became better educated, more prosperous, and middle class. As memory of the specific emergency that had justified strong government faded, those societies became less and less ready to tolerate military rule.

右派威权国家的弱点在于它们无法控制公民社会。许多国家在上台时都有恢复秩序或实施 “经济纪律” 的任务,但它们在刺激经济稳定增长或创造社会秩序方面并不比民主国家的前辈更成功。而那些成功的国家则是被自己的旗帜吊起来的。因为他们所处的社会随着教育程度的提高、经济的繁荣和中产阶级的出现而开始超越他们。随着人们对证明强势政府合理性的特定紧急情况的记忆逐渐消失,这些社会变得越来越不愿意容忍军事统治。

Totalitarian governments of the Left sought to avoid these problems by subordinating the whole of civil society to their control, including what their citizens were allowed to think. But such a system in its pure form could be maintained only through a terror that threatened the system’s own rulers. Once that terror was relaxed, a long process of degeneration set in, during which the state lost control of certain key aspects of civil society. Most important was its loss of control over the belief system. And since the socialist formula for economic growth was defective, the state could not prevent its citizens from taking note of this fact and drawing their own conclusions.


Moreover, few totalitarian regimes could replicate themselves through one or more succession crises. In the absence of commonly accepted rules of succession, it would always be a temptation for some ambitious contender for power to throw the whole system into question by calls for fundamental reform in the struggle against his rivals. The reform card is a powerful trump because dissatisfaction with Stalinist systems is high everywhere. Thus Khrushchev used anti-Stalinism against Beria and Malenkov, Gorbachev used it against his Brezhnev-era competitors, and Zhao Ziyang used it against the hardline Li Peng. The question of whether the individuals or groups contending for power were real democrats was in a sense irrelevant, since the succession process tended to undermine the old regime’s credibility by exposing its inevitable abuses. New social and political forces, more sincerely committed to liberal ideas, were unleashed and soon escaped the control of those who planned the first limited reforms.


The weakness of strong states has meant that many former authoritarianisms have now given way to democracy, while the former post-totalitarian states have become simple authoritarianisms, if not democracies. The Soviet Union has devolved power to its constituent republics, and while China continues to be a dictatorship, the regime has lost control of significant parts of society. Neither country possesses any longer the ideological coherence once given them by MarxismLeninism: the conservatives opposed to reform in the Soviet Union are as likely to place an Orthodox icon on their wall as a picture of Lenin. The would-be makers of the August 1991 coup resembled a Latin American military junta, with army officers and police officiais playing a major role.

强国的软弱意味着许多以前的独裁主义现在已经让位于民主,而以前的后极权主义国家即使不是民主国家,也已经成为简单的独裁主义。苏联已经将权力下放给其组成共和国,而中国虽然仍然是一个独裁国家,但其政权已经失去了对社会重要部分的控制。这两个国家都不再拥有马克思列宁主义曾经赋予它们的意识形态的一致性:反对苏联改革的保守派在他们的墙壁上放置东正教的图标和列宁的照片的可能性一样。1991 年 8 月政变的潜在制造者类似于拉丁美洲的军政府,由军官和警察发挥主要作用。

In addition to the crisis of political authoritarianism, there has been a quieter but no less significant revolution going on in the field of economics. The development that was both manifestation and cause of this revolution was the phenomenal economic growth of East Asia since World W ar II. This success story was not limited to early modernizers like Japan, but eventually came to include virtually all countries in Asia willing to adopt market principles and integrate themselves fully into the global, capitalist economic system. Their performance suggested that poor countries without resources other than their own hardworking populations could take advantage of the openness of the international economic system and create unimagined amounts of new wealth, rapidly closing the gap with the more established capitalist powers of Europe and North America.


The East Asian economic miracle was carefully observed around the world, nowhere more than in the communist bloc. Communism’s terminal crisis began in some sense when the Chinese leadership recognized that they were being left behind by the rest of capitalist Asia, and saw that socialist central planning had condemned China to backwardness and poverty. The ensuing Chinese liberalizing reforms led to a doubling of grain production in five years and provided a new demonstration of the power of market principles. The Asian lesson was later absorbed by economists in the Soviet Union, who knew the terrible waste and inefficiency that central planning had brought about in their own country. The Eastern Europeans had less need to be taught; they understood better than other communists that their failure to reach the living standards of their fellow Europeans in the West was due to the socialist system imposed on them after the war by the Soviets.


But students of the East Asian economic miracle were not restricted to the communist bloc. A remarkable transformation has taken place in the economic thinking of Latin Americans as well. In the 1950s, when the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch headed the United Nations Economic Committee for Latin America, it was fashionable to attribute the underdevelopment not only of Latin America but of the Third World more generally to the global capitalist system. It was argued that early developers in Europe and America had in effect structured the world economy in their favor and condemned those who came later to dependent positions as providers of raw materials. By the early 1990s, that understanding had changed entirely: President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, President Carlos Menem in Argentina, and President Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, all sought to implement far-reaching programs of economic liberalization after coming to power, accepting the need for market competition and openness to the world economy. Chile put liberal economic principles into practice earlier in the 1980s under Pinochet, with the result that its economy was the healthiest of any in the Southern Cone as it emerged from dictatorship under the leadership of President Patricio Alwyn. These new, democratically elected leaders started from the premise that underdevelopment was not due to the inherent inequities of capitalism, but rather to the insufficient degree of capitalism that had been practiced in their countries in the past. Privatization and free trade have become the new watchwords in place of nationalization and import substitution. The Marxist orthodoxy of Latin American intellectuals has come under increasing challenge from writers like Hernando de Soto, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Carlos Rangel, who have begun to find a significant audience for liberal, marketoriented economic ideas.

但研究东亚经济奇迹的学生并不限于共产主义集团。拉丁美洲人的经济思维也发生了显著的转变。在 20 世纪 50 年代,当阿根廷经济学家劳尔·普雷比什(Raul Prebisch)领导联合国拉丁美洲经济委员会时,流行的说法是将拉丁美洲和第三世界的不发达普遍归咎于全球资本主义体系。有人认为,欧洲和美国的早期发展商实际上已经将世界经济构造得对他们有利,并谴责那些后来者作为原材料提供者的依赖地位。到 20 世纪 90 年代初,这种认识已经完全改变。墨西哥的卡洛斯·萨利纳斯·德戈塔里总统、阿根廷的卡洛斯·梅内姆总统和巴西的费尔南多·科洛·德梅洛总统,在上台后都试图实施意义深远的经济自由化计划,接受市场竞争和对世界经济开放的需要。智利在 20 世纪 80 年代早些时候在皮诺切特的领导下将自由经济原则付诸实践,结果在帕特里西奥·阿尔温总统的领导下摆脱了独裁统治,其经济是南锥体国家中最健康的。这些新的民选领导人的出发点是,不发达不是由于资本主义固有的不公平,而是由于他们国家过去实行的资本主义程度不够。私有化和自由贸易已经成为取代国有化和进口替代的新口号。拉丁美洲知识分子的马克思主义正统观念受到了埃尔南多·德·索托、马里奥·巴尔加斯·略萨和卡洛斯·兰热尔等作家越来越多的挑战,他们开始为自由的、以市场为导向的经济思想找到大量的听众。

As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. Two hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent.

当人类接近千年的尾声时,专制主义和社会主义中央计划的双重危机使得只有一个竞争者作为一种潜在的普遍有效的意识形态站在舞台上:自由民主,个人自由和人民主权的学说。在法国和美国革命爆发 200 年后,自由和平等的原则被证明不仅是持久的,而且是复苏的。

Liberalism and democracy, while closely related, are separate concepts. Political liberalism can be defined simply as a rule of law that recognizes certain individual rights or freedoms from government control. While there can be a wide variety of definitions of fundamental rights, we will use the one contained in Lord Bryce’s classic work on democracy, which limits them to three: civil rights, “the exemption from control of the citizen in respect of his person and property”; religious rights, “exemption from control in the expression of religious opinions and the practice of worship”; and what he calls political rights, “exemption from control in matters which do not so plainly affect the welfare of the whole community as to render control necessary,” including the fundamental right of press freedom. It has been a common practice for socialist countries to press for the recognition of various secondand third-generation economic rights, such as the right to employment, housing, or health care. The problem with such an expanded list is that the achievement of these rights is not clearly compatible with other rights like those of property or free economic exchange. In our definition we will stick to Bryce’s shorter and more traditional list of rights, which is compatible with those contained in the American Bill of Rights.


Democracy, on the other hand, is the right held universally by all citizens to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in politics. The right to participate in political power can be thought of as yet another liberal right—indeed, the most important one—and it is for this reason that liberalism has been closely associated historically with democracy.

另一方面,民主是所有公民普遍拥有的分享政治权力的权利,也就是说,所有公民都有投票和参与政治的权利。参与政治权力的权利可以被认为是另一项自由权利 —— 事实上,是最重要的权利,正是因为这个原因,自由主义在历史上与民主紧密相连。

In judging which countries are democratic, we will use a strictly formal definition of democracy. A country is democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, multiparty elections,5 on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage. It is true that formal democracy alone does not always guarantee equal participation and rights. Democratic procedures can be manipulated by elites, and do not always accurately reflect the will or true selfinterests of the people. But once we move away from a formal definition, we open up the possibility of infinite abuse of the democratic principle. In this century, the greatest enemies of democracy have attacked “formal” democracy in the name of “substantive” democracy. This was the justification used by Lenin and the Bolshevik party to close down the Russian Constituent Assembly and proclaim a party dictatorship, which was to achieve substantive democracy “in the name of the people.” Formal democracy, on the other hand, provides real institutional safeguards against dictatorship, and is much more likely to produce “substantive” democracy in the end.

在判断哪些国家是民主的时候,我们将使用民主的严格正式定义。如果一个国家给予其人民在普遍和平等的成人投票权基础上,通过定期、无记名投票、多党选举 5 来选择自己的政府的权利,那么这个国家就是民主的。诚然,仅靠正式的民主并不总是能保证平等的参与和权利。民主程序可能被精英操纵,并不总是准确反映人民的意愿或真正的自身利益。但是,一旦我们脱离了形式上的定义,我们就开启了无限滥用民主原则的可能性。在本世纪,民主的最大敌人以 “实质性” 民主的名义攻击了 “形式” 民主。这是列宁和布尔什维克党用来关闭俄国制宪会议和宣布党内独裁的理由,这是为了 “以人民的名义” 实现实质性民主。另一方面,正式民主提供了防止独裁的真正的制度保障,而且最终更有可能产生 “实质性” 民主。

While liberalism and democracy usually go together, they can be separated in theory. It is possible for a country to be liberal without being particularly democratic, as was eighteenth-century Britain. A broad list of rights, including the franchise, was fully protected for a narrow social elite, but denied to others. It is also possible for a country to be democratic without being liberal, that is, without protecting the rights of individuals and minorities. A good example of this is the contemporary Islamic Republic of Iran, which has held regular elections that were reasonably fair by Third World standards, making the country more democratic than it was in the time of the Shah. Islamic Iran, however, is not a liberal state; there are no guarantees of free speech, assembly, and, above all, of religion. The most elementary rights of Iranian citizens are not protected by the rule of law, a situation that is worse for Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities.

虽然自由主义和民主通常是一起的,但在理论上它们是可以分开的。一个国家有可能在没有特别民主的情况下是自由的,就像 18 世纪的英国一样。包括选举权在内的一系列广泛的权利得到了狭隘的社会精英的充分保护,但其他人却被剥夺了。一个国家也有可能是民主的而不是自由的,也就是说,不保护个人和少数群体的权利。这方面的一个很好的例子是当代的伊朗伊斯兰共和国,它定期举行选举,按第三世界的标准来说是相当公平的,使该国比伊朗国王时代更加民主。然而,伊斯兰的伊朗并不是一个自由的国家;没有对言论自由、集会自由,尤其是宗教自由的保障。伊朗公民最基本的权利没有得到法治的保护,这种情况对伊朗的民族和宗教少数群体来说更为糟糕。

In its economic manifestation, liberalism is the recognition of the right of free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and markets. Since the term “capitalism” has acquired so many pejorative connotations over the years, it has recently become a fashion to speak of “free-market economics” instead; both are acceptable alternative terms for economic liberalism. It is evident that there are many possible interpretations of this rather broad définition of economic liberalism, ranging from the United States of Ronald Reagan and the Britain of Margaret Thatcher to the social democracies of Scandinavia and the relatively statist regimes in Mexico and India. All contemporary capitalist states have large public sectors, while most socialist states have permitted a degree of private economic activity. There has been considerable controversy over the point at which the public sector becomes large enough to disqualify a state as liberal.Rather than try to set a precise percentage, it is probably more useful to look at what attitude the state takes in principle to the legitimacy of private property and enterprise. Those that protect such economic rights we will consider liberal; those that are opposed or base themselves on other principles (such as “economic justice”) will not qualify.

在其经济表现中,自由主义是对自由经济活动和基于私有财产和市场的经济交流权利的认可。由于多年来 “资本主义” 这个词已经有了很多贬义的含义,所以最近流行用 “自由市场经济” 来代替;这两个词都是可以接受的经济自由主义的替代术语。显然,对经济自由主义这个相当宽泛的定义有许多可能的解释,从罗纳德·里根的美国和撒切尔夫人的英国到斯堪的纳维亚的社会民主国家以及墨西哥和印度的相对国家主义政权。所有当代资本主义国家都有大型公共部门,而大多数社会主义国家都允许一定程度的私人经济活动。对于公共部门的规模大到足以使一个国家失去自由主义的资格,一直存在着相当大的争议。与其试图设定一个精确的百分比,不如看看国家在原则上对私有财产和企业的合法性采取什么态度可能更有用。那些保护这种经济权利的国家,我们将认为是自由主义的;那些反对或基于其他原则(如 “经济正义”)的国家将不符合条件。

The present crisis of authoritarianism has not necessarily led to the emergence of liberal democratic regimes, nor are all the new democracies which have emerged secure. The newly democratic countries of Eastern Europe face wrenching transformations of their economies, while the new democracies in Latin America are hobbled by a terrible legacy of prior economic mismanagement. Many of the fast developers in East Asia, while economically liberal, have not accepted the challenge of political liberalization. The liberal revolution has left certain areas like the Middle East relatively untouched. It is altogether possible to imagine states like Peru or the Philippines relapsing into some kind of dictatorship under the weight of the crushing problems they face.


But the fact that there will be setbacks and disappointments in the process of democratization, or that not every market economy will prosper, should not distract us from the larger pattern that is emerging in world history. The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves politically and economically has been diminishing over time. Of the different types of regimes that have emerged in the course of human history, from monarchies and aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and communist dictatorships of this cen­tury, the only form of government that has survived intact to the end of the twentieth century has been liberal democracy.

但是,在民主化进程中会有挫折和失望,或者不是每个市场经济都会繁荣,这一事实不应分散我们对世界历史上正在出现的更大模式的注意力。随着时间的推移,各国在决定如何组织自己的政治和经济方面所面临的明显的选择数量一直在减少。在人类历史上出现的不同类型的政权中,从君主制和贵族制,到宗教神权制,再到本世纪的法西斯和共产主义独裁,唯一完整地存活到 20 世纪末的政府形式是自由民主。

What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, as the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people. Monarchism in its various forms had been largely defeated by the beginning of this century. Fascism and communism, liberal democracy’s main competitors up till now, have both discredited themselves. If the Soviet Union (or its successor states) fails to democratize, if Peru or the Philippines relapse into some form of authoritarianism, democracy will most likely have yielded to a colonel or bureaucratwho claims to speak in the name of the Russian, Peruvian, or Philippine people alone. Even non-democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard.


It is true that Islam constitutes a systematic and coherent ide­ology, just like liberalism and communism, with its own code of morality and doctrine of political and social justice. The appeal of Islam is potentially universal, reaching out to all men as men, and notjust to members of a particular ethnic or national group. And Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in countries where it has not achieved political power directly. The end of the Cold W ar in Europe was followed immediately by a challenge to the West from Iraq, in which Islam was arguably a factor.


Despite the power demonstrated by Islam in its current revival, however, it remains the case that this religion has virtually no appeal outside those areas that were culturally Islamic to begin with. The days of Islam’s cultural conquests, it would seem, are over: it can win back lapsed adherents, but has no resonance for young people in Berlin, Tokyo, or Moscow. And while nearly a billion people are culturally Islamic—one-fifth of the world’s population—they cannot challenge liberal democracy on its own territory on the level of ideas. Indeed, the Islamic world would seem more vulnerable to liberal ideas in the long run than the reverse, since such liberalism has attracted numerous and powerful Muslim adherents over the past century and a half. Part of the reason for the current, fundamentalist revival is the strength of the perceived threat from liberal, Western values to traditional Islamic societies.

尽管伊斯兰教在当前的复兴中表现出了强大的力量,但是,在那些一开始就具有伊斯兰文化的地区之外,这种宗教几乎没有任何吸引力。伊斯兰教的文化征服时代似乎已经结束了:它可以赢回失落的信徒,但对柏林、东京或莫斯科的年轻人却没有任何共鸣。虽然有近 10 亿人在文化上属于伊斯兰教 —— 占世界人口的五分之一 —— 但他们无法在自己的领土上对自由民主进行思想上的挑战。事实上,从长远来看,伊斯兰世界似乎更容易受到自由主义思想的影响,而不是相反,因为这种自由主义在过去一个半世纪里吸引了无数强大的穆斯林信徒。目前原教旨主义复兴的部分原因是自由主义、西方价值观对传统伊斯兰社会的威胁感很强。

We who live in stable, longstanding liberal democracies face an unusual situation. In our grandparents’time, many reasonable people could foresee a radiant socialist future in which private property and capitalism had been abolished, and in which politics itself was somehow overcome. Today, by contrast, we have trouble imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist. Within that framework, of course, many things could be improved: we could house the homeless, guarantee opportunity for minorities and women, improve competitiveness, and create new jobs. W e can also imagine future worlds that are significantly worse than what we know now, in which national, racial, or religious intolerance makes a comeback, or in which we are overwhelmed by war or environmental collapse. But we cannot picture to ourselves a world that is essentially different from the present one, and at the same time better. Other, less reflective ages also thought of themselves as the best, but we arrive at this conclusion exhausted, as it were, from the pursuit of alternatives we felt had to be better than liberal democracy.


The fact that this is so, and the breadth of the current worldwide liberal revolution, invites us to raise the following question: Are we simply witnessing a momentary upturn in the fortunes of liberal democracy, or is there some longer-term pattern of development at work that will eventually lead all countries in the direction of liberal democracy?


It is possible, after all, that the present trend toward democracy is a cyclical phenomenon. One need only look back to the late 1960s and early 70s, when the United States was undergoing a crisis of self-confidence brought on by its involvement in the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. The West as a whole was thrown into economic crisis as a result of the OPEC oil embargo; most of Latin America’s democracies were overthrown in a series of military coups; and unor anti-democratic regimes seemed to be prospering around the world, from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and South Africa. What reason, then, do we have to expect that the situation of the 1970s will not recur, or worse yet, that the 1930s, with its clash of virulent

毕竟,目前的民主趋势有可能是一种周期性的现象。我们只需回顾一下 20 世纪 60 年代末和 70 年代初,当时美国正经历着因卷入越南战争和水门事件而带来的自信危机。整个西方国家由于欧佩克的石油禁运而陷入经济危机;拉丁美洲的大多数民主国家在一系列军事政变中被推翻;从苏联、古巴、越南到沙特阿拉伯、伊朗和南非,非民主政权似乎正在世界各地兴旺发达。那么,我们有什么理由期待 1970 年代的情况不会重现,或者更糟糕的是,1930 年代的激烈冲突,以及反民主意识形态的冲突,会不会再次发生?

anti-democratic ideologies, can not return?


Can it not be argued, moreover, that the current crisis of authoritarianism is a fluke, a rare convergence of political planets that will not recur for the next hundred years? For careful study of the different transitions away from authoritarianism in the 1970s and 80s will yield a plethora of lessons concerning the accidental nature of these events. The more one knows about a particular country, the more one is aware of the “maelstrom of external contingency” that differentiated that country from its neighbors, and the seemingly fortuitous circumstances that led to a democratic outcome. Things could have worked out very differently: the Portuguese Communist party could have emerged victorious in 1975, or the Spanish transition might not have resulted in democracy had King Juan Carlos not played so skillful and moderating a role. Liberal ideas have no force independent of the human actors who put them into effect, and if Andropov or Chernenko had lived longer, or if Gorbachev himself had a different personality, the course of events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe between 1985 and 1991 would have been quite different. Following the current fashion in the social sciences, one is tempted to say that unpredictable political factors like leadership and public opinion dominate the democratization process and ensure that every case will be unique both in process and outcome.

此外,是否可以说,目前的威权主义危机是一种侥幸,是一种罕见的政治行星的聚合,在未来一百年内不会再出现?因为仔细研究 20 世纪 70 年代和 80 年代摆脱威权主义的不同过渡,将产生大量关于这些事件的偶然性的教训。人们对某个国家了解得越多,就越能意识到将该国与邻国区分开来的 “外部偶然因素的漩涡”,以及导致民主结果的看似偶然的情况。事情的结果可能会非常不同:葡萄牙共产党可能会在 1975 年取得胜利,或者西班牙的转型可能不会导致民主,如果胡安·卡洛斯国王没有发挥如此巧妙和温和的作用。自由主义思想没有独立于将其付诸实施的人类行为者的力量,如果安德罗波夫或契尔年科活得更久,或者如果戈尔巴乔夫本人有不同的个性,1985 年至 1991 年期间苏联和东欧的事件进程就会完全不同。按照目前社会科学的流行趋势,人们很想说,领导层和公众舆论等不可预测的政治因素主导着民主化进程,并确保每个案例的过程和结果都是独一无二的。

But it is precisely if we look not just at the past fifteen years, but at the whole scope of history, that liberal democracy begins to occupy a special kind of place. While there have been cycles in the worldwide fortunes of democracy, there has also been a pro­nounced secular trend in a democratic direction. The table on pages 49 50 illustrates this pattern over time. It indicates that the growth of democracy has not been continuous or unidirectional; Latin America had fewer democracies in 1975 than it did in 1955, and the world as a whole was less democratic in 1940 than it was in 1919. Periods of democratic upsurge are interrupted by radical discontinuities and setbacks, such as those represented by nazism and Stalinism. On the other hand, all of these reverses tended to be themselves reversed eventually, leading over time to an impressive overall growth in the number of democracies around the world. The percentage of the world’s population living under democratic government would grow dramatically, moreover, should the Soviet Union or China democratize in the next generation, in whole or in part. Indeed, the growth of liberal democracy, together with its companion, economic liberalism, has been the most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the last four hundred years.

但恰恰是如果我们不仅看过去的 15 年,而且看整个历史范围,自由民主开始占据一种特殊的位置。虽然世界范围内的民主命运有周期性,但也有一个明显的朝向民主的世俗趋势。第 49-50 页的表格说明了这一模式的时间。它表明,民主的增长并不是连续的或单向的;拉丁美洲 1975 年的民主国家比 1955 年少,而整个世界在 1940 年的民主程度比 1919 年少。民主高涨的时期被激进的不连续性和挫折所打断,如纳粹主义和斯大林主义所代表的时期。另一方面,所有这些倒退最终都倾向于自己被逆转,随着时间的推移,导致世界各地的民主国家的数量有了令人印象深刻的整体增长。此外,如果苏联或中国在下一代全部或部分实现民主化,世界上生活在民主政府下的人口比例将急剧增加。事实上,自由民主的发展,以及与之相伴的经济自由主义,是过去四百年来最引人注目的宏观政治现象。

It is true that democracies have been relatively rare in human history, so rare that before 1776 there was not a single one in existence anywhere in the world. (The democracy of Periclean Athens does not qualify, because it did not systematically protect individual rights.)1 3 Counted in the number of years they have existed, factory production and automobiles and cities with multiple millions of inhabitants have been equally rare, while practices like slavery, hereditary monarchies, and dynastic marriages have persisted for enormous periods of time. What is significant, however, is not the frequency or length of occurrence, but the trend: in the developed world, we would as little expect to see the disappearance of cities or cars in the near future as we would the re-emergence of slavery.

诚然,民主国家在人类历史上比较少见,少到 1776 年之前世界上没有一个民主国家存在。(雅典的民主制度并不符合条件,因为它没有系统地保护个人权利。)1 3 从存在的年限来看,工厂生产和汽车以及拥有数百万居民的城市也同样罕见,而像奴隶制、世袭君主制和王朝婚姻等做法则持续了很长一段时间。然而,重要的不是发生的频率或时间长度,而是趋势:在发达国家,我们几乎不会期望在不久的将来看到城市或汽车的消失,就像我们会看到奴隶制的重新出现一样。

It is against this background that the remarkable worldwide character of the current liberal revolution takes on special significance. For it constitutes further evidence that there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies—in short, something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy. The existence of peaks and troughs in this development is undeniable. But to cite the failure of liberal democracy in any given country, or even in an entire region of the world, as evidence of democracy’s overall weakness, reveals a striking narrowness of view. Cycles and discontinuities in themselves are not incompatible with a history that is directional and universal, just as the existence of business cycles does not negate the possibility of longterm economic growth.

正是在这种背景下,当前自由主义革命的显著的世界性特征具有特殊的意义。因为它进一步证明,有一个基本的过程在起作用,它决定了所有人类社会的共同进化模式 —— 简而言之,类似于人类在自由民主方向的世界历史。在这个发展过程中,存在着高峰和低谷,这是不可否认的。但是,把自由民主在任何一个国家,甚至在世界的整个地区的失败作为民主的总体弱点的证据,显示出一种惊人的狭隘。周期和不连续性本身并不与具有方向性和普遍性的历史相抵触,正如商业周期的存在并不否定长期经济增长的可能性。

picture p49-50

图片 p49-50

Just as impressive as the growth in the number of democracies is the fact that democratic government has broken out of its original beachhead in Western Europe and North America, and has made significant inroads in other parts of the world that do not share the political, religious, and cultural traditions of those areas. The argument was once made that there was a distinct Iberian tradition that was “authoritarian, patrimonial, Catholic, stratified, corporate and semi-feudal to the core.“1 4 To hold Spain, Portugal, or the countries of Latin America to the standards of the liberal democracy of Western Europe or the United States was to be guilty of “ethnocentrism.“1 5 Y et those universal standards of rights were those to which people in the Iberian tradition held themselves, and since the mid1970s Spain and Portugal have graduated to the ranks of stable democracies, tied ever more tightly to an economically integrating Europe. These same standards have had meaning for peoples in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and many other parts of the world as well. The success of democracy in a wide variety of places and among many different peoples would suggest that the principles of liberty and equality on which they are based are not accidents or the results of ethnocentric prejudice, but are in fact discoveries about the nature of man as man, whose truth does not diminish but grows more evident as one’s point of view becomes more cosmopolitan.

与民主国家数量的增长同样令人印象深刻的是,民主政府已经冲出了它在西欧和北美的原始滩头,并在世界其他地区取得了重大进展,而这些地区的政治、宗教和文化传统并不属于这些地区。曾经有人提出,伊比利亚有一个独特的传统,它是 “专制的、世袭的、天主教的、分层的、企业的和半封建的核心。”1 4 用西欧或美国的自由民主的标准来要求西班牙、葡萄牙或拉丁美洲的国家,是犯了 “民族中心主义”。"1 5 等这些普遍的权利标准是伊比利亚传统中的人们对自己的要求,自 20 世纪 70 年代中期以来,西班牙和葡萄牙已经进入了稳定的民主国家行列,与经济一体化的欧洲紧密相连。这些同样的标准对拉丁美洲、东欧、亚洲和世界上许多其他地区的人民也有意义。民主在许多地方和许多不同民族中的成功表明,它们所依据的自由和平等原则并不是偶然的,也不是民族中心主义偏见的结果,而实际上是对人的本质的发现,其真理不会减少,而是随着人们的观点变得更加世界化而更加明显。

The question of whether there is such a thing as a Universal History of mankind that takes into account the experiences of all times and all peoples is not new; it is in fact a very old one which recent events compel us to raise anew. From the beginning, the most serious and systematic attempts to write Universal Histories saw the central issue in history as the development of Freedom. History was not a blind concatenation of events, but a meaningful whole in which human ideas concerning the nature of a just political and social order developed and played themselves out. A nd if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end.


Part Two, then, will take up the question of whether, at the end of the twentieth century, it makes sense for us to shake off our acquired pessimism and reconsider once again whether it is possible to write a Universal History of mankind.




Chapter 5: An Idea for a Universal History

第 5 章:关于世界历史的一个想法

The historical imagination has never flown so far, even in a dream; for now the history of man is merely the continuation of that of animals and plants; the universal historian finds traces of himself even in the utter depths of the sea, in the living slime. He stands astounded in the face of the enormous way that man has run, and his gaze quivers before the mightier wonder, the modern


man who can see all the way! He stands proudly on the pyramid of the world-process; and while he lays the final stone of his knowledge, he seems to cry aloud to listening Nature: “We are at the top, we are at the top; we are the completion of Nature!”


—Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History


A Universal History of mankind is not the same thing as a history of the universe. That is, it is not an encyclopaedic catalogue of everything that is known about humanity, but rather an attempt to find a meaningful pattern in the overall development of human societies generally. The effort to write a Universal History is itself not universal to all peoples and cultures. Despite the fact that the Western philosophical and historical tradition started in Greece, the writers of Greek antiquity never undertook such a project. Plato in the Republic spoke about a certain natural cycle of regimes, while Aristotle’s Politics discussed the causes of revolution and how one type of regime yields to another. Aristotle believed that no regime could satisfy man completely, and that the dissatisfaction would lead men to replace one regime with another in an endless cycle. Democracy did not occupy a special place in this sequence, either with respect to goodness or stability; in fact, both writers suggested that democracy had a tendency to give way to tyranny. Moreover, Aristotle did not assume the continuity of history. That is, he believed that the cycle of regimes was embedded in a larger natural cycle , whereby cataclysms like floods would periodically eliminate not only existing human societies, but all memory of them as well, forcing men to start the historical process over again from the beginning. In the Greek view, history thus is not secular but cyclical.


The first truly Universal Histories in the Western tradition were Christian. While there were Greek and Roman efforts to write histories of the known world, it was Christianity that first introduced the concept of the equality of all men in the sight of God, and thereby conceived of a shared destiny for all the peoples of the world. A Christian historian such as Saint Augustine had no interest in the particular histories of the Greeks or the Jews as such; what mattered was the redemption of man as man, an event that would constitute the working out of God’s will on earth. All nations were but branches of a more general humanity, whose fate could be understood in terms of God’s plan for mankind. Christianity moreover introduced the concept of a history that was finite in time, beginning with God’s creation of man and ending with his final salvation. For Christians, the end of earthly history would be marked by the day of judgment that would usher in the kingdom of heaven, at which point the earth and earthly events would literally cease to exist. As the Christian account of history makes clear, an “end of history” is implicit in the writing of all Universal Histories. The particular events of history can become meaningful only with respect to some larger end or goal, the achievement of which necessarily brings the historical process to a close. This final end of man is what makes all particular events potentially intelligible.

西方传统中第一部真正的《世界史》是基督教的。虽然希腊和罗马也曾努力撰写已知世界的历史,但正是基督教首次提出了在上帝面前人人平等的概念,并由此设想了世界上所有民族的共同命运。像圣奥古斯丁这样的基督教历史学家对希腊人或犹太人的特定历史没有兴趣;重要的是人作为人的救赎,这一事件将构成上帝的意志在地球上的实现。所有国家都只是一个更普遍的人类的分支,其命运可以从上帝对人类的计划中得到理解。此外,基督教还提出了一个历史的概念,这个历史在时间上是有限的,从上帝创造人类开始,到他最后的救赎结束。对基督徒来说,尘世历史的结束将以迎来天国的审判日为标志,届时地球和尘世事件将真正不复存在。正如基督教对历史的描述所表明的,“历史的结束” 隐含在所有《世界历史》的写作中。历史上的特定事件只有在涉及到某个更大的目的或目标时才会变得有意义,而这个目的的实现必然会使历史进程结束。人类的这一最终目的是使所有特定事件具有潜在可理解性的原因。

The revival of interest in the ancients that took place in the Renaissance provided an historical horizon to thought that the ancients themselves lacked. The metaphor comparing human history to the life of a single man, and the idea that modern man, building on the accomplishments of the ancients, lived in the “old age of mankind,” was suggested by several writers in this period, including Pascal. The most important early attempts to write secular versions of a Universal History, however, were undertaken in conjunction with the establishment of the scientific method in the sixteenth century. The method that we associate with Galileo, Bacon, and Descartes assumed the possibility of a knowledge and therefore a mastery of nature, which was in turn subject to a set of coherent and universal laws. Knowledge of these laws was not only accessible to man as man, but was cumu­lative, such that successive generations could be spared the efforts and mistakes of earlier ones. Thus the modern notion of progress had its origins in the success of modern natural science, and allowed Francis Bacon to assert the superiority of modernity to antiquity on the basis of inventions like the compass, printing press, and gunpowder. This concept of progress as the cumula­tive and endless acquisition of knowledge was stated most clearly by Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle in 1688:

文艺复兴时期发生的对古人的兴趣的复兴,为思想提供了一个古人本身所缺乏的历史视野。将人类历史比作一个人的生命,以及现代人在古人成就的基础上生活在 “人类的旧时代” 的想法,是由这一时期的一些作家,包括帕斯卡尔提出的。然而,撰写世俗版本的《世界历史》的最重要的早期尝试,是与十六世纪科学方法的建立一起进行的。我们与伽利略、培根和笛卡尔联系在一起的方法,假定有可能了解并因此掌握自然,而自然又受制于一套连贯而普遍的规律。对这些定律的认识不仅是人类可以获得的,而且是可以累积的,这样一来,后人就可以免去前人的努力和错误。因此,现代的进步概念起源于现代自然科学的成功,并允许弗朗西斯·培根在指南针、印刷机和火药等发明的基础上宣称现代性优于古代性。伯纳德·勒·博维耶·德·丰特内尔(Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle)在 1688 年最清楚地阐述了这种进步是对知识的累积和无尽的获取的概念。

A good cultivated mind contains, so to speak, all minds of preceding centuries; it is but a single identical mind which has been developing and improving itself all the time … but I am obliged to confess that the man in question will have no old age; he will always be equally capable of those things for which his youth is suited, and he will be ever more and more capable of those things which are suited to his prime; that is to say, to abandon the allegory, men will never degenerate, and there will be no end to the growth and development of human wisdom.

可以说,一个好的有修养的头脑包含了以前几个世纪的所有头脑;它不过是一个相同的头脑,一直在发展和改进自己…… 但我不得不承认,有关的人不会有老年;他总是同样有能力做那些他年轻时适合做的事情,而且他将越来越有能力做那些适合他壮年的事情;也就是说,放弃这个寓言,人将永远不会退化,人类智慧的成长和发展将没有尽头。

The progress envisioned by Fontenelle was primarily in the domain of scientific knowledge; he did not develop a correspond­ing theory of social or political progress. The father of the mod­ern notion of social progress was Machiavelli, for it was he who proposed that politics be liberated from the moral constraints of classical philosophy, and that man conquer fortuna. Other theories of progress were advanced by Enlightenment writers such as Voltaire, the French encyclopaedists, the economist Turgot, and his friend and biographer Condorcet. Condorcet’s Progress of the Human Mind contained a ten-stage Universal History of man, the last era of which—yet to be achieved—was characterized by equality of opportunity, liberty, rationality, democracy, and universal education. Like Fontenelle, Condorcet postulated no term to human perfectibility, implying the possibility of an eleventh stage of history unknown to man at the present.

丰特奈尔所设想的进步主要是在科学知识领域;他没有发展相应的社会或政治进步理论。现代社会进步概念之父是马基雅弗利,因为正是他建议将政治从古典哲学的道德约束中解放出来,并建议人类征服财富。其他的进步理论由启蒙作家提出,如伏尔泰、法国百科全书作家、经济学家杜尔哥以及他的朋友和传记作者孔多塞。孔多塞的《人类思想的进步》包含了人类的十个阶段的世界历史,其中最后一个时代 —— 尚未实现 —— 的特点是机会平等、自由、理性、民主和普及教育。与丰特奈尔一样,孔多塞对人类的完美性没有任何假设,这意味着人类目前还不知道有第 11 个历史阶段的可能性。

The most serious efforts at writing Universal Histories were undertaken, however, in the German idealist tradition. The idea was proposed by the great Immanuel Kant in a 1784 essay, An Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View. This work, though only sixteen pages long, defined the essential terms of reference for all subsequent efforts to write a Universal History.

然而,撰写《世界历史》的最认真的努力是在德国理想主义传统中进行的。这个想法是由伟大的伊曼纽尔·康德在 1784 年的一篇文章中提出的,即《从世界性的角度看世界历史的想法》。这篇著作虽然只有 16 页,但却为后来所有撰写世界历史的努力确定了基本的参考条件。

Kant was fully aware that “this idiotic course of things human” seemed to show no particular pattern on its surface, and that human history appeared to be one of constant warfare and cruelty. He nonetheless wondered whether there was not a regular movement to human history such that what seemed chaotic from the standpoint of a single individual might not reveal a slow and progressive evolution over a long period of time. This was particularly true in the development of man’s reason. No one individual, for example, could expect to discover the whole of mathematics, but the cumulative character of mathematical knowledge allowed each generation to build on the accomplishments of preceding ones.

康德完全意识到,“人类的这一愚蠢进程” 在其表面上似乎没有显示出特别的模式,人类历史似乎是一个不断的战争和残酷的历史。然而,他想知道人类历史是否有规律可循,以至于从一个人的角度看似乎是混乱的,但在很长一段时间内可能不会显示出缓慢和渐进的演变。这在人类理性的发展中尤其如此。例如,没有一个人可以期望发现整个数学,但数学知识的积累特性使每一代人都能在前一代人的成就上有所发展。

Kant suggested that history would have an end point, that is to say, a final purpose that was implied in man’s current potentialities and which made the whole of history intelligible. This end point was the realization of human freedom, for “a society in which freedom under external laws is associated in the highest degree with irresistible power, i.e., a perfectly just civic constitu­tion, is the highest problem Nature assigns to the human race.” The achievement of such a just civic constitution and its universalization throughout the world would then be the criterion by which one could understand progress in history. It also provided a standard by which one could undertake the tremendous effort of abstraction required to separate what was essential in this evolution from the great mass of facts about events that constitute the raw material of history. The question to be answered by a Universal History then was whether, when taking all societies and all times into account, there was overall reason to expect general human progress in the direction of republican government, that is, what we today understand as liberal democracy.

康德提出,历史将有一个终点,也就是说,一个最终的目的,它隐含在人类当前的潜力中,并使整个历史变得可理解。这个终点就是人类自由的实现,因为 “一个在外部法律下的自由在最大程度上与不可抗拒的力量相联系的社会,即一个完全公正的公民宪法,是自然赋予人类的最高问题。” 实现这样一种公正的公民宪法并在全世界普及,将是人们理解历史进步的标准。它还提供了一个标准,人们可以据此进行巨大的抽象化努力,以便从构成历史原材料的大量事件事实中分离出这一演变中的重要内容。当时,《世界历史》要回答的问题是,在考虑到所有社会和所有时代的情况下,是否有总体理由期待人类朝着共和政体的方向普遍进步,也就是我们今天理解的自由民主。

Kant also outlined in general terms the mechanism that would propel mankind to the higher level of rationality represented by liberal institutions. This mechanism was not reason, but rather reason’s opposite: the selfish antagonism created by man’s “asocial sociability,” which leads men to leave the war of all against all and join together in civil societies, and then encourage the arts and sciences so that those societies can remain competitive with one another. It was precisely man’s competitiveness and vanity, his desire to dominate and rule, which was the wellspring of social creativity, ensuring the realization of potentials “unborn in an Arcadian shepherd’s life.”

康德还笼统地概述了将人类推向自由制度所代表的更高水平的理性的机制。这种机制不是理性,而是理性的反面:人类的 “非社会性” 所产生的自私的对抗性,这种对抗性导致人们离开所有人对所有人的战争,在公民社会中联合起来,然后鼓励艺术和科学,使这些社会能够保持彼此的竞争。恰恰是人的竞争性和虚荣心,他对支配和统治的渴望,是社会创造力的源泉,确保了 “在阿卡迪亚牧羊人的生活中没有诞生的” 潜能的实现。

Kant’s essay did not itself constitute a Universal History. Writ­ten when the philosopher was sixty years of age, his Idea merely pointed to the need for a new Kepler or Newton who could ex­plain the universal laws of human historical evolution. Kant noted that the genius who undertook such a history would have to be qualified both as a philosopher, so as to understand what was important in human affairs, and as an historian who could assim­ilate the history of all times and all peoples into a meaningful whole. He would follow “the influence of Greek history on the construction and misconstruction of the Roman state which swal­lowed up the Greek, then the Roman influence on the barbarians who in turn destroyed it, and so on down to our times; if one adds episodes from the national histories of the enlightened nations, one will discover a regular progress in the constitution of states on our continent (which will probably give law, eventually, to all the others.)” The story was one of the successive destruction of civi­lizations, but each overthrow preserved something from the ear­lier period and thereby prepared the way for a higher level of life. The task of writing this history, he concluded modestly, was be­yond his abilities, but if successfully carried out could contribute to the achievement of universal republican government by giving man a clear view of his future.

康德的文章本身并不构成一部世界历史。这篇文章写于这位哲学家 60 岁的时候,他的想法只是指出需要一个新的开普勒或牛顿来解释人类历史演变的普遍规律。康德指出,承担这样一部历史的天才必须同时具备哲学家的资格,以便理解人类事务中的重要内容,并作为一个历史学家,能够将所有时代和所有民族的历史纳入一个有意义的整体。他将遵循 "希腊历史对罗马国家的建设和误解的影响,罗马国家吞噬了希腊人,然后罗马人对野蛮人的影响,野蛮人反过来又摧毁了它,这样一直到我们的时代;如果加上开明国家的民族历史的插曲,就会发现我们大陆上的国家宪法有规律的进展(这可能最终会给所有其他国家带来法律。这个故事是文明的连续毁灭,但每一次推翻都保留了早期的一些东西,从而为更高层次的生活准备了道路。他谦虚地总结说,撰写这段历史的任务超出了他的能力范围,但如果成功地完成,可以通过让人类清楚地看到自己的未来,为实现普遍的共和政体做出贡献。

Kant’s project of writing a Universal History that was at once philosophically serious and grounded in a mastery of empirical history was left to his successor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, to complete in the generation following Kant’s death. Hegel has never had a good reputation in the AngloSaxon world, where he has been accused of being a reactionary apologist for the Prussian monarchy, a forerunner of twentieth-century totalitarianism, and, worst of all from an English perspective, a difncult-to-read metaphysician. This prejudice against Hegel has blinded people to his importance as one of the constitutive philosophers of moder­nity. Whether or not we acknowledge our debt to him, we owe to Hegel the most fundamental aspects of our presentday conscious­ness.


It is remarkable the extent to which Hegel’s system fulfilled all the particulars of Kant’s proposal for a Universal History, both in form and substance. Hegel, like Kant, defined his project as the writing of a Universal History which would provide “the exhibi­tion of Spirit [i.e., collective human consciousness] in the process of working out the knowledge of that which it is potentially.” Hegel sought to explain the “good” contained in the various real states and civilizations of history, the reasons why they were ultimately overthrown, and the “germ of enlightenment” that survived from each and thereby paved the way for higher levels of development. As in Kant’s view of man’s “asocial sociability,” Hegel saw progress in history arising not from the steady development of reason, but through the blind interplay of the passions that led men to conflict, revolution, and war—his famous “cun­ning of reason.” History proceeds through a continual process of conflict, wherein systems of thought as well as political systems collide and fall apart from their own internal contradictions. They are then replaced by less contradictory and therefore higher ones, which give rise to new and different contradictions—the socalled dialectic. Hegel was one of the first European philosophers to take seriously the “national histories of other peoples” outside of Europe like those of India and China, and to incorporate them into his overall scheme. And as Kant postulated, there was an end point to the process of history, which is the realization of freedom here on earth: “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.” The unfolding of Universal History could be understood as the growth of the equal­ity of human freedom, summed up in Hegel’s epigram that “the Eastern nations knew that one was free; the Greek and Roman world only that some are free; while we know that all men absolutely (man as man) are free.“1 7 For Hegel, the embodiment of human freedom was the modern constitutional state, or again, what we have called liberal democracy. The Universal History of mankind was nothing other than man’s progressive rise to full rationality, and to a selfconscious awareness of how that rationality expresses itself in liberal selfgovernment.

值得注意的是,黑格尔的体系在形式和内容上都满足了康德关于普遍历史的建议的所有具体内容。黑格尔和康德一样,把他的项目定义为撰写一部世界历史,它将提供 “精神即人类集体意识在研究它潜在的知识的过程中的展示”。黑格尔试图解释历史上各种现实状态和文明所包含的 “善”,解释它们最终被推翻的原因,以及从每种状态中幸存下来的 “启蒙的萌芽”,从而为更高水平的发展铺平道路。正如康德对人的 “非社会性” 的看法一样,黑格尔认为历史的进步不是来自理性的稳定发展,而是通过激情的盲目相互作用,使人走向冲突、革命和战争 —— 他著名的 “理性的狡猾”。历史是通过一个持续的冲突过程进行的,在这个过程中,思想体系和政治体系发生碰撞,并因其自身的内部矛盾而瓦解。然后,它们又被矛盾较少、因而较高的矛盾所取代,从而产生新的、不同的矛盾 —— 所谓的辩证法。黑格尔是最早认真对待欧洲以外的 “其他民族的民族历史” 的欧洲哲学家之一,如印度和中国的民族历史,并将其纳入他的整体计划。正如康德假设的那样,历史进程有一个终点,那就是在地球上实现自由:“世界的历史不是别的,而是自由意识的进步”。世界历史的发展可以被理解为人类自由平等的增长,黑格尔的诗句总结道:“东方国家知道一个人是自由的;希腊和罗马世界只知道一些人是自由的;而我们知道所有的人(人作为人)都是自由的。”1 7 对黑格尔来说,人类自由的体现是现代宪政国家,或者说,我们称之为自由民主。人类的世界史无非是人类逐渐上升到充分的理性,以及对这种理性如何在自由的自治中表现出来的自觉意识。

Hegel has frequently been accused of worshipping the state and its authority, and therefore of being an enemy of liberalism and democracy. A fuller consideration of this charge is beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice it to say that by his own account, Hegel was the philosopher of freedom, who saw the entire historical process culminating in the realization of freedom in concrete political and social institutions. Rather than being known as the champion of the state, Hegel could equally well be understood as the defender of civil society, that is, the philosopher who justified preservation of a large realm of private economic and political activity independent of the control of the state. This is certainly the way that Marx understood him, and why he attacked Hegel as an apologist for the bourgeoisie.


There has been considerable mystification concerning the He­gelian dialectic. This began with Marx’s collaborator Friedrich Engels, who believed that the dialectic was a “method” that could be appropriated from Hegel separately from the content of his system. Others have asserted that for Hegel, the dialectic was a metaphysical device that allowed one to deduce the whole of human history from a priori or logical first principles, independently of empirical data and knowledge of real historical events. This view of the dialectic is untenable; a reading of Hegel’s historical works will reveal that historical accident and contingency play a large role in them. The Hegelian dialectic is similar to its Platonic predecessor, the Socratic dialogue, that is, a conversation between two human beings on some important subject like the nature of the good or the meaning of justice. Such discussions are resolved on the basis of the principle of contradiction: that is, the less self-contradictory side wins, or, if both are found in the course of the conversation to be self-contradictory, then a third position emerges free of the contradictions of the initial two. But this third position may itself contain new, unforeseen contradictions, thereby giving rise to yet another conversation and another resolution. For Hegel, the dialectic takes place not only on the level of philosophical discussions, but between societies, or, as contemporary social scientists would say, between socioeconomic systems. One might describe history as a dialogue between societies, in which those with grave internal contradictions fail and are succeeded by others that manage to overcome those contradictions. Thus for Hegel the Roman Empire ultimately collapsed because it established the universal legal equality of all men, but without recognizing their rights and inner human dignity. This recognition could only be found in the Judeo-Christian tradition, that established the universal equality of man on the basis of his moral freedom. The Christian world was in turn subject to other contradictions. The classical example was the medieval city, which protected within it merchants and traders who constituted the germs of a capitalist economic order. Their superior economic efficiency eventually exposed the irrationality of moral constraints on economic productivity, and thereby abolished the very city that gave them birth.

关于黑格尔辩证法,一直有相当多的神秘化。这始于马克思的合作者弗里德里希·恩格斯,他认为辩证法是一种 “方法”,可以从黑格尔那里获得,与他系统的内容分开。还有人断言,对黑格尔来说,辩证法是一种形而上学的手段,它允许人们从先验的或逻辑的第一原则中推导出整个人类历史,而不受经验数据和真实历史事件知识的影响。这种对辩证法的看法是站不住脚的;阅读黑格尔的历史作品会发现,历史的偶然性和意外性在其中起了很大的作用。黑格尔的辩证法类似于它的柏拉图式的前身苏格拉底对话,即两个人之间关于一些重要话题的对话,如善的本质或正义的意义。这种讨论是在矛盾原则的基础上解决的:也就是说,自我矛盾较少的一方获胜,或者说,如果在对话过程中发现两者都是自我矛盾的,那么就会出现第三种立场,摆脱最初两种立场的矛盾。但这第三种立场本身可能包含新的、不可预见的矛盾,从而引起另一次对话和另一个解决方案。对黑格尔来说,辩证法不仅发生在哲学讨论的层面上,而且发生在社会之间,或者像当代社会科学家所说的,发生在社会经济体系之间。人们可以把历史描述为社会之间的对话,在对话中,那些具有严重内部矛盾的社会失败了,而被那些设法克服这些矛盾的社会所继承。因此,对黑格尔来说,罗马帝国最终崩溃了,因为它确立了所有人在法律上的普遍平等,但没有承认他们的权利和内在的人类尊严。这种承认只能在犹太·基督教传统中找到,它在道德自由的基础上确立了人的普遍平等。基督教世界反过来又受到其他矛盾的影响。典型的例子是中世纪的城市,它在其中保护了构成资本主义经济秩序萌芽的商人和贸易商。他们卓越的经济效率最终暴露了道德对经济生产力限制的不合理性,从而废除了孕育他们的城市。

Where Hegel differed most substantially from earlierwriters of Universal Histories like Fontenelle or Condorcet was in his vastly more profound philosophical grounding for concepts such as nature, freedom, history, truth, and reason. While Hegel may not have been the first philosopher to write about history, he was the first historicist philosopher—that is, a philosopher who believed in the essential historical relativity of truth. Hegel maintained that all human consciousness was limited by the particular social and cultural conditions of man’s surrounding environment—or as we say, by “the times.” Past thought, whether of ordinary people or great philosophers and scientists, was not true absolutely or “ob­jectively,” but only relative to the historical or cultural horizon within which that person lived. Human history must therefore be seen not only as a succession of different civilizations and levels of material accomplishment, but more importantly as a succession of different forms of consciousness. Consciousness—the way in which human beings think about fundamental questions of right and wrong, the activities they find satisfying, their beliefs about the gods, even the way in which they perceive the world—has changed fundamentally over time. And since these perspectives were mutually contradictory, it follows that the vast majority of them were wrong, or forms of “false consciousness” to be unmasked by subsequent history. The world’s great religions, according to Hegel, were not true in themselves, but were ideologies which arose out of the particularhistorical needs of the people who believed in them. Christianity, in particular, was an ideology that grew out of slavery, and whose proclamation of universal equality served the interests of slaves in their own liberation.

黑格尔与早期的《世界历史》作者如丰特奈尔或孔多塞的最大不同之处在于,他对自然、自由、历史、真理和理性等概念的哲学基础要深刻得多。虽然黑格尔可能不是第一个写历史的哲学家,但他是第一个历史主义哲学家,也就是相信真理的基本历史相对性的哲学家。黑格尔认为,所有的人类意识都受到人类周围环境的特定社会和文化条件的限制,或者像我们所说的,受到 “时代” 的限制。过去的思想,无论是普通人还是伟大的哲学家和科学家,都不是绝对的或 “客观的” 真实,而只是相对于那个人所处的历史或文化范围而言。因此,人类历史不仅必须被视为不同文明和物质成就水平的继承,更重要的是被视为不同意识形式的继承。意识 —— 人类思考基本是非问题的方式,他们认为满意的活动,他们对神的信仰,甚至他们感知世界的方式 —— 随着时间的推移发生了根本的变化。由于这些观点是相互矛盾的,因此,它们中的绝大多数都是错误的,或者是被后来的历史所揭穿的 “错误意识” 的形式。黑格尔认为,世界上的伟大宗教本身并不是真实的,而是产生于信仰它们的人的特殊历史需要的意识形态。尤其是基督教,它是一种从奴隶制中发展起来的意识形态,它所宣扬的普遍平等符合奴隶们解放自己的利益。

The radical nature of Hegelian historicism is hard to perceive today because it is so much a part of our own intellectual horizon. We assume that there is an historical “perspectivism” to thought and share a general prejudice against ways of thinking that are not “up to date.” Historicism is implicit in the position of the contemporary feminist who regards her mother’s or grandmother’s devotion to family and home as a quaint holdover from an earlier age. Much as that progenitor’s voluntary submission to a male-dominated culture might have been right “for her time” and may even have made her happy, it is no longer acceptable and constitutes a form of “false consciousness.” Historicism is also implicit in the attitude of a black who denies that it is possible for a white person to ever understand what it means to be black. For though the consciousness of blacks and whites is not necessarily separated by historical time, they are held to be separated by the horizon of culture and experience within which each was nur­tured, and across which there is only the most limited of commu­nication.

黑格尔历史主义的激进性质在今天很难被察觉,因为它在很大程度上是我们自己知识视野的一部分。我们假定思想有一种历史的 “透视主义”,并对不 “与时俱进” 的思维方式有一种普遍的偏见。历史主义隐含在当代女权主义者的立场中,她们将母亲或祖母对家庭和住宅的奉献视为早期时代的古板遗留。尽管她的祖先对男性主导的文化的自愿服从可能在 “她的时代” 是正确的,甚至可能使她感到幸福,但它不再被接受,并构成了一种 “错误的意识”。历史主义也隐含在一个黑人的态度中,他否认一个白人有可能理解作为黑人意味着什么。因为尽管黑人和白人的意识不一定被历史时间分开,但他们被认为是被文化和经验的地平线分开的,每个人都是在这个地平线上长大的,而在这个地平线上只有最有限的交流。

The radicalness of Hegel’s historicism is evident in his very concept of man. With one important exception, virtually every philosopher writing before Hegel believed that there was such a thing as “human nature,” that is, a more or less permanent set of traits—passions, desires, abilities, virtues, and so forth—that characterized man as man. While individual men could obviously vary, the essential nature of man did not change over time, whether he or she was a Chinese peasant or a modern European trade unionist. This philosophical view is reflected in the common cliché that “human nature never changes,” used most often in the context of one of the less attractive human characteristics like greed, lust, or cruelty. Hegel, by contrast, did not deny that man had a natural side arising from needs of the body like food or sleep, but believed that in his most essential characteristics man was undetermined and therefore free to create his own nature.

黑格尔的历史主义的激进性在他的人的概念中是很明显的。除了一个重要的例外,几乎所有在黑格尔之前写作的哲学家都认为有 “人性” 这种东西,也就是说,有一套或多或少永久的特征 —— 激情、欲望、能力、美德等等 —— 将人作为人的特征。虽然个别的人显然会有差异,但人的基本性质不会随着时间的推移而改变,无论他或她是一个中国农民还是一个现代欧洲工会会员。这种哲学观点反映在 “人性永不改变” 这一常见的陈词滥调中,最常被用于贪婪、欲望或残忍等不太吸引人的人类特征。相比之下,黑格尔并不否认人有因食物或睡眠等身体需要而产生的自然一面,但他认为在人的最基本特征中,人是不确定的,因此可以自由地创造自己的本性。

Thus the nature of human desire, according to Hegel, is not given for all time, but changes between historical periods and cultures. To take one example, an inhabitant of contemporary America or France or Japan spends the greater part of his or her energies in pursuit of things—a certain type of car or athletic shoes or designer gown—or of status—the right neighborhood or school or job. Most of these objects of desire did not even exist and therefore could not have been desired in earlier times, and would probably not be desired by a presentday resident of an impoverished Third World country, whose time would be spent in search of more basic needs like security or food. Consumerism and the science of marketing that caters to it refer to desires that have literally been created by man himself, and which will give way to others in the future. Our present desires are conditioned by our social milieu, which in turn is the product of the entirety of our historical past. And the specific objects of desire are only one of the aspects of “human nature” that have changed over time; the importance of desire in relation to the other elements of human character has also evolved. Hegel’s Universal History therefore gives an account not only of the progress of knowledge and institutions, but of the changing nature of man himself. For it is human nature to have no fixed nature, not to be but to become something other than it once was.

因此,按照黑格尔的说法,人类欲望的本质并不是一直存在的,而是在不同的历史时期和文化之间变化的。举个例子,一个当代美国、法国或日本的居民把他或她的大部分精力花在追求东西上 —— 某种类型的汽车、运动鞋或名牌礼服 —— 或者追求地位 —— 合适的邻居、学校或工作。这些欲望的对象在早期甚至不存在,因此不可能被渴望,而且可能不会被今天的贫穷的第三世界国家的居民所渴望,他们的时间会花在寻找更基本的需求上,如安全或食物。消费主义和迎合它的营销科学指的是由人类自己创造的欲望,这些欲望在未来将让位于其他欲望。我们现在的欲望是由我们的社会环境决定的,而社会环境又是我们整个历史的产物。而欲望的具体对象只是 “人性” 中随时间变化的一个方面;欲望相对于人类性格的其他要素的重要性也在不断变化。因此,黑格尔的《世界历史》不仅说明了知识和制度的进步,而且说明了人本身不断变化的性质。因为人的本性是没有固定的,不是成为而是成为曾经的另一种东西。

Where Hegel differed from Fontenelle and from the more radical historicists who came after him was that he did not believe that the historical process would continue indefinitely, but would come to an end with an achievement of free societies in the real world. There would, in other words, be an end of history. This did not mean that there would be an end to events arising out of the births, deaths, and social interactions of humankind, or that there would be a cap on factual knowledge about the world. Hegel, however, had defined history as the progress of man to higher levels of rationality and freedom, and this process had a logical terminal point in the achievement of absolute selfconsciousness. This selfconsciousness, he believed, was embodied in his own philosophical system, just as human freedom was embodied in the modern liberal state that emerged in Europe after the French Revolution and in North America after the American Revolution. When Hegel declared that history had ended after the Battle of Jena in 1806, he was obviously not making the claim that the liberal state was victorious throughout the world; its victory was not even certain in his little corner of Germany at the time. What he was saying was that the principles of liberty and equality underlying the modern liberal state had been discovered and implemented in the most advanced countries, and that there were no alternative principles or forms of social and political organization that were superior to liberalism. Liberal societies were, in other words, free from the “contradictions” that characterized earlier forms of social organization and would therefore bring the historical dialectic to a close.

黑格尔与丰特奈尔以及在他之后的更激进的历史学家的不同之处在于,他不相信历史进程会无限期地持续下去,而是会随着现实世界中自由社会的实现而结束。换句话说,会有一个历史的终结。这并不意味着从人类的出生、死亡和社会互动中产生的事件会结束,也不意味着关于世界的事实性知识会有一个上限。然而,黑格尔将历史定义为人类向更高层次的理性和自由的进步,这个过程在逻辑上的终点是实现绝对自我意识。他认为,这种自我意识体现在他自己的哲学体系中,就像人类自由体现在法国大革命后在欧洲和美国大革命后在北美出现的现代自由主义国家中。当黑格尔宣称历史在 1806 年耶拿战役后结束时,他显然不是在宣称自由主义国家在全世界取得了胜利;当时在他所在的德国的小角落里,自由主义的胜利甚至还不确定。他说的是,现代自由主义国家所依据的自由和平等原则已经在最先进的国家被发现并实施,而且没有其他原则或社会和政治组织形式比自由主义更优越。换句话说,自由主义社会摆脱了早期社会组织形式的 “矛盾”,因此将为历史辩证法画上句号。

From the moment Hegel formulated his system, people were not inclined to take seriously his claim that history ended with the modern liberal state. Almost immediately, Hegel came under attack from the other great nineteenth-century writer of a Universal History, Karl Marx. Indeed, we are unaware of our intellectual debt to Hegel in large part because his legacy has passed to us via Marx, who appropriated large parts of the Hegelian system for his own purposes. Marx accepted from Hegel a view of the fundamental historicity of human affairs, the notion that human society has evolved over the course of time from primitive social structures to more complex and highly developed ones. He agreed as well that the historical process is fundamentally dialectical, that is, that earlier forms of political and social organization contained internal “contradictions” that became evident over time and led to their downfall and replacement by something higher. And Marx shared Hegel’s belief in the possibility of an end of history. That is, he foresaw a final form of society that was free from contradictions, and whose achievement would terminate the historical process.

从黑格尔制定其体系的那一刻起,人们就不倾向于认真对待他关于历史随着现代自由主义国家结束的说法。几乎在第一时间,黑格尔就受到了十九世纪另一位伟大的《世界历史》作家卡尔·马克思的攻击。事实上,我们没有意识到我们对黑格尔的知识债务,很大程度上是因为他的遗产通过马克思传给了我们,而马克思为了自己的目的挪用了黑格尔体系的大部分内容。马克思从黑格尔那里接受了关于人类事务的基本历史性的观点,即人类社会随着时间的推移从原始社会结构演变为更复杂和高度发达的社会结构的概念。他也同意,历史进程从根本上说是辩证的,也就是说,早期的政治和社会组织形式包含了内部的 “矛盾”,随着时间的推移变得明显,并导致了它们的衰落和被更高的东西取代。而且,马克思与黑格尔一样,相信历史有结束的可能。也就是说,他预见到了一种没有矛盾的最终社会形式,它的实现将终止历史进程。

Where Marx differed from Hegel was over just what kind of society emerged at the end of history. Marx believed that the liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of class conflict, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Marx turned Hegel’s historicism against him, arguing that the liberal state did not represent the universalization of freedom, but only the victory of freedom for a certain class, the bourgeoisie. Hegel believed that alienation—the division of man against himself and his subsequent loss of control over his destiny—had been adequately resolved at the end of history through the philosophical recognition of the freedom possible in the liberal state. Marx, on the other hand, observed that in liberal societies man remains alienated from himself because capital, a human creation, has turned into man’s lord and master and controls him. The bureaucracy of the liberal state, which Hegel called the “universal class” because it represented the interests of the people as a whole,for Marx represented only particularinterests within civil society,those of the capitalists who dominated it. Hegel the philosopher did not achieve “absolute selfconsciousness,” but was himself a product of his times, an apologist for the bourgeoisie. The Marxist end of history would come only with victory of the true “universal class,” the proletariat, and the subsequent achievement of a global communist Utopia that would end class struggle once and for all.

马克思与黑格尔的分歧之处在于,在历史的尽头会出现什么样的社会。马克思认为,自由主义国家未能解决一个基本矛盾,即阶级冲突,资产阶级和无产阶级之间的斗争。马克思反驳了黑格尔的历史主义,认为自由主义国家并不代表自由的普遍化,而只是代表某个阶级即资产阶级的自由的胜利。黑格尔认为,异化 —— 人对自己的分裂以及随后对自己命运的失控 —— 已经在历史的尽头通过对自由国家中可能存在的自由的哲学认识而得到了充分的解决。另一方面,马克思注意到,在自由主义社会中,人仍然与自己疏远,因为资本这个人类的创造物已经变成了人的主宰和控制者。自由主义国家的官僚机构被黑格尔称为 “普遍阶级”,因为它代表了全体人民的利益,而对马克思来说,它只代表公民社会中的特殊利益,即那些主宰它的资本家的利益。黑格尔这位哲学家并没有实现 “绝对的自我意识”,他自己也是时代的产物,是资产阶级的辩护人。马克思主义的历史终结只有在真正的 “普遍阶级” —— 无产阶级的胜利,以及随后实现全球共产主义乌托邦,一劳永逸地结束阶级斗争时才会到来。

The Marxist critique of Hegel and of liberal society is by now so familiar that it scarcely bears repeating. Y et the monumental failure of Marxism as a basis for real-world societies—plainly evident 140 years after the Communist Manifesto—raises the question of whether Hegel’s Universal History was not in the end the more prophetic one. This possibility was put forward in the middle of this century by Alexandre Kojève, the French-Russian philosopher who taught a highly influential series of seminars at Paris’s École Pratique des Hautes Études in the 1930s. If Marx was Hegel’s greatest nineteenth-century interpreter, then Kojève was surely his greatest interpreterin the twentieth century. Like Marx, Kojève did not feel bound merely to explicate the thought of Hegel, but used it creatively instead to build his own understanding of modernity. Raymond Aron gives us a glimpse of Kojève’s brilliance and originality:

马克思主义对黑格尔和自由社会的批判现在已经非常熟悉,几乎不需要再重复了。然而,马克思主义作为现实社会基础的巨大失败 —— 在《共产党宣言》发表 140 年后明显可见 —— 提出了这样一个问题:黑格尔的《世界历史》最终是否更有预见性。这种可能性在本世纪中叶由亚历山大·科耶夫(Alexandre Kojève)提出,这位法籍俄罗斯哲学家在 1930 年代在巴黎高等师范学院教授了一系列极具影响力的研讨会。如果说马克思是黑格尔在十九世纪最伟大的解释者,那么科耶夫肯定是他在二十世纪最伟大的解释者。和马克思一样,科耶夫并不觉得自己有义务仅仅阐释黑格尔的思想,而是创造性地利用它来建立他自己对现代性的理解。雷蒙·阿隆让我们看到了科耶夫的才华和原创性。

[Kojève] fascinated an audience of superintellectuals inclined toward doubt or criticism. Why? His talent, his dialectical virtuosity had something to do with it… . [His speaker’s art] was intimately connected with his subject and his personality. The subject was both world history and [Hegel’s] Phenomenology. The latter shed light on the former. Everything took on meaning. Even those who were suspicious of historical providence, who suspected the artifice behind the art, did not resist the magician; at the moment, the intelligibility he conferred on the time and on events was enough of a proof.

科耶夫使那些倾向于怀疑或批评的超级知识分子的观众着迷。他的才华,他的辩证法技巧都与此有关。. . . 他的演讲艺术与他的主题和他的个性密切相关。这个主题既是世界历史,也是黑格尔的现象学。后者照亮了前者。一切都有了意义。即使是那些怀疑历史天意,怀疑艺术背后的伪装的人,也没有抵制这位魔术师;此时此刻,他赋予时间和事件的可理解性就足以证明。

At the center of Kojève’s teaching was the startling assertion that Hegel had been essentially right, and that world history, for all the twists and turns it had taken in subsequent years, had effectively ended in the year 1806. It is difficult to read through the layers of irony in Kojève’s work to uncover his true intent, but behind this seemingly odd conclusion is the thought that the principles of liberty and equality that emerged from the French Revolution, embodied in what Kojève called the modern “universal and homogeneous state,” represented the end point of human ideological evolution beyond which it was impossible to progress further. Kojève was of course aware that there had been many bloody wars and revolutions in the years since 1806, but these he regarded as essentially an “alignment of the provinces.” In other words, communism did not represent a higher stage than liberal democracy, it was part of the same stage of history that would eventually universalize the spread of liberty and equality to all parts of the world. Though the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions seemed like monumental events at the time, their only lasting effect would be to spread the already established principles of liberty and equality to formerly backward and oppressed peoples, and to force those countries of the developed world already living in accordance with such principles to implement them more completely.

科耶夫教学的中心是一个惊人的论断,即黑格尔在本质上是正确的,世界历史,就其在随后几年中的所有曲折而言,实际上已在 1806 年结束。要读懂科耶夫作品中的层层讽刺,发现他的真实意图是很困难的,但在这个看似奇怪的结论背后,是这样一种思想:法国大革命中出现的自由和平等原则,体现在科耶夫所谓的现代 “普遍和同质的国家” 中,代表了人类意识形态进化的终点,超越了这个终点就不可能再有进步。科耶夫当然知道,自 1806 年以来,已经发生了许多血腥的战争和革命,但他认为这些基本上是 “各省的结盟”。换句话说,共产主义并不代表比自由民主更高的阶段,它是同一历史阶段的一部分,最终将使自由和平等普及到世界各地。尽管布尔什维克革命和中国革命在当时看来是不朽的事件,但它们唯一持久的影响是将已经确立的自由和平等原则传播给以前落后和受压迫的人民,并迫使发达国家中那些已经按照这种原则生活的国家更彻底地执行这些原则。

One can get a glimpse of Kojève’s brilliance, as well as his peculiarity, from the following passage:


Observing what was taking place around me and reflecting on what had taken place in the world since the Battle of Jena, I understood that Hegel was right to see in this battle the end of History properly socalled. In and by this battle the vanguard of humanity virtually attained the limit and the aim, that is, the end, of Man’s historical evolution. What has happened since then was but an extension in space of the universal revolutionary force actualized in France by RobespierreNapoleon. From the authentically historical point of view, the two world wars with their retinue of large and small revolutions had only the effect of bringing the backward civilizations of the peripheral provinces into line with the most advanced (real or virtual) European historical positions. If the sovietization of Russia and the communization of China are anything more than or different from the democratization of imperial Germany (by way of Hitlerism) or the accession of Togoland to independence, nay, the selfdetermination of the Papuans, it is only because the Sino-Soviet actualization of Robespierrian Bonapartism obliges post-Napoleonic Europe to speed up the elimination of the numerous more or less anachronistic sequels to its prerevolutionary past.


The fullest embodiment of the principles of the French Revolution were for Kojève the countries of postwar Western Europe, that is, those capitalist democracies that had achieved a high degree of material abundance and political stability. For these were societies with no fundamental “contradictions” remaining: selfsatisfied and selfsustaining, they had no further great political goals to struggle for and could preoccupy themselves with economic activity alone. Kojève gave up teaching in the latter part of his life to work as a bureaucrat for the European Community. The end of history, he believed, meant the end not only of large political struggles and conflicts, but the end of philosophy as well; the European Community was therefore an appropriate institutional embodiment of the end of history.

对科耶夫来说,法国大革命原则的最充分体现是战后的西欧国家,也就是那些已经实现了高度物质丰富和政治稳定的资本主义民主国家。因为这些社会已经没有基本的 “矛盾”:自我满足和自我维持,他们没有进一步的伟大政治目标需要奋斗,可以只专注于经济活动。科耶夫在他生命的后半段放弃了教学,转而为欧洲共同体做官。他认为,历史的终结不仅意味着大型政治斗争和冲突的终结,也意味着哲学的终结;因此,欧洲共同体是历史终结的一个适当的机构体现。

The Universal Histories represented by the monumental works of Hegel and Marx were followed by other, less impressive ones. The second half of the nineteenth century saw a number of relatively optimistic theories about progressive social evolution, such as those of the positivist Auguste Comte and the social Darwinist Herbert Spencer. The latter saw social evolution as part of a larger process of biological evolution, subject to laws similar to those of the survival of the fittest.


The twentieth century also saw several attempts at Universal Histories—though of a decidedly darker character—including Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, and Arnold Toynbee’s The Study of History, which drew its inspiration from the former work. Both Spengler and Toynbee divide history into the histories of distinct peoples—“cultures” in the former case and “societies” in the latter—each of which was said to be subject to certain uniform laws of growth and decay. They thus broke with the tradition that began with the Christian historians and culminated in Hegel and Marx of a unitary and progressive history of mankind. Spengler and T oynbee return, in a certain sense, to the cyclical histories of individual peoples that characterized Greek and Roman historiography. Though both works were widely read at the time, they both suffer from a similar organicist flaw by drawing a questionable analogy between a culture or society and a biological organism. Spengler remains popular because of his pessimism and seems to have had some influence on statesmen like Henry Kissinger, but neither writer achieved the degree of seriousness of their German predecessors.

二十世纪还出现了一些关于《世界历史》的尝试 —— 尽管其性质明显更黑暗 —— 包括奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒的《西方的衰落》和阿诺德·汤因比的《历史研究》,后者从前者获得了灵感。斯宾格勒和汤因比都将历史分为不同民族的历史 —— 前者为 “文化”,后者为 “社会” —— 据说每个民族都受制于某些统一的成长和衰亡规律。因此,他们打破了始于基督教历史学家、终于黑格尔和马克思的人类统一和渐进历史的传统。斯宾格勒和托因比在某种意义上又回到了希腊和罗马历史学所特有的个别民族的周期性历史。虽然这两部作品在当时被广泛阅读,但它们都存在类似的有机主义缺陷,即在文化或社会与生物有机体之间做了一个值得怀疑的类比。斯宾格勒因其悲观主义而仍然很受欢迎,并且似乎对亨利·基辛格等政治家产生了一些影响,但这两位作家都没有达到他们的德国前辈那样的严肃程度。

The last significant Universal History to be written in the twentieth century was not the work of a single individual, but rather a collective effort on the part of a group of social scientists—mostly American—writing after World War II, under the general rubric of “modernization theory.” Karl Marx, in the preface to the English edition of Das Kapital, had stated that “The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” This was, consciously or not, the beginning premise of modernization theory. Drawing heavily on the work of Marx and of the sociologists Weber and Durkheim, modernization theory posited that industrial development followed a coherent pattern of growth, and would in time produce certain uniform social and political structures across different countries and cultures. By studying countries like Britain or the United States that industrialized and democratized first, one could unlock a universal pattern that all countries would eventually follow. While Max Weber took a despairing and pessimistic view of the increasing rationalism and secularism of mankind’s historical “progress,” postwar modernization theory gave his ideas a decidedly optimistic and, one is tempted to say, typically American cast. While there was disagreement among modernization theorists as to how unilinear historical evolution would be, and whether there were alternative paths to modernity, none doubted that history was directional or that the liberal democracy of the advanced industrial nations lay at its end. In the 1950s and 60s they worked, with great enthusiasm, to harness their new social science to the task of helping the newly independent countries of the Third World develop economically and politically.

二十世纪最后一部重要的《世界历史》不是一个人的作品,而是一群社会科学家 —— 主要是美国人 —— 在二战后以 “现代化理论” 为总标题进行的集体努力。卡尔·马克思在《资本论》英文版的序言中指出,“工业上比较发达的国家只是向欠发达的国家展示自己的未来形象”。无论自觉与否,这都是现代化理论的起始前提。现代化理论在很大程度上借鉴了马克思以及社会学家韦伯和杜克海姆的工作,认为工业发展遵循一种连贯的增长模式,并将在不同国家和文化中及时产生某些统一的社会和政治结构。通过研究像英国或美国这样首先实现工业化和民主化的国家,人们可以解开一个所有国家最终都会遵循的普遍模式。马克斯·韦伯对人类历史 “进步” 中不断增长的理性主义和世俗主义采取了绝望和悲观的看法,而战后的现代化理论则给他的观点赋予了明显的乐观主义,而且,人们很想说,这是典型的美国色彩。虽然现代化理论家们对历史演变的单线化程度以及是否存在通往现代化的替代道路存在分歧,但没有人怀疑历史是有方向性的,也没有人怀疑先进工业国家的自由民主会走到尽头。在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代,他们以极大的热情致力于利用他们的新社会科学来帮助第三世界的新独立国家在经济和政治上发展。

Modernization theory eventually fell victim to the accusation that it was ethnocentric, that is, that it elevated the Western European and North American development experience to the level of universal truth, without recognizing its own “culture-boundness.” “As a result of W estern political and cultural hegemony,” one critic charged, “the ethnocentric notion has been encouraged that only the West’s political development represents a valid model.” This critique was deeper than the simple charge that there were many other paths to modernity than those specific ones followed by countries like Britain and America. It questioned the very concept of modernity itself, in particularwhether all nations really wanted to adopt the West’s liberal democratic principles, and whether there were not equally valid cultural starting and end points.

现代化理论最终成为种族中心论的受害者,也就是说,它把西欧和北美的发展经验提升到普遍真理的高度,而没有认识到自己的 “文化约束”。“由于西方的政治和文化霸权”,一位批评者指控说,“民族中心主义的观念被鼓励,认为只有西方的政治发展才是有效的模式。” 这种批评比简单的指控更深刻,即除了英国和美国这样的国家所遵循的特定道路外,还有许多其他的现代性道路。它对现代性的概念本身提出了质疑,特别是是否所有国家都真的想采用西方的自由民主原则,以及是否不存在同样有效的文化起点和终点。

The charge of ethnocentrism spelled the death knell for modernization theory. For the social scientists who formulated this theory shared the relativistic assumptions of their critics: they believed they had no scientific or empirical grounds on which they could defend the values of liberal democracy, and could only emphasize that they had no intention of being ethnocentric themselves.


It is safe to say that the enormous historical pessimism engendered by the twentieth century has discredited most Universal Histories. The use of Marx’s concept of “History” to justify terror in the Soviet Union, China, and other communist countries has given that word a particularly sinister connotation in the eyes of many. The notion that history is directional, meaningful, progressive, or even comprehensible is very foreign to the main currents of thought of our time. To speak as Hegel did of World History is to invite sneers and bemused condescension from intellectuals who believe they grasp the world in all its complexity and tragedy. It is no accident that the only writers of Universal Histories who have achieved any degree of popular success in this century were those like Spengler and Toynbee who described the decline and decay of W estern values and institutions.

可以说,二十世纪产生的巨大的历史悲观主义使大多数《世界历史》名誉扫地。利用马克思的 “历史” 概念来为苏联、中国和其他共产主义国家的恐怖行为辩护,在许多人眼里赋予了这个词特别险恶的含义。历史是有方向的、有意义的、进步的、甚至是可理解的概念,对于我们这个时代的主要思想潮流来说是非常陌生的。像黑格尔那样谈论世界历史,就会招致那些自认为掌握了世界所有的复杂性和悲剧性的知识分子的讥笑和疑惑的蔑视。本世纪唯一取得任何程度的流行成功的《世界历史》作家,是像斯宾格勒和汤因比这样描述西方价值观和制度的衰落和腐朽的人,这并非偶然。

But while our pessimism is understandable, it is contradicted by the empirical flow of events in the second half of the century. We need to ask whether our pessimism is not becoming something of a pose, adopted as lightly as was the optimism of the nineteenth century. For a naive optimist whose expectations are belied appears foolish, while a pessimist proven wrong maintains an aura of profundity and seriousness. It is therefore safer to follow the second course. But the appearance of democratic forces in parts of the world where they were never expected to exist, the instability of authoritarian forms of government, and the complete absence of coherent theoretical alternatives to liberal democracy force us to raise Kant’s old question anew: Is there such a thing as a Universal History of mankind, taken from a point of view far more cosmopolitan than was possible in Kant’s day?


Let us go back to the beginning, so to speak, and look at the question without appeal to the authority of earlier theories of history: Is history directional, and is there reason to think that there will be a universal evolution in the direction of liberal democracy?


Let us consider at the outset only the question of directionality, leaving aside for the moment the question of whether that directionality implies progress in terms of either morality or human happiness. Do all or most societies evolve in a certain uniform direction, or do their histories follow either a cyclical or simply random path?1 If the latter, then it is possible that mankind can simply repeat any social or political practice of the past: slavery may recur, Europeans may crown themselves princes and emperors, and American women can lose the right to vote. A directional history, by contrast, implies that no form of social organization, once superseded, is ever repeated by the same society (though different societies at different stages of development can, naturally, repeat a similar evolutionary pattern).


But if history is never to repeat itself, there must be a constant and uniform Mechanism or set of historical first causes that dictates evolution in a single direction, and that somehow preserves the memory of earlier periods into the present. Cyclical or random views of history do not exclude the possibility of social change and limited regularities in development, but they do not require a single source of historical causation. They must also encompass a process of ^-generation as well, by which consciousness of earlier achievements is completely wiped out. For without the possibility of a total historical forgetting, each successive cycle would build, if only in small ways, on the experiences of earlier ones.


As a first cut at understanding the Mechanism that gives history its directionality, let us take our cue from Fontenelle and Bacon, and posit knowledge as the key to the directionality of history—in particular, knowledge about the natural universe that we can obtain through science. For if we look around at the entire range of human social endeavor, the only one that is by common consensus unequivocally cumulative and directional is modern natural science. The same cannot be said for activities like painting, poetry, music, or architecture: it is not clear that Rauschenberg is a better painter than Michelangelo or Schoenberg superior to Bach, simply because they lived in the twentieth century; Shakespeare and the Parthenon represent a certain kind of perfection and it makes no sense to speak of “advancing” beyond them. Natural science, on the other hand, builds upon itself: there are certain “facts” about nature that were hidden from the great Sir Isaac Newton, that are accessible to any undergraduate physics student today simply because he or she was born later. The scientific understanding of nature is neither cyclical nor random; mankind does not return periodically to the same state of ignorance, nor are the results of modern natural science subject to human caprice. Human beings are free to pursue certain branches of science rather than others, and they can obviously apply the results as they please, but neither dictators nor parliaments can repeal the laws of nature, much as they are tempted to do so.

作为理解赋予历史方向性的机制的第一步,让我们从丰特奈尔和培根那里得到启示,把知识作为历史方向性的关键 —— 特别是关于自然宇宙的知识,我们可以通过科学获得。因为如果我们环顾整个人类社会努力的范围,唯一一个被普遍认为是明确的累积性和方向性的是现代自然科学。绘画、诗歌、音乐或建筑等活动就不是这样了:不清楚劳森伯格是否比米开朗基罗更优秀的画家,也不清楚勋伯格是否比巴赫更优秀,只因为他们生活在二十世纪;莎士比亚和帕特农神庙代表了某种完美,谈论 “推进” 它们是没有意义的。另一方面,自然科学是建立在自身之上的:有一些关于自然界的 “事实” 是伟大的艾萨克·牛顿爵士所不知道的,而今天任何一个物理学本科生都可以获得这些事实,仅仅是因为他或她出生得晚。对自然的科学理解既不是周期性的,也不是随机的;人类不会周期性地回到同样的无知状态,现代自然科学的结果也不会受制于人的任性。人类可以自由地追求某些科学分支而不是其他分支,而且他们显然可以按照自己的意愿应用这些结果,但是独裁者和议会都不能废除自然法则,尽管他们很想这样做。

Scientific knowledge has been accumulating for a very long period, and has had a consistent if frequently unperceived effect in shaping the fundamental character of human societies. Those that possess ferrous metallurgy and agriculture were quite different from ones that only knew stone tools or hunting and gathering. But a qualitative change occurred in the relationship of scientific knowledge to the historical process with the rise of modern natural science, that is, from the discovery of the scientific method by men like Descartes, Bacon, and Spinoza in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The possibility of mastering nature opened up by modern natural science was not a universal feature of all societies, but had to be invented at a certain point in history by certain Europeans. However, once having been invented, the scientific method became a universal possession of rational man, potentially accessible to everyone regardless of differences in culture or nationality. Discovery of the scientific method created a fundamental, non-cyclical division of historical time into periods before and after. And once discovered, the progressive and continuous unfolding of modern natural science has provided a directional Mechanism for explaining many aspects of subsequent historical development.


The first way in which modern natural science produces historical change that is both directional and universal is through military competition. The universality of science provides the basis for the global unification of mankind in the first instance because of the prevalence of war and conflict in the international system. Modern natural science confers a decisive military advantage on those societies that can develop, produce, and deploy technology the most effectively, and the relative advantage conferred by technology increases as the rate of technological change accelerates. Zulu spears were no match for British rifles, no matter how brave individual warriors were: mastery of science was the reason why Europe could conquer most of what is now the Third World in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and diffusion of that science from Europe is now permitting the Third World to regain some of its sovereignty in the twentieth.


The possibility of war is a great force for the rationalization of societies, and for the creation of uniform social structures across cultures. Any state that hopes to maintain its political autonomy is forced to adopt the technology of its enemies and rivals. More than that, however, the threat of war forces states to restructure their social systems along lines most conducive to producing and deploying technology. For example, states must be of a certain size in order to compete with their neighbors, which creates powerful incentives for national unity; they must be able to mobilize resources on a national level, which requires the creation of a strong centralized state authority with the power of taxation and regulation; they must break down various forms of regional, religious, and kinship ties which potentially obstruct national unity; they must increase educational levels in order to produce an elite capable of disposing of technology; they must maintain contact with and awareness of developments taking place beyond their borders; and, with the introduction of mass armies during the Napoleonic Wars, they must at least open the door to the enfranchisement of the poorer classes of their societies if they are to be capable of total mobilization. All of these developments could occur for other motives—for example, economic ones—but war frames the need for social modernization in a particularly acute way and provides an unambiguous test of its success.

战争的可能性是使社会合理化的巨大力量,也是创造跨文化的统一社会结构的巨大力量。任何希望保持其政治自主性的国家都被迫采用其敌人和对手的技术。然而,不仅如此,战争的威胁迫使国家沿着最有利于生产和部署技术的路线重组其社会系统。例如,国家必须有一定的规模才能与邻国竞争,这就为国家统一创造了强大的动力;他们必须能够在全国范围内调动资源,这就需要建立一个强大的中央集权的国家权力机构,拥有税收和监管的权力;他们必须打破各种形式的地区、宗教和亲属关系,这些关系可能会阻碍国家统一。他们必须提高教育水平,以培养能够处置技术的精英;他们必须与境外的发展保持联系,并对其有所了解;而且,随着拿破仑战争期间大规模军队的引入,如果他们要有能力进行全面动员,他们至少必须打开大门,让社会中的贫困阶层获得权利。所有这些发展都可能出于其他动机 —— 例如经济动机 —— 而发生,但战争以一种特别尖锐的方式确定了社会现代化的需要,并为其成功提供了一个明确的测试。

There are numerous historical examples of socalled “defensive modernizations,” in which countries were forced to reform as a result of military threat. The great centralizing monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, like those of Louis XIII in France or Philip II in Spain, sought to consolidate power over their territories in large measure in order to guarantee the revenues required to wage war with their neighbors. In the seventeenth century, these monarchies were at peace for only three out of the hundred years; the enormous economic requirements for raising armies provided the chief incentive for central governments to break the power of feudal and regional institutions and create what we recognize as “modern” state structures. The rise of monarchical absolutism in turn had a leveling effect on French society by reducing aristocratic privileges, and opening the way for new social groups that would become crucial during the Revolution.

历史上有许多所谓的 “防御性现代化” 的例子,在这些例子中,国家由于受到军事威胁而被迫改革。十六和十七世纪的大集权君主,如法国的路易十三或西班牙的腓力二世,在很大程度上寻求巩固对其领土的权力,以保证与邻国开战所需的收入。在 17 世纪,这些君主国在一百年中只有三年处于和平状态;养兵千日用兵一时的巨大经济需求,为中央政府打破封建和地区机构的权力,建立我们所承认的 “现代” 国家结构提供了主要动力。君主专制主义的兴起反过来又对法国社会产生了平坦的影响,因为它减少了贵族的特权,并为新的社会团体开辟了道路,这些团体在大革命期间将变得至关重要。

A similar process occurred in the Ottoman Empire and in Japan. The incursion of a French army into Egypt under Napoleon in 1798 shook Egyptian society and led to a major reform of the Egyptian military under its Ottoman pasha, Mohammed Ali. This new army, trained with European help, was so successful that it challenged Ottoman control of much of the Middle East, and prompted the Ottoman sultan Mahmud II to undertake a far-reaching set of reforms that duplicated those of the European monarchs from the previous two centuries. Mahmud broke the old feudal order by massacring the Janissaries (an elite corps of palace guards) in 1826 opened up a series of secular schools, and dramatically increased the power of the central Ottoman bureaucracy. Similarly, the superiority of Commodore Perry’s naval guns was decisive in persuading the daimyos in Japan that they had no choice but to open their country up and accept the challenge of foreign competition. (This did not happen without resistance; as late as the 1850s a gunnery specialist, Takashima Shuhan, was jailed for advocating the adoption of Western military technology.) Under the slogan “Rich Country, Strong Army,” the new leadership of Japan replaced old temple schools with a system of compulsory education administered by the state, recruited a mass peasant army in place of the samurai warriors, and established national taxation, banking, and currency systems. The wholesale transformation of Japanese society brought about during the Meiji restoration and the re-centralization of the Japanese state was motivated by an urgent sense that Japan had to learn to absorb Western technology if it was not to lose its national independence to European colonialism, as China had done.

类似的过程也发生在奥斯曼帝国和日本。1798 年,拿破仑领导的法国军队入侵埃及,震动了埃及社会,并导致埃及军队在奥斯曼帝国帕夏·穆罕默德·阿里的领导下进行了重大改革。这支在欧洲帮助下训练出来的新军队是如此成功,以至于挑战了奥斯曼帝国对中东大部分地区的控制,并促使奥斯曼帝国苏丹马哈茂德二世进行了一系列影响深远的改革,与前两个世纪的欧洲君主的改革相重复。马哈茂德在 1826 年通过屠杀 Janissaries(皇宫守卫的精英队伍)打破了旧的封建秩序,开设了一系列世俗学校,并大大增加了奥斯曼中央官僚机构的权力。同样,佩里准将的海军火炮的优势在说服日本大名方面起了决定性作用,他们别无选择,只能开放他们的国家,接受外国竞争的挑战。(这并不是没有阻力的;早在 19 世纪 50 年代,一位炮兵专家高岛修宪就因为主张采用西方军事技术而被关进了监狱)。在 “富国强兵” 的口号下,日本的新领导层用国家管理的义务教育制度取代了古老的寺庙学校,招募了一支大规模的农民军来取代武士,并建立了国家税收、银行和货币制度。明治维新期间日本社会的全面转型和日本国家的重新集权是出于一种紧迫感,即日本必须学会吸收西方技术,这样它才不会像中国那样在欧洲殖民主义面前失去民族独立。

In other cases, ignominious defeat in war has been the spur to the adoption of rationalizing social reform. The reforms of vom Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau in Prussia were motivated by a recognition that Napoleon had been able to defeat their country at Jena-Auerstadt so easily because of the backwardness of the Prussian state and its total alienation from society. Military reforms such as the introduction of universal conscription were accompanied by introduction of the Napoleonic Code into Prussia, an event that for Hegel signaled the arrival of modernity in Germany. Russia is an example of a country whose modernization and reform process over the past 350 years has been driven primarily by its military ambitions and setbacks. Military modernization lay at the root of Peter the Great’s efforts to turn Russia into a modern European monarchy; the city of St. Petersburg was originally conceived of as a naval base at the head of the Neva River. Russia’s defeat in the Crimean W ar led directly to the reforms of Alexander II, including the abolition of serfdom, while its defeat in the Russo-Japanese W ar made possible the liberal reforms of Stolypin and the period of economic growth from 1905 to 1914.

在其他情况下,在战争中的无耻失败是对采取合理化社会改革的刺激。普鲁士的沃姆·斯坦因、沙恩霍斯特和格奈森瑙的改革是出于这样一种认识:拿破仑之所以能够在耶拿·阿尔施塔特轻易击败他们的国家,是因为普鲁士国家的落后和与社会的完全疏离。军事改革伴随着普鲁士引入《拿破仑法典》等军事改革形式,对黑格尔来说,这一事件标志着现代性在德国的到来。俄罗斯是一个例子,在过去的 350 年里,其现代化和改革进程主要是由其军事野心和挫折推动的。军事现代化是彼得大帝将俄罗斯变成一个现代欧洲君主国的努力的根源;圣彼得堡市最初被设想为涅瓦河畔的一个海军基地。俄罗斯在克里米亚战争中的失败直接导致了亚历山大二世的改革,包括废除农奴制,而它在日俄战争中的失败则使斯托雷平的自由主义改革和 1905 至 1914 年的经济增长期成为可能。

Perhaps the most recent example of defensive modernization was the initial phase of Mikhail Gorbachev’s own perestroïka. It is quite clear from his speeches and those of other senior Soviet officiais that one of the chief reasons that they initially considered undertaking a fundamental reform of the Soviet economy was their realization that an unreformed Soviet Union was going to have serious problems remaining competitive, economically and militarily, into the twenty-first century. In particular, President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) posed a severe challenge because it threatened to make obsolete an entire generation of Soviet nuclear weapons, and shifted the superpower competition into areas like microelectronics and other innovative technologies where the Soviet Union had serious disadvantages. Soviet leaders, including many in the military, understood that the corrupt economic system inherited from Brezhnev would be unable to keep up in an SDI-dominated world, and were willing to accept short-run retrenchment for the sake of long-run survival.

也许最近的防御性现代化的例子是米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫自己的改革的初始阶段。从他和其他苏联高级官员的讲话中可以很清楚地看出,他们最初考虑对苏联经济进行根本性改革的主要原因之一是他们认识到,一个未经改革的苏联要想在二十一世纪保持经济和军事上的竞争力,会有严重的问题。特别是,里根总统的战略防御倡议(SDI)构成了一个严峻的挑战,因为它有可能使整个一代苏联的核武器过时,并将超级大国的竞争转移到像微电子和其他创新技术领域,而苏联在这些领域有严重的劣势。苏联领导人,包括许多军方人士都明白,从勃列日涅夫那里继承下来的腐败的经济体系将无法在一个 SDI 主导的世界中跟上步伐,为了长期的生存,他们愿意接受短期的缩减。

The persistence of war and military competition among nations is thus, paradoxically, a great unifier of nations. Even as war leads to their destruction, it forces states to accept modern technological civilization and the social structures that support it. Modern natural science forces itself on man, whether he cares for it or not: most nations do not have the option of rejecting the technological rationalism of modernity if they want to preserve their national autonomy. We see here a demonstration of the truth of Kant’s observation that historical change comes about as a result of man’s “asocial sociability”: it is conflict rather than cooperation that first induces men to live in societies and then develop the potential of those societies more fully.

因此,矛盾的是,战争和国家间的军事竞争的持续存在,是国家的伟大统一。即使战争导致了它们的毁灭,它也迫使各国接受现代技术文明和支持它的社会结构。现代自然科学迫使人类接受它,无论他是否在意:大多数国家如果想保持其民族自主性,就不能选择拒绝现代性的技术理性主义。我们在这里看到了康德观察的真实性,即历史变革是由于人的 “非社会性” 而产生的:是冲突而不是合作首先诱使人们生活在社会中,然后更充分地发展这些社会的潜力。

It is possible to evade the requirement of technological rationalization for a certain length of time, if one lives in an isolated or undesirable territory. Alternatively, countries can get lucky. Islamic “science” was incapable of producing the F-4 fighterbombers and Chieftain tanks required to defend Khomeini’s Iran from ambitious neighbors like Iraq. Islamic Iran could attack the Western rationalism that did produce such weapons only because it could buy them with income from its oil resources. The fact that the mullahs who ruled Iran could simply watch a valuable resource gush out of the ground permitted them to indulge themselves in certain projects like worldwide Islamic revolution that other countries, not similarly blessed, could not pursue.

如果一个人生活在一个孤立的或不受欢迎的领土上,就有可能在一定时间内逃避技术合理化的要求。另外,各国也可以获得幸运。伊斯兰 “科学” 没有能力生产 F-4 战斗轰炸机和 “酋长” 坦克,以保卫霍梅尼的伊朗不受伊拉克等野心勃勃的邻国的侵害。伊斯兰教的伊朗能够攻击确实生产了这种武器的西方理性主义,只是因为它可以用其石油资源的收入来购买这些武器。统治伊朗的毛拉们可以眼睁睁地看着宝贵的资源从地下涌出,这使他们可以沉迷于某些项目,如世界性的伊斯兰革命,而其他国家却没有同样的福气,无法追求。

The second way in which modern natural science can be expected to produce directional historical change is through the progressive conquest of nature for the purpose of satisfying human desires, a project that we otherwise call economic development. Industrialization is not simply the intensive application of technology to the manufacturing process and the creation of new machines. It is also the bringing to bear of human reason to the problem of social organization and the creation of a rational division of labor. These parallel uses of reason, for the creation of new machines and the organization of the production process, have succeeded beyond the wildest expectations of the early proponents of the scientific method. In Western Europe, per capita income grew more than tenfold from the mid-1700s to the present, starting from a base that was already higher than that of many presentday Third World countries. Economic growth produced certain uniform social transformations in all societies, regardless of their prior social structure.

现代自然科学可望产生方向性历史变化的第二种方式是通过逐步征服自然以满足人类的欲望,这一项目我们另称为经济发展。工业化不仅仅是将技术深入应用于制造过程和创造新机器。它也是将人类的理性用于解决社会组织的问题和创造合理的劳动分工。理性在创造新机器和组织生产过程中的平行使用,已经成功地超出了科学方法的早期支持者的最疯狂的期望。在西欧,从 17 世纪中期到现在,人均收入增长了 10 倍以上,其起点已经高于当今许多第三世界国家。经济增长在所有社会中产生了某些统一的社会转型,无论其先前的社会结构如何。

Modern natural science regulates the direction of economic development by establishing a constantly changing horizon of production possibilities. The direction in which this technological horizon unfolds is very closely intertwined with the development of an increasingly rational organization of labor . For example, technological improvements in communications and transportation—the building of roads, the development of ships and ports, the invention of railroads and the like—make possible an expansion in the size of markets, which in turn facilitate the realization of economies of scale through rationalization of the organization of labor. Specialized tasks which were unprofitable when a factory was selling to a couple of local villages suddenly become worthwhile when one sells to an entire nation, or to an even broader international market. The increased productivity resulting from these changes then enlarges the internal market and creates new demands for an even greater division of labor.

现代自然科学通过建立一个不断变化的生产可能性的视野来调节经济发展的方向。这一技术领域的发展方向与日益合理的劳动组织的发展密切相关。例如,通信和运输方面的技术改进 —— 道路的修建、船舶和港口的发展、铁路的发明等等 —— 使市场规模的扩大成为可能,这反过来又促进了通过劳动组织的合理化实现规模经济。当一个工厂只向当地几个村庄销售时,那些无利可图的专门工作在向整个国家或更广泛的国际市场销售时突然变得有价值了。这些变化带来的生产力的提高,扩大了内部市场,为更大的分工创造了新的需求。

The requirements of the rational organization of labor dictate certain consistent, largescale changes in social structure. Indus­trial societies must be predominantly urban, because it is only in cities that one finds an adequate supply of skilled labor required to run modern industries, and because cities have the infrastruc­ture and services to support large, highly specialized enterprises. Apartheid in South Africa ultimately broke down because it was built on the belief that black industrial labor could somehow be kept permanently in the countryside. For labor markets to func­tion efficiently, labor has to become increasingly mobile: workers cannot remain permanently tied to a particular job, locale, or set of social relationships, but must become free to move about, learn new tasks and technologies, and sell their labor to the highest bidder. This has a powerful effect in undermining traditional social groups like tribes, clans, extended families, religious sects, and so on. The latter may in certain respects be more humanly satisfying to live in, but since they are not organized according to the rational principles of economic efficiency, they tend to lose out to those that are.


What replaces them are “modern” bureaucratic forms of organization. Workers are supposed to be accepted into these organizations on the basis of their training and ability, not as a result of family ties or status; and their performance is measured according to established, universal rules. Modern bureaucracies institutionalize the rational organization of labor by taking complex tasks and dividing them into a hierarchical structure of simpler ones, many of which can be performed as a matter of routine. Rational bureaucratic organization is likely in the long run to pervade every aspect of society in an industrialized country, regardless of whether the organization in question is a government agency, labor union, corporation, political party, newspaper, charitable trust, university, or professional association. In contrast to the nineteenth century, when four out of five Americans were self-employed and therefore not part of a bureaucratic organization, only one in ten falls into this category now. This “unplanned revolution” has replicated itself in all industrialized countries, regardless of whether that country was capitalist or socialist, and in spite of differences in the religious and cultural backgrounds of the pre-industrial societies out of which they emerged.

取代它们的是 “现代” 官僚组织形式。工人应该根据他们的培训和能力被接受进入这些组织,而不是由于家庭关系或地位;他们的表现是根据既定的、普遍的规则来衡量的。现代官僚机构将合理的劳动组织制度化,将复杂的任务划分为较简单的等级结构,其中许多任务可以作为例行公事来执行。从长远来看,理性的官僚组织可能会渗透到工业化国家社会的每一个方面,无论有关组织是政府机构、工会、公司、政党、报纸、慈善信托、大学还是专业协会。与 19 世纪相比,当时五分之四的美国人是自营职业者,因此不属于官僚组织,而现在只有十分之一的人属于这一类别。这种 “无计划的革命” 在所有工业化国家都得到了复制,不管这个国家是资本主义还是社会主义,也不管它们产生的前工业社会的宗教和文化背景有什么不同。

It has proven not to be the case that industrial development necessarily implies bureaucracies of ever-increasing size, or gigantic industrial combines. Past a certain point, large bureaucracies become increasingly less efficient—being afflicted by what economists call diseconomies of scale—and are therefore less efficient than a larger number of smaller organizations. Nor do certain modern industries, like software engineering, need to be located in big cities. Nonetheless, these smaller units still need to be organized according to rational principles, and need the support of an urban society.

事实证明,工业发展并不一定意味着规模不断扩大的官僚机构或巨大的工业联合体。过了某一点,大型官僚机构的效率就会越来越低 —— 受到经济学家所说的规模不经济的影响 —— 因此比大量的小型组织的效率低。某些现代工业,如软件工程,也不需要位于大城市。尽管如此,这些较小的单位仍然需要按照合理的原则进行组织,并需要城市社会的支持。

The rational organization of labor should not be regarded as a phenomenon separate in essence from technological innovation; both are aspects of the rationalization of economic life, the first in the sphere of social organization and the latter in the sphere of machine production. Karl Marx believed that the productivity of modern capitalism was based primarily on machineproduction (that is, the application of technology) rather than the division of labor, and hoped that the latter could one day be abolished. Technology would make it possible to eliminate the distinctions between town and country, oil baron and roughneck, investment banker and garbage collector, and create a society in which one could “hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.” Nothing that has occurred in the subsequent history of world economic development suggests that this is true: the rational organization of labor remains essential to modern economic productivity, even as the mind-numbing effects of detail-labor have been mitigated by advances in technology. Attempts by communist regimes to abolish the division of labor and to end the slavery of specialization have only led to a tyranny more monstrous than that of the Manchester workshops condemned by Marx. Mao endeavored to abolish the distinctions between town and country and between mental and physical labor at several points, notably during the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s and during the Cultural Revolution a decade later. Both of these efforts led to unimaginable human suffering, dwarfed only by the Khmer Rouge’s attempt to merge town and country in Cambodia after 1975.

劳动的合理组织不应被视为与技术创新在本质上分开的现象;两者都是经济生活合理化的方面,前者在社会组织领域,后者在机器生产领域。卡尔·马克思认为,现代资本主义的生产力主要基于机器生产(即技术的应用),而不是劳动分工,并希望后者有一天能够被废除。技术将有可能消除城市和乡村、石油大亨和粗工、投资银行家和垃圾收集者之间的区别,并创造一个可以 “上午打猎,下午钓鱼,晚上养牛,晚饭后批评” 的社会。在后来的世界经济发展史上,没有任何事情表明这是真的:合理的劳动组织对现代经济生产力仍然至关重要,即使技术的进步已经减轻了细节劳动的令人头疼的影响。共产主义政权试图废除劳动分工,结束专业化的奴役,这只会导致比马克思所谴责的曼彻斯特工场更畸形的暴政。毛泽东曾多次努力废除城乡之间以及脑力劳动和体力劳动之间的区别,特别是在 1950 年代末的大跃进和十年后的文化大革命期间。这两种努力都导致了难以想象的人类苦难,只有红色高棉在 1975 年后试图将柬埔寨的城镇和乡村合并时,才会相形见绌。

Neither the organization of labor nor bureaucracies were new at the time of the Industrial Revolution; what was new was their thoroughgoing rationalization according to the principles of economic efficiency. It is the demand for rationality that imposes uniformity on the social development of industrializing societies. Men may pursue a thousand and one goals in pre-industrial so­cieties: religion or tradition may dictate that the life of an aristo­cratic warrior is superior to that of a city merchant; a priest may prescribe the “just price” for a certain commodity. But a society that lives by such rules will not allocate its resources efficiently, and will therefore not develop economically as fast as one that lives by rational rules.

在工业革命时期,劳动组织和官僚机构都不是新事物;新事物是根据经济效率的原则对其进行彻底的合理化。正是对理性的要求,使工业化社会的社会发展具有统一性。在前工业化社会中,人们可能会追求千奇百怪的目标:宗教或传统可能规定贵族战士的生活比城市商人的生活更优越;牧师可能规定某种商品的 “公正价格”。但是,按这种规则生活的社会不会有效地分配其资源,因此经济发展不会像按理性规则生活的社会那样快。

To illustrate the homogenizing power of the division of labor, let us consider its effect on social relations in concrete cases. A t the time of General Franco’s victory over Republican forces in the Spanish civil war, Spain was a predominantly agricultural country. The social base of the Spanish Right rested on local notables and landowners in the countryside, who were able to mobilize masses of peasant supporters on the basis of tradition and personal loyalty. The Mafia, whether operating out of New Jersey or Palermo, owes its cohesion to similar sorts of personal and family ties, as do the local warlords who continue to dominate rural politics in Third World countries like El Salvador and the Philippines. Spain’s economic development in the 1950s and 60s introduced modern market relationships into the countryside, and thereby brought about an unplanned social revolution that destroyed these traditional patron-client relationships. Masses of peasants were drawn off the land into cities, depriving local notables of supporters; the bosses themselves evolved into more ef­ficient agricultural producers who were oriented outwards to national and international markets; and the peasants who remained on the land become contractual employees selling their labor. A modern-day, would-be Franco would lack the social basis on which to recruit any army. The pressure of economic rationalization also explains why the Mafia persists in the relatively underdeveloped south of Italy rather than in its industrial­ized north. Patron-client relationships based on non-economic ties obviously persist in modern societies—everyone knows of a boss’ son who was promoted ahead of his colleagues, or old-boy networks used in hiring—but they are usually declared illegal and have to be carried out sub rosa.

为了说明劳动分工的同质化力量,让我们考虑一下它在具体案例中对社会关系的影响。在佛朗哥将军战胜西班牙内战中的共和军时,西班牙是一个以农业为主的国家。西班牙右派的社会基础在于农村的地方名流和地主,他们能够在传统和个人忠诚的基础上动员广大的农民支持者。黑手党,无论是在新泽西还是在巴勒莫活动,其凝聚力都归功于类似的个人和家庭关系,就像在萨尔瓦多和菲律宾等第三世界国家继续主宰农村政治的地方军阀那样。西班牙在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代的经济发展将现代市场关系引入农村,从而带来了一场无计划的社会革命,破坏了这些传统的赞助人·客户关系。大批农民从土地上被吸引到城市,使当地的知名人士失去了支持者;老板们自己演变成了更有效率的农业生产者,他们面向全国和国际市场;而留在土地上的农民则成为出售劳动力的合同雇员。一个现代的、可能的佛朗哥将缺乏招募任何军队的社会基础。经济合理化的压力也解释了为什么黑手党在相对不发达的意大利南部而不是在其工业化的北部持续存在。基于非经济关系的赞助人·客户关系显然在现代社会中持续存在 —— 每个人都知道老板的儿子比他的同事更早被提拔,或者老男孩网络被用于雇用 —— 但它们通常被宣布为非法,必须在罗萨之下进行。

In this chapter, we have sought to pose the question: Is history directional?We have done this in a deliberately naive form, since there are so many pessimists among us who would deny that history exhibits any directionality whatsoever. We have selected modern natural science as a possible underlying “mechanism” of directional historical change, because it is the only largescale so­cial activity that is by consensus cumulative and therefore directional. The progressive unfolding of modern natural science permits one to understand many of the specific details of histor­ical evolution, for example, why men moved by horse-drawn carriage and railroad before they went by automobile and airplane, or why later societies are more urbanized than earlier ones, or why the modern political party, labor union, or nationstate has replaced the tribe or clan as the primary axis of group loyalty in industrialized societies.

在这一章中,我们试图提出这样一个问题:历史是否具有方向性?历史是有方向性的吗?我们故意以一种天真的形式来做这个问题,因为我们中间有许多悲观主义者会否认历史表现出任何方向性。我们选择了现代自然科学作为方向性历史变化的一个可能的基本 “机制”,因为它是唯一大规模的社会活动,是公认的累积性的,因此是方向性的。现代自然科学的逐步展开使人们能够理解历史演变的许多具体细节,例如,为什么人们在乘坐汽车和飞机之前要乘坐马车和铁路,或者为什么后来的社会比早期的社会更加城市化,或者为什么现代政党、工会或民族国家已经取代部落或宗族成为工业化社会中群体忠诚的主要轴心。

But while modern natural science can explain some phenom­ena quite readily, there are many others—starting with the form of government chosen by a particular society—which it can explain only with great difficulty. Moreover, although modern natural science may be regarded as a possible “regulator” of directional historical change, it should in no way be regarded as the ultimate cause of change. For one would immediately be driven to ask, why modern natural science? While the internal logic of science may explain why it unfolds as it does, science itself does not tell us why men pursue science. Science as a social phenomenon unfolds not simply because men are curious about the universe, but because science permits them to gratify their desire for security, and for the limitless acquisition of material goods. Modern corporations do not maintain research and development staffs out of an abstract love of knowledge, but to make money. The desire for economic growth seems to be a universal characteristic of virtually all presentday societies, but if man is not simply an economic animal we would expect the explanation given above to be an incomplete one. This is a question to which we will return shortly.

但是,虽然现代自然科学可以很容易地解释一些现象,但还有许多其他现象 —— 从一个特定社会所选择的政府形式开始 —— 它只能非常困难地解释。此外,尽管现代自然科学可以被看作是历史变化方向的一个可能的 “调节器”,但它绝不应该被看作是变化的最终原因。因为人们会立即被逼问,为什么是现代自然科学?虽然科学的内部逻辑可以解释它为什么会这样展开,但科学本身并没有告诉我们人们为什么要追求科学。科学作为一种社会现象的展开,并不只是因为人们对宇宙的好奇,而是因为科学允许他们满足对安全的渴望,以及对物质财富的无限获取。现代企业不是出于对知识的抽象热爱而维持研究和开发人员,而是为了赚钱。对经济增长的渴望似乎是几乎所有当今社会的普遍特征,但如果人不是简单的经济动物,我们就会认为上面的解释是不完整的。这是一个我们很快就会回到的问题。

We are not, for the time being, placing any moral or ethical valuation on the historical directionality implied by modern natural science. It should be taken for granted that phenomena like the division of labor and growing bureaucratization are profoundly ambiguous in their implications for human happiness, as has been underlined by Adam Smith, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and other social scientists who first pointed to them as central characteristics of modern life. We are under no obligation at present to assume that the ability of modern science to raise economic productivity makes men more moral, happier, or otherwise better off than they were before. As the starting point of our analysis, we want to demonstrate provisionally that there are good reasons for thinking that the history produced as a consequence of the unfolding of modern natural science moves in a single coherent direction, and to examine further the consequences that flow from that conclusion.


If the discovery of modern natural science produces direc­tional history, the question naturally arises, Can it be un-invented? Can the scientific method cease to dominate our lives, and is it possible for industrialized societies to return to premodern, prescientific ones? Is the directionality of history, in short, reversible?


Chapter 7: No Barbarians at the Gates


In the Australian filmmaker George Miller’s movie The Road Warrior, our presentday, oil-based civilization is portrayed as having collapsed as a result of an apocalyptic war. Science has been lost; latter-day Visigoths and Vandals ride around in the outback on Harley-Davidsons and dune buggies, trying to steal gasoline and bullets from one another because the production technology has been lost.


The possibility of the cataclysmic destruction of our modern, technological civilization and its sudden return to barbarism has been a constant subject of science fiction, particularly in the post­war period when the invention of nuclear weapons made this seem like a real possibility. Frequently, the kind of barbarism to which mankind descends is not a pure resurrection of earlier forms of social organization, but a curious mixture of old social forms and modern technology, as when emperors and dukes fly between solar systems in space ships. If, however, our assumptions about the interrelationships between modern natural science and modern social organization are correct, then such “mixed” outcomes would not be viable for long: for without the destruc­tion or rejection of the scientific method itself, modern natural science would eventually reproduce itself and force the recreation of many aspects of the modern, rational social world as well.

我们的现代技术文明遭到灾难性破坏并突然回到野蛮状态的可能性一直是科幻小说的永恒主题,特别是在战后时期,核武器的发明使这种可能性似乎成为现实。通常情况下,人类下降到的那种野蛮状态并不是早期社会组织形式的纯粹复活,而是旧的社会形式和现代技术的奇怪混合,就像皇帝和公爵乘坐太空船在太阳系之间飞行一样。然而,如果我们对现代自然科学和现代社会组织之间的相互关系的假设是正确的,那么这种 “混合” 的结果就不会长期可行:因为如果不破坏或拒绝科学方法本身,现代自然科学最终会自我复制,并迫使现代理性社会世界的许多方面也重新出现。

So let us consider the question: Is it possible for mankind as a whole to reverse the directionality of history through the rejection or loss of the scientific method? This problem can be broken down into two parts: first, can modern natural science be deliberately rejected by existing societies; and second, can a global cataclysm result in the involuntary loss of modern natural science?


The deliberate rejection of technology and a rationalized society has been suggested by any number of groups in modern times, from the Romantics of the early nineteenth century, to the hippie movement of the 1960s, to Ayatollah Khomeini and Islamic fundamentalism. At the moment, the most coherent and articulate source of opposition to technological civilization comes from the environmental movement. Contemporary environmentalism comprises many different groups and strands of thought, but the most radical among them have attacked the entire modern project of mastering nature through science, and have suggested that man might be happier if nature were not manipulated but returned to something more closely approximating its original, pre-industrial state.


Almost all of these anti-technological doctrines have a common ancestry in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the first modern philosopher to question the goodness of historical “progress.” Rousseau understood before Hegel the essential historicity of human experience, and how human nature itself had been modified over time. But unlike Hegel, he believed that historical change had served to make men profoundly unhappy. Take the ability of modern economies to satisfy human needs. Rousseau in the Second Discourse points out that true human needs are actually very few in number: man needs shelter from the elements and food to eat; even security is not necessarily a basic requirement because it presupposes that men living in contiguity with other men would naturally want to threaten each other. All other human wants are not essential to happiness, but arise out of man’s ability to compare himself to his neighbors and feel himself deprived if he does not have what they have. The wants created by modern consumerism arise, in other words, from man’s vanity, or what Rousseau calls his amour-propre. The problem is that these new wants, created by man himself in historical time, are infinitely elastic and incapable of being fundamentally satisfied. Modern economies, for all of their enormous efficiency and innovation, create a new need for every want they satisfy. Men are made unhappy not because they fail to gratify some fixed set of desires, but by the gap that continually arises between new wants and their fulfillment.

几乎所有这些反技术学说都有一个共同的祖先,那就是让·雅克·卢梭的思想,他是第一个质疑历史 “进步” 的美好的现代哲学家。卢梭比黑格尔更早理解人类经验的基本历史性,以及人性本身是如何随着时间的推移而改变的。但与黑格尔不同的是,他认为历史的变化使人深感不快。以现代经济满足人类需求的能力为例。卢梭在《第二论》中指出,真正的人类需求其实很少:人需要遮风挡雨,需要吃东西;甚至安全也不一定是基本要求,因为它的前提是,与其他人毗邻而居的人自然想威胁对方。所有其他的人类需求都不是幸福的基本条件,而是源于人将自己与邻居进行比较的能力,如果他没有他们所拥有的东西,就会感到自己被剥夺了。换句话说,现代消费主义产生的欲望来自于人的虚荣心,或者卢梭所说的 “爱慕”。问题是,这些由人类自己在历史时间中创造出来的新欲望,具有无限的弹性,不可能从根本上得到满足。现代经济,就其巨大的效率和创新而言,每满足一个需求就会产生一个新的需求。人之所以不快乐,不是因为他们不能满足某些固定的欲望,而是因为在新的欲望和它们的满足之间不断产生的差距。

Rousseau gives an example of this phenomenon in the collector who is more unhappy about the gaps in his collection than he is satisfied by those objects he owns. One might find a more contemporary illustration in the highly innovative modern consumer electronics industry. In the 1920s and 30s, it was the height of consumerist aspiration for a family to own a radio. Today in contemporary America there is hardly a teenager alive who does not own several, and who yet is extremely dissatisfied for not owning a Nintendo, or a portable compact disc player, or a beeper. It is obvious, moreover, that his acquisition of these items will not serve to make him any more satisfied, since by that time the Japanese will have invented some other new electronic gadget which he can aspire to own.

卢梭举了一个例子来说明这一现象,即收藏家对他的收藏品中的空白比对他拥有的那些物品更不满意。人们可以在高度创新的现代消费电子行业中找到一个更现代的说明。在 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代,一个家庭拥有一台收音机是消费主义愿望的高峰。今天,在当代美国,几乎没有一个活着的青少年不拥有几台,而且还因为没有任天堂,或便携式光盘播放器,或 BP 机而感到非常不满。此外,很明显,他获得这些物品并不会使他更加满意,因为到那时日本人已经发明了一些他可以渴望拥有的其他新的电子小工具。

What could potentially make man happy, according to Rousseau, would be to get off the treadmill of modern technology and the endless cycle of wants it creates, and to recover some of the wholeness of natural man. Natural man did not live in society, did not compare himself to others, or live in the artificial world of fears, hopes, and expectations created by society. Rather, he was made happy by experiencing the sentiment of his own existence, of being a natural man in a natural world. He did not seek to use his reason to master nature; there was no need, for nature was essentially beneficent, nor was reason natural to him as a solitary individual.


Rousseau’s attack upon civilized man raised the first and most fundamental question mark over the entire project of conquering nature, the perspective that sees trees and mountains as raw materials rather than as places of rest and contemplation. His criticism of the Economic Man envisioned by John Locke and Adam Smith remains the basis of most presentday attacks on unlimited economic growth, and is the (oftentimes unconscious) intellectual basis for most contemporary environmentalism. As industrialization and economic development continue, and as the consequent degradation of the natural environment becomes more and more obvious, Rousseau’s critique of economic modernization has had greater appeal. Is it possible to imagine the emergence of a highly radicalized environmentalism that would seek to reject, on the basis of an updated Rousseauism, the entire modern project of the conquest of nature, as well as the technological civilization that rests on it? The answer, for a variety of reasons, would appear to be no.

卢梭对文明人的攻击对整个征服自然的项目提出了第一个也是最根本的问号,即把树木和山脉视为原材料而不是休息和沉思的地方的观点。他对约翰·洛克和亚当·斯密所设想的 “经济人” 的批评,仍然是当今大多数攻击无限经济增长的基础,也是大多数当代环保主义的(往往是无意识的)思想基础。随着工业化和经济发展的继续,以及随之而来的自然环境的退化变得越来越明显,卢梭对经济现代化的批判具有更大的吸引力。是否有可能想象出现一种高度激进的环境主义,在更新的卢梭主义的基础上,寻求拒绝整个征服自然的现代项目,以及建立在其上的技术文明?由于各种原因,答案似乎是否定的。

The first reason has to do with the expectations created by current economic growth. While individuals and small communities can “return to nature,” quitting their jobs as investment bank­ers or real estate developers in order to live by a lake in the Adirondacks, a society-wide rejection of technology would mean the wholesale de-industrialization of a nation in Europe, America, or Japan, and its transformation, in effect, into an impoverished Third World country. There would perhaps be less air pollution and toxic waste, but also less modern medicine and communica­tions, less birth control and therefore less sexual liberation. Rather than freeing man from the cycle of new wants, most people would become reacquainted with the life of a poor peasant tied to the land in an unending cycle of back-breaking labor. Many countries have, of course, existed at the level of subsistence agriculture for generations, and the people living in them have doubtless achieved considerable happiness; but the likelihood that they could do so having once experienced the consumerism of a tech­nological society is doubtful, and that they could be persuaded as a society to exchange one for the other even more so. Moreover, if there were other countries that chose not to de-industrialize, the citizens of the ones that did would have a constant standard of comparison against which to judge themselves. Burma’s decision after World W ar II to reject the goal of economic development common elsewhere in the Third World and to remain interna­tionally isolated might have worked in a pre-industrial world, but proved very difficult to sustain in a region full of booming Singapores and Thailands.

第一个原因与当前经济增长所产生的期望有关。虽然个人和小社区可以 “回归自然”,辞去投资银行家或房地产开发商的工作,以便在阿迪朗达克的湖边生活,但全社会对技术的拒绝将意味着欧洲、美国或日本一个国家的全面去工业化,以及它实际上转变为一个贫穷的第三世界国家。也许空气污染和有毒废物会减少,但现代医学和通信也会减少,生育控制会减少,因此性解放也会减少。与其说是把人从新的欲望的循环中解放出来,不如说大多数人将重新认识到贫穷农民的生活,他们被绑在土地上,从事无休止的劳动。当然,许多国家已经在自给自足的农业水平上存在了几代人,生活在其中的人们无疑已经取得了相当大的幸福;但他们在经历了技术社会的消费主义后还能这样做的可能性是值得怀疑的,而他们作为一个社会被说服以一换一的可能性就更大了。此外,如果有其他国家选择不进行去工业化,那么那些选择去工业化的国家的公民就会有一个持续的比较标准来判断自己。缅甸在二战后决定拒绝第三世界其他地方常见的经济发展目标,并保持国际孤立,这在前工业化的世界里可能是可行的,但在一个充满繁荣的新加坡和泰国的地区,证明是很难维持的。

Only slightly less unrealistic is the alternative of breaking se­lectively with technology by seeking to somehow freeze techno­logical development at its current level, or to permit technological innovation only on a highly selective basis. While this might better preserve current living standards, at least in the short run, it is not clear why life at an arbitrarily selected level of technology would seem particularly satisfying. It would offer neither the glitter of a dynamic and growing economy, nor a genuine return to nature. The effort to freeze technology has worked for small religious communities like the Amish or Mennonites, but would be much more difficult to realize in a large and stratified society. The social and economic inequalities that exist today in developed societies are much less disruptive politically if there is a growing economic pie to share; they would become much more serious if the United States came to resemble a giant, stagnant East Germany. Furthermore, freezing technology at the already high level of today’s advanced countries is not likely to be an adequate solution for an impending ecological crisis, and fails to answer the question of whether the global ecosystem can tolerate the Third World catching up. Selective innovation raises difficult questions as to what authority decides which technologies are acceptable. The politicization of innovation will inevitably have a chilling effect on economic growth as a whole.


Moreover, defense of the environment, far from requiring a break with modern technology and the economic world created by it, may in the long run require that world as its precondition. Indeed, apart from the Fundi wing of the Green movement in Germany and certain other extremists, the mainstream of the environmental movement recognizes that the most realistic solutions to environmental problems are likely to lie in the creation of alternative technologies, or technologies to actively protect the environment. A healthy environment is a luxury best afforded by those with wealth and economic dynamism; the worst environmental offenders, whether in the disposal of toxic wastes or deforestation of tropical rain forests, are developing countries that feel their relative poverty does not give them any option but to exploit their own natural resources, or that do not have the social discipline to enforce environmental laws. Despite the depredations of acid rain, the northeastern United States and many other parts of northern Europe are more heavily forested now than they were a hundred or even two hundred years ago.

此外,保护环境不仅不需要与现代技术和由其创造的经济世界决裂,而且从长远来看,可能还需要将这种世界作为其前提条件。事实上,除了德国绿色运动的 Fundi 派和其他一些极端分子之外,环境运动的主流认识到,环境问题最现实的解决方案可能在于创造替代技术,或者积极保护环境的技术。一个健康的环境是那些拥有财富和经济活力的国家所能承受的最好的奢侈品;最严重的环境犯罪者,无论是有毒废物的处理还是热带雨林的砍伐,都是那些觉得自己相对贫穷,除了开采自己的自然资源之外没有任何选择的发展中国家,或者是那些没有社会纪律来执行环境法的国家。尽管有酸雨的摧残,美国东北部和北欧的许多其他地区现在的森林覆盖率比一百年甚至两百年前还要高。

For all of these reasons, then, it seems highly unlikely that our civilization will voluntarily choose the Rousseauian option and reject the role that modern natural science has come to play in our contemporary economic life. But let us also examine the more extreme case, where the choice is not voluntary but forced upon us by some cataclysm, either a global nuclear war or an environmental collapse which, despite our best efforts, attacks the phys­ical basis for contemporary human life. It is clearly possible to destroy the fruits of modern natural science; indeed, modern technology has given us the means to do so in a matter of minutes. But is it possible to destroy modern natural science itself, to re­lease us from the grip that the scientific method has held over our lives, and return mankind as a whole permanently to a prescientific level of civilization?


Let us take the case of a global war involving weapons of mass destruction. Since Hiroshima we have envisioned this as a nuclear war, but it could now be the result of some new and terrible biological or chemical agent. Assuming that such a war does not trigger nuclear winter or some other natural process that makes the earth completely uninhabitable by man, we must assume that the conflict will destroy much of the population, power, and wealth of the belligerents, and perhaps of their major allies, with devastating consequences for neutral onlookers as well. There may be major environmental consequences that would make the military catastrophe merge with an ecological one. There will also likely be major changes in the configuration of world politics: the belligerents may be finished as great powers, their territory fragmented and occupied by countries that managed to stay out of the conflict, or else so poisoned that no one would want to live there. The war might come to envelop all of the technologically ad­vanced countries capable of producing weapons of mass destruc­tion, demolishing their factories, laboratories, libraries, and universities, eliminating knowledge of how to fabricate weapons of such enormous destructiveness. And as for the rest of the world that escaped the war’s direct consequences, there might emerge such a great aversion to war and the technological civilization that made it possible that a number of states would voluntarily renounce advanced weaponry and the science that produced it. The survivors might decide, more forthrightly than now, to reject pol­icies of deterrence that manifestly failed to protect mankind from destruction and, wiser and more moderate, seek to control new technologies in a far more thoroughgoing way than is the practice in our contemporary world. (An ecological catastrophe such as the melting of the ice caps or the desertification of North America and Europe through global warming could lead to a similar effort to control the scientific inventions that led to the disaster.) The horrors inflicted by science may lead to the revival of anti-modern and anti-technological religions, whose effect would be to erect moral and emotional barriers to the creation of new and poten­tially deadly technologies.


Yet even these extreme circumstances would appear unlikely to break the grip of technology over human civilization, and science’s ability to replicate itself. The reasons for this again have to do with the relationship between science and war. For even if one could destroy modern weapons and the specific knowledge of how to produce them, one could not eliminate the memory of the method that made their production possible. The unification of human civilization through modern communications and transportation means that there is no part of mankind that is not aware of the scientific method and its potential, even if that part is currently incapable of generating technology or applying it successfully. There are, in other words, no true barbariansat the gates, unaware of the power of modern natural science. And as long as this is true, the ability to use modern natural science for military purposes will continue to give such states advantages over states that do not. The pointless destructiveness of the war just past will not necessarily teach men that no military technology can be used for rational purposes; there may be yet newer ones which men can convince themselves will give them decisive advantages. The good states, that had drawn moderating lessons from disaster and sought to control the technologies that caused it, would still have to live in a world with bad states that saw the disaster as an opportunity for their own ambitions. And, as Machiavelli taught at the beginning of the modern era, the good states will have to take their cue from the bad ones if they are to survive and remain states at all. They will need to maintain a certain level of technology, if only to defend themselves, and indeed will have to encourage technological innovation in the military sphere if their enemies are also innovators. Even if in hesitant and controlled ways, good states that sought to control the creation of new technologies would slowly have to let the technological genie back out of the bottle. Man’s post-cataclysmic dependence on modern natural science would be even greater if it were ecological in nature, since technology might be the only way of making the earth habitable once again.


A truly cyclical history is conceivable only if we posit the possibility that a given civilization can vanish entirely without leaving any imprint on those that follow. This, in fact, occurred prior to the invention of modern natural science. Modern natural science, however, is so powerful, both for good and for evil, that it is very doubtful whether it can ever be forgotten or “un-invented” under conditions other than the physical annihilation of the human race. And if the grip of a progressive modern natural science is irreversible, then a directional history and all of the other variegated economic, social, and political consequences that flow from it are also not reversible in any fundamental sense.

只有当我们假设一个特定的文明可以完全消失而不给后来的文明留下任何印记的可能性时,真正的周期性历史才是可以想象的。事实上,这在现代自然科学发明之前就已经发生了。然而,现代自然科学是如此强大,无论对善还是对恶都是如此,以至于除了人类的实际毁灭之外,它是否能够被遗忘或 “不被发明” 是非常令人怀疑的。如果一个进步的现代自然科学的控制是不可逆转的,那么一个方向性的历史和所有其他丰富多彩的经济、社会和政治后果,在任何根本意义上也是不可逆转的。

Our country has not been lucky. Indeed, it was decided to carry out this Marxist experiment on us—-fate pushed us in precisely this direction. Instead of some country in Africa, they began this experiment with us. In the end we proved that there is no place for this idea. It has simply pushed us off the path the world’s civilized countries have taken. This is reflected today, when 40 percent of the people are living below the poverty level and, moreover, in constant humiliation when they receive produce upon presentation of ration cards. This is a constant humiliation, a reminder every hour that you are a slave in this country.

我们的国家并不幸运。事实上,它决定在我们身上进行这种马克思主义实验 —— 命运恰恰把我们推向了这个方向。他们不是在非洲的某个国家,而是在我们身上开始这个实验。最后我们证明,这种想法是不存在的。它只是把我们推离了世界文明国家所走过的道路。这反映在今天,40% 的人生活在贫困线以下,而且,当他们在出示配给卡时得到农产品时,不断受到羞辱。这是一种持续的羞辱,每时每刻都在提醒你,在这个国家你是一个奴隶。

Boris Yeltsin, in a speech to a meeting of Democratic Russia, Moscow, June 1, 1991

鲍里斯·叶利钦在民主俄罗斯会议上的讲话,1991 年 6 月 1 日,莫斯科

All we have demonstrated up to this point is that the progressive unfolding of modern natural science produces a directional history and certain uniform social changes across different nations and cultures. Technology and the rational organization of labor are the preconditions for industrialization, which in turn engenders such social phenomena as urbanization, bureaucratization, the breakdown of extended family and tribal ties, and increasing levels of education. We have also shown how the dominance of modern natural science over human life is not likely to be reversed under any foreseeable circumstances, even under the most extreme circumstances. We have not, however, demonstrated that science leads in any necessary way either to capitalism in the economic sphere, or to liberal democracy in the political.


And indeed, there are examples of countries that have gone through the first stages of industrialization, that are economically developed, urbanized, and secular, possessing a strong and coherent state structure and a relatively well-educated population, but that are neither capitalist nor democratic. The chief example of this for many years was Stalin’s Soviet Union, which between 1928 and the late 1930s had accomplished a fantastic social transformation from a largely peasant agricultural country to an industrial powerhouse, without permitting its citizens either economic or political freedom. Indeed, the speed with which this transformation occurred seemed to demonstrate to many people that centralized planning under a police-state tyranny was in fact a more effective means of achieving rapid industrialization than free people operating in free markets. Isaac Deutscher, writing in the 1950s, could still maintain that centrally planned economies were more efficient than the anarchical workings of market economies, and that nationalized industries were better able to modernize plant and equipment than those in the private sector. The existence, through 1989, of countries in Eastern Europe which were both socialist and economically developed, appeared to indicate that centralized planning was not incompatible with economic modernity.

而事实上,有一些国家已经经历了工业化的最初阶段,经济发达,城市化,世俗化,拥有强大而协调的国家结构和相对受过良好教育的人口,但既不是资本主义也不是民主的例子。多年来的主要例子是斯大林的苏联,它在 1928 年至 20 世纪 30 年代末完成了从一个主要是农民的农业国家到工业强国的梦幻般的社会转型,但不允许其公民有经济或政治自由。事实上,这种转变的速度似乎向许多人证明,在警察国家暴政下的中央计划实际上是实现快速工业化的一个更有效的手段,而不是在自由市场中运作的自由人。艾萨克·多伊切尔(Isaac Deutscher)在 20 世纪 50 年代写道,他仍然可以坚持认为中央计划经济比市场经济的无政府运作更有效率,而且国有工业比私营部门的工厂和设备更有能力实现现代化。到 1989 年,东欧国家既是社会主义国家又是经济发达国家,这似乎表明中央计划与经济现代化并非不相容。

These examples from the communist world suggested at one time that the progressive unfolding of modern natural science could just as well lead us to Max Weber’s nightmare of a rational and bureaucratized tyranny, rather than to an open, creative, and liberal society. Our Mechanism, then, needs to be extended. In addition to explaining why economically developed countries have urbanized societies and rational bureaucracies, the Mechanism should further demonstrate why we should expect an eventual evolution in the direction of both economic and political liberalism. In this and the following chapter, we will investigate the Mechanism’s relationship to capitalism in two distinct cases: for advanced industrial societies, and for underdeveloped ones. Having established that the Mechanism in some way makes capitalism inevitable, we will then return to the question of whether it can be expected to produce democracy as well.


Despite the bad moral odor that capitalism has had for both the traditionalist-religious Right and the socialist-Marxist Left, its ultimate victory as the world’s only viable economic system is easier to explain in terms of the Mechanism than is the victory of liberal democracy in the political sphere. For capitalism has proven far more efficient than centrally planned economic sys­tems in developing and utilizing technology, and in adapting to the rapidly changing conditions of a global division of labor, under the conditions of a mature industrial economy.


Industrialization, we now know, is not a one-shot affair whereby countries are suddenly propelled into economic moder­nity, but rather a continuously evolving process without a clear end point, where today’s modernity quickly becomes tomorrow’s antiquity. The means of satisfying what Hegel called the “system of needs” has changed steadily as those needs themselves have changed. Industrialization for early social theorists like Marx and Engels consisted of light industries like textile manufacturing in England or the porcelain industry in France. This quickly gave way to developments like the propagation of railroads, the creation of the iron, steel, and chemical industries, shipbuilding and other forms of heavy manufacturing, and the growth of unified national markets, which constituted industrial modernity for Lenin, Stalin, and their Soviet followers. Britain, France, the United States, and Germany reached this level of development approximately by the First World War, Japan and the rest of Western Europe by World War II, and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1950s. Today, they are hallmarks of an intermediate and, for the most advanced countries, long-sincebypassed phase of industrial development. What has replaced it has been given a variety of titles: a “mature industrial society,” the stage of “high mass consumption,” the “technetronic era,” the “information age,” or a “postindustrial society.“2 While specific formulations differ, all stress the vastly increased role of information, technical knowledge, and services at the expense of heavy manufacturing.

我们现在知道,工业化并不是一个一次性的事件,即国家突然被推入经济现代化,而是一个不断发展的过程,没有一个明确的终点,今天的现代化很快就会变成明天的古代化。满足黑格尔所说的 “需求体系” 的手段随着这些需求本身的变化而不断变化。对于像马克思和恩格斯这样的早期社会理论家来说,工业化包括轻工业,如英国的纺织业或法国的制瓷业。这很快让位于铁路的传播、钢铁和化学工业的建立、造船和其他形式的重工业,以及统一的国家市场的增长等发展,这些构成了列宁、斯大林和他们的苏联追随者的工业现代化。英国、法国、美国和德国大约在第一次世界大战前达到了这一发展水平,日本和西欧其他国家在第二次世界大战前达到了这一发展水平,而苏联和东欧在 20 世纪 50 年代达到了这一发展水平。今天,它们是工业发展的中间阶段的标志,对最先进的国家来说,早已绕过了这个阶段。取而代之的是各种各样的称号:“成熟的工业社会”、“高度大众消费” 阶段、“技术电子时代”、“信息时代” 或 “后工业社会”。

Modern natural science—in the familiar forms of technological innovation and the rational organization of labor—continues to dictate the character of “postindustrial” societies, much as it did that of societies entering the first stages of industrialization. Writing in 1967, Daniel Bell pointed out that the average time span between the initial discovery of a new technological innovation and recognition of its commercial possibilities fell from 30 years between 1880 and 1919, to 16 between 1919 and 1945, to 9 years from 1945 to 1967. This figure has since decreased even further, with product cycles in the most advanced technologies like computers and software now measured in months rather than years. Figures like this do not begin to suggest the incredible diversity of products and services that have been created since 1945, many of them entirely de novo; nor do they suggest the complexity of such economies and the new forms of technical knowledge—not just in science and engineering, but in marketing, finance, distribution, and the like—required to keep them operating.

现代自然科学 —— 以人们熟悉的技术创新和合理的劳动组织形式 —— 继续决定着 “后工业化” 社会的特征,就像它决定着进入工业化第一阶段的社会的特征一样。丹尼尔·贝尔在 1967 年的著作中指出,从最初发现一项新的技术创新到承认其商业可能性的平均时间跨度从 1880 年到 1919 年的 30 年,下降到 1919 年到 1945 年的 16 年,以及 1945 年到 1967 年的 9 年。此后,这一数字甚至进一步下降,像计算机和软件这样最先进的技术的产品周期现在是以月而不是年来衡量的。这样的数字还不足以说明自 1945 年以来所创造的产品和服务的难以置信的多样性,其中许多是完全从头开始的;也不能说明这种经济的复杂性和新形式的技术知识 —— 不仅在科学和工程方面,而且在营销、金融、分销和类似方面 —— 需要保持它们的运作。

At the same time, the global division of labor, predicted but only very incompletely realized in Marx’s time, has become a reality. International trade has grown at a compound annual rate of

同时,在马克思时代就预言但只是非常不完整地实现的全球劳动分工,已经成为现实。在过去的一代人中,国际贸易以每年 13% 的复合速度增长。

13 percent over the last generation, with even higher rates of growth in specific sectors like international banking. In the decades before that it had seldom increased at a rate of more than 3 percent. The continuing decrease in transportation and communications costs has resulted in the realization of economies of scale greater than were possible in even the largest national markets, such as those of the United States, Japan, or the individual countries of Western Europe. The result has been another of those unplanned and gradual revolutions: the unification of a very large part of mankind (outside the communist world) in a single market for German cars, Malaysian semiconductors, Argentine beef, Japanese fax machines, Canadian wheat, and American airplanes.

在过去的一代中,国际贸易以每年 13% 的复合增长率增长,在国际银行业等特定部门的增长率甚至更高。在此之前的几十年里,它的增长率很少超过 3%。运输和通信成本的持续下降导致了规模经济的实现,甚至超过了最大的国家市场,如美国、日本或西欧的个别国家。其结果是另一种无计划的渐进式革命:将人类的很大一部分(在共产主义世界之外)统一在一个单一的市场上,以购买德国汽车、马来西亚半导体、阿根廷牛肉、日本传真机、加拿大小麦和美国飞机。

Technological innovation and the highly complex division of labor has created a tremendous increase in the demand for technical knowledge at all levels in the economy, and consequently for people who—to put it crudely—think rather than do. This includes not only scientists and engineers, but all of the structures that support them, like public schools, universities, and the communications industry. The higher “information” content of modern economic production is reflected in the rise of the service sector—professionals, managers, office workers, people involved in trade, marketing, and finance, as well as government workers and health care providers—atthe expense of “traditional” manufacturing occupations.

技术创新和高度复杂的劳动分工使经济中各个层面对技术知识的需求大大增加,因此,对那些 —— 说得粗俗一点 —— 会思考而不是会做事的人的需求也大大增加。这不仅包括科学家和工程师,还包括支持他们的所有结构,如公立学校、大学和通信行业。现代经济生产中较高的 “信息” 含量反映在服务部门的崛起上 —— 专业人员、管理人员、办公室工作人员、从事贸易、营销和金融的人员,以及政府工作人员和医疗保健提供者 —— 而不是 “传统” 的制造业职业。

Evolution in the direction of decentralized decision making and markets becomes a virtual inevitability for all industrial economies that hope to become “postindustrial.” While centrally planned economies could follow their capitalist counterparts into the age of coal, steel, and heavy manufacturing,5 they were much less able to cope with the requirements of the information age. One might say in fact that it was in the highly complex and dynamic “postindustrial” economic world that MarxismLeninism as an economic system met its Waterloo.

对于所有希望成为 “后工业” 的工业经济体来说,朝着分散决策和市场的方向发展实际上是不可避免的。虽然中央计划经济可以跟随他们的资本主义同行进入煤炭、钢铁和重工业时代,5 但他们应对信息时代的要求的能力要差得多。可以说,正是在高度复杂和充满活力的 “后工业化” 经济世界中,马克思列宁主义作为一种经济体系遭遇了滑铁卢。

The failure of central planning in the final analysis is related to the problem of technological innovation. Scientific inquiry proceeds best in an atmosphere of freedom, where people are permitted to think and communicate freely, and more importantly where they are rewarded for innovation. The Soviet Union and China both promoted scientific inquiry, particularly in “safe” areas of basic or theoretical research, and created material incentives to stimulate innovation in certain sectors like aerospace and weapons design. But modern economies must innovate across the board, not only in hi-tech fields but in more prosaic areas like the marketing of hamburgers and the creation of new types of insurance. While the Soviet state could pamper its nuclear physicists, it didn’t have much left over for the designers of television sets, which exploded with some regularity, or for those who might aspire to market new products to new consumers, a completely non-existent field in the USSR and China.

中央计划的失败归根结底与技术创新的问题有关。科学探索在自由的氛围中进行得最好,人们被允许自由地思考和交流,更重要的是,他们在创新方面得到了奖励。苏联和中国都促进了科学探索,特别是在基础或理论研究的 “安全” 领域,并创造了物质激励,以刺激某些部门的创新,如航空航天和武器设计。但现代经济必须全面创新,不仅在高科技领域,而且在更平凡的领域,如汉堡包的营销和新型保险的创造。虽然苏联国家可以宠爱它的核物理学家,但它并没有为电视机的设计者留下什么,因为电视机经常爆炸,或者为那些可能渴望向新消费者推销新产品的人留下什么,在苏联和中国,这是一个完全不存在的领域。

Centralized economies have not succeeded in making rational investment decisions, or in effectively incorporating new technologies into the production process. This can occur only when managers receive adequate information on the effects of their decisions, in the form of market-determined prices. And ultimately, it was competition that ensured that the feedback received through the pricing system was accurate. Early reforms in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent in the Soviet Union, sought to give managers somewhat greater autonomy, but in the absence of a rational pricing system, managerial autonomy had little effect.


The complexity of modern economies proved to be simply beyond the capabilities of centralized bureaucracies to manage, no matter how advanced their technical capabilities. In place of a demand-driven price system, Soviet planners have tried to decree a “socially just” allocation of resources from above. For many years, they believed that bigger computers and better linear programming would make possible an efficient centralized allocation of resources. This proved to be an illusion. Goskomtsen, the former Soviet state committee on prices, had to review some 200,000 prices every year, or three or four prices per day for every official working in that bureaucracy. This represented only 42 percent of the total number of price decisions made by Soviet officials every year,6 which in turn was only a fraction of the number of pricing decisions that would have to have been made were the Soviet economy able to offer the same diversity of products and services as a Western capitalist economy. Bureaucrats sitting in Moscow or Beijing might have had a chance of setting a semblance of efficient prices when they had to supervise economies producing commodities numbering in the hundreds or low thousands; the task becomes impossible in an age when a single airplane can consist of hundreds of thousands of separate parts. In modern economies, moreover, pricing increasingly reflects differences in quality: a Chrysler Le Baron and a BMW are equally cars in terms of their overall technical specifications, and yet consumers have assigned a substantial premium to the latter based on a certain “feel” about it. The ability of bureaucrats to make distinctions reliably is, to say the least, problematic.

事实证明,现代经济的复杂性根本不是中央集权的官僚机构所能管理的,无论其技术能力多么先进。为了取代需求驱动的价格体系,苏联的规划者试图从上面颁布 “社会公正” 的资源分配法令。多年来,他们认为更大的计算机和更好的线性编程将使资源的有效集中分配成为可能。这被证明是一种幻觉。Goskomtsen,前苏联国家价格委员会,每年必须审查大约 20 万个价格,或者每个在该官僚机构工作的官员每天有三或四个价格。这只占苏联官员每年作出的价格决定总数的 42%,6 而这只是在苏联经济能够提供与西方资本主义经济同样多样化的产品和服务时必须作出的价格决定的一小部分。坐在莫斯科或北京的官僚们,当他们必须监督生产数百或数千种商品的经济体时,或许还有机会制定一个类似于有效的价格;而在一架飞机可能由数十万个独立部件组成的时代,这项任务变得不可能。此外,在现代经济中,定价越来越多地反映了质量的差异:一辆克莱斯勒 Le Baron 和一辆宝马在整体技术规格上是同样的汽车,但消费者基于对它的某种 “感觉”,对后者给予了大量的溢价。至少可以说,官僚们可靠地进行区分的能力是有问题的。

The need for central planners to maintain control over prices and allocations of goods prohibits them from participating in the international division of labor, and thereby from realizing the economies of scale it makes possible. Communist East Germany, with a population of seventeen million, tried valiantly to duplicate the world economy within its own borders, and in fact managed to make bad versions of a great many products that it could have purchased from the outside much more cheaply, from the pollution-producing Trabant car to Erich Honecker’s prized memory chips.

中央计划者需要保持对价格和商品分配的控制,这使他们无法参与国际分工,从而无法实现规模经济的可能性。拥有一千七百万人口的共产主义东德,勇敢地试图在其境内复制世界经济,事实上,它成功地制造了许多产品的不良版本,而这些产品本可以更便宜地从外部购买,从产生污染的 Trabant 汽车到 Erich Honecker 珍贵的记忆芯片。

Finally, central planning undermines an all-important aspect of human capital, the work ethic. Even a strong work ethic can be destroyed through social and economic policies that deny people personal incentives to work, and recreating it can be extremely difficult. As we will see in Part Four below, there is good reason to believe that the strong work ethic of many societies is not the result of the modernization process, but rather is a holdover from that society’s premodern culture and traditions. Having a strong work ethic may not be an absolute condition for a successful “postindustrial” economy, but it certainly helps, and may become a critical counterweight to the tendency of such economies to emphasize consumption over production.

最后,中央计划破坏了人力资本的一个最重要的方面,即工作道德。即使是强烈的工作道德,也可以通过剥夺人们工作的个人动机的社会和经济政策而被破坏,而且重新创造它可能是非常困难的。正如我们在下面第四部分所看到的,有充分的理由相信,许多社会的强烈的工作伦理不是现代化进程的结果,而是该社会前现代文化和传统的遗留物。拥有强烈的工作伦理可能不是一个成功的 “后工业” 经济的绝对条件,但它肯定是有帮助的,并可能成为这种经济强调消费而不是生产的趋势的一个重要平衡。

It has been a common expectation that the technocratic imperatives of industrial maturity would eventually lead to a softening of communist central control, and its replacement by more liberal, marketoriented practices. The judgment of Raymond Aron that “technological complexity will strengthen the managerial class at the expense of the ideologists and militants” echoed an earlier one that technocrats would be the “gravediggers of communism.“7 These predictions in the end proved to be quite correct; what people in the West could not anticipate was how long it would take for them to be borne out. The Soviet and Chinese states proved themselves perfectly capable of bringing their societies up to the coal and steel age: the technology involved was not highly complex, and could be mastered by largely illiterate peasants forcibly pulled off the farm and put into simplified assembly lines. Specialists with the technical expertise required to run such an economy proved to be docile and easy to control politically. Stalin once put the noted aircraft designer Tupolev in the Gulag, where he designed one of his best airplanes. Stalin’s successors managed to co-opt managers and technocrats by offering them status and rewards in return for loyalty to the system. Mao in China took a different course: seeking to avoid creation of a privileged technical intelligentsia as in the Soviet Union, he declared an all-out war against them, first during the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, and then again during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. Engineers and scientists were forced to harvest crops and engage in other forms of back-breaking labor, while positions requiring technical competence went to politically correct ideologues.

人们普遍期望,工业成熟期的技术官僚要求最终会导致共产主义中央控制的软化,并由更自由的、以市场为导向的做法所取代。雷蒙德·阿隆(Raymond Aron)的判断是:“技术的复杂性将加强管理阶层,而牺牲思想家和激进分子的利益”,这与之前的判断相呼应,即技术官僚将成为 “共产主义的掘墓人”。苏联和中国证明自己完全有能力将其社会带入煤炭和钢铁时代:所涉及的技术并不十分复杂,基本上不识字的农民也能掌握,他们被强行从农场拉出来,投入到简化的装配线中。事实证明,拥有管理这种经济所需的技术专长的专家是温顺的,容易在政治上加以控制。斯大林曾经把著名的飞机设计师图波列夫关进古拉格,在那里他设计了一架最好的飞机。斯大林的继任者成功地收编了管理人员和技术专家,为他们提供地位和奖励,以换取他们对制度的忠诚。中国的毛泽东采取了不同的做法:为了避免像苏联那样产生一个有特权的技术知识分子,他首先在 1950 年代末的大跃进期间向他们宣布了一场全面的战争,然后在 1960 年代末的文化大革命期间再次宣布了这场战争。工程师和科学家被迫去收割庄稼和从事其他形式的艰苦劳动,而需要技术能力的职位则由政治上正确的思想家担任。

This experience should teach us not to underestimate the ability of totalitarian or authoritarian states to resist the imperatives of economic rationality for a considerable length of time—in the cases of the Soviet Union and China, for a generation or more. But this resistance came, eventually, at the price of economic stagnation. The total failure of centrally planned economies in countries like the Soviet Union and China to move beyond a 1950s level of industrialization undercut their ability to play important roles on the international stage, or even to safeguard their own national security. Mao’s persecution of competent technocrats during the Cultural Revolution proved to be an economic disaster of the first order that set China back a generation. One of Deng Xiaoping’s first acts when coming to power in the mid1970s was therefore to restore prestige and dignity to the technical intelligentsia and to protect them from the vagaries of ideological politics, choosing the path of cooptation adopted by the Soviets a generation earlier. But the efforts to co-opt technological elites in the service of ideology eventually worked the other way as well: that elite, given a relatively greater degree of freedom to think and study the outside world, became familiar with and began to adopt many of the ideas current in that world. As Mao feared, the technological intelligentsia became the principal bearer of “bourgeois liberalism,” and played a key role in the subsequent economic reform process.

这一经验告诉我们,不要低估极权主义或威权主义国家在相当长的时间内抵制经济理性的能力 —— 就苏联和中国而言,抵制了一代或更长时间。但这种抵抗最终是以经济停滞为代价的。苏联和中国等国家的中央计划经济完全不能超越 1950 年代的工业化水平,这削弱了它们在国际舞台上发挥重要作用的能力,甚至削弱了保障本国安全的能力。事实证明,毛泽东在文化大革命期间对有能力的技术专家的迫害是一场经济灾难,使中国倒退了一代。因此,邓小平在 1970 年代中期上台后的第一件事就是恢复技术知识分子的声望和尊严,保护他们不受意识形态政治的影响,并选择了苏联在一代人之前所采取的增选道路。但是,为意识形态服务而收编技术精英的努力最终也起了反作用:这些精英获得了相对更大的思考和研究外部世界的自由,熟悉并开始采纳这个世界上的许多思想。正如毛泽东所担心的,技术知识分子成为 “资产阶级自由主义” 的主要承担者,并在随后的经济改革进程中发挥了关键作用。

By the end of the 1980s, then, China, the Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe can be seen as having succumbed to the economic logic of advanced industrialization. Despite the political crackdown ordered after Tiananmen Square, the Chinese leadership has accepted the need for markets and decentralized economic decision making, as well as close integration into the global capitalist division of labor, and has shown itself willing to accept greater social stratification accompanying the rise of a technocratic elite. The countries of Eastern Europe all opted for a return to market economic systems after their democratic revolutions in 1989,even though they differed amongst themselves on the timing and pace of marketization. The Soviet leadership was more reluctant to take the plunge into full-scale marketization, but after the political transformation brought about by the failure of the August 1991 coup, moved toward implementing far-reaching liberal economic reform.

那么,到 80 年代末,中国、苏联和东欧国家可以被视为已经屈服于先进工业化的经济逻辑。尽管在天安门广场之后下令进行政治镇压,但中国领导层已经接受了市场和分散的经济决策的需要,以及与全球资本主义分工的紧密结合,并表明自己愿意接受伴随着技术专家精英的崛起而出现的更大的社会分层。东欧国家在 1989 年的民主革命后都选择了回归市场经济体系,尽管它们之间在市场化的时间和速度上存在分歧。苏联领导层更不愿意投身于全面的市场化,但在 1991 年 8 月政变失败所带来的政治转型之后,他们开始实施影响深远的自由经济改革。

Societies have a degree of freedom in the extent to which they regulate and plan capitalist economies. The logic of our Mechanism does not dictate this degree in any rigid way. Nonetheless, the unfolding of technologically driven economic modernization creates strong incentives for developed countries to accept the basic terms of the universal capitalist economic culture, by permitting a substantial degree of economic competition and letting prices be determined by market mechanisms. No other path toward full economic modernity has been proven to be viable.


Chapter 9: The Victory of the VCR


Not a single country in the world, no matter what its political system, has ever modernized with a closed-door policy.


—Deng Xiaoping, in a 1982 speech

-邓小平在 1982 年的一次演讲中指出

The fact that capitalism was in some sense inevitable for advanced countries, and that Marxist-Leninist socialism was a serious obstacle to the creation of wealth and a modern technological civilization, may have seemed like commonplace knowledge by the last decade of the twentieth century. What was less obvious were the relative merits of socialism versus capitalism for less developed countries that had not yet reached the level of industrialization represented by Europe in the 1950s. For impoverished countries for whom the coal and steel age was no more than a dream, the fact that the Soviet Union was not at the leading edge of informationage technologies was much less impressive than the fact that it had created an urban, industrial society in a single generation. Socialist central planning continued to be appealing because it offered a quick route to capital accumulation and the “rational” redirection of national resources into “balanced” industrial development. The Soviet Union had done this by squeezing its agricultural sector through outright terror in the 1920s and 30s, a process that had taken early industrializers like the United States and England a couple of centuries to accomplish by non-coercive means.

资本主义在某种意义上对先进国家来说是不可避免的,而马克思列宁主义的社会主义是创造财富和现代技术文明的严重障碍,这一事实在二十世纪最后十年可能已经是司空见惯的知识。不太明显的是,对于尚未达到欧洲在 20 世纪 50 年代所代表的工业化水平的欠发达国家来说,社会主义与资本主义的相对优点。对于那些煤炭和钢铁时代不过是一个梦想的贫困国家来说,苏联没有处于信息科技的前沿这一事实,远不如它在一代人的时间里创造了一个城市和工业社会这一事实令人印象深刻。社会主义中央计划仍然很有吸引力,因为它提供了一条快速实现资本积累和 “合理” 地将国家资源转用于 “平衡” 工业发展的途径。苏联在 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代通过赤裸裸的恐怖手段压榨其农业部门来实现这一目标,这一过程是美国和英国等早期工业化国家花了几个世纪才通过非强制手段完成的。

The argument in favor of socialism as the development strategy of choice for Third World countries was considerably strengthened by the apparently persistent failure of capitalism to produce sustained economic growth in regions like Latin America. Indeed, it is safe to say that were it not for the Third World, Marxism would have died a much quicker death in this century. But the continuing poverty of the underdeveloped world breathed new life into the doctrine by permitting the Left to attribute that poverty first to colonialism, and then, when there was no more colonialism, to “neo-colonialism,” and finally to the behavior of multinational corporations. The most recent attempt to keep a form of Marxism alive in the Third World was socalled dependencia (“dependency”) theory. Developed primarily in Latin America, it gave intellectual coherence to the selfassertion of the impoverished South as a whole against the wealthy, industrialized North in the 1960s and 70s. Allied to Southern nationalism, dependency theory took on a power greater than that justified by its intellectual underpinnings, and had a corrosive effect on prospects for economic development in many parts of the Third World for the better part of a generation.

支持社会主义作为第三世界国家的首选发展战略的论点,因资本主义在拉丁美洲等地区产生持续经济增长的明显持续失败而大大加强。事实上,可以说,如果不是因为第三世界,马克思主义在本世纪会死得更快。但是,不发达世界的持续贫困为这一理论注入了新的活力,它允许左派将这种贫困首先归咎于殖民主义,然后在没有殖民主义的情况下,归咎于 “新殖民主义”,最后归咎于跨国公司的行为。最近试图在第三世界保持马克思主义的一种形式是所谓的依赖性(“dependencia”)理论。它主要是在拉丁美洲发展起来的,在 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代,它为贫穷的南方作为一个整体对富裕的工业化北方的自我主张提供了思想上的一致性。依赖理论与南方民族主义结合在一起,其力量超过了其思想基础所证明的力量,并在一代人的时间里对第三世界许多地区的经济发展前景产生了腐蚀作用。

The real father of dependency theory was Lenin himself. In his well-known 1914 pamphlet, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism he sought to account for the fact that European capitalism had not led to the steady impoverishment of the working class, but had in fact permitted a rise in their living standards and the development of a reasonably selfsatisfied, trade-union mentality among workers in Europe. Capitalism had bought time for itself, he argued, by in effect exporting exploitation to the colonies, where native labor and raw materials could absorb European “surplus capital.” Competition among “monopoly capitalists” led to the political division of the underdeveloped world and, ultimately, to conflict, war, and revolution among them. Lenin argued, in contrast to Marx, that the final contradiction which would bring down capitalism was not class struggle within the developed world, but between the developed North and the “global proletariat” in the underdeveloped world.

依赖性理论的真正父亲是列宁本人。在他著名的 1914 年小册子《帝国主义。他试图解释这样一个事实:欧洲资本主义并没有导致工人阶级的持续贫困化,而是事实上允许他们的生活水平提高,并在欧洲工人中发展出一种合理的自我满足的工会心态。他认为,资本主义为自己争取了时间,实际上是把剥削出口到殖民地,那里的本地劳动力和原材料可以吸收欧洲的 “剩余资本”。垄断资本家 “之间的竞争导致了不发达世界的政治分裂,并最终导致了他们之间的冲突、战争和革命。与马克思相反,列宁认为,导致资本主义崩溃的最终矛盾不是发达世界内部的阶级斗争,而是发达的北方国家与不发达世界的” 全球无产阶级 "之间的矛盾。

While several different schools of dependency theory eventually emerged in the 1960s,3 they had their origin in the work of the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch. Prebisch, who headed the United Nation’s Economic Committee for Latin America (ECLA) in the 1950s4 and later the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), noted that the terms of trade for the world’s “periphery” were declining relative to its “center.” He argued that the sluggish growth of Third World regions like Latin America was a result of the global capitalist economic order, which kept them in a state of perpetual “dependent development.“5 The wealth of the North was therefore directly linked to the poverty of the South.

虽然在 20 世纪 60 年代最终出现了几个不同的依赖理论流派,3 但它们都起源于阿根廷经济学家 Raul Prebisch 的工作。普雷维什在 20 世纪 50 年代领导了联合国拉丁美洲经济委员会(ECLA),4 后来又领导了联合国贸易和发展会议(UNCTAD),他注意到世界 “边缘” 地区的贸易条件相对于 “中心” 地区在不断下降。他认为,像拉丁美洲这样的第三世界地区增长缓慢是全球资本主义经济秩序的结果,它使这些地区长期处于 “依赖性发展” 的状态。

According to classical liberal trade theory, participation in an open system of world trade should maximize the advantage of all, even if one country sold coffee beans and another computers. Economically backward latecomers to this system should in fact have certain advantages in economic development, since they could simply import technology from the earlier developers rather than having to create it themselves. Dependency theory, by contrast, held that late development doomed a country to perpetual backwardness. The advanced countries controlled the world terms of trade and, through their multinational corporations, forced Third World countries into what was called “unbalanced development”—that is, the export of raw materials and other commodities with low processing content. The developed North had locked up the world market for sophisticated manufactured goods like automobiles and airplanes, leaving the Third World to be, in effect, global “hewers of wood and drawers of water.“8 Many dependencistas linked the international economic order to the authoritarian regimes that had recently come to power in Latin America in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.

根据古典自由主义贸易理论,参与一个开放的世界贸易体系应该使所有人的利益最大化,即使一个国家卖咖啡豆,另一个国家卖电脑。经济上落后于这个体系的国家实际上应该在经济发展上有一定的优势,因为他们可以简单地从早期发展的国家进口技术,而不是自己去创造技术。与此相反,依赖理论认为,晚期发展注定了一个国家的永久落后。先进国家控制着世界贸易条件,并通过其跨国公司迫使第三世界国家进入所谓的 “不平衡发展”,即出口原材料和其他低加工含量的商品。发达国家锁定了汽车和飞机等精密制造品的世界市场,使第三世界实际上成为全球 “砍柴的人和汲水的人”。

The policies that emerged from dependency theory were decidedly illiberal. The more moderate dependencistas sought to bypass Western multinational corporations and to encourage local industry by erecting high tariff walls against imports, a practice known as import substitution. The solutions recommended by the more radical dependency theorists sought to undermine the global economic order altogether by fostering revolution, withdrawal from the capitalist trading system, and integration into the Soviet bloc on the model of Cuba. Thus, at the beginning of the 1970s when Marxist ideas were being recognized as a dismal basis for real societies in places like China and the Soviet Union, they were being revived by intellectuals in the Third World and in American and European universities as a formula for the underdeveloped world’s future.

从依赖理论中产生的政策明显是不自由的。较为温和的依附论者试图绕过西方跨国公司,通过对进口产品设置高额关税墙来鼓励本地工业,这种做法被称为进口替代。更为激进的依赖理论家所建议的解决方案是通过促进革命、退出资本主义贸易体系和以古巴为榜样融入苏联集团来彻底破坏全球经济秩序。因此,在 20 世纪 70 年代初,当马克思主义思想在中国和苏联等地被认为是现实社会的糟糕基础时,它们却被第三世界的知识分子和美国及欧洲的大学作为不发达世界的未来公式而恢复了。

But while dependency theory lives on among leftwing intellectuals, it has by now been exploded as a theoretical model by one large phenomenon it cannot possibly explain: that is, the economic development of East Asia in the postwar period. Asian economic success, apart from whatever material benefits it bestowed on the countries of Asia, has had the salutary effect of finally laying to rest self-defeating ideas like dependencia theory that were becoming in themselves an obstacle to growth by preventing clear thinking about the sources of economic development. For if, as dependency theory claimed, Third World underdevelopment was due to the participation of less developed countries in the global capitalist order, how could one possibly explain the phenomenal economic growth that had occurred in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand? For after the war, almost all of these countries had deliberately eschewed policies of economic autarky and import substitution that were then sweeping Latin America, and instead pursued export-led growth with great single-mindedness, deliberately tying themselves to foreign markets and capital through links with multinational corporations. One could not argue, moreover, that these countries started with unfair advantages because they were endowed with natural resources or accumulated capital from the past; unlike the oil-rich countries of the Middle East or certain mineral-rich countries in Latin America, they entered the race with nothing more than the human capital of their populations.


Postwar Asian experience demonstrated that late modernizers were actually advantaged relative to more established industrial powers, just as earlier liberal trade theories had predicted. The late modernizers in Asia, beginning with Japan, were able to purchase the most up-to-date technologies from the United States and Europe and, unburdened by an aging and inefficient infrastructure, were able to become competitive (many Americans would say too competitive) in hi-tech areas within a generation or two. This proved to be true not only for Asia relative to Europe and North America, but within Asia as well, where those countries like Thailand and Malaysia that started their development process later than Japan and South Korea have experienced no relative disadvantage. W estern multinational corporations behaved as liberal economic textbooks claimed they should: while “exploiting” cheap labor in Asia, they provided markets, capital, and technology in return, and were the vehicles for the diffusion of technology that eventually allowed selfsustaining growth in the local economies. This is perhaps the reason why one high Singaporean officiai remarked that the three abominations his country would not tolerate were “hippies, long-haired boys, and critics of multinational corporations.”

战后亚洲的经验表明,相对于更成熟的工业大国,后发的现代化国家实际上是有优势的,就像早期的自由贸易理论所预测的那样。亚洲的后发现代化国家,首先是日本,能够从美国和欧洲购买最先进的技术,在没有老化和低效的基础设施的负担下,能够在一两代人的时间里在高科技领域具有竞争力(许多美国人会说竞争力太强)。事实证明,这不仅在亚洲相对于欧洲和北美是如此,而且在亚洲内部也是如此,像泰国和马来西亚这样发展进程晚于日本和韩国的国家并没有经历相对的不利。西方跨国公司的行为正如自由主义经济教科书所宣称的那样:在 “剥削” 亚洲廉价劳动力的同时,它们提供了市场、资本和技术作为回报,并成为技术传播的工具,最终使当地经济实现了自我维持的增长。这也许就是为什么一位新加坡高级官员说,他的国家不能容忍的三种可恶现象是 “嬉皮士、长发男孩和跨国公司的批评者”。

The growth record compiled by these late modernizers was truly astounding. Japan grew at an annual rate of 9. percent in the 1960s and 6 percent in the 1970s; the “four tigers” (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea) grew at 9. percent in the same period; and ASEAN as a whole saw growth of over 8 percent. In Asia one could make direct comparisons of the relative performance of alternative economic systems. Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China both started their separate existence in 1949 with roughly equal standards of living. Under a market system, Taiwan’s real GNP grew at 8. percent per year, leading to a GNP per capita of $7,500 by 1989. The comparable figure for the PRC was approximately $350, much of which was itself due to nearly a decade of marketoriented reforms. In 1960 North and South Korea had roughly equal levels of GNP per capita. In 1961, South Korea dropped an import-substitution policy and brought domestic and international prices into line. The South Korean economy subsequently grew at a rate of 8. percent per year, leading to a 1989 per capita GNP of $4,550, more than four times that of the North.

这些后来的现代化国家所创造的增长记录确实令人震惊。日本在 20 世纪 60 年代的年增长率为 9%,70 年代为 6%;“四小龙”(香港、台湾、新加坡和韩国)在同一时期的增长率为 9%;东盟作为一个整体,增长率超过 8%。在亚洲,人们可以对其他经济体系的相对表现进行直接比较。台湾和中华人民共和国都是在 1949 年开始独立存在,生活水平大致相同。在市场体系下,台湾的实际国民生产总值以每年 8% 的速度增长,到 1989 年人均国民生产总值达到 7500 美元。中国的可比数字约为 350 美元,其中大部分是由于近十年来的市场化改革。1960 年,北韩和南韩的人均国民生产总值水平大致相同。1961 年,南朝鲜放弃了进口替代政策,并使国内和国际价格保持一致。南朝鲜的经济随后以每年 8% 的速度增长,导致 1989 年的人均国民生产总值达到 4550 美元,是朝鲜的四倍多。

Nor has economic success come at the expense of social justice at home. It has been argued that wages were exploitatively low in Asia, and governments there have engaged in draconian policies to suppress consumer demand and enforce a very high rate of savings. But income distribution began to equalize rapidly in one country after another once they reached a certain level of prosperity. Taiwan and South Korea have steadily decreased income inequality over the last generation: while Taiwan’s top 20 percent made 15 times the income of the lowest 20 percent in 1952, the multiple fell to 4. times by 1980. If growth continues at anything near its present rate, there is no reason to think that the rest of ASEAN will not continue to follow suit in the next generation.

经济上的成功也没有以牺牲国内的社会公正为代价。有人认为,亚洲的工资被剥削得很低,那里的政府采取了严厉的政策来压制消费需求并强制执行非常高的储蓄率。但是,在一个又一个国家达到一定的繁荣程度后,收入分配开始迅速平等化。台湾和韩国在过去的一代中稳步减少了收入不平等:在 1952 年,台湾收入最高的 20% 的人的收入是收入最低的 20% 的 15 倍,到 1980 年,这个倍数下降到 4 倍。如果继续以接近目前的速度增长,没有理由认为东盟其他国家在下一代不会继续效仿。

In a last-ditch effort to save dependency theory, some of its proponents have tried to argue that the economic success of the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) was due to planning, and that industrial policies and not capitalism lay at the root of their success. But while economic planning does play a relatively greater role in Asia than in the United States, the most successful sectors within Asian economies have tended to be those permitting the greatest degree of competition in domestic markets and integration into international ones. Most of those on the Left, moreover, who cite Asia as a positive example of state intervention in the economy, would not be able to stomach the semiauthoritarian Asian style of planning, with its quashing of labor and welfare demands. The Left’s preferred kind of planning, with its intervention on behalf of the victims of capitalism, has historically had much more ambiguous economic results.


What Asia’s postwar economic miracle demonstrates is that capitalism is a path toward economic development that is potentially available to all countries. No underdeveloped country in the Third World is disadvantaged simply because it began the growth process later than Europe, nor are the established industrial powers capable of blocking the development of a latecomer, provided that country plays by the rules of economic liberalism.


But if the capitalist “world system” is not an obstacle to economic development in the Third World, why have other marketoriented economies outside of Asia not grown as fast? For the phenomenon of economic stagnation in Latin America and other parts of the Third World is every bit as real as Asian economic success, and was what gave rise to dependency theory in the first place. If we reject neo-Marxist explanations like dependency theory, there are two broad categories of possible answers.

但是,如果资本主义 “世界体系” 不是第三世界经济发展的障碍,为什么亚洲以外的其他以市场为导向的经济体没有那么快的增长?因为拉丁美洲和第三世界其他地区的经济停滞现象与亚洲的经济成功一样真实,而且是依赖性理论首先产生的原因。如果我们拒绝像依附理论这样的新马克思主义的解释,有两大类可能的答案。

The first is a cultural explanation: that is, that the habits, customs, religions, and social structure of the peoples of regions like Latin America somehow obstruct the achievement of high levels of economic growth in a way that those of the peoples of Asia or Europe do not. The cultural argument is a serious one to which we will return in Part Four. If there are significant cultural obstacles to making markets work in certain societies, then the universality of capitalism as a route to economic modernization would be thrown into question.


The second explanation is one of policy: capitalism has never worked in Latin America and other parts of the Third World because it has never been seriously tried. That is, most of the ostensibly “capitalist” economies of Latin America are seriously crippled by their mercantilist traditions and the all-pervasive state sectors established in the name of economic justice. This argument has a good deal of power, and since policies are much more readily changeable than cultures, it behooves us to explore this argument first.

第二个解释是政策问题:资本主义在拉丁美洲和第三世界的其他地区从来没有成功过,因为它从来没有被认真尝试过。也就是说,拉丁美洲大多数表面上的 “资本主义” 经济被其重商主义传统和以经济正义的名义建立的无处不在的国家部门严重削弱了。这个论点有很大的力量,而且由于政策比文化更容易改变,所以我们有必要首先探讨这个论点。

While North America inherited the philosophy, traditions, and culture of liberal England as it emerged out of the Glorious Revolution, Latin America inherited many of the feudal institutions of seventeenthand eighteenth-century Spain and Portugal. Among these were the Spanish and Portuguese crowns’ strong disposition to control economic activity for their own greater glory, a practice known as mercantilism. According to one specialist, “From colonial times to the present, the [Brazilian] government has never been removed from the economic sphere to the extent it has been in post-mercantilist Europe… . The crown was the supreme economic patron, and all commercial and productive activities depended on special licenses, grants of monopoly, and trade privileges.“2 0 It became common practice in Latin America to use state power to advance the economic interests of the upper classes, which took their cue from the old leisured and landed upper classes of Europe, rather than of the more entrepreneurial middle class that had emerged in England and France subsequent to the Spanish conquest of Latin America. These elites were protected by their own governments from international competition through import-substitution policies adopted by many Latin American governments from the 1930s through the 1960s. Import substitution limited local producers to small domestic markets where they could not realize potential economies of scale; the cost of producing an automobile in Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico, for example, ran from 60 to 150 percent higher than in the United States.

北美洲继承了光荣革命后出现的自由主义英国的哲学、传统和文化,而拉丁美洲则继承了 17 和 18 世纪西班牙和葡萄牙的许多封建制度。其中包括西班牙和葡萄牙王室为了自身更大的荣誉而控制经济活动的强烈倾向,这种做法被称为重商主义。根据一位专家的说法,“从殖民时代到现在,巴西政府从未像后重商主义时代的欧洲那样脱离经济领域。. . . 王室是最高的经济赞助人,所有的商业和生产活动都依赖于特殊的许可证、垄断权和贸易特权。”2 0 在拉丁美洲,利用国家权力来促进上层阶级的经济利益成为普遍的做法,这些上层阶级从欧洲古老的有产者和土地上层阶级那里得到启发,而不是从西班牙征服拉丁美洲后在英国和法国出现的更具企业家精神的中产阶级那里得到启发。从 1930 年代到 1960 年代,许多拉美国家的政府都采取了进口替代政策,保护这些精英阶层免受国际竞争。进口替代将本地生产商限制在无法实现潜在规模经济的小型国内市场;例如,在巴西、阿根廷或墨西哥生产一辆汽车的成本比美国高 60% 至 150%。

The longstanding historical predisposition toward mercantilism was combined, in the twentieth century, with the desire of progressive forces in Latin America to use the state as a means of redistributing wealth from rich to poor in the interests of “social justice.” This took a variety of forms, including the labor legislation introduced in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the 1930s and 40s, which discouraged the development of laborintensive industries that had been crucial for Asian economic growth. The Left and the Right thus converged in their belief in the need for extensive government intervention in economic affairs. The result of this convergence is that many Latin American economies are dominated by bloated and inefficient state sectors that either attempt to manage economic activity directly or burden it with a tremendous regulatory overhead. In Brazil, the state not only runs posts and communications, but manufactures steel, mines iron ore and potash, prospects for oil, runs commercial and investment banks, generates electric power, and builds airplanes. These public-sector companies cannot go bankrupt, and use employment as a form of political patronage. Prices throughout the Brazilian economy, and particularly within the public sector, are set less by the market than by a process of political negotiation with powerful unions.

长期以来,重商主义的历史倾向在 20 世纪与拉丁美洲进步势力的愿望相结合,即利用国家作为重新分配财富的手段,从富人到穷人,以维护 “社会正义”。这采取了多种形式,包括 20 世纪 30 年代和 40 年代在阿根廷、巴西和智利等国实行的劳工立法,这些立法阻碍了对亚洲经济增长至关重要的劳动密集型产业的发展。因此,左派和右派在相信政府需要广泛干预经济事务方面趋于一致。这种趋同的结果是,许多拉丁美洲经济体被臃肿和低效的国家部门所支配,这些部门要么试图直接管理经济活动,要么用巨大的监管费用来负担经济活动。在巴西,国家不仅管理邮政和通信,还制造钢铁,开采铁矿石和钾盐,勘探石油,经营商业和投资银行,发电和制造飞机。这些公共部门的公司不能破产,并把就业作为一种政治赞助的形式。整个巴西经济的价格,尤其是公共部门的价格,与其说是由市场决定的,不如说是由与强大的工会进行的政治谈判过程决定的。

Or take the case of Peru. Hernando de Soto in his book The Other Path documents how his institute in Lima attempted to set up a fictitious factory according to the formal legal rules established by the Peruvian government. Going through eleven bureaucratic procedures required took 289 days and a total cost of $1,231 in fees and lost wages (including the payment of two bribes), or thirty-two times the minimum monthly wage. According to de Soto, regulatory barriers to the formation of new businesses constitute a major obstacle to entrepreneurship in Peru, particularly on the part of poor people, and explains the burgeoning of a huge “informal” (that is, illegal or extra-legal) economy of people unwilling and unable to cope with stateimposed barriers to trade. All of the major Latin American economies have large “informal” sectors, which produce as much as a quarter to a third of total GNP. Needless to say, forcing economic activity into illegal channels is hardly conducive to economic efficiency. In the words of novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, “One of the most widely believed myths about Latin America is that its backwardness results from the erroneous philosophy of economic liberalism …” In fact, V argas Llosa argues, such liberalism has never existed; what existed in its place was a form of mercantilism, that is, “a bureaucratized and law-ridden state that regards the redistribution of national wealth as more important than the production of wealth,” with redistribution taking the form of “the concession of monopolies or favored status to a small elite that depends on the state and on which the state itself is dependent.”

或者以秘鲁的情况为例。赫尔南多·德·索托在他的《另一条道路》一书中记录了他在利马的研究所如何试图按照秘鲁政府制定的正式法律规则建立一个虚构的工厂。通过所需的 11 个官僚程序花了 289 天,总共花费了 1231 美元的费用和工资损失(包括两次行贿),或者是最低月工资的 32 倍。根据德索托的说法,在秘鲁,组建新企业的监管障碍构成了创业的主要障碍,特别是对穷人而言,这也解释了为什么一个巨大的 “非正规”(即非法或法外)经济正在蓬勃发展,这些人不愿意也无法应对国家设置的贸易壁垒。所有主要的拉美经济体都有庞大的 “非正规” 部门,其产量占国民生产总值的四分之一到三分之一。毋庸置疑,将经济活动强行纳入非法渠道,很难提高经济效率。用小说家马里奥·巴尔加斯·略萨的话说,“关于拉丁美洲最广为人知的神话之一是,它的落后是由错误的经济自由主义哲学造成的.” 事实上,V argas Llosa 认为,这种自由主义从未存在过;取而代之的是一种重商主义,即 “一个官僚化的、充满法律的国家,将国家财富的再分配视为比财富的生产更重要”,再分配的形式是 “将垄断或优惠地位让给依赖国家的少数精英,而国家本身也依赖于此”。

The cases of disastrous state intervention in economic affairs are legion in Latin America. The most notorious is that of Argentina, which in 1913 had a per capita GDP comparable to that of Switzerland, twice as large as Italy’s, and half of Canada’s. Today, the comparable figures are less than a sixth, a third, and a fifth, respectively. Argentina’s long decline from development back into underdevelopment can be traced directly to its adoption of import-substitution policies in response to the worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s. These policies were reinforced and institutionalized under the leadership of Juan Perôn in the 1950s, who also used the power of the state to redistribute wealth to the working class as a means of cementing his personal power base. The ability of political leaders to stubbornly reject the imperatives of economic reality is perhaps nowhere better demonstrated than in a letter Perôn wrote in 1953 to Carlos Ibanez, president of Chile, in which he advised:

在拉丁美洲,国家对经济事务进行灾难性干预的案例不胜枚举。最臭名昭著的是阿根廷,它在 1913 年的人均国内生产总值与瑞士相当,是意大利的两倍,是加拿大的一半。今天,这些可比数字分别不到六分之一、三分之一和五分之一。阿根廷从发展到不发达的长期衰退,可以直接追溯到它为应对 20 世纪 30 年代的世界经济危机而采取的进口替代政策。这些政策在 20 世纪 50 年代胡安·佩罗恩的领导下得到了加强和制度化,他还利用国家权力向工人阶级重新分配财富,作为巩固其个人权力基础的一种手段。政治领导人顽固地拒绝经济现实的要求的能力,也许在佩罗恩 1953 年写给智利总统卡洛斯·伊瓦涅斯的信中得到了最好的证明。

Give to the people, especially the workers, all that is possible. When it seems to you that already you are giving them too much, give them more. You will see the results. Everyone will try to scare you with the specter of an economic collapse. But all of this is a lie. There is nothing more elastic than the economy which everyone fears so much because no one understands it.


It is nature of their country’s economy better than Juan Perôn did. Argentina now faces the daunting problem of undoing that statist economic legacy, a task which ironically enough fell to one of Perôn’s followers, President Carlos Menem.


More boldly than Menem’s Argentina, Mexico under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari undertook a broad-ranging set of liberalizing economic reforms, including the reduction of tax rates and budget deficits, privatization (selling 875 of 1155 government-owned companies between 1982 and 1991), cracking down on tax evasion and other forms of corruption on the part of corporations, bureaucrats, and labor unions, and opening talks with the United States on a free-trade pact. The result, at the end of the 1980s, was three years of 3—4 percent real GNP growth and an inflation rate of less than 20 percent—very low by historic and regional standards.

与梅内姆的阿根廷相比,墨西哥在总统卡洛斯·萨利纳斯·德戈塔里的领导下,进行了一系列广泛的自由化经济改革,包括降低税率和预算赤字、私有化(1982 年至 1991 年期间出售了 1155 家政府拥有的公司中的 875 家)、打击企业、官僚和工会的逃税和其他形式的腐败,并与美国就自由贸易协定展开谈判。结果,在 20 世纪 80 年代末,三年的实际国民生产总值增长率为 3-4%,通货膨胀率低于 20% —— 按历史和区域标准来看是非常低的。

Socialism, then, is no more appealing as an economic model for developing countries than it is for advanced industrial societies. Thirty or forty years ago, the socialist alternative seemed much more plausible. Leaders of Third World countries, in the cases where they were honest enough to admit the enormous human cost of Soviet or Chinese-style modernization, could still argue that they werejustified by the objective of industrialization. Their own societies were ignorant, violent, backward, and poverty-ridden. They argued that economic modernization under capitalist conditions was not a cost-free process, either, and in fair to say that Argentine technocrats now understand the any case their societies could not wait the decades that it took Europe and North America to accomplish this process.


Today, this argument looks less and less tenable. The Asian NIEs, repeating the experiences of Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have proven that economic liberalism allows late modernizers to catch up with and even overtake the early ones, and that this goal can be accomplished within the space of a generation or two. And while this was not exactly a cost-free process, the kinds of privations and hardships suffered by the working classes in countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong looked positively benign when compared to the wholesale social terror unleashed on the populations of the Soviet Union and China.

今天,这种说法看起来越来越不靠谱了。亚洲新兴工业化国家重复了德国和日本在 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初的经验,证明了经济自由主义可以让后期的现代化者赶上甚至超过早期的现代化者,而且这个目标可以在一两代人的时间里完成。虽然这并不是一个无代价的过程,但与苏联和中国人民遭受的大规模社会恐怖相比,日本、韩国、台湾和香港等国家的工人阶级所遭受的各种痛苦和磨难显得非常温和。

The recent experiences of the Soviet Union, China, and the states of Eastern Europe in converting their command economies back into market systems suggests a whole new category of considerations that should deter developing nations from choosing the socialist path to development. Let us imagine that one is a guerrilla leader in the jungles of Peru or a township in South Africa, plotting a Marxist-Leninist or Maoist revolution against the governments of those countries. As in 1917 or 1949, one would have to anticipate the need to seize power and use the coercive machinery of the state to break the old social order, and to create new, centralized economic institutions. But in addition, one would now have to anticipate (again, provided one is an intellectually honest guerrilla) that the fruits of this first revolution would be necessarily limited; that one could perhaps hope that in a generation your country would reach the economic level of East Germany in the 1960s or 70s. This would be no mean achievement, but one would have to anticipate further being stuck there for a good long time. And if this guerrilla leader wanted to move beyond an East German level of development, with all of its demoralizing social and environmental costs, one would have to further anticipate a second revolution, whereby the socialist central planning mechanism was in turn smashed and capitalist institutions were restored. But this would not be an easy task either, since by that time one’s society would have acquired a totally irrational pricing system, one’s managers would have lost touch

苏联、中国和东欧国家最近在将其指令性经济重新转化为市场体系方面的经验表明,有一类全新的考虑应该阻止发展中国家选择社会主义的发展道路。让我们想象一下,你是秘鲁丛林或南非乡镇的游击队领袖,正在策划一场针对这些国家政府的马列主义或毛主义革命。和 1917 年或 1949 年一样,人们必须预见到需要夺取权力,使用国家的强制机制来打破旧的社会秩序,并建立新的集中的经济机构。但除此之外,人们现在还必须预见到(同样,如果你是一个智力上诚实的游击队员的话),这第一次革命的成果必然是有限的;人们也许可以希望在一代人的时间里,你的国家会达到东德在 60 年代或 70 年代的经济水平。这将是一个不小的成就,但人们必须预料到会在那里停留很长时间。如果这个游击队领导人想超越东德的发展水平,以及所有令人沮丧的社会和环境成本,我们就必须进一步预期第二次革命,从而粉碎社会主义中央计划机制,恢复资本主义制度。但这也不是一件容易的事,因为到那时,我们的社会将获得一个完全不合理的价格体系,我们的管理者将失去联系

with the most up-to-date practices in the outside world, and one’s working class would have lost whatever work ethic they once possessed. In light of these problems, all of which one could foresee in advance, it would seem to be much easier to be a free-market guerrilla instead and proceed directly to that second, capitalist revolution without passing through the socialist stage. That is, tear down the old state structures of regulation and bureaucracy, undermine the wealth, privileges, and status of the old social classes by exposing them to international competition, and free the creative energies of one’s own civil society.


The logic of a progressive modern natural science predisposes human societies toward capitalism only to the extent that men can see their own economic selfinterest clearly. Mercantilism, dependencia theory, and a host of other intellectual mirages have prevented people from achieving this clarity of vision. But the experiences of Asia and of Eastern Europe now provide important empirical test beds against which the claims of competing economic systems can be measured.


Our Mechanism can now explain the creation of a universal consumer culture based on liberal economic principles, for the Third World as well as the First and Second. The enormously productive and dynamic economic world created by advancing technology and the rational organization of labor has a tremendous homogenizing power. It is capable of linking different societies around the world to one another physically through the creation of global markets, and of creating parallel economic aspirations and practices in a host of diverse societies. The attractive power of this world creates a very strong predisposition for all human societies to participate in it, while success in this participation requires the adoption of the principles of economic liberalism. This is the ultimate victory of the VCR.

我们的机制现在可以解释基于自由经济原则的普遍消费文化的产生,对于第三世界以及第一和第二世界都是如此。由不断进步的技术和合理的劳动组织所创造的具有巨大生产力和活力的经济世界具有巨大的同质化力量。它能够通过创造全球市场将世界各地的不同社会实际地联系在一起,并在众多不同的社会中创造出平行的经济愿望和实践。这个世界的吸引力为所有人类社会创造了一种非常强烈的参与倾向,而这种参与的成功需要采用经济自由主义的原则。这就是 VCR 的最终胜利。

Chapter 10: In the Land of Education


Thus I came to you, 0 men of today, and into the land of education… .But what happened to me? For all my anxiety I had to laugh. Never had my eyes beheld anything so dappled and motley. I laughed and laughed while my foot was still trembling, and my heart no less. “This is clearly the home of all paint pots” Isaid …

今天的人哪,我就这样来到你们这里,进入教育的土地。…… 但我怎么了?对于我所有的焦虑,我不得不笑。我的眼睛从未见过如此斑驳和杂乱的东西。我笑了,笑了,而我的脚还在颤抖,我的心也不例外。“这显然是所有颜料罐的家” 伊萨德……

—Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra


We now come to the most difficult part of our argument: Does the Mechanism of modern natural science lead to liberal democracy? If the logic of advanced industrialization, determined by modern natural science, creates a strong predisposition in favor of capitalism and market economics, does it also produce free government and democratic participation? In a landmark article written in 1959, the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset demonstrated that there was an extremely high degree of empirical correlation between stable democracy, on the one hand, and a country’s level of economic development on the other, as well as with other indices related to economic development such as urbanization, education, and so forth. Is there a necessary connection between advanced industrialization and political liberalism that accounts for this high degree of correlation? Or is it possible that political liberalism is simply a cultural artifact of European civilization and its various offshoots, which for independent reasons happen to have produced the most notable cases of successful industrialization?

我们现在来到了我们论证中最困难的部分。现代自然科学的机制是否会导致自由民主?如果由现代自然科学决定的先进工业化逻辑产生了有利于资本主义和市场经济的强烈倾向,它是否也会产生自由政府和民主参与?社会学家 Seymour Martin Lipset 在 1959 年写的一篇具有里程碑意义的文章中表明,在稳定的民主和一个国家的经济发展水平之间,以及与经济发展有关的其他指数,如城市化、教育等,存在着极高的经验相关性。先进的工业化和政治自由主义之间是否存在着必然的联系,以说明这种高度的关联性?或者说,政治自由主义只是欧洲文明及其各种分支的文化产物,由于独立的原因,它们恰好产生了最引人注目的成功工业化案例?

As we will see, the relationship between economic development and democracy is far from accidental, but the motives behind the choice of democracy are not fundamentally economic. They have another source, and are facilitated, but not made necessary, by industrialization.


The tight relationship that exists between economic development, educational levels, and democracy is illustrated quite clearly in Southern Europe. In 1958,Spain embarked on a program of economic liberalization in which the mercantilist policies of the Francoist state were replaced by liberal ones linking the Spanish economy to that of the outside world. This led to a period of very rapid economic growth: in the decade before Franco’s death, Spain’s economy grew 7. percent per year. It was followed closely by those of Portugal and Greece, which achieved growth rates of 6. and 6. percent per year, respectively. The social transformations brought about by industrialization were dramatic: in Spain, only 18 percent of the population lived in cities of over 100,000 population in 1950; by 1970, this figure had increased to 34 percent. In 1950 half the populations of Spain, Portugal, and Greece were engaged in agriculture, compared to an average of 24 percent for Western Europe as a whole; by 1970 only Greece remained above that latter figure, while in Spain the percentage had dropped to 2 1 . 5 With urbanization came higher degrees of education and personal income, and an appreciation of the consumer culture that was being created within the European Community. While these economic and social changes did not in themselves bring about greater political pluralism, they created the social milieu under which pluralism could flourish once political conditions became ripe. The Francoist commissar of the Plan for Economic Development who oversaw much of Spain’s technocratic revolution, Laureano Lopez Rodo, was reported to have said that Spain would be ready for democracy when per capita income reached $2000. This proved quite prophetic: in 1974, on the eve of Franco’s death, per capita GDP stood at $2,446.

经济发展、教育水平和民主之间存在的紧密关系在南欧得到了很好的说明。1958 年,西班牙开始实施经济自由化计划,佛朗哥国家的重商主义政策被将西班牙经济与外部世界联系起来的自由主义政策所取代。这导致了一个非常快速的经济增长期:在佛朗哥去世前的十年里,西班牙的经济每年增长 7%。紧随其后的是葡萄牙和希腊,它们的年增长率分别为 6.0% 和 6.0%。工业化带来的社会变革是巨大的:在西班牙,1950 年只有 18% 的人口生活在 10 万人口以上的城市;到 1970 年,这个数字增加到 34%。1950 年,西班牙、葡萄牙和希腊有一半的人口从事农业,而整个西欧的平均比例为 24%;到 1970 年,只有希腊仍然高于这个数字,而西班牙的比例已经下降到 21%。随着城市化的发展,人们的受教育程度和个人收入也越来越高,对欧洲共同体内部正在形成的消费文化也越来越重视。虽然这些经济和社会变化本身并没有带来更多的政治多元化,但它们创造了一种社会环境,一旦政治条件成熟,多元化就会蓬勃发展。据报道,负责监督西班牙技术官僚革命的佛朗哥主义经济发展计划委员劳拉诺·洛佩斯·罗多说,当人均收入达到 2000 美元时,西班牙就可以实现民主了。事实证明这很有预见性:1974 年,在佛朗哥去世前夕,人均 GDP 为 2446 美元。

A similar linkage between economic development and liberal democracy can be seen in Asia. Japan, the first East Asian state to modernize, was the first to achieve a stable liberal democracy. (Japan’s democratization was accomplished at the point of a gun, so to speak, but the result proved durable long past the point where democracy could be said to have been imposed coercively.) Taiwan and South Korea, with the secondand third highest levels of education and per capita GNP , have experienced the greatest change in their political systems. In Taiwan, for example, 45 percent of the ruling Guomindang party’s Central Committee have higher educational degrees, many of them earned in the United States. Forty-five percent of Taiwanese and 37 percent of South Koreans receive some higher education, compared with 60 percent of Americans and 22 percent of Britons. And indeed, it is the younger, better educated members of Taiwan’s Parliament that have pushed the most strongly to make it a more representative institution. Australia and New Zealand, those lands of European settlement in Asia, had of course modernized economically and democratized well before World War II.

在亚洲也可以看到经济发展和自由民主之间的类似联系。日本是第一个实现现代化的东亚国家,也是第一个实现稳定的自由民主的国家。(日本的民主化可以说是在枪口下完成的,但其结果被证明是持久的,远远超过了民主可以说是被强加的程度)。台湾和韩国的教育水平和人均国民生产总值位居第二和第三,它们的政治制度经历了最大的变化。例如,在台湾,执政的国民党中央委员会中有 45% 的人拥有高等教育学位,其中许多是在美国获得的。45% 的台湾人和 37% 的韩国人接受过一些高等教育,而 60% 的美国人和 22% 的英国人接受过高等教育。事实上,正是这些年轻的、受教育程度较高的台湾议会成员最有力地推动了使其成为一个更具代表性的机构。澳大利亚和新西兰,这些欧洲人在亚洲定居的土地,当然在二战前已经实现了经济现代化和民主化。

In South Africa, the apartheid system was codified following the victory of D. F. Malan’s National party in 1948. The Afrikaner community that it represented was singularly backward in socioeconomic terms, particularly when compared to contemporaneous European societies. The Afrikaners in this period were largely poor, uneducated farmers who had recently been driven to the cities by drought and hardship. The Afrikaners used their capture of state power to advance themselves socially and economically, primarily through public-sector employment. Between 1948 and 1988 they underwent a dramatic transformation into an urban, educated, and increasingly entrepreneurial white-collar society. With that education came contact with the political norms and trends of the outside world, from which they could not isolate themselves. The liberalization of South African society had already started in the late 1970s with the re-legalization of black trade unions and the relaxation of censorship laws. By the time of F. W. de Klerk’s opening to the African National Congress in February 1990,the government was in many ways simply following the opinion of its white electorate, now little different in educational and occupational achievement from its counterparts in Europe and America.

在南非,种族隔离制度是在 D·F·马兰的国家党于 1948 年获胜后形成的。它所代表的非洲裔社区在社会经济方面非常落后,特别是与同时代的欧洲社会相比。这一时期的非裔美国人主要是贫穷的、没有受过教育的农民,他们最近因干旱和困难而被赶到城市。阿非利加人利用他们对国家权力的掌握来提高自己的社会和经济地位,主要是通过公共部门的就业。从 1948 年到 1988 年,他们经历了一个戏剧性的转变,变成了一个城市的、受过教育的、越来越有企业家精神的白领社会。伴随着这种教育,他们接触到了外部世界的政治规范和趋势,他们无法将自己孤立起来。随着黑人工会的重新合法化和审查法的放松,南非社会的自由化在 1970 年代末已经开始。到 1990 年 2 月德克勒克(F·W. de Klerk)向非洲人国民大会开放时,政府在许多方面只是在遵循其白人选民的意见,现在在教育和职业成就方面与欧洲和美国的同行们没有什么不同。

The Soviet Union as well has been undergoing a comparable social transformation, though at a slower pace than the countries of Asia. It too has changed from an agricultural to an urban society, with increasing levels of mass and specialized education. These sociological changes, going on in the background while the Cold W ar was being fought out in Berlin and Cuba, were conditions that encouraged the steps subsequently undertaken toward democratization.


Looking around the world, there remains a very strong overall correlation between advancing socioeconomic modernization and the emergence of new democracies. Traditionally the most economically advanced regions, Western Europe and North America, have also hosted the world’s oldest and most stable liberal democracies. Southern Europe has followed closely behind, and achieved stable democracy in the 1970s. Within Southern Europe, Portugal had the rockiest transition to democracy in the mid1970s because it started from a lower socioeconomic base; a great deal of social mobilization had to occur after rather than before the passing of the old regime. Right behind Europe economically is Asia, whose nations have democratized (or are in the process of doing so) in strict proportion to their degree of development. Of the formerly communist states in Eastern Europe, the most economically advanced among them—East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, followed by Poland—also made the most rapid transitions to full democracy, while less developed Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Albania all elected reform communists in 1990—91. The Soviet Union is at a roughly comparable level of development to the larger states of Latin America like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and like them has failed to achieve a fully stable democratic order. Africa, the least developed region of the world, possesses only a handful of recent democracies, of uncertain stability.

环顾世界,社会经济现代化的推进与新民主国家的出现之间仍然存在着非常强烈的整体关联。传统上经济最发达的地区,即西欧和北美,也是世界上最古老和最稳定的自由民主国家的所在地。南欧紧随其后,并在 20 世纪 70 年代实现了稳定的民主。在南欧,葡萄牙在 1970 年代中期向民主过渡的过程最为坎坷,因为它的社会经济基础较低;大量的社会动员工作必须在旧政权倒台之后而不是之前发生。在经济上紧随欧洲之后的是亚洲,其国家的民主化(或正在进行民主化)与它们的发展程度完全成正比。在东欧的前共产主义国家中,经济最发达的国家 —— 东德、匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克,其次是波兰,也最迅速地过渡到全面民主,而欠发达的保加利亚、罗马尼亚、塞尔维亚和阿尔巴尼亚都在 1990-91 年选出了改革的共产主义者。苏联的发展水平与阿根廷、巴西、智利和墨西哥等拉美大国大致相当,与它们一样,也未能实现完全稳定的民主秩序。非洲是世界上最不发达的地区,只拥有少数几个近期的民主国家,其稳定性不确定。

The only apparent regional anomaly is the Middle East, which possesses no stable democracies, and yet contains a number of states with per capita incomes on a European or Asian level. But this is easily explained by oil: income from petroleum has permitted states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and the UAE to acquire the trappings of modernity—automobiles, VCRs, Mirage fighterbombers, and the like—without having had their societies go through the social transformations that come when such wealth is generated by the labor of their populations.

唯一明显的区域性反常现象是中东,那里没有稳定的民主国家,但却有一些国家的人均收入达到了欧洲或亚洲的水平。但这很容易用石油来解释:石油收入使沙特阿拉伯、伊拉克、伊朗和阿联酋等国获得了现代化的装饰品 —— 汽车、录像机、幻影战斗机等,而他们的社会却没有经历社会转型,而这种财富是由他们的人口劳动创造的。

To explain why advancing industrialization should produce liberal democracy, three types of argument have been put forward. Each one is flawed to a certain degree. The first is a functional argument, to the effect that only democracy is capable of mediating the complex web of conflicting interests that are created by a modern economy. This view was argued most strongly by Talcott Parsons, who believed that democracy was an “evolutionary universal” of all societies:

为了解释为什么推进工业化会产生自由民主,人们提出了三类论据。每一种都有一定程度的缺陷。第一种是功能论证,大意是只有民主才能够调和现代经济所产生的复杂的利益冲突网络。塔尔科特·帕森斯(Talcott Parsons)对这种观点的论证最为有力,他认为民主是所有社会的 “进化通用”。

The basic argument for considering democratic association a universal … is that, the larger and more complex a society becomes, the more important is effective political organization, not only in its administrative capacity, but also, and not least, in its support of a universalistic legal order… . No institutional form basically different from the democratic association can … mediate consensus in [the] exercise [of power and authority] by particularpersons and groups, and in the formation of particular binding policy decisions.

认为民主结社是一种普遍的…… 的基本论点是,社会越大、越复杂,有效的政治组织就越重要,这不仅体现在其行政能力上,而且还体现在其对普遍主义法律秩序的支持上。. . . 任何与民主社团基本不同的制度形式都不能…… 在特定的人和团体行使权力和权威以及形成特定的有约束力的政策决定时调解共识。

To restate Parsons’ point somewhat, democracies are best equipped to deal with the rapidly proliferating number of interest groups created by the industrialization process. Consider the completely new social actors that emerge in the course of industrialization: a working class, which becomes increasingly differentiated according to industrial and craft specialties, new layers of managerial personnel whose interests do not necessarily coincide with those of top management, government bureaucrats at a national, regional, and local level, and waves of immigrants from abroad, legal and illegal, who seek to take advantage of the open labor markets in developed countries. Democracy, the argument goes, is more functional in such a setting because it is more adaptable. Establishing universal and open criteria for participation in the political system allows new social groups and interests to express themselves and join in the general political consensus. Dictatorships can adapt to change as well, and in some cases can act more rapidly than democracies, as did the obligarchs ruling Meiji Japan after 1868. But history abounds with as many other cases of narrow ruling elites out of touch with the social changes that were occurring under their noses as a result of economic development, like the Prussian Junkers or the landowning elites in Argentina.

稍微重述一下帕森斯的观点,民主政体最有能力处理工业化进程中产生的迅速激增的利益集团。考虑到在工业化过程中出现的全新的社会行为者:根据工业和手工艺专业而变得日益分化的工人阶级,利益不一定与高层管理相一致的新的管理阶层,国家、地区和地方一级的政府官僚,以及来自国外的合法和非法移民,他们试图利用发达国家的开放劳动力市场。有观点认为,民主在这样的环境下更能发挥作用,因为它的适应性更强。建立普遍和开放的政治制度参与标准,使新的社会群体和利益能够表达自己,并加入到普遍的政治共识中。独裁国家也能适应变化,在某些情况下,独裁国家的行动比民主国家更迅速,就像 1868 年后统治明治日本的义务政府那样。但历史上也有很多其他的例子,如普鲁士的容克们或阿根廷的地主精英们,他们与在他们眼皮底下发生的因经济发展而带来的社会变化脱节。

Democracy, according to this line of argument, is more functional than dictatorship because many of the conflicts that develop between these emerging social groups have to be adjudicated either in the legal system or, ultimately, in the political system. The market alone cannot determine the appropriate level and location of public infrastructure investment, or rules for the settlement of labor disputes, or the degree of airline and trucking regulation, or occupational health and safety standards. Each one of these questions is “value-laden” to some extent, and must be referred to the political system. And if that system is going to adjudicate these conflicting interests fairly and in a way that receives the consent of all of the major actors within the economy, it must be democratic. A dictatorship could resolve such conflicts in the name of economic efficiency, but the smooth functioning of a modern economy depends on the willingness of its many interdependent social components to work together. If they do not believe in the legitimacy of the adjudicator, if there is no trust in the system, there will be no active and enthusiastic cooperation of the sort required to make the system as a whole function smoothly.

根据这一论点,民主比独裁更具功能性,因为这些新兴社会群体之间形成的许多冲突必须在法律体系中或最终在政治体系中进行裁决。单靠市场不能决定公共基础设施投资的适当水平和位置,或解决劳动纠纷的规则,或航空公司和卡车运输的监管程度,或职业健康和安全标准。这些问题中的每一个都在某种程度上带有 “价值”,必须交由政治系统处理。如果这个系统要公平地裁定这些冲突的利益,并得到经济中所有主要参与者的同意,它必须是民主的。独裁者可以以经济效率的名义解决这些冲突,但现代经济的顺利运行取决于其许多相互依存的社会组成部分是否愿意一起工作。如果他们不相信裁决者的合法性,如果对这个系统没有信任,就不会有使整个系统顺利运作所需的那种积极和热情的合作。

An example of the way in which democracy could arguably be said to be more functional for developed countries is with respect to a central issue of our time, the environment. Among the most notable products of advanced industrialization are significant levels of pollution and environmental damage. These constitute what economists call externalities, that is, costs imposed on third parties which do not directly affect the enterprises doing the damage. Despite various theories blaming ecological damage either on capitalism or socialism, experience has shown that neither economic system is particularly good for the environment. Both private corporations as well as socialist enterprises and ministries will focus on growth or output and will seek to avoid paying for externalities wherever they can. But since people want not only economic growth but a safe environment for themselves and their children, it becomes a function of the state to find a fair trade-off between the two, and to spread the costs of ecological protection around so that no one sector will bear them unduly.


And in this respect, the communist world’s truly abysmal environmental record suggests that what is most effective in protecting the environment is neither capitalism nor socialism, but democracy. As a whole, democratic political systems reacted much more quickly to the growth of ecological consciousness in the 1960s and 70s than did the world’s dictatorships. For without a political system that permits local communities to protest the siting of a highly toxic chemical plant in the middle of their communities, without freedom for watchdog organizations to monitor the behavior of companies and enterprises, without a national political leadership sufficiently sensitized that it is willing to devote substantial resources to protect the environment, a nation ends up with disasters like Chernobyl, or the desiccation of the Aral Sea, or an infant mortality rate in Krakow that is four times the already high Polish national average, or a 70 percent rate of miscarriages in Western Bohemia. Democracies permit participation and therefore feedback, and without feedback, governments will always tend to favor the large enterprise that adds significantly to national wealth, over the longterm interests of dispersed groups of private citizens.

在这方面,共产主义世界真正糟糕的环境记录表明,在保护环境方面最有效的不是资本主义或社会主义,而是民主。从整体上看,民主政治制度对 20 世纪 60 年代和 70 年代生态意识的增长的反应比世界上的独裁国家要快得多。因为如果没有一个政治制度允许当地社区抗议在他们社区中间建立一个剧毒的化工厂,没有监督组织监督公司和企业的行为的自由,没有一个足够敏感的国家政治领导人愿意投入大量的资源来保护环境,一个国家最终会出现像切尔诺贝利这样的灾难,或者咸海的干涸,或者克拉科夫的婴儿死亡率是已经很高的波兰全国平均水平的四倍,或者西波西米亚的流产率为 70%。民主制度允许参与,因此也允许反馈,如果没有反馈,政府将总是倾向于大幅增加国家财富的大型企业,而不是分散的公民个人群体的长期利益。

A second line of argument explaining why economic development should produce democracy has to do with the tendency of dictatorships or one-party rule to degenerate over time, and to degenerate more quickly when faced with the task of running an advanced technological society. Revolutionary regimes may govern effectively in their early years by virtue of what Max Weber called charismatic authority. But once the regime’s founders have passed on, there is no guarantee that their successors will enjoy a comparable degree of authority, or even that they will be minimally competent at running the country. Longstanding dictatorships are capable of producing grotesque personalistic excesses like former Romanian ruler Nicolae Ceaucescu’s 40,000-watt chandelier, built at a time when the state was declaring regular electricity blackouts. Self-destructive power struggles develop among followers of those who founded the regime, who succeed in checking one another but not in governing the country effectively. The alternative to ceaseless power struggle and arbitrary dictatorship is increasingly routinized and institutionalized procedures for selecting new leaders and vetting policies. If such procedures for changing leaders exist, the authors of bad policies can be replaced without bringing down the entire system.

解释为什么经济发展应该产生民主的第二个论点,与独裁或一党统治随着时间的推移而退化的趋势有关,而且在面临管理先进技术社会的任务时,退化得更快。革命政权在其早期可能会凭借马克斯·韦伯所说的魅力型权威进行有效治理。但是,一旦政权的创建者去世,就不能保证他们的继任者会享有同等程度的权威,甚至不能保证他们会有管理国家的最低能力。长期的独裁统治能够产生怪诞的个人主义过度行为,比如前罗马尼亚统治者尼古拉·乔塞斯库(Nicolae Ceaucescu)的 40000 瓦的吊灯,在国家宣布定期停电的时候建造。自毁性的权力斗争在那些建立政权的追随者之间发展,他们成功地相互制衡,但不能有效地治理国家。除了无休止的权力斗争和任意的独裁统治外,另一个选择是越来越常规化和制度化的程序,以选择新的领导人和审查政策。如果存在这种更换领导人的程序,那么坏政策的制定者就可以被替换,而不会使整个系统崩溃。

There is also a version of this thesis that applies to rightwing authoritarian transitions to democracy. Democracy emerges as the result of a pact or compromise between elite groups—the army, technocrats, industrial bourgeoisie—which, exhausted, frustrated, or mutually checked in their ambitions, accept pacts or power-sharing arrangements as a second-best outcome. Under either the leftwing communist or rightwing authoritarian versions of this argument, democracy does not arise because anybody necessarily wants it, but rather as a byproduct of elite struggle.

这个理论还有一个版本适用于右翼威权主义向民主的过渡。民主的出现是精英集团 —— 军队、技术官僚、工业资产阶级 —— 之间达成协议或妥协的结果,这些集团在他们的野心中感到疲惫、沮丧或相互制约,接受协议或权力分享安排作为次佳结果。无论是左翼的共产主义还是右翼的专制主义版本,民主的产生并不是因为有人一定要它,而是作为精英斗争的副产品。

The final and most powerful line of argument linking economic development with liberal democracy is that successful industrialization produces middleclass societies, and that middleclass societies demand political participation and equality of rights. Despite the disparities in income distribution that frequently arise in the early phases of industrialization, economic development ultimately tends to promote the broad equality of condition because it creates enormous demand for a large, educated work force. And such a broad equality of condition arguably predisposes people to oppose political systems that do not respect that equality or permit people to participate on an equal basis.


Middleclass societies arise as a result of universal education. The link between education and liberal democracy has been frequently noted, and would seem to be an all-importantone. Industrial societies require large numbers of highly skilled and educated workers, managers, technicians, and intellectuals; hence even the most dictatorial state cannot avoid the need for both mass education and open access to higher and specialized education if it wants to be economically advanced. Such societies cannot exist without a large and specialized educational establishment. Indeed, in the developed world social status is determined to a very large degree by one’s level of educational achievement. The class differences that exist in the contemporary United States, for example, are due primarily to differences in education. There are few obstacles to the advancement of a person with the proper educational credentials. Inequality creeps into the system as a result of unequal access to education; lack of education is the surest condemnation to second-class citizenship.


The effect of education on political attitudes is complicated, but there are reasons for thinking it at least creates the conditions for democratic society. The self-professed aim of modern education is to “liberate” people from prejudices and traditional forms of authority. Educated people are said not to obey authority blindly, but rather learn to think for themselves. Even if this doesn’t happen on a mass basis, people can be taught to see their own selfinterest more clearly, and over a longer time horizon. Education also makes people demand more of themselves and for themselves; in other words, they acquire a certain sense of dignity which they want to have respected by their fellow citizens and by the state. In a traditional peasant society, it is possible for a local landlord (or, for that matter, a communist commissar) to recruit peasants to kill other peasants and dispossess them of their land. They do so not because it is in their interest, but because they are used to obeying authority. Urban professionals in developed countries, on the other hand, can be recruited to a lot of nutty causes like liquid diets and marathon running, but they tend not to volunteer for private armies or death squads simply because someone in a uniform tells them to do so.

教育对政治态度的影响很复杂,但有理由认为它至少为民主社会创造了条件。现代教育自称的目标是将人们从偏见和传统形式的权威中 “解放出来”。据说受过教育的人不会盲目地服从权威,而是学会自己思考。即使这不会在大规模的基础上发生,但人们可以被教导更清楚地看到自己的自我利益,并且在更长的时间范围内。教育也使人们对自己和自己有更多的要求;换句话说,他们获得了某种尊严感,他们希望得到同胞和国家的尊重。在一个传统的农民社会中,当地的地主(或共产党员)有可能招募农民去杀害其他农民并剥夺他们的土地。他们这样做不是因为这符合他们的利益,而是因为他们习惯于服从权威。另一方面,发达国家的城市专业人员可以被招募到很多疯狂的事业中,如液体饮食和马拉松跑步,但他们往往不会自愿加入私人军队或行刑队,只是因为有穿制服的人告诉他们要这样做。

A variation of this argument would maintain that the scientific-technical elite required to run modern industrial economies would eventually demand greater political liberalization, because scientific inquiry can only proceed in an atmosphere of freedom and the open exchange of ideas. We saw earlier how the emergence of a large technocratic elite in the USSR and China created a certain bias in favor of markets and economic liberalization, since these were more in accord with the criteria of economic rationality. Here the argument is extended into the political realm: that scientific advance depends not only on freedom for scientific inquiry, but on a society and political system that are as a whole open to free debate and participation.


These, then, are the arguments that can be made linking high levels of economic development with liberal democracy. The existence of an empirical connection between the two is undeniable. But none of these theories is, in the end, adequate to establish a necessary causal connection.


The argument we associated with Talcott Parsons, to the effect that liberal democracy is the system most capable of resolving conflicts on the basis of consent in a complex modern society, is true only up to a point. The universalism and formality that characterizes the rule of law in liberal democracies does provide a level playing field on which people can compete, form coalitions, and ultimately make compromises. But it is not necessarily the case that liberal democracy is the political system best suited to resolving social conflicts per se. A democracy’s ability to peacefully resolve conflicts is greatest when those conflicts arise between socalled “interest groups” that share a larger, preexisting consensus on the basic values or rules of the game, and when the conflicts are primarily economic in nature. But there are other kinds of non-economic conflicts that are far more intractable, having to do with issues like inherited social status and nationality, that democracy is not particularly good at resolving.

我们与塔尔科特·帕森斯(Talcott Parsons)相关的论点,即自由民主是最有能力在复杂的现代社会中以同意为基础解决冲突的制度,只在某一点上是正确的。自由民主国家的法治所具有的普遍性和正式性确实提供了一个公平的竞争环境,人们可以在这个环境中竞争,形成联盟,并最终做出妥协。但是,自由民主并不一定是最适合解决社会冲突的政治制度本身。当这些冲突发生在所谓的 “利益集团” 之间时,民主制度和平解决冲突的能力是最强的,这些利益集团在基本价值或游戏规则上有着更大的、预先存在的共识,而且冲突主要是经济性质的。但是,还有其他类型的非经济冲突要棘手得多,与继承的社会地位和国籍等问题有关,而民主并不特别擅长解决这些冲突。

The success of American democracy at resolving conflicts between the various interest groups within its heterogeneous and dynamic population does not imply that democracy will similarly be able to resolve the conflicts that arise in other societies. The American experience is quite unique insofar as Americans were, in Tocqueville’s phrase, “born equal.” Despite the diversity of backgrounds, lands, and races to which Americans traced their ancestry, on coming to America they abandoned those identities by and large and assimilated into a new society without sharply defined social classes or longstanding ethnic and national divisions. America’s social and ethnic structure has been sufficiently fluid to prevent the emergence of rigid social classes, significant subnationalisms, or linguistic minorities. American democracy has therefore rarely faced some of the more intractable social conflicts of other, older societies.

美国民主制度成功地解决了其异质和动态人口中各种利益集团之间的冲突,但这并不意味着民主制度将同样能够解决其他社会中出现的冲突。就美国人用托克维尔的话说 “生而平等” 而言,美国的经验是相当独特的。尽管美国人的背景、土地和种族各不相同,但来到美国后,他们基本上放弃了这些身份,并被同化到一个没有明确的社会阶层或长期存在的种族和民族分歧的新社会。美国的社会和民族结构一直很不稳定,足以防止出现僵硬的社会阶层、重要的亚民族主义或语言上的少数群体。因此,美国的民主制度很少面临其他古老社会中一些更难解决的社会冲突。

Moreover, even American democracy has not been particularly successful in solving its most persistent ethnic problem, that of American blacks. Black slavery constituted the major exception to the generalization that Americans were “born equal,” and American democracy could not in fact settle the question of slavery through democratic means. Long after the abolition of slavery, long, indeed after the achievement of full legal equality by American blacks, many remain profoundly alienated from the mainstream of American culture. Given the profoundly cultural nature of the problem, on the side both of blacks and whites, it is not clear that American democracy is really capable of doing what would be necessary to assimilate blacks fully, and to move from formal equality of opportunity to a broader equality of condition.

此外,即使是美国民主在解决其最顽固的民族问题,即美国黑人的问题方面也不是特别成功。黑人奴隶制构成了美国人 “生而平等” 这一概括的主要例外,而美国民主事实上无法通过民主手段解决奴隶制的问题。在废除奴隶制后很久,甚至在美国黑人实现完全的法律平等后很久,许多人仍然与美国文化的主流深深地疏远。鉴于这个问题的深刻的文化性质,无论是黑人还是白人,都不清楚美国的民主是否真的能够做到让黑人完全同化,并从正式的机会平等走向更广泛的条件平等。

Liberal democracy may be more functional for a society that has already achieved a high degree of social equality and consensus concerning certain basic values. But for societies that are highly polarized along lines of social class, nationality, or religion, democracy can be a formula for stalemate and stagnation. The most typical form of polarization is that of class conflict in countries with highly stratified and inegalitarian class structures left over from a feudal social order. Such was the situation in France at the time of the Revolution, and such continues to be the case in Third World countries like the Philippines and Peru. Society is dominated by a traditional elite, most often of large landowners, who are neither tolerant of other classes nor efficient entrepreneurs. The establishment of formal democracy in such a country masks enormous disparities in wealth, prestige, status, and power, which these elites can use to control the democratic process. A familiar social pathology ensues: the dominance of old social classes generates an equally intransigent leftist opposition that believes that the democratic system itself is corrupt and needs to be smashed, along with the social groups protected by it. A democracy that protects the interests of a class of inefficient, leisured landowners and engenders a social civil war cannot be said to be “functional” in economic terms.

对于一个已经实现了高度社会平等并在某些基本价值观上达成共识的社会来说,自由民主可能更有作用。但对于那些因社会阶层、民族或宗教而高度分化的社会来说,民主可能是一种僵局和停滞的公式。最典型的两极分化形式是封建社会秩序留下的高度分层和不平等的阶级结构的国家中的阶级冲突。大革命时期的法国就是这种情况,而像菲律宾和秘鲁这样的第三世界国家仍然是这种情况。社会由传统的精英阶层主导,最常见的是大地主,他们既不容忍其他阶层,也没有高效的企业家。在这样的国家建立正式的民主,掩盖了财富、声望、地位和权力方面的巨大差距,这些精英可以利用这些差距来控制民主进程。一个熟悉的社会病理学随之产生:旧社会阶级的主导地位产生了一个同样顽固的左派反对派,他们认为民主制度本身是腐败的,需要和受其保护的社会群体一起被打碎。一个保护效率低下的地主阶级的利益并引发社会内战的民主制度,在经济上不能说是 “有效” 的。

Democracy is also not particularly good at resolving disputes between different ethnic or national groups. The question of national sovereignty is inherently uncompromisable: it either belongs to one people or another—Armenians or Azerbaijanis, Lithuanians or Russians—and when different groups come into conflict there is seldom a way of splitting the difference through peaceful democratic compromise, as there is in the case of economic disputes. The Soviet Union could not become democratic and at the same time remain unitary, for there was no consensus among the Soviet Union’s nationalities that they shared a common citizenship and identity. Democracy would only emerge on the basis of the country’s breakup into smaller national entities. American democracy has done surprisingly well dealing with ethnic diversity, but that diversity has been contained within certain bounds: none of America’s ethnic groups constitutes historical communities living on their traditional lands and speaking their own language, with a memory of past nationhood and sovereignty.

民主在解决不同种族或民族群体之间的争端方面也不是特别好。国家主权问题本质上是不可妥协的:它要么属于一个民族,要么属于另一个民族 —— 亚美尼亚人或阿塞拜疆人,立陶宛人或俄罗斯人 —— 当不同群体发生冲突时,很少有办法通过和平的民主妥协来分化分歧,就像在经济争端中那样。苏联不可能在成为民主国家的同时保持统一,因为苏联各民族之间并没有达成共识,认为他们有共同的公民身份和认同。民主只有在国家分裂成更小的民族实体的基础上才会出现。美国的民主在处理民族多样性方面做得出奇的好,但这种多样性被控制在一定的范围内:美国的民族群体没有一个构成历史社区,生活在他们的传统土地上,说着自己的语言,对过去的国家和主权有记忆。

A modernizing dictatorship can in principle be far more effective than a democracy in creating the social conditions that would permit both capitalist economic growth and, over time, the emergence of a stable democracy. Take, for example, the case of the Philippines. Filipino society to this day continues to be characterized by a highly inegalitarian social order in the countryside, where a small number of traditional landowning families control a very large proportion of the country’s agricultural land. Like other landowning upper classes, the Philippine version is not characterized by a lot of dynamism and efficiency. Nonetheless, through their social position they have managed to dominate much of postindependence Filipino politics. The continued dominance of this social group has in turn bred one of Southeast Asia’s few remaining Maoist guerrilla movements, that of the Communist party of the Philippines and its military wing, the New People’s Army. The fall of the Marcos dictatorship and his replacement by Corazon Aquino in 1986 did nothing to remedy either the problem of land distribution or the insurgency, not least because Mrs. Aquino’s family was among the largest landowners in the Philippines. Since her election, efforts to implement a serious land reform program have foundered on the opposition of a legislature largely controlled by the very people who would be its targets. Democracy in this instance is constrained in bringing about the kind of egalitarian social order that would be necessary either as the ground for capitalist growth or for the longterm stability of democracy itself. In such circumstances, dictatorship could potentially be much more functional in bringing about a modern society, as it was when dictatorial power was used to bring about land reform during the American occupation of Japan.

在创造社会条件,使资本主义经济增长,并随着时间的推移使稳定的民主制度出现方面,一个现代化的独裁政权原则上可能比民主制度有效得多。以菲律宾的情况为例。菲律宾社会至今仍以农村高度不平等的社会秩序为特征,少数传统的地主家庭控制着全国非常大比例的农业用地。像其他地主上层阶级一样,菲律宾版的特点是没有很多活力和效率。尽管如此,通过他们的社会地位,他们还是成功地主导了独立后菲律宾的大部分政治。这一社会群体的持续主导地位反过来又孕育了东南亚仅存的几个毛派游击运动之一,即菲律宾共产党及其军事部门 —— 新人民军。1986 年,马科斯独裁政权倒台,科拉松·阿基诺接替了他的位置,但这并没有对土地分配问题或叛乱活动起到任何补救作用,尤其是因为阿基诺夫人的家族是菲律宾最大的土地所有者之一。自她当选以来,实施严肃的土地改革计划的努力因立法机构的反对而搁浅,而立法机构主要由将成为改革目标的人控制。在这种情况下,民主在实现平等主义的社会秩序方面受到了限制,而这种秩序无论是作为资本主义增长的基础还是作为民主本身的长期稳定都是必要的。在这种情况下,独裁在实现现代社会方面可能会发挥更大的作用,就像在美国占领日本期间利用独裁权力来实现土地改革一样。

A similar kind of reform effort was undertaken by the leftwing military officers who ruled Peru between 1968 and 1980. Before the military takeover, 50 percent of Peru’s land was held by seven hundred hacienda owners who also controlled much of Peruvian politics. The military enacted the most sweeping land reform in Latin America after Cuba’s, replacing the old agrarian obligarchs with a new, more modern elite of industrialists and technobureaucats, and facilitating the dramatic growth of a middle class through improvements in education. This dictatorial interlude saddled Peru with an even larger and more inefficient state sector, but it did eliminate some of the most glaring social inequalities and thereby improved somewhat the longterm prospects for the emergence of an economically modern sector after the military returned to their barracks in 1980.

1968 年至 1980 年期间统治秘鲁的左翼军官也进行了类似的改革努力。在军方接管之前,秘鲁 50% 的土地被七百个庄园主所占有,他们也控制了秘鲁的大部分政治。军方颁布了仅次于古巴的拉丁美洲最全面的土地改革,用工业家和技术官僚组成的新的、更现代化的精英阶层取代了旧的农业义务制,并通过改善教育促进了中产阶级的急剧增长。这段独裁时期使秘鲁的国家部门规模更大、效率更低,但它确实消除了一些最明显的社会不平等现象,从而在一定程度上改善了 1980 年军队重返军营后经济现代化部门出现的长期前景。

The use of dictatorial state power to break the grip of established social groups is not unique to the Leninist Left; its use by rightwing regimes can pave the way toward market economics and therefore the achievement of the most advanced levels of industrialization. For capitalism flourishes best in a mobile and egalitarian society where an entrepreneurial middle class has pushed aside traditional landowners and other privileged but economically inefficient social groups. If a modernizing dictatorship uses coercion to speed up this process, and at the same time avoids the temptation to transfer resources and power from an inefficient traditional landowning class to an equally inefficient state sector, then there is no reason why it should be economically incompatible with the most modern forms of “postindustrial” economic organization. It is this kind of logic that has led Andranik Migranian and other Soviet intellectuals to call for an “authoritarian transition” to a market economy in the USSR through the creation of a national presidency with dictatorial powers.

使用独裁的国家权力来打破既定社会群体的控制,并不是列宁主义左派所独有的;右翼政权使用这种权力可以为市场经济铺平道路,从而实现最先进的工业化水平。因为资本主义在一个流动的、平等的社会中发展得最好,在这个社会中,创业的中产阶级已经把传统的地主和其他有特权但经济效率低下的社会群体挤到一边。如果一个现代化的独裁政权使用强制手段来加速这一进程,同时避免将资源和权力从低效的传统地主阶级转移到同样低效的国家部门的诱惑,那么它就没有理由在经济上与最现代的 “后工业” 经济组织形式不相容。正是这种逻辑导致安德拉尼克·米格拉尼扬和其他苏联知识分子呼吁通过建立一个拥有独裁权力的国家总统,在苏联实现向市场经济的 “专制过渡”。

Sharp social cleavages along class, national, ethnic, or religious lines can be mitigated by the process of capitalist economic development itself, improving the prospects for the emergence of a democratic consensus over time. But there is no guarantee that these differences will not persist as a country grows economically, or indeed, that they will not come back in a more virulent form. Economic development has not weakened the sense of national identity among French Canadians in Quebec; indeed, their fear of homogenization into the dominant Anglophone culture has sharpened their desire to preserve their distinctiveness. To say that democracy is more functional for societies “born equal” like the United States begs the question of how a nation gets there in the first place. Democracy, then, does not necessarily become more functional as societies become more complex and diverse. In fact, it fails precisely when the diversity of a society passes a certain limit.

沿着阶级、民族、种族或宗教路线的尖锐社会裂痕可以通过资本主义经济发展过程本身得到缓解,从而改善随着时间推移出现民主共识的前景。但不能保证这些分歧不会随着一个国家的经济增长而持续存在,或者说,它们不会以更激烈的形式重新出现。经济发展并没有削弱魁北克法裔加拿大人的民族认同感;事实上,他们对同质化为主流英语文化的恐惧,使他们对保持自己的独特性的愿望更加强烈。如果说民主对于像美国这样 “生而平等” 的社会更有作用,那就会引出一个问题:一个国家首先是如何达到这个目标的。那么,民主并不一定会随着社会变得更加复杂和多样化而变得更加有效。事实上,当一个社会的多样性超过一定限度时,民主就会失效。

The second of the arguments presented above, that democracy eventually emerges as the byproduct of a power struggle among non-democratic elites on either the Left or the Right, is also not satisfying as an explanation for why there should be a universal evolution in the direction of liberal democracy. For by this account, democracy is not the preferred outcome of any of the groups struggling for leadership in the country. Democracy becomes instead a kind of truce between warring factions, and is vulnerable to a shift in the balance of power between them that would allow one particular group or elite to re-emerge triumphant. In other words, if democracy arises in the Soviet Union only because ambitious figures like Gorbachev and Yeltsin need a demagogic stick with which to beat the established party apparatus, it follows that the victory of one or the other would lead to a rescinding of democratic gains. Similarly, this argument presumes that democracy in Latin America is little more than a compromise between the authoritarian Right and authoritarian Left, or between powerful groups on the Right, each of which has its own preferred vision of society that it will impose when it is in a position to attain power. This may be an accurate way of describing the process leading to democracy in certain specific countries, but if democracy is nobody’s first choice it will hardly be stable. Such an explanation cannot be grounds for expecting a universal evolution in that direction.


The final argument, that advancing industrialization produces educated, middleclass societies that naturally prefer liberal rights and democratic participation, is correct only up to a point. It is reasonably clear that education is, if not an absolutely necessary precondition, then at least a highly desirable adjunct to democracy. It is hard to imagine democracy working properly in a largely illiterate society where the people cannot take advantage of information about the choices open to them. But it is a rather different matter to say that education necessarily leads to belief in democratic norms. It is the case that rising educational levels in countries from the Soviet Union and China to South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil have been closely associated with the spread of democratic norms. But fashionable ideas in the world’s educational centers happen to be democratic at the present moment: it is not surprising that a Taiwanese student receiving an engineering degree at UCLA should return home believing that liberal democracy represents the highest form of political organization for modern countries. But this is very different from arguing that there is any necessary connection between his engineering training, which is what will be economically important to Taiwan, and his newfound belief in liberal democracy. Indeed, to think that education leads naturally to democratic values reflects considerable presumption on the part of democratic man. In other periods, when democratic ideas were not as broadly accepted, young people studying in the W est just as frequently went home believing that communism or fascism was the wave of the future for modern societies. Higher education in the United States and other Western countries today generally inculcates in young people the historicist and relativist perspective of twentieth-century thought. This prepares them for citizenship in liberal democracies by en­couraging a kind of tolerance for differing points of view, but it also teaches them that there is no final ground for belief in the superiority of liberal democracy to other forms of government.

最后一个论点,即不断推进的工业化产生了受过教育的中产阶级社会,这些社会自然倾向于自由权利和民主参与,这只是在一定程度上是正确的。比较清楚的是,如果不是绝对必要的前提条件,那么教育至少是民主的一个非常理想的辅助手段。很难想象民主会在一个基本不识字的社会中正常运作,因为在这个社会中,人们无法利用关于向他们开放的选择的信息。但是,如果说教育一定会导致对民主规范的信仰,那就是另一回事了。事实是,从苏联和中国到韩国、台湾和巴西,这些国家教育水平的提高与民主规范的传播密切相关。但是,在世界教育中心的时髦观念在当前恰好是民主的:一个在加州大学洛杉矶分校获得工程学位的台湾学生回国后相信自由民主代表了现代国家政治组织的最高形式,这并不令人惊讶。但这与认为他的工程训练 —— 这对台湾来说是很重要的 —— 与他新发现的自由民主信念之间有任何必然联系是完全不同的。事实上,认为教育会自然而然地导致民主价值观,反映了民主人士的相当大的推测。在其他时期,当民主思想还没有被广泛接受的时候,在 WEST 学习的年轻人回家后也经常相信共产主义或法西斯主义是现代社会的未来趋势。今天美国和其他西方国家的高等教育通常向年轻人灌输二十世纪思想的历史主义和相对主义观点。这为他们在自由民主国家的公民身份做了准备,鼓励他们对不同观点的容忍,但这也告诉他们,相信自由民主比其他形式的政府优越,并没有最终的依据。

The fact that educated, middleclass people in the most advanced, industrialized countries by and large prefer liberal democracy over various forms of authoritarianism begs the question of why they show this preference. It seems fairly clear that the preference for democracy is not dictated by the logic of the industrialization process itself. Indeed, the logic of that process would seem to point in quite the opposite direction. For if a country’s goal is economic growth above all other considerations, the truly winning combination would appear to be neither liberal democracy nor socialism of either a Leninist or democratic variety, but the combination of liberal economics and authoritarian politics that some observers have labeled the “bureaucraticauthoritarian state,” or what we might term a “marketoriented authoritarianism.”

在最先进的工业化国家中,受过教育的中产阶级基本上都喜欢自由民主,而不是各种形式的专制主义,这就引出了一个问题:为什么他们会有这种偏好。似乎相当清楚的是,对民主的偏爱并不是由工业化进程本身的逻辑所决定的。事实上,这个过程的逻辑似乎指向了完全相反的方向。因为如果一个国家的目标是经济增长高于所有其他考虑因素,那么真正获胜的组合似乎既不是自由民主,也不是列宁主义或民主主义的社会主义,而是自由经济和专制政治的组合,一些观察家称之为 “官僚专制国家”,或者我们可以称之为 “市场导向的专制主义”。

There is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that marketoriented authoritarian modernizers do better economically than their democratic counterparts. Historically, some of the most impressive economic growth records have been compiled by this type of state, including Imperial Germany, Meiji Japan, the Russia of Witte and Stolypin, and, more recently, Brazil after the military takeover in 1964, Chile under Pinochet, and, of course, the NIEs of Asia. Between 1961 and 1968, for example, the average annual growth rate of the developing world’s democracies, including India, Ceylon, the Philippines, Chile, and Costa Rica, was only 2. percent, whereas the group of conservative authoritarian regimes (Spain, Portugal, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan) had an average growth rate of 5. percent.

有相当多的经验证据表明,以市场为导向的威权主义现代化国家在经济上比其民主国家做得更好。从历史上看,一些最令人印象深刻的经济增长记录是由这种类型的国家编制的,包括帝国德国、明治日本、维特和斯托雷平的俄国,以及最近,1964 年军事接管后的巴西、皮诺切特时期的智利,当然还有亚洲的国家经济实体。例如,在 1961 年至 1968 年期间,发展中世界的民主国家,包括印度、锡兰、菲律宾、智利和哥斯达黎加的平均年增长率只有 2%,而保守的专制政权集团(西班牙、葡萄牙、伊朗、台湾、韩国、泰国和巴基斯坦)的平均增长率为 5%。

The reasons why a marketoriented authoritarian state should do better economically than a democratic one are reasonably straightforward, and were described by the economist Joseph Schumpeter in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. While voters in democratic countries may affirm free-market principles in the abstract, they are all too ready to abandon them when their own short-term, economic selfinterest is at stake. There is no presumption, in other words, that democratic publics will make economically rational choices, or that economic losers will not use their political power to protect their positions. Democratic regimes, reflecting the demands of the various interest groups in their societies, tend as a whole to spend more on welfare, to create disincentives to production through wage-leveling tax policies, to protect failing and non-competitive industries, and therefore to have larger budget deficits and higher rates of inflation. T o take one example close to home, during the 1980s the United States spent much more than it produced through a series of mounting budget deficits, constraining future economic growth and the choices of future generations in order to maintain a high level of present consumption. Despite a widespread concern that this kind of improvidence would be damaging in the long term both economically and politically, the American democratic system was unable to deal seriously with the problem because it could not decide on how to fairly allocate the resulting pain of budget cuts and tax increases. Democracy in America has therefore not demonstrated a high degree of economic functionality in recent years.

经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特(Joseph Schumpeter)在他的《资本主义、社会主义和民主》一书中描述了以市场为导向的威权国家在经济上比民主国家做得更好的原因,这一点相当直接。虽然民主国家的选民可能会抽象地肯定自由市场原则,但当他们自己的短期经济利益受到威胁时,他们都会随时放弃这些原则。换句话说,没有人假定民主公众会做出经济上的理性选择,也没有人假定经济上的失败者不会利用他们的政治力量来保护自己的地位。民主制度反映了其社会中各种利益集团的要求,整体上倾向于在福利上花费更多,通过工资水平的税收政策来抑制生产,保护失败的和没有竞争力的行业,因此,预算赤字更大,通货膨胀率更高。举一个离家很近的例子,在 20 世纪 80 年代,美国通过一系列不断增加的预算赤字,花费的钱比生产的钱多得多,限制了未来的经济增长和后代的选择,以维持当前的高消费水平。尽管人们普遍担心这种不自量力的行为会在经济上和政治上造成长期的损害,但美国的民主制度却无法认真处理这个问题,因为它无法决定如何公平地分配由此产生的预算削减和增税的痛苦。因此,美国的民主制度在最近几年没有表现出高度的经济功能。

Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, are in principle better able to follow truly liberal economic policies undistorted by redistributive goals that constrain growth. They do not have to be accountable to workers in declining industries, or subsidize inefficient sectors simply because the latter have political clout. They can actually use the power of the state to hold down consumption in the interests of longterm growth. During its period of high growth in the 1960s, the South Korean government was able to suppress wage demands by banning strikes and forbidding talk of greater worker consumption and welfare. By contrast, South Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987 led to an enormous proliferation of strikes and long-suppressed wage demands that the new, democratically elected regime had to meet. The result was significantly higher Korean labor costs and diminished competitiveness. Of course, communist regimes have been able to achieve extremely high rates of savings and investment by ruthlessly squeezing consumers, but their long-run growth and ability to modernize were hobbled by the absence of competition. Marketoriented authoritarians,on the other hand, have the best of both worlds: they are able to enforce a relatively high degree of social discipline on their populations, while permitting a sufficient degree of freedom to encourage innovation and the employment of the most up-to-date technologies.

另一方面,专制政权原则上能够更好地遵循真正自由的经济政策,不受限制增长的再分配目标的影响。他们不必对衰落行业的工人负责,也不必仅仅因为后者有政治影响力而对低效部门进行补贴。他们实际上可以利用国家的力量来压制消费,以利于长期增长。在 1960 年代的高增长时期,韩国政府能够通过禁止罢工和禁止谈论更多的工人消费和福利来压制工资要求。相比之下,韩国在 1987 年向民主过渡,导致罢工和长期被压制的工资要求大量增加,新的民选政权不得不满足这些要求。其结果是韩国的劳动力成本大大增加,竞争力下降。当然,共产主义政权能够通过无情地压榨消费者来实现极高的储蓄和投资率,但他们的长期增长和现代化能力却因为缺乏竞争而受到阻碍。另一方面,以市场为导向的专制主义者拥有两个世界中最好的东西:他们能够对其人民实施相对较高的社会纪律,同时允许足够的自由度,以鼓励创新和使用最新的技术。

If one argument against the economic efficiency of democracies is that they tamper too much with the market in the interests of redistribution and current consumption, another argument is that they do not tamper with it enough. Marketoriented authoritarian regimes are in many ways more statist in their economic policies than the developed democracies of North America and Western Europe. But this statism is single-mindedly directed toward promoting high economic growth rather than to goals like redistribution and social justice. It is not clear whether socalled “industrial policies,” in which the state subsidizes or supports certain economic sectors at the expense of others have been more of a hindrance than a help to the economies of Japan and other Asian NIEs in the long run. But state intervention in the market, competently executed and remaining within the broad parameters of a competitive market, has quite evidently been fully compatible with very high levels of growth. Taiwanese planners in the late 1970s to early 1980s were able to shift investment resources from light industries like textiles to more advanced ones like electronics and semiconductors, despite the considerable pain and unemployment this created in the former sector. An industrial policy worked in Taiwan only because the state was able to shield its planning technocrats from political pressures so that they could reinforce the market and make decisions according to criteria of efficiency—in other words, it worked because Taiwan was not governed democratically. An American industrial policy is much less likely to improve its economic competitiveness, precisely because America is more democratic than Taiwan or the Asian NIEs. The planning process would quickly fall prey to pressures from Congress either to protect inefficient industries or to promote ones favored by special interests.

如果说反对民主国家经济效率的一个论点是它们为了再分配和当前的消费而对市场做了太多的手脚,那么另一个论点则是它们对市场做的手脚不够多。以市场为导向的专制政权在许多方面比北美和西欧的发达民主国家的经济政策更具有国家主义。但这种国家主义是一心一意为了促进经济的高速增长,而不是为了重新分配和社会公正等目标。目前还不清楚所谓的 “产业政策”,即国家以牺牲其他部门的利益来补贴或支持某些经济部门,从长远来看,对日本和其他亚洲新兴工业化国家的经济是否是阻碍多于帮助。但是,国家对市场的干预,在竞争性市场的广泛参数范围内有能力地执行,显然与非常高的增长水平完全相容。台湾的规划者在 1970 年代末至 1980 年代初能够将投资资源从纺织业等轻工业转移到电子和半导体等更先进的行业,尽管这在前一个部门造成了巨大的痛苦和失业。工业政策在台湾之所以奏效,只是因为国家能够保护其规划技术官僚不受政治压力的影响,从而使他们能够加强市场并根据效率标准做出决定 —— 换句话说,它之所以奏效,是因为台湾没有实行民主治理。美国的工业政策更不可能提高其经济竞争力,这正是因为美国比台湾或亚洲的新兴经济体更民主。规划过程将很快受到来自国会的压力,要么保护低效产业,要么促进特殊利益集团所青睐的产业。

There is an unquestionable relationship between economic development and liberal democracy, which one can observe simply by looking around the world. But the exact nature of that relationship is more complicated than it first appeared, and is not adequately explained by any of the theories presented up to this point. The logic of modern natural science and the industrialization process it fosters does not point in a single direction in the sphere of politics, as it does in the sphere of economics. Liberal democracy is compatible with industrial maturity, and is preferred by the citizens of many industrially advanced states, but there does not appear to be a necessary connection between the two. The Mechanism underlying our directional history leads equally well to a bureaucraticauthoritarian future as to a liberal one. W e will therefore have to look elsewhere in trying to understand the current crisis of authoritarianism and the worldwide democratic revolution.


To Kant’s question, Is it possible to write a Universal History from a cosmopolitan point of view? our provisional answer is yes.


Modern natural science has provided us with a Mechanism whose progressive unfolding gives both a directionality and a coherence to human history over the past several centuries. In an age when we can no longer identify the experiences of Europe and North America with those of humanity as a whole, the Mechanism is truly universal. Apart from fast-disappearing tribes in the jungles of Brazil or Papua New Guinea, there is not a single branch of mankind that has not been touched by the Mechanism, and which has not become linked to the rest of mankind through the universal economic nexus of modern consumerism. It is not the mark of provincialism but of cosmopolitanism to recognize that there has emerged in the last few centuries something like a true global culture, centering around technologically driven economic growth and the capitalist social relations necessary to produce and sustain it. Societies which have sought to resist this unification, from Tokugawa Japan and the Sublime Porte, to the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, Burma, and Iran, have managed to fight rearguard actions that have lasted only for a generation or two. Those that were not defeated by superior military technology were seduced by the glittering material world that modern natural science has created. While not every country is capable of becoming a consumer society in the near future, there is hardly a society in the world that does not embrace the goal itself.


Given the grip of modern natural science, it is difficult to sustain the idea that history is cyclical. This is not to say that there is no repetition in history. Those who have read Thucydides can note the parallels between the rivalry of Athens and Sparta and the Cold W ar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those who have watched the periodic rise and fall of certain great powers in antiquity and compared them to those of contemporary times, are not wrong in seeing similarities. But recurrence of certain longstanding historical patterns is compatible with a directional, dialectical history, as long as we understand that there is memory and movement between repetitions. Athenian democracy is not modern democracy, nor does Sparta find any contemporary counterpart, despite certain resemblances it might bear to Stalin’s Soviet Union. A truly cyclical history like that envisioned by Plato or Aristotle would require a global cataclysm of such magnitude that all memory of earlier times would be lost. Even in an age of nuclear weapons and global warming, it is difficult to conceive of a cataclysm with the power to destroy the idea of modern natural science. And as long as a stake is not driven through that vampire’s heart, it will reconstitute itself— with all of its social, economic, and political concomitants—within the space of a few generations. Reversing course in any fundamental way would mean a total break with modern natural science and the economic world created by it. There seems to be little prospect that any contemporary society will chose to do so, and military competition will in any case make membership in that world self-enforcing.

鉴于现代自然科学的控制力,很难维持历史是周期性的观点。这并不是说,历史上没有重复。读过修昔底德的人可以注意到雅典和斯巴达的竞争与美国和苏联的冷战冲突之间的相似之处。那些观察过古代某些大国的周期性兴衰,并将其与当代的大国进行比较的人,看到相似之处并没有错。但是,某些长期存在的历史模式的重复出现是与有方向性的、辩证的历史相适应的,只要我们理解在重复之间存在着记忆和运动。雅典民主不是现代民主,斯巴达也没有找到任何当代对应物,尽管它可能与斯大林的苏联有某些相似之处。像柏拉图或亚里士多德所设想的那种真正的周期性历史,需要一场规模如此之大的全球性灾难,以至于所有关于早期的记忆都会消失。即使在一个拥有核武器和全球变暖的时代,也很难想象一场大灾难有能力摧毁现代自然科学的理念。只要不把木桩刺进吸血鬼的心脏,它就会在几代人的时间内重建自己 —— 及其所有的社会、经济和政治伴随物。以任何根本的方式扭转方向都将意味着与现代自然科学和由它创造的经济世界彻底决裂。任何当代社会似乎都不可能选择这样做,而军事竞争在任何情况下都会使这个世界的成员资格得到自我强化。

At the end of the twentieth century, Hitler and Stalin appear to be bypaths of history that led to dead ends, rather than real alternatives for human social organization. While their human costs were incalculable, these totalitarianisms in their purest form burned themselves out within a lifetime—Hitlerism in 1945, and Stalinism by 1956. Many other countries have tried to duplicate totalitarianism in some form, from the Chinese Revolution in 1949 to the genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the mid1970s, with a myriad of small ugly dictatorships in between, stretching from North Korea, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Cuba, and Afghanistan on the Left to Iran, Iraq, and Syria on the Right. But the common characteristic of all of these latter-day, would-be totalitarianisms is that they have occurred in relatively backward and impoverished Third World countries. The persistent failure of communism to make headway in the developed world, and its prevalence among countries that are just entering the first stages of industrialization, suggest that the “totalitarian temptation” has been, as Walt Rostow put it, primarilya “disease of the transition,” a pathological condition arising out of the special political and social requirements of countries at a certain stage of socioeconomic development.

在二十世纪末,希特勒和斯大林似乎是通向死胡同的历史绕道,而不是人类社会组织的真正替代方案。虽然它们的人类代价无法估量,但这些最纯粹的极权主义在一生中就被烧毁了 —— 希特勒主义在 1945 年,而斯大林主义在 1956 年。许多其他国家也试图以某种形式复制极权主义,从 1949 年的中国革命到 1970 年代中期柬埔寨的红色高棉的种族灭绝,中间还有无数丑陋的小独裁政权,从左派的朝鲜、南也门、埃塞俄比亚、古巴和阿富汗到右派的伊朗、伊拉克和叙利亚。但所有这些后世的、可能的极权主义的共同特点是,它们都发生在相对落后和贫穷的第三世界国家。共产主义在发达国家的持续失败,以及它在刚刚进入工业化第一阶段的国家中的普遍存在,表明 “极权主义的诱惑”,正如沃尔特·罗斯托所说,主要是一种 “转型期的疾病”,是处于社会经济发展的某个阶段的国家的特殊政治和社会要求所产生的病态。

But what then about fascism, which did arise in a highly developed country? How is it possible to relegate German National Socialism to a “stage of history,” rather than seeing it as a specific invention of modernity itself? And if the generation that lived through the 1930s was shocked out of its complacency by the explosion of hatreds supposedly “overcome” by the progress of civilization, who can guarantee that we will not be surprised by a new eruption coming from another source heretofore unrecognized?

但是,那么法西斯主义呢,它确实产生于一个高度发达的国家?怎么可能将德国国家社会主义归入 “历史阶段”,而不是将其视为现代性本身的具体发明?如果经历过 1930 年代的那一代人被所谓被文明进步 “克服” 的仇恨的爆发震惊了,那么谁能保证我们不会被来自另一个迄今未被认识到的来源的新的爆发所惊讶?

The answer is, of course, that we have no guarantee and cannot assure future generations that there will be no future Hitlers or Pol Pots. A modern-day, would-be Hegelian who maintained that Hitler was necessary to bring democracy to Germany after 1945 would deserve ridicule. On the other hand, a Universal History need not justify every tyrannical regime and every war to expose a meaningful larger pattern in human evolution. The power and longterm regularity of that evolutionary process is not diminished if we admit that it was subject to large and apparently unexplainable discontinuities, any more than the biological theory of evolution is undermined by the fact of the sudden extinction of the dinosaurs.

当然,答案是,我们无法保证,也无法向后代保证,未来不会有希特勒或波尔图。一个现代的、想成为黑格尔的人,如果坚持认为希特勒对 1945 年后的德国带来民主是必要的,那将值得嘲笑。另一方面,《世界历史》不需要为每一个暴政和每一场战争进行辩解,就能揭示出人类进化中一个有意义的大模式。如果我们承认这一进化过程存在着巨大的、明显无法解释的不连续性,那么这一进化过程的力量和长期规律性就不会被削弱,就像生物进化理论被恐龙的突然灭绝这一事实所削弱一样。

It is not sufficient to simply cite the Holocaust and expect discourse on the question of progress or rationality in human history to end, much as the horror of this event should make us pause and contemplate. There is an inclination not to want to discuss the Holocaust’s historical causes rationally, similar in many respects to the opposition of anti-nuclear activists to rational discourse about deterrence or the strategic employment of nuclear weapons. In both cases there is an underlying concern that “rationalization” will domesticate genocide. It is common among writers who see the Holocaust as in some way the cardinal event of modernity to maintain that it is both historically unique in its evil, and at the same time a manifestation of a potentially universal evil that lies below the surface of all societies. But one cannot have it both ways: if it is a uniquely evil event, one without historical precedent, then it must have had equally unique causes, causes that we would not expect to see easily duplicated in other countries at different times. It therefore cannot be taken as in any way a necessary aspect of modernity. On the other hand, if it is a manifestation of a universal evil, then it becomes just an extreme version of a terrible but very familiar phenomenon of nationalist excess, which can slow down but not derail the locomotive of History.

仅仅引用大屠杀,并期望结束关于人类历史上的进步或理性问题的讨论是不够的,尽管这一事件的恐怖应该让我们暂停和沉思。有一种倾向是不想理性地讨论大屠杀的历史原因,这在许多方面类似于反核活动家反对理性地讨论威慑或战略使用核武器的问题。在这两种情况下,都有一种潜在的担忧,即 “合理化” 将使种族灭绝行为本土化。在那些将大屠杀视为现代性的主要事件的作家中,普遍认为大屠杀在历史上是独一无二的邪恶,同时也是一种潜在的普遍邪恶的表现,这种邪恶隐藏在所有社会的表面之下。但是,我们不能两全其美:如果它是一个独特的邪恶事件,一个没有历史先例的事件,那么它一定有同样独特的原因,我们不会期望在不同时期的其他国家轻易看到这些原因。因此,它不能以任何方式被视为现代性的一个必要方面。另一方面,如果它是一种普遍的邪恶的表现,那么它就成了一种可怕但非常熟悉的民族主义过度现象的极端版本,它可以减缓但不能使历史的火车头脱轨。

I am inclined toward the view that the Holocaust was both a unique evil and the product of historically unique circumstances that converged in Germany during the 1920s and 30s. These conditions are not only not latent in most developed societies, but would be very hard (though not impossible) to duplicate in other societies in the future. Many of these circumstances, such as defeat in a long and brutal war and economic depression, are well known and potentially replicable in other countries. But others have to do with the special intellectual and cultural traditions of Germany at the time, its anti-materialism and emphasis on struggle and sacrifice, that made it very distinct from liberal France and England. These traditions, which were in no way “modern,” were tested by the wrenching social disruptions caused by Imperial Germany’s hothouse industrialization before and after the Franco-Prussian W ar . It is possible to understand nazism as another, albeit extreme, variant of the “disease of the transition,” a byproduct of the modernization process that was by no means a necessary component of modernity itself. None of this implies that a phenomenon like nazism is now impossible because we have advanced socially beyond such a stage. It does suggest, however, that fascism is a pathological and extreme condition, by which one cannot judge modernity as a whole.

我倾向于这样的观点:大屠杀既是一种独特的罪恶,也是 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代在德国汇聚的历史上独特情况的产物。这些情况不仅在大多数发达社会中不存在,而且在未来的其他社会中也很难(尽管不是不可能)复制。其中许多情况,如在长期残酷的战争中的失败和经济萧条,是众所周知的,并有可能在其他国家复制。但其他情况与德国当时特殊的知识和文化传统有关,它的反物质主义和对斗争和牺牲的强调,使它与自由主义的法国和英国非常不同。这些传统决不是 “现代” 的,在普法战争前后,帝国德国的温室工业化所造成的巨大的社会混乱中,这些传统受到了考验。我们可以把纳粹主义理解为 “转型期的疾病” 的另一个变种,尽管是极端的,是现代化进程的副产品,但绝不是现代性本身的必要组成部分。这并不意味着像纳粹主义这样的现象现在是不可能的,因为我们的社会发展已经超越了这样的阶段。然而,它确实表明,法西斯主义是一种病态和极端的状况,人们不能以此来判断整个现代性。

To say that Stalinism or nazism are diseases of social development is not to be blind to their monstrosity or to lack sympathy for their victims. As Jean-François Revel has pointed out, the fact that liberal democracy is victorious in some countries in the 1980s does nothing for the majority of humanity in the past hundred years whose lives have been consumed by totalitarianism.

说斯大林主义或纳粹主义是社会发展的疾病,并不是对它们的畸形视而不见或对它们的受害者缺乏同情心。正如 Jean-François Revel 所指出的,自由民主在 20 世纪 80 年代的一些国家取得了胜利,但对于过去一百年中被极权主义吞噬了生命的人类大多数来说,这并不意味着什么。

On the other hand, the fact that their lives have been wasted and their pain unredeemed should not leave us speechless in trying to address the question of whether there is a rational pattern to history. There is a widespread expectation that a Universal History, if one can be discerned, must function as a kind of secular theodicy, that is, a justification of all that exists in terms of history’s final end. This no Universal History can reasonably be expected to do. From the beginning, such an intellectual construct represents an enormous abstraction from the detail and texture of history, and almost necessarily ends up ignoring entire peoples and ages that constitute “pre-history.” Any Universal History we can construct will inevitably give no reasonable account of many occurrences which are all too real to the people who experience them. A Universal History is simply an intellectual tool; it cannot take the place of God in bringing personal redemption to every one of history’s victims.

另一方面,他们的生命被浪费了,他们的痛苦没有得到救赎,这一事实不应该让我们在试图解决历史是否存在合理模式的问题时无言以对。人们普遍期望,如果能够发现一部普遍的历史,它必须作为一种世俗的神论发挥作用,也就是说,在历史的最终结局方面为所有存在的事物提供理由。我们不能合理地期望任何一部世界历史能够做到这一点。从一开始,这样的知识结构就代表了对历史细节和质地的巨大抽象,而且几乎必然最终忽略了构成 “史前” 的整个民族和时代。我们所能构建的任何世界历史都将不可避免地对许多事件作出合理的解释,而这些事件对于经历过这些事件的人来说是非常真实的。通史只是一种智力工具;它不能代替上帝为每一个历史的受害者带来个人的救赎。

Nor does the existence of discontinuities in historical development like the Holocaust—horrifying as they may be—nullify the obvious fact that modernity is a coherent and extremely powerful whole. The existence of discontinuities does not make any less real the remarkable similarities in the experiences of people living through the process of modernization. No person could deny that twentieth-century life is different in fundamental ways from life in all previous ages, and few of those comfortable residents of developed democracies who scoff at the idea of historical progress in the abstract would be willing to make their lives in a backward, Third World country that represents, in effect, an earlier age of mankind. One can recognize the fact that modernity has permitted new scope for human evil, even question the fact of human moral progress, and yet continue to believe in the existence of a directional and coherent historical process.

像大屠杀这样的历史发展的不连续性的存在 —— 尽管它们可能是可怕的 —— 也不能否定一个明显的事实,即现代性是一个连贯的、极其强大的整体。不连续性的存在并没有使经历过现代化进程的人们的经历中的显著相似性变得不那么真实。没有人会否认,二十世纪的生活在根本上不同于以往所有时代的生活,而那些对抽象的历史进步观念嗤之以鼻的发达民主国家的舒适居民中,很少有人愿意在一个落后的第三世界国家过日子,而这个国家实际上代表了人类的早期时代。人们可以承认现代性为人类的邪恶提供了新的空间,甚至质疑人类道德进步的事实,但仍然相信存在着一个有方向性和连贯性的历史进程。

It should be evident by now that the Mechanism we have laid out is essentially an economic interpretation of history. The “logic of modern natural science” has no force of its own, apart from the human beings who want to make use of science to conquer nature so as to satisfy their needs, or to secure themselves against dangers. In itself, science (whether in the form of machine production or the rational organization of labor) dictates only a horizon of technological possibilities determined by the basic laws of nature. It is human desire that pushes men to exploit these possibilities: not the desire to satisfy a limited set of “natural” needs, but a highly elastic desire whose own horizon of possibilities is constantly being pushed back.

现在应该很明显,我们所阐述的机制基本上是对历史的经济解释。“现代自然科学的逻辑” 没有自己的力量,除了那些想利用科学来征服自然以满足他们的需要,或确保自己免受危险的人类。就其本身而言,科学(无论是以机器生产的形式还是以劳动的合理组织形式)只规定了一个由自然界的基本规律决定的技术可能性的范围。推动人们利用这些可能性的是人类的欲望:不是满足一套有限的 “自然” 需求的欲望,而是一种高度弹性的欲望,其自身的可能性的范围不断被推后。

The Mechanism is, in other words, a kind of Marxist interpretation of history that leads to a completely non-Marxist conclusion. It is the desire of “man the species-being” to produce and consume that leads him to leave the countryside for the city, to work in large factories or large bureaucracies rather than on the land, to sell his labor to the highest bidder instead of working in the occupation of his ancestors, to acquire an education and to submit to the discipline of the clock.

换句话说,“机制” 是一种对历史的马克思主义解释,导致了一个完全非马克思主义的结论。正是 “人这个物种的存在” 对生产和消费的渴望,导致他离开农村来到城市,在大型工厂或大型官僚机构工作,而不是在土地上工作,把他的劳动力卖给出价最高的人,而不是从事他祖先的职业,获得教育并服从于时钟的纪律约束。

But, contrary to Marx, the kind of society that permits people to produce and consume the largest quantity of products on the most equal basis is not a communist one, but a capitalist society. In volume 3 of Capital, Marx describes the realm of freedom that will emerge under communism in the following terms:


In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite.


The Marxist realm of freedom is, in effect, the four-hour working day: that is, a society so productive that man’s labor in the morning can satisfy all of his natural needs and those of his family and fellows, leaving him the afternoon and evening to be a hunter, or a poet, or a critic. In a way, real-world communist societies like the Soviet Union or the former German Democratic Republic achieved this realm of freedom, since few people put in more than four hours of honest work a day. But the remainder of their time was seldom spent writing poems or criticism, since this could promptly land them in jail; it was spent waiting on line, drinking, or scheming for the opportunity to take a vacation in a crowded sanitarium on a polluted beach. But if the “necessary labor time” required to satisfy basic physical needs was four hours on average for workers in socialist societies, it was on the order of an hour or two for corresponding capitalist societies, and the six or seven hours of “surplus labor” time that rounded out the working day did not go only into the pockets of capitalists, but allowed workers to buy cars and washing machines, barbecues and campers. Whether this constituted a “realm of freedom” in any meaningful sense was another matter, but an American worker was far more fully liberated from the “realm of necessity” than his Soviet counterpart.

马克思主义的自由境界实际上是四小时工作制:也就是说,一个社会的生产力很高,人在上午的劳动可以满足他和他的家人及伙伴的所有自然需求,让他在下午和晚上成为一个猎人,或一个诗人,或一个批评家。在某种程度上,现实世界的共产主义社会,如苏联或前德意志民主共和国,实现了这种自由的境界,因为很少有人每天投入超过四个小时的诚实工作。但他们剩下的时间很少用来写诗或批评,因为这可能会让他们迅速入狱;而是用来排队等候、喝酒,或谋划着在污染的海滩上拥挤的疗养院里度假的机会。但是,如果说社会主义社会的工人满足基本生理需求所需的 “必要劳动时间” 平均为 4 个小时,那么在相应的资本主义社会中则为 1 至 2 个小时,而完成工作日的 6 或 7 个小时的 “剩余劳动” 时间不仅进入了资本家的口袋,而且允许工人购买汽车和洗衣机、烧烤架和野营车。这是否构成任何有意义的 “自由领域” 是另一回事,但美国工人比他的苏联同行更充分地从 “必要领域” 中解放出来。

Of course, statistics on productivity per worker bear no necessary relationship to happiness. As Marx explained, physical needs increase along with productivity, and one would need to know which type of society kept needs in better balance with productive capabilities in order to know which one produced more satisfied workers. The irony is that communist societies came to acquire the everexpanding horizon of wants generated by Western consumerist societies without acquiring the means of satisfying them. Erich Honecker used to say that the standard of living in the German Democratic Republic was “much higher than in the Kaiser’s time”; indeed, it was much higher than for most societies in human history, and satisfied man’s “natural” wants many times over. But this was scarcely relevant. East Germans compared themselves not to people of the Kaiser’s time, but to contemporary West Germans, and found their society lacking.

当然,关于每个工人的生产力的统计数据与幸福没有必然的关系。正如马克思所解释的,物质需求随着生产力的提高而增加,人们需要知道哪种类型的社会使需求与生产能力保持更好的平衡,以便知道哪种类型的社会产生了更多满意的工人。讽刺的是,共产主义社会获得了西方消费主义社会产生的不断扩大的需求范围,却没有获得满足这些需求的手段。埃里希·昂纳克曾经说过,德意志民主共和国的生活水平 “比德皇时代高得多”;的确,它比人类历史上大多数社会的生活水平都高得多,并且多次满足了人类的 “自然” 需求。但这几乎没有什么意义。东德人不是把自己与德皇时代的人相比,而是与当代西德人相比,发现他们的社会缺乏。

If man is primarily an economic animal driven by his desire and reason, then the dialectical process of historical evolution should be reasonably similar for different human societies and cultures. This was the conclusion of “modernization theory,” which borrowed from Marxism an essentially economic view of the underlying forces of historical change. Modernization theory looks much more persuasive in 1990 than it did fifteen or twenty years earlier when it came under heavy attack in academic circles. Almost all countries that have succeeded in achieving a high level of economic development have in fact come to look increasingly similar to one another, rather than less. While there are a variety of routes that countries can take to get to the end of history, there are few versions of modernity other than the capitalist liberal-democratic one that look like they are going concerns. Modernizing countries, from Spain and Portugal to the Soviet Union and China to Taiwan and South Korea, have all moved in this direction.

如果人主要是由欲望和理性驱动的经济动物,那么对于不同的人类社会和文化来说,历史演变的辩证过程应该是合理的。这是 “现代化理论” 的结论,它从马克思主义那里借用了对历史变革的基本力量的基本经济观点。现代化理论在 1990 年看起来比 15 或 20 年前在学术界受到猛烈攻击时更有说服力。几乎所有成功实现高度经济发展的国家,事实上都变得越来越相似,而不是越来越少。虽然各国可以采取各种路线来走到历史的尽头,但除了资本主义自由民主的版本之外,几乎没有其他版本的现代化看起来是要关注的。现代化的国家,从西班牙和葡萄牙到苏联和中国,再到台湾和韩国,都朝着这个方向发展。

But like all economic theories of history, modernization theory is somehow not satisfying. It is a theory that works to the extent that man is an economic creature, to the extent that he is driven by the imperatives of economic growth and industrial rationality. Its undeniable power derives from the fact that human beings, particularly in the aggregate, do in fact act out of such motives for much of their lives. But there are other aspects of human motivation that have nothing to do with economics, and it is here that the discontinuities in history—the majority of man’s wars, the sudden eruptions of religious or ideological or nationalist passion that lead to phenomena like Hitler and Khomeini— find their origin. A true Universal History of mankind would have to be able to explain not only the broad and incremental evolutionary trends, but the discontinuous and unexpected ones as well.

但是,像所有历史上的经济理论一样,现代化理论在某种程度上是不令人满意的。它是一种在人类是经济生物的范围内起作用的理论,在人类被经济增长和工业理性的必要性所驱动的范围内起作用。它不可否认的力量来自于这样一个事实,即人类,特别是在总体上,在他们生活的大部分时间里确实是出于这样的动机而行动。但人类动机的其他方面与经济无关,正是在这里,历史上的不连续性 —— 人类的大多数战争,宗教或意识形态或民族主义激情的突然爆发,导致希特勒和霍梅尼这样的现象 —— 找到了它们的起源。一部真正的人类世界史不仅要能够解释广泛和渐进的进化趋势,而且要能够解释不连续和意外的趋势。

From the preceding discussion it should be clear that we cannot explain the phenomenon of democracy adequately if we try to understand it solely in economic terms. An economic account of history gets us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy, but it does not quite deliver us to the other side. The process of economic modernization may bring about certain largescale social changes like the transformation of tribal and agricultural societies into urban, educated, middleclass ones that in some way create the material conditions for democracy. But this process does not explain democracy itself, for if we look more deeply into the process, we find that democracy is almost never chosen for economic reasons. The first major democratic revolutions, those of the United States and France, both took place just as the Industrial Revolution was getting under way in England and before either country had “modernized” economically as we understand the term today. Their opting for the rights of man could therefore not have been conditioned by the industrialization process. The American Founding Fathers may have been angered over the attempts of the British Crown to tax them without representation in Parliament, but their decision to declare independence and fight Britain in order to establish a new democratic order can hardly be explained as a matter of economic efficiency. Then, as at many subsequent points in world history, the option of prosperity without liberty existed—from the Tory planters who opposed the Declaration of Independence in the United States, to the nineteenth-century authoritarian modernizers of Germany and Japan, to contemporaries like Deng Xiaoping, who offered his country economic liberalization and modernization under the continued tutelage of a dictatorial Communist party, and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who has argued that democracy would be an obstacle to Singapore’s spectacular economic success. And yet, people in all ages have taken the non-economic step of risking their lives and their livelihoods to fight for democratic rights. There is no democracy without democrats, that is, without a specifically Democratic Man that desires and shapes democracy even as he is shaped by it.

从前面的讨论中可以看出,如果我们试图仅仅从经济角度来理解民主现象,我们就无法充分地解释民主。对历史的经济解释使我们到达了自由民主的应许之地的大门,但它并没有完全把我们送到另一边。经济现代化的过程可能会带来某些大规模的社会变革,比如将部落和农业社会转变为城市、受过教育的中产阶级社会,这在某种程度上为民主创造了物质条件。但这一过程并不能解释民主本身,因为如果我们更深入地研究这一过程,就会发现民主几乎从来不是出于经济原因的选择。第一场重要的民主革命,即美国和法国的民主革命,都是在工业革命在英国开始的时候发生的,而且这两个国家在经济上实现了我们今天所理解的 “现代化” 之前。因此,他们对人的权利的选择不可能受到工业化进程的影响。美国的开国元勋们可能对英国王室在议会中没有代表权的情况下向他们征税的企图感到愤怒,但他们为了建立一个新的民主秩序而宣布独立并与英国作战的决定很难被解释为一个经济效率问题。当时,就像后来世界历史上的许多时候一样,存在着没有自由的繁荣的选择 —— 从反对美国独立宣言的托利种植园主,到十九世纪德国和日本的专制现代化者,再到像邓小平这样的同时代人,他在一个独裁的共产党的持续监护下为他的国家提供经济自由化和现代化,以及新加坡的李光耀,他认为民主将成为新加坡惊人的经济成功的障碍。然而,各个时代的人们都采取了非经济性的措施,冒着生命和生计的危险为民主权利而战。没有民主人士就没有民主,也就是说,没有一个专门的民主人士,即使他被民主所塑造,也渴望和塑造民主。

A Universal History based on the progressive unfolding of modern natural science can, moreover, make sense only of the past four hundred or so years of human history, dating from the discovery of the scientific method in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet neither the scientific method nor the liberation of human desire that drove subsequent efforts to conquer nature and bend it to human purposes sprang ex nihilo from the pens of Descartes or Bacon. A fuller Universal History, even one that based itself in large measure on modern natural science, would have to understand the premodern origins of science, and of the desire that lay behind the desire of Economic Man.


Such considerations suggest that we have not come very far yet in our attempt to understand the basis either of the current worldwide liberal revolution, or of any Universal History that may underlie it. The modern economic world is a massive and imposing structure that holds much of our lives in an iron grip, but the process by which it came to be is not coterminous with history itself and not sufficient to tell us whether we have reached the end of history. For that, we would do better to rely, not on Marx and the social science tradition that sprang from his economically based view of history, but on Hegel, his “idealist” predecessor who was the first philosopher to answer Kant’s challenge of writing a Universal History. For Hegel’s understanding of the Mechanism that underlies the historical process is incomparably deeper than that of Marx or of any contemporary social scientist. For Hegel, the primary motor of human history is not modern natural science or the ever expanding horizon of desire that powers it, but rather a totally non-economic drive, the struggle for recognition. Hegel’s Universal History complements the Mechanism we have just outlined, but gives us a broader understanding of man—“man as man”— that allows us to understand the discontinuities, the wars and sudden eruptions of irrationality out of the calm of economic development, that have characterized actual human history.

这样的考虑表明,我们在试图理解当前世界范围内的自由主义革命的基础,或者理解可能作为其基础的任何世界历史方面,还没有走得很远。现代经济世界是一个巨大的、威严的结构,它把我们生活中的许多东西都牢牢地抓在手里,但它产生的过程与历史本身并不一致,也不足以告诉我们我们是否已经到达了历史的尽头。为此,我们最好不要依靠马克思和从他的经济历史观中产生的社会科学传统,而是依靠他的 “唯心主义” 前辈黑格尔,他是第一个回答康德撰写《世界历史》这一挑战的哲学家。因为黑格尔对支撑历史进程的机制的理解,比马克思或任何当代社会科学家的理解都要深刻得无可比拟。对黑格尔来说,人类历史的主要动力不是现代自然科学,也不是为其提供动力的不断扩大的欲望视野,而是一种完全非经济性的驱动力,即争取承认的斗争。黑格尔的《世界历史》补充了我们刚刚概述的机制,但给了我们对人更广泛的理解 —— “作为人的人” —— 使我们能够理解不连续性、战争和从经济发展的平静中突然爆发出来的非理性,这些都是实际人类历史的特征。

Returning to Hegel is important also because it provides us with a framework for understanding whether the human historical process can be expected to continue indefinitely, or whether we have in fact reached the end of history. As a beginning point for this analysis, let us accept the Hegelian-Marxist thesis that past history has proceeded dialectically, or through a process of contradiction, leaving aside for the time being the question of whether the dialectic has an ideal or material basis. That is, a certain form of socio-political organization arises in some part of the world, but contains an internal contradiction which over time leads to its own undermining and replacement by a different and more successful one. The problem of the end of history can be put in the following way: A r e there any “contradictions” in our contemporary liberal democratic social order that would lead us to expect that the historical process will continue, and produce a new, higher order? We could recognize a “contradiction” if we saw a source of social discontent sufficiently radical to eventually cause the downfall of liberal democratic societies—the “system,” in the language of the 1960s—as a whole. It is not sufficient to point to “problems” in contemporary liberal democracies, even if they are serious ones like budget deficits, inflation, crime, or drugs. A “problem” does not become a “contradiction” unless it is so serious that it not only cannot be solved within the system, but corrodes the legitimacy of the system itself such that the latter collapses under its own weight. For example, the steady impoverishment of the proletariat in capitalist societies was for Marx not just a “problem,” but a “contradiction” because it would lead to a revolutionary situation that would bring down the entire structure of capitalist society and replace it with a different one. Conversely, we can argue that history has come to an end if the present form of social and political organization is completely satisfying to human beings in their most essential characteristics.

回到黑格尔的重要性还在于,它为我们提供了一个框架来理解人类历史进程是否可望无限期地继续下去,或者我们是否实际上已经到达了历史的终点。作为这一分析的起点,让我们接受黑格尔·马克思主义的论点,即过去的历史是辩证地进行的,或者说是通过矛盾的过程进行的,暂时不考虑辩证法是否有理想或物质基础的问题。也就是说,某种形式的社会政治组织在世界的某些地方出现了,但却包含着一种内部矛盾,随着时间的推移,这种矛盾会导致其自身被破坏,并被一种不同的、更成功的组织取代。历史终结的问题可以用以下方式来说明。在我们当代自由民主的社会秩序中,是否有任何 “矛盾” 会导致我们期待历史进程继续下去,并产生一个新的、更高的秩序?如果我们看到社会不满的来源足够激进,最终导致自由民主社会 —— 用 1960 年代的语言来说,就是 “制度” —— 整体的垮台,我们就能认识到 “矛盾” 了。指出当代自由民主国家的 “问题” 是不够的,即使这些问题很严重,如预算赤字、通货膨胀、犯罪或毒品。一个 “问题” 不会成为 “矛盾”,除非它严重到不仅无法在体制内解决,而且腐蚀了体制本身的合法性,以至于后者在自身的重量下崩溃。例如,资本主义社会中无产阶级的持续贫困化对马克思来说不仅是一个 “问题”,而且是一个 “矛盾”,因为它将导致一个革命的局面,使整个资本主义社会的结构崩溃,并以一个不同的结构取代它。相反,我们可以说,如果目前的社会和政治组织形式在最基本的特征上完全满足于人类,那么历史就走到了尽头。

But how would we know if there are any remaining contradictions in our present order? There are essentially two approaches to this problem. In the first, we would observe the actual course of historical development to see whether there is a demonstrable pattern to history that indicates the superiority of one particular form of society. Just as a modern economist does not try to define a product’s “utility” or “value” in itself, but rather accepts the marketplace’s valuation of it as expressed in a price, so one would accept the judgment of the “marketplace” of world history. We can think of human history as a dialogue or competition between different regimes or forms of social organization. Societies “refute” one another in this dialogue by triumphing over them or by outlasting them—in some cases through military conquest, in others through the superiority of their economic system, in others because of their greater internal political cohesion. If human societies over the centuries evolve toward or converge on a single form of socio-political organization like liberal democracy, if there do not appear to be viable alternatives to liberal democracy, and if people living in liberal democracies express no radical discontent with their lives, we can say that the dialogue has reached a final and definitive conclusion. The historicist philosopher would be compelled to accept liberal democracy’s own claims to superiority and finality. Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht: world history is the final arbiter of right.

但我们如何知道我们目前的秩序中是否还有任何剩余的矛盾?对于这个问题,基本上有两种方法。第一种,我们会观察历史发展的实际进程,看是否有一个可证明的历史模式,表明一种特定的社会形式的优越性。正如现代经济学家并不试图定义产品本身的 “效用” 或 “价值”,而是接受市场对它的评价,正如价格所表达的那样,我们将接受世界历史的 “市场” 的判断。我们可以把人类历史看作是不同制度或社会组织形式之间的对话或竞争。各个社会在这种对话中相互 “驳斥”,战胜或超越对方 —— 有些是通过军事征服,有些是通过其经济体系的优越性,有些是由于其更大的内部政治凝聚力。如果几个世纪以来,人类社会朝着自由民主这样一种单一的社会政治组织形式发展或趋同,如果自由民主似乎没有可行的替代方案,如果生活在自由民主国家的人们没有对他们的生活表示根本的不满,我们可以说,对话已经达到了最终的明确结论。历史主义哲学家将被迫接受自由民主自身的优越性和终结性主张。Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht:世界历史是权利的最终仲裁者。

This is not to say that those who take this approach must simply worship power and success under the dictum that “might makes right.” One does not have to endorse every tyrant and would-be empire builder who struts on the stage of world history for a brief moment, but only that one regime or system which survives the entire process of world history. This implies an ability to solve the problem of human satisfaction that had been present in human history from the beginning, as well as an ability to survive and adapt to mankind’s changing environment.

这并不是说,采取这种方法的人必须在 “强权即公理” 的口号下简单地崇拜权力和成功。我们不需要赞同每一个在世界历史舞台上短兵相接的暴君和可能的帝国建设者,而只需要赞同在世界历史的整个过程中幸存下来的那个政权或制度。这意味着有能力解决人类历史上一开始就存在的人类满足问题,以及有能力生存并适应人类不断变化的环境。

Such an “historicist” approach, no matter how sophisticated, nonetheless suffers from the following problem: How do we know that an apparent lack of “contradictions” in the apparently victorious social system—here, liberal democracy—is not illusory, and that the progress of time will not reveal new contradictions requiring a further stage of human historical evolution? Without an underlying concept of human nature that posited a hierarchy of essential and non-essential human characteristics, it would be impossible to know whether an apparent social peace represented true satisfaction of human longings, rather than the work of a particularly efficient police apparatus, or merely the calm before a revolutionary storm. W e should keep in mind that Europe on the eve of the French Revolution looked to many observers like a successful and satisfying social order, as did that in Iran in the

这样一种 “历史主义” 的方法,无论多么复杂,都存在以下问题:我们怎么知道表面上胜利的社会制度 —— 这里是自由民主 —— 中明显缺乏的 “矛盾” 不是虚幻的,而且时间的进展不会揭示新的矛盾,需要人类历史进化的进一步阶段?如果没有一个关于人性的基本概念,提出人类基本特征和非基本特征的等级制度,就不可能知道表面上的社会和平是否代表了人类渴望的真正满足,而不是一个特别有效的警察机构的工作,或者只是革命风暴前的平静。我们应该记住,在许多观察家看来,法国大革命前夕的欧洲是一个成功的、令人满意的社会秩序,就像伊朗在 1970 年代或东欧国家的社会秩序一样。

1970s or the countries of Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Or to take another example: some contemporary feminists assert that most prior history was the history of conflicts among “patriarchal” societies, but that “matriarchal” societies, more consensual, nurturing, and prone to peace, constitute a viable alternative. This cannot be demonstrated on the basis of empirical fact, since there are no existing examples of matriarchal societies. And yet, the possibility of their future existence cannot be ruled out, if the feminist understanding of the possibilities for the liberation of the female side of the human personality proves to be correct. And if it is so, then we clearly have not reached the end of history.

70 年代的伊朗和 80 年代的东欧国家一样。或者再举一个例子:一些当代女权主义者断言,以前的历史大多是 “父权制” 社会之间的冲突史,但 “母权制” 社会,更有共识,更有教养,更容易实现和平,构成了一种可行的替代。这一点无法根据经验事实来证明,因为目前还没有母系社会的例子。然而,如果女权主义对人类个性中女性一面解放的可能性的理解被证明是正确的,就不能排除它们未来存在的可能性。如果是这样的话,那么我们显然还没有到达历史的终点。

An alternative approach to determining whether we have reached the end of history might be termed a “trans-historical” one, or an approach based on a concept of nature. That is, we would judge the adequacy of existing liberal democracies from the standpoint of a trans-historical concept of man. W e would look not simply at empirical evidence of popular discontent in the real-world societies of, let us say, Britain or America. Rather, we would appeal to an understanding of human nature, those permanent though not consistently visible attributes of man as man, and measure the adequacy of contemporary democracies against this standard. This approach would free us from the tyranny of the present, that is, from the standards and expectations set by the very society we are trying to judge.

另一种确定我们是否已经到达历史终点的方法可以称为 “跨历史” 的方法,或基于自然概念的方法。也就是说,我们将从一个跨历史的人的概念的角度来判断现有的自由民主制度是否充分。我们不会简单地看现实社会中民众不满的经验证据,比如说英国或美国的社会。相反,我们将诉诸于对人性的理解,即人作为人的那些永久的但并非一贯可见的属性,并根据这一标准来衡量当代民主政体是否充分。这种方法将使我们摆脱当前的暴政,也就是说,摆脱我们试图评判的社会所设定的标准和期望。

The mere fact that human nature is not created “once and for all” but creates itself “in the course of historical time” does not spare us the need to talk about human nature, either as a structure within which man’s self-creation occurs, or as an end point or telos toward which human historical development appears to be moving. For example, if as Kant suggests man’s reason cannot be fully developed except as the result of a long and cumulative social process, this does not therefore make reason any less “natural” an aspect of man.

人性不是 “一劳永逸” 地创造出来的,而是 “在历史时间的过程中” 自我创造出来的,但这一事实并没有使我们摆脱谈论人性的需要,无论是作为人类自我创造的结构,还是作为人类历史发展似乎正在走向的终点或终极目标。例如,如果像康德所说的那样,除非是作为长期累积的社会过程的结果,否则人的理性不可能得到充分发展,这并不意味着理性就不是人的一个 “自然” 方面。

In the end, it would appear impossible to talk about “history,” much less a “Universal History,” without reference to a permanent, trans-historical standard, i.e., without reference to nature. For “history” is not a given, not merely a catalogue of everything that happened in the past, but a deliberate effort of abstraction in which we separate out important from unimportant events. The standards on which this abstraction are based are variable. In the past couple of generations, for example, there has been a movement away from diplomatic and military history toward social history, the history of women and minority groups, or the history of “everyday life.” The fact that the objects of historical attention have shifted from the rich and powerful to those lower down the social scale does not imply the abandoning of standards of historical selection, but merely the changing of standards to fit a newer and more egalitarian consciousness. But neither the diplomatic historian nor the social historian can evade the choice between important and unimportant, and hence reference to a standard that exists somewhere “outside” of history (and, incidentally, outside of the sphere of competence of professional historians qua historians). This is all the more true of a Universal History, which raises the level of abstraction to an even higher degree. The Universal Historian must be ready to discard entire peoples and times as essentially preor non-historical, because they do not bear on the central “plot” of his or her story.

最后,如果不参照一个永久的、跨历史的标准,即不参照自然,似乎就不可能谈论 “历史”,更不可能谈论 “普遍历史”。因为 “历史” 不是一个既定的东西,不仅仅是过去发生的一切的目录,而是一种有意的抽象化努力,在这种努力中,我们把重要的和不重要的事件区分开来。这种抽象所依据的标准是可变的。例如,在过去的几代人中,有一种从外交和军事史向社会史、妇女和少数民族群体的历史或 “日常生活” 的历史发展的趋势。历史关注的对象从富人和权贵转向社会底层,这并不意味着放弃了历史选择的标准,而只是改变了标准,以适应更新的、更平等的意识。但是,无论是外交史学家还是社会史学家,都无法回避在重要与不重要之间的选择,因而也无法回避对存在于历史 “之外” 的某个地方的标准的参考(而且,顺便说一下,在专业史学家作为历史学家的能力范围之外)。这对一部普遍历史来说更是如此,它将抽象程度提高到了一个更高的程度。普世历史学家必须准备好抛弃整个民族和时代,因为它们基本上是以前的或非历史的,因为它们对他或她的故事的中心 “情节” 没有影响。

It seems inevitable, then, that we must move from a discussion of history to a discussion of nature if we are to address seriously the question of the end of history. We cannot discuss the longterm prospects for liberal democracy—its appeal to people who haven’t experienced it, and its staying power for others long used to living by its rules—by focusing only on the “empirical” evidence presented to us by the contemporary world. W e must instead raise directly and explicitly the nature of the trans-historical standards by which we evaluate the goodness or badness of any regime or social system. Kojève claims that we have reached the end of history because life in the universal and homogenous state is completely satisfying to its citizens. The modern liberal democratic world, in other words, is free of contradictions. In evaluating this claim, we do not want to be sidetracked by objections that misunderstand the point of Kojève’scontention—for example, by pointing to this or that social group or individual which is demonstrably dissatisfied by being denied equal access to the good things of society due to poverty, racism, and so forth. The deeper question is one of first principles—that is, whether the “good things” of our society are truly good and satisfying to “man as man” or whether there is in principle a higher form of satisfaction that some other type of regime or social organization could provide. T o answer this question, to understand whether in fact our age is the “old age of mankind,” we must go back and look at natural man as he existed before the start of the historical process, in other words, at the “first man.”

那么,如果我们要认真解决历史终结的问题,我们似乎不可避免地必须从对历史的讨论转向对自然的讨论。我们无法通过只关注当代世界提供给我们的 “经验” 证据来讨论自由民主的长期前景 —— 它对那些没有经历过自由民主的人的吸引力,以及它对那些长期习惯于按其规则生活的人的持久力。相反,我们必须直接和明确地提出跨历史的标准的性质,通过这些标准,我们评价任何政权或社会制度的好坏。科耶夫声称,我们已经走到了历史的尽头,因为在普遍的、同质的国家中的生活对其公民来说是完全满足的。换句话说,现代的自由民主世界是没有矛盾的。在评估这一主张时,我们不想被那些误解科耶夫的观点的反对意见所困扰 —— 例如,指出这个或那个社会群体或个人由于贫穷、种族主义等原因被剥夺了平等享受社会美好事物的机会而明显地感到不满。更深层次的问题是第一原则的问题,也就是说,我们社会的 “好东西” 对 “人” 来说是否真的是好的和令人满意的,或者原则上是否有其他类型的制度或社会组织可以提供的更高形式的满足。为了回答这个问题,为了理解我们的时代实际上是否是 “人类的晚年”,我们必须回到过去,看看历史进程开始之前存在的自然人,换句话说,看看 “第一个人”。

Chapter 13: In the Beginning, a Battle to the Death for Pure Prestige

13 一开始,为了纯粹的声望而进行的生死之战

And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of selfconsciousness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance… .

只有冒着生命危险,才能获得自由;只有这样,才能检验和证明自我意识的基本性质不是赤裸裸的存在,不是它最初出现时的那种直接形式。. . .

The individual, who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent selfconsciousness.


—G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind


All human, anthropogenetic desire—the desire that generates selfconsciousness, the human reality—is, finally, a function of the desire for “recognition.” And the risk of life by which the human reality “comes to light” is a risk for the sake of such a desire. Therefore, to speak of the “origin” of selfconsciousness is necessarily to speak of a fight to the death for “recognition.”

所有人类的、人类生成的欲望 —— 产生自我意识、人类现实的欲望 —— 最后都是对 “承认” 的欲望的一种功能。而人类现实得以 “曝光” 的生命风险,是为了这种欲望而进行的风险。因此,谈论自我意识的 “起源”,必然是谈论为 “承认” 而进行的殊死搏斗。

—Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel


What is at stake for people around the world, from Spain and Argentina to Hungary and Poland, when they throw off dictatorship and establish a liberal democracy? To some extent, the answer is a purely negative one based on the mistakes and injustices of the preceding political order: they want to get rid of the hated colonels or party bosses who oppressed them, or to live without fear of arbitrary arrest. Those living in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union think or hope that they are getting capitalist prosperity, since capitalism and democracy are closely intertwined in the minds of many. But as we have seen, it is perfectly possible to have prosperity without freedom, as Spain, or South Korea, or Taiwan did under autocratic rule. And yet in each of these countries prosperity was not enough. Any attempt to portray the basic human impulse driving the liberal revolutions of the late twentieth century, or indeed of any liberal revolution since those of America and France in the eighteenth century, as merely an economic one, would be radically incomplete. The Mechanism created by modern natural science remains a partial and ultimately unsatisfying account of the historical process. Free government exercises a positive pull of its own: When the president of the United States or the president of France praises liberty and democracy, they are praised as good things in themselves, and this praise seems to have resonance for people around the world.


To understand this resonance, we need to return to Hegel, the philosopher who first answered Kant’s call and wrote what remains in many ways the most serious Universal History. As interpreted by Alexandre Kojève, Hegel provides us with an alternative “mechanism” by which to understand the historical process, one based on the “struggle for recognition.” While we need not abandon our economic account of history, “recognition” allows us to recover a totally non-materialist historical dialectic that is much richer in its understanding of human motivation than the Marxist version, or than the sociological tradition stemming from Marx.

为了理解这种共鸣,我们需要回到黑格尔,这位哲学家首先响应康德的号召,写下了在许多方面仍然是最严肃的《世界历史》。正如亚历山大·科耶夫(Alexandre Kojève)所解释的那样,黑格尔为我们提供了一种理解历史进程的替代 “机制”,一种基于 “为承认而斗争” 的机制。虽然我们不需要放弃对历史的经济说明,但 “承认” 使我们能够恢复一个完全非物质主义的历史辩证法,它对人类动机的理解比马克思主义的版本,或比源于马克思的社会学传统要丰富得多。

There is, of course, a legitimate question as to whether Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, presented here, is really Hegel as he understood himself, or whether it contains an admixture of ideas that are properly “Kojèvian.” Kojève does take certain elements of Hegel’s teaching, such as the struggle for recognition and the end of history, and make them the centerpiece of that teaching in a way that Hegel himself may not have done. While uncovering the original Hegel is an important task for the purposes of the “present argument,” we are interested not in Hegel per se but in Hegel-as-interpreted-by-Kojève, or perhaps a new, synthetic philosopher named Hegel-Kojève. In subsequent references to Hegel, we will actually be referring to Hegel-Kojève, and we will be more interested in the ideas themselves than in the philosophers who originally articulated them.

当然,有一个合理的问题是,科耶夫在这里提出的对黑格尔的解释是否真的是他自己理解的黑格尔,或者它是否包含了适当的 “科耶夫” 思想的混合物。科耶夫确实采纳了黑格尔教学中的某些内容,如争取承认的斗争和历史的终结,并以黑格尔本人可能没有做的方式使它们成为该教学的核心。虽然就 “目前的论证” 而言,发掘原始黑格尔是一项重要的任务,但我们感兴趣的不是黑格尔本身,而是被科耶夫解释的黑格尔,或者也许是一个名为黑格尔·科耶夫的新的合成哲学家。在以后提到黑格尔时,我们实际上是指黑格尔·科耶夫,而且我们将对思想本身更感兴趣,而不是对最初阐述这些思想的哲学家更感兴趣。

One might think that to uncover the real meaning of liberalism, one would want to go even further back in time to the thought of those philosophers who were the original source of liberalism, Hobbes and Locke. For the oldest and most durable liberal societies—those in the AngloSaxon tradition, like England, the United States, and Canada—have typically understood themselves in Lockean terms. W e will in fact return to Hobbes and Locke, but Hegel is of particular interest to us for two reasons. In the first place, he provides us with an understanding of liberalism that is nobler than that of Hobbes and Locke. For virtually coeval with the enunciation of Lockean liberalism has been a persistent unease with the society thereby produced, and with the prototypic product of that society, the bourgeois. That unease is ultimately traceable to a single moral fact, that the bourgeois is primarily preoccupied with his own material wellbeing, and is neither publicspirited, nor virtuous, nor dedicated to the larger community around him or her. In short, the bourgeois is selfish; and the selfishness of the private individual has been at the core of critiques of liberal society both on the part of the Marxist Left and the aristocratic-republican Right. Hegel, in contrast to Hobbes and Locke, provides us with a selfunderstanding of liberal society which is based on the non-selfish part of the human personality, and seeks to preserve that part as the core of the modern political project. Whether he ultimately succeeds in this remains to be seen: the latter question will be the subject of the final part of this book.

人们可能会认为,要揭示自由主义的真正含义人们会想进一步追溯到那些作为自由主义最初来源的哲学家,霍布斯和洛克的思想。因为最古老、最持久的自由主义社会 —— 那些具有盎格鲁·撒克逊传统的社会,如英国、美国和加拿大 —— 通常都以洛克的术语来理解自己。事实上,我们将回到霍布斯和洛克,但黑格尔对我们特别有兴趣,原因有二。首先,他为我们提供了一种对自由主义的理解,这种理解比霍布斯和洛克的理解更崇高。因为几乎与洛克的自由主义的阐述同时存在的,是对由此产生的社会以及该社会的典型产品 —— 资产阶级的持续不安。这种不安最终可追溯到一个单一的道德事实,即资产阶级主要专注于自己的物质利益,既不热心公益,也没有美德,更没有为他或她周围的更大社区做出贡献。简而言之,资产阶级是自私的;而个人的自私一直是马克思主义左派和贵族共和党右派对自由社会批评的核心。与霍布斯和洛克相比,黑格尔为我们提供了对自由社会的自我理解,这种理解基于人类人格的非自私部分,并试图将这部分作为现代政治项目的核心加以保护。他最终是否能成功,还有待观察:后一个问题将是本书最后一部分的主题。

The second reason for returning to Hegel is that the understanding of history as a “struggle for recognition” is actually a very useful and illuminating way of seeing the contemporary world. We inhabitants of liberal democratic countries are by now so used to accounts of current events that reduce motivation to economic causes, so thoroughly bourgeois in our own perceptions, that we are frequently surprised to discover how totally non-economic most political life is. Indeed, we do not even have a corrimon vocabulary for talking about the prideful and assertive side of human nature that is responsible for driving most wars and political conflicts. The “struggle for recognition” is a concept as old as political philosophy, and refers to a phenomenon coterminous with political life itself. If it seems to us today a somewhat strange and unfamiliar term, it is only because of the successful “economization” of our thinking that has occurred in the past four hundred years. Yet the “struggle for recognition” is evident everywhere around us and underlies contemporary movements for liberal rights, whether in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, Asia, Latin America, or in the United States itself.

回到黑格尔的第二个原因是,把历史理解为 “争取承认的斗争” 实际上是看待当代世界的一种非常有用和有启发性的方式。我们这些自由民主国家的居民现在已经习惯了对当前事件的描述,这些描述将动机归结为经济原因,在我们自己的观念中是如此彻底的资产阶级,以至于我们经常惊讶地发现大多数政治生活是多么的非经济。事实上,我们甚至没有一个冠冕堂皇的词汇来谈论人类本性中骄傲和自信的一面,而这正是推动大多数战争和政治冲突的原因。争取承认的斗争 “是一个与政治哲学一样古老的概念,它指的是与政治生活本身共存的现象。如果它今天对我们来说是一个有点奇怪和陌生的术语,那只是因为在过去四百年中我们的思维成功地” 经济化 “了。然而”,争取承认的斗争 "在我们周围随处可见,它是当代自由权利运动的基础,无论是在苏联、东欧、南部非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲,还是在美国本身。

To uncover the meaning of the “struggle for recognition,” we need to understand Hegel’s concept of man, or of human nature. For those early modern theorists of liberalism who preceded Hegel, the discussion of human nature was presented as a portrayal of the First Man, that is, man in the “state of nature.” Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau never intended the state of nature to be understood as an empirical or historical account of primitive man, but rather a kind of experiment in thought to strip away those aspects of human personality that were simply the product of convention—such as the fact that one was Italian or an aristocrat or a Buddhist—and to uncover those characteristics that were common to man as man.

为了揭示 “为承认而斗争” 的意义,我们需要理解黑格尔的人的概念,或人性的概念。对于那些在黑格尔之前的早期现代自由主义理论家来说,对人性的讨论是作为第一人的描写提出的,也就是说,处于 “自然状态” 的人。霍布斯、洛克和卢梭从未打算将自然状态理解为对原始人的经验性或历史性描述,而是一种思想实验,以剥离人类人格中那些仅仅是惯例的产物的方面 —— 例如一个人是意大利人或贵族或佛教徒的事实 —— 来发现那些作为人的共同特征。

Hegel denied that he had a state of nature doctrine and in fact would have rejected the concept of a human nature, permanent and unchanging. Man, for him, was free and wn-determined, and therefore capable of creating his own nature in the course of historical time. A n d yet, this process of historical self-creation had a starting point that looked for all intents and purposes like a state of nature teaching. Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind described a primitive “first man” living at the beginning of history whose philosophical function was indistinguishable from the “man in the state of nature” of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. That is, this “first man” was a prototypic human being, possessing those fundamental human attributes that existed prior to the creation of civil society and the historical process.

黑格尔否认他有自然状态的学说,事实上,他也会拒绝永久和不变的人性的概念。对他来说,人是自由的、由意志决定的,因此能够在历史时间的过程中创造自己的本性。然而,这个历史性的自我创造过程有一个起点,就所有的意图和目的而言,它看起来像一个自然教学的状态。黑格尔在《心灵现象学》中描述了一个生活在历史之初的原始 “第一人”,其哲学功能与霍布斯、洛克和卢梭的 “自然状态下的人” 没有区别。也就是说,这个 “第一个人” 是一个典型的人,拥有那些在公民社会和历史进程产生之前就存在的基本人类属性。

Hegel’s “first man” shares with the animals certain basic natural desires, such as the desire for food, for sleep, for shelter, and above all for the preservation of his own life. He is, to this extent, part of the natural or physical world. But Hegel’s “first man” is radically different from the animals in that he desires not only real, “positive” objects—a steak, or fur jacket with which to keep warm, or a shelter in which to live—but also objects that are totally nonmaterial. Above all, he desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be recognized. Indeed, for Hegel, an individual could not become selfconscious, that is, become aware of himself as a separate human being, without being recognized by other human beings. Man, in other words, was from the start a social being: his own sense of selfworth and identity is intimately connected with the value that other people place on him. He is, in David Riesman’s phrase, fundamentally “other directed.” While

黑格尔的 “第一个人” 与动物共享某些基本的自然欲望,如对食物、睡眠、住所的渴望,最重要的是对保护自己的生命的渴望。在这种程度上,他是自然或物理世界的一部分。但黑格尔的 “第一个人” 与动物有根本的不同,因为他不仅渴望真实的、“积极的” 物体 —— 牛排,或用来取暖的毛皮外套,或用来生活的住所,而且还渴望完全非物质的物体。最重要的是,他渴望其他人的欲望,也就是说,被其他人需要或被承认。事实上,对黑格尔来说,一个人如果不被其他人承认,就不能成为自我意识,也就是说,不能意识到自己是一个独立的人。换句话说,人从一开始就是一个社会人:他自己的自我价值和身份感与其他人对他的价值密切相关。用大卫·里斯曼的话说,他从根本上说是 “被他人指导的”。虽然

animals exhibit social behavior, this behavior is instinctual and is based on the mutual satisfaction of natural needs. A dolphin or a monkey desires a fish or banana, not the desire of another dolphin or monkey. As Kojève explains, only a man can desire “an object perfectly useless from the biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy’s flag)”; he desires such objects not for themselves but because they are desired by other human beings.

动物表现出社会行为,这种行为是本能的,是基于自然需求的相互满足。一只海豚或猴子渴望得到一条鱼或一根香蕉,而不是另一只海豚或猴子的欲望。正如科耶夫所解释的,只有人可以渴望 “从生物角度看完全无用的物体(如奖章,或敌人的旗帜)”;他渴望这种物体不是为了自己,而是因为它们被其他人类所渴望。

But Hegel’s “first man” differs from the animals in a second and much more fundamental way. This man wants not only to be recognized by other men, but to be recognized as a man. And what constitutes man’s identity as man, the most fundamental and uniquely human characteristic, is man’s ability to risk his own life. Thus the “first man” ‘s encounter with other men leads to a violent struggle in which each contestant seeks to make the other “recognize” him by risking his own life. Man is a fundamentally other-directed and social animal, but his sociability leads him not into a peaceful civil society, but into a violent struggle to the death for pure prestige. This “bloody battle” can have one of three results. It can lead to the death of both combatants, in which case life itself, human and natural, ends. It can lead to the death of one of the contestants, in which case the survivor remains unsatisfied because there is no longer another human consciousness to recognize him. Or, finally, the battle can terminate in the relationship of lordship and bondage, in which one of the contestants decides to submit to a life of slavery rather than face the risk of violent death. The master is then satisfied because he has risked his life and received recognition for having done so from another human being. The initial encounter between “first men” in Hegel’s state of nature is every bit as violent as Hobbes’s state of nature or Locke’s state of war, but issues not in a social contract or other form of peaceful civil society, but in a highly unequal relationship of lordship and bondage.

但黑格尔的 “第一个人” 在第二个方面与动物不同,而且是更根本的不同。这个人不仅希望被其他的人承认,而且希望被承认为一个人。而构成人作为人的身份的,最基本的和独特的人类特征的,是人冒自己生命危险的能力。因此,“第一个男人” 与其他男人的相遇导致了一场激烈的斗争,在这场斗争中,每个参赛者都试图通过冒自己的生命危险使对方 “承认” 他。人从根本上说是一种由他人引导的社会性动物,但他的社会性使他没有进入一个和平的公民社会,而是进入了为纯粹的声望而进行的生死攸关的暴力斗争。这场 “血战” 可能有三种结果之一。它可以导致战斗双方的死亡,在这种情况下,生命本身,人类和自然,都会结束。它可以导致其中一个竞争者的死亡,在这种情况下,幸存者仍然不满意,因为不再有另一个人类意识来认识他。或者,最后,战斗可以在领主和奴役的关系中结束,其中一个竞争者决定服从于奴役的生活,而不是面对暴力死亡的风险。这时,主人会感到满意,因为他冒着生命危险,并从另一个人那里得到了认可。在黑格尔的自然状态中,“第一人” 之间的最初交锋与霍布斯的自然状态或洛克的战争状态一样暴力,但不是在社会契约或其他形式的和平公民社会中发生,而是在高度不平等的领主和奴役关系中。

For Hegel just as for Marx, primitive society was divided into social classes. But unlike Marx, Hegel believed that the most important class differences were not based on economic function, such as whether one was a landlord or a peasant, but on one’s attitude toward violent death. Society was divided between masters who were willing to risk their lives, and slaves who were not. The Hegelian understanding of early class stratification is probably historically more accurate than that of Marx. Many traditional aristocratic societies initially arose out of the “warrior ethos” of nomadic tribes who conquered more sedentary peoples through superior ruthlessness, cruelty, and bravery. After the initial conquest, the masters in subsequent generations settled down on estates and assumed an economic relationship as landlords exacting taxes or tribute from the vast mass of peasant “slaves” over whom they ruled. But the warrior ethos—the sense of innate superiority based on the willingness to risk death— remained the essential core of the culture of aristocratic societies the world over, long after years of peace and leisure allowed these same aristocrats to degenerate into pampered and effeminate courtiers.

对黑格尔来说,就像对马克思一样,原始社会被划分为社会阶层。但与马克思不同的是,黑格尔认为最重要的阶级差异不是基于经济功能,例如一个人是地主还是农民,而是基于一个人对暴力死亡的态度。社会被划分为愿意冒生命危险的主人和不愿意冒生命危险的奴隶。黑格尔对早期阶级分层的理解在历史上可能比马克思的理解更准确。许多传统的贵族社会最初产生于游牧部落的 “战士精神”,他们通过卓越的无情、残酷和勇敢征服了更多定居的民族。在最初的征服之后,随后几代的主人在庄园中定居下来,作为地主承担起经济关系,向他们所统治的广大农民 “奴隶” 征收税收或贡品。但是,在多年的和平与闲暇让这些贵族堕落成娇生惯养的朝臣之后,战士的精神 —— 基于愿意冒死的先天优越感 —— 仍然是全世界贵族社会文化的基本核心。

Much of this Hegelian account of early man will sound very strange to modern ears, particularly his identification of the willingness to risk one’s life in a battle for pure prestige as the most basic human trait. For isn’t the willingness to risk one’s life simply a primitive social custom that has long since passed out of the world, along with dueling and revenge murders?8 In our world, there are still people who run around risking their lives in bloody battles over a name, or a flag, or a piece of clothing; but they tend to belong to gangs with names like the Bloods or the Crips, and make their living dealing drugs, or else live in countries like Afghanistan. In what sense can a man who is willing to kill and be killed over something of purely symbolic value, over prestige or recognition, be said to be more deeply human than someone who more sensibly backs down at a challenge, and submits his claim to peaceful arbitration or to the courts?


The importance of the willingness to risk’s one’s life in a battle for prestige can only be understood if we contemplate more deeply Hegel’s view of the meaning of human freedom. In the AngloSaxon liberal tradition familiar to us, there is a commonsense understanding of freedom as something like the simple absence of restraint. Thus, according to Thomas Hobbes, “LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifies properly the absence of opposition—by opposition I mean external impediments of motion—and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational.“9 By this definition, a rock rolling down a hill and a hungry bear wandering around in the woods without constraint would both be said to be “free.” But in fact, we know that the tumbling of the rock is determined by gravity and the slope of the hill, just as the behavior of the bear is determined through the complex interaction of a variety of natural desires, instincts, and needs. A hungry bear foraging for food in the forest is “free” only in a formal sense. It has no choice but to respond to its hunger and instincts. Bears typically do not stage hunger strikes on behalf of higher causes. The behaviors of the rock and the bear are determined by their own physical natures and by the natural environment around them. In that sense they are like machines programmed to operate by a certain set of rules, the ultimate rules being the fundamental laws of physics.

只有当我们更深入地思考黑格尔对人类自由意义的看法时,才能理解愿意冒着生命危险去争夺声望的重要性。在我们熟悉的盎格鲁·撒克逊自由主义传统中,对自由有一种常识性的理解,即简单的没有约束的东西。因此,根据托马斯·霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes)的说法,“自由,或者说自由,恰当地意味着没有反对 —— 我指的是运动的外部障碍 —— 可以适用于非理性和无生命的生物,而不是理性的生物。”9 根据这个定义,一块石头从山上滚下来,一只饥饿的熊在森林里没有约束地四处游荡,都可以说是 “自由”。但事实上,我们知道石头的翻滚是由重力和山坡决定的,就像熊的行为是由各种自然欲望、本能和需求的复杂互动决定的。一只在森林中觅食的饿熊只是在形式上是 “自由” 的。它别无选择,只能对自己的饥饿和本能做出反应。熊通常不会为了更高的目标而进行绝食抗议。石头和熊的行为是由它们自己的身体本性和它们周围的自然环境决定的。在这个意义上,它们就像被编程的机器,按照一定的规则运作,最终的规则是物理学的基本定律。

By Hobbes’s definition, any human being not physically constrained from doing something would be considered “free.” But to the extent that a human being has a physical or animal nature, he or she can also be thought of as nothing more than a finite collection of needs, instincts, wants, and passions, which interact in a complicated but ultimately mechanical way that determine that person’s behavior. Thus, a hungry and cold man seeking to satisfy his natural needs for food and shelter is no more free than the bear, or even the rock: he is simply a more complicated machine operating according to a more complicated set of rules. The fact that he faces no physical constraint in his search for food and shelter creates only the appearance, but not the reality, of freedom.

根据霍布斯的定义,任何不受身体约束的人都会被视为 “自由”。但是,就一个人的身体或动物本性而言,他或她也可以被认为不过是需求、本能、欲望和激情的有限集合,它们以一种复杂但最终是机械的方式相互作用,决定了这个人的行为。因此,一个饥寒交迫的人寻求满足他对食物和住所的自然需求,并不比熊,甚至石头更自由:他只是一台更复杂的机器,按照一套更复杂的规则运作。他在寻找食物和住所的过程中没有面临任何物理约束,这一事实只创造了自由的表象,而不是现实。

Hobbes’s great political work, Leviathan, begins with just such a portrayal of man as a highly complicated machine. He breaks human nature down into a series of basic passions like joy, pain, fear, hope, indignation, and ambition, that in different combinations he believes are sufficient to determine and explain the whole of human behavior. Thus Hobbes does not in the end believe that man is free in the sense of having a capacity for moral choice. He can be more or less rational in his behavior, but that rationality simply serves ends like selfpreservation that are given by nature. And nature, in turn, can be fully explained by the laws of matter-inmotion, laws that had been recently explicated by Sir Isaac Newton.


Hegel, by contrast, starts with a completely different understanding of man. Not only is man not determined by his physical or animal nature, but his very humanity consists in his ability to overcome or negate that animal nature. He is free not just in Hobbes’s formal sense of being physically unconstrained, but free in the metaphysical sense of being radically ww-determined by nature. This includes his own nature, the natural environment around him, and nature’s laws. He is, in short, capable of true moral choice, that is, choice between two courses of action not simply on the basis of the greater utility of one over another, not simply as the result of the victory of one set of passions and instincts over another, but because of an inherent freedom to make and adhere to his own rules. And man’s specific dignity lies not in a superior calculating ability that makes him a cleverer machine than the lower animals, but precisely in this capacity for free moral choice.


But how do we know that man is free in this more profound sense? Certainly, many instances of human choice are in fact merely calculations of selfinterest that serve nothing more than the satisfaction of animal desires or passions. For example, a man may forebear from stealing an apple from his neighbor’s orchard not out of any moral sense, but because he fears that retribution will be more severe than his present hunger, or because he knows his neighbor will be going away on a trip and that the apples will soon be his for the taking. That he can calculate in this fashion does not make him any less determined by his natural instincts—in this case, hunger—than an animal who simply grabs for the apple.

但我们怎么知道人在这种更深刻的意义上是自由的?当然,人类选择的许多例子实际上只是对自我利益的计算,只不过是为了满足动物的欲望或激情。例如,一个人不去偷邻居果园里的苹果,并不是出于任何道德感,而是因为他担心报应会比他现在的饥饿感更严重,或者因为他知道他的邻居要出远门,苹果很快就会被他拿走。他能以这种方式计算,并不意味着他对其自然本能 —— 在这种情况下,饥饿 —— 的决定比简单地抓取苹果的动物少。

Hegel would not deny that man has an animal side or a finite and determined nature: he must eat and sleep. But he is also demonstrably capable of acting in ways that totally contravene his natural instincts, and contravene them not for the sake of satisfying a higher or more powerful instinct, but, in a way, purely for the sake of the contravention. This is why the willingness to risk one’s life in a battle for pure prestige plays such an important role in Hegel’s account of history. For by risking his life, man proves that he can act contrary to his most powerful and basic instinct, the instinct for selfpreservation. As Kojève puts it, man’s human desire must win out over his animal desire for selfpreservation. And that is why it is important that the primeval battle at the beginning of history be over prestige alone, or an apparent trifle like a medal or a flag that signifies recognition. The reason that I fight is to get another human being to recognize the fact that I am willing to risk my life, and that I am therefore free and authentically human. If the bloody battle were fought for some purpose (or as we modern bourgeois, schooled by Hobbes and Locke, would say, some “rational” purpose) such as the protection of our family or the acquisition of our opponent’s land and possessions, then the battle itself would simply have been fought for the satisfaction of some other animal need. In fact, many lower animals are capable of risking their life in battle for the sake of, say, protecting their young, or staking out territory in which to forage. In each case, this behavior is instinctually determined and exists for the evolutionary purpose of assuring the survival of the species. Only man is capable of engaging in a bloody battle for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life, that he is something more than a complicated machine or a “slave to his passions,“1 0 in short, that he has a specifically human dignity because he is free.

黑格尔不会否认人有动物的一面或有限的、确定的本性:他必须吃饭和睡觉。但他也明显能够以完全违背其自然本能的方式行事,而且违背本能不是为了满足更高或更强大的本能,而是在某种程度上,纯粹为了违背而违背。这就是为什么愿意冒着生命危险为纯粹的声望而战在黑格尔的历史论述中起着如此重要的作用。因为通过冒着生命危险,人证明了他可以违背自己最强大、最基本的本能,即自我保护的本能而行动。正如科耶夫所说,人类的欲望必须战胜他自我保护的动物欲望。而这就是为什么在历史之初的原始战斗仅仅是为了声望,或者是像奖章或标志着认可的旗帜这样的表面琐事,这一点很重要。我之所以战斗,是为了让另一个人承认我愿意冒生命危险的事实,因此我是自由的,是真正的人类。如果这场血腥的战斗是为了某种目的(或者像我们这些受霍布斯和洛克教育的现代资产阶级所说的,某种 “理性” 的目的),比如保护我们的家庭或者获得对手的土地和财产,那么这场战斗本身就只是为了满足其他一些动物的需要而进行的。事实上,许多低等动物能够在战斗中冒着生命危险,比如说,为了保护它们的孩子,或者是为了争夺觅食的领土。在每一种情况下,这种行为都是本能决定的,是为了保证物种的生存而存在的进化目的。只有人类能够参与血腥的战斗,其唯一目的是表明他对自己的生命的蔑视,表明他不仅仅是一台复杂的机器或 “激情的奴隶”,1 简而言之,表明他具有特殊的人类尊严,因为他是自由的。

One might argue that “counterinstinctual” behavior such as the willingness to risk one’s life in a prestige battle is simply determined by yet another deeper and more atavistic instinct, of which Hegel was not aware. Indeed, modern biology suggests that animals as well as men engage in prestige battles, though no one would assert the latter are moral agents. If we take the teaching of modern natural science seriously, the human realm is entirely subordinate to the realm of nature, and is equally determined by nature’s laws. All human behavior can ultimately be explained by the subhuman, by psychology and anthropology, which in turn rest on biology and chemistry, and ultimately on the workings of the fundamental forces of nature. Hegel and his predecessor Immanuel Kant were aware of the threat that the materialistic foundations of modern natural science posed to the possibility of human free choice. The ultimate purpose of Kant’s great Critique of Pure Reason was to fence off an “island” in the midst of the sea of mechanical natural causation that would, in a philosophically rigorous way, permit truly free, human moral choice to coexist with modern physics. Hegel accepted the existence of this “island,” indeed, an island much larger and capacious than Kant envisioned. Both philosophers believed that in certain respects human beings were quite literally not subject to the laws of physics. This was not to say that human beings could move faster than the speed of light or repeal the action of gravity, but rather that moral phenomena could not simply be reduced to the mechanics of matter-in-motion.

有人可能会说,“反本能” 的行为,如愿意在声望之战中冒生命危险,仅仅是由另一种更深层、更隐蔽的本能决定的,而黑格尔并不知道。事实上,现代生物学表明,动物和人一样都会参与威望之战,尽管没有人会断言后者是道德的主体。如果我们认真对待现代自然科学的教导,人类领域完全从属于自然领域,并且同样由自然规律决定。所有的人类行为最终都可以由亚人类来解释,由心理学和人类学来解释,而心理学和人类学又依赖于生物学和化学,并最终依赖于自然界基本力量的运作。黑格尔和他的前辈伊曼纽尔·康德意识到现代自然科学的唯物主义基础对人类自由选择的可能性构成的威胁。康德伟大的《纯粹理性批判》的最终目的是在机械的自然因果关系的海洋中围出一个 “岛屿”,以哲学上的严格方式,允许真正自由的人类道德选择与现代物理学共存。黑格尔接受了这个 “岛” 的存在,事实上,这个岛比康德所设想的要大得多,也很有容量。两位哲学家都认为,在某些方面,人类完全不受物理学规律的制约。这并不是说人类的运动速度可以超过光速,也不是说人类可以废除重力作用,而是说道德现象不能简单地归结为运动中的物质力学。

It is beyond our present capacity or intention to analyze the adequacy of the “island” created by German idealism; the metaphysical question of the possibility of human free choice is, as Rousseau said, “l’abyme de la philosophie.“1 1 But if we put aside this tortured question for the moment, we can still note that as a psychological phenomenon, Hegel’s emphasis on the importance of the risk of death points to something very real and important. Whether or not true free will exists, virtually all human beings act as if it does, and evaluate each other on the basis of their ability to make what they believe to be genuine moral choices. While much human activity is directed toward fulfilling natural needs, a significant amount of time is spent in pursuit of goals more evanescent. Men seek not just material comfort, but respect or recognition, and they believe that they are worthy of respect because they possess a certain value or dignity. A psychology, or a political science, that did not take into account man’s desire for recognition, and his infrequent but very pronounced willingness to act at times contrary to even the strongest natural instinct, would misunderstand something very important about human behavior.

分析德国唯心主义所创造的 “岛屿” 是否充分,超出了我们目前的能力或意图;人类自由选择的可能性这一形而上学问题,正如卢梭所说,是 “哲学的深渊”1 1。但如果我们暂时抛开这个折磨人的问题,我们仍然可以注意到,作为一种心理现象,黑格尔对死亡风险重要性的强调指向了一些非常真实和重要的东西。无论真正的自由意志是否存在,几乎所有的人都像它一样行事,并根据他们作出他们认为是真正的道德选择的能力来评价对方。虽然人类的许多活动都是为了满足自然需求,但也有大量的时间是为了追求更短暂的目标。男人追求的不仅仅是物质上的舒适,还有尊重或认可,他们认为自己值得被尊重,因为他们拥有某种价值或尊严。如果心理学或政治学没有考虑到人对认可的渴望,以及他不经常但非常明显地愿意在某些时候违背最强烈的自然本能的行为,就会误解人类行为中非常重要的东西。

For Hegel, freedom was notjust a psychological phenomenon, but the essence of what was distinctively human. In this sense, freedom and nature are diametrically opposed. Freedom does not mean the freedom to live in nature or according to nature; rather, freedom begins only where nature ends. Human freedom emerges only when man is able to transcend his natural, animal existence, and to create a new self for himself The emblematic starting point for this process of self-creation is the struggle to the death for pure prestige.


But while this struggle for recognition is the first authentically human act, it is far from the last. The bloody battle between Hegel’s “first men” is only the beginning point of the Hegelian dialectic, and leaves us still a very long way from modern liberal democracy. The problem of human history can be seen, in a certain sense, as the search for a way to satisfy the desire of both masters and slaves for recognition on a mutual and equal basis; history ends with the victory of a social order that accomplishes this goal.

但是,虽然这种争取承认的斗争是第一个真正的人类行为,但它远不是最后一个。黑格尔的 “第一个人” 之间的血腥斗争只是黑格尔辩证法的起点,它使我们离现代自由民主还有很长的路要走。在某种意义上,人类历史的问题可以被看作是在寻找一种方法,以满足主人和奴隶在相互平等的基础上获得承认的愿望;历史以完成这一目标的社会秩序的胜利而结束。

Before describing the further stages in the evolution of the dialectic, however, it would be useful to contrast Hegel’s account of the “first man” in the state of nature with those of the traditional founders of modern liberalism, Hobbes and Locke. For while Hegel’s beginning and ending points are quite similar to those of the English thinkers, his concept of man is radically different, and provides us with a very different way of seeing contemporary liberal democracy.

然而,在描述辩证法演变的进一步阶段之前,将黑格尔对自然状态下 “第一个人” 的描述与现代自由主义的传统创始人霍布斯和洛克的描述进行对比是有益的。因为虽然黑格尔的起点和终点与英国思想家的相当相似,但他的人的概念却截然不同,并为我们提供了一种非常不同的方式来看待当代自由民主。

For every man looks that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavors, as far as he dares … to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage and from others by example.

因为每个人都希望他的同伴对他的评价与他对自己的评价相同;一旦有任何轻视或低估的迹象,他自然会尽力而为,只要他敢于…… …… 以损害的方式向他的同伴索取更大的价值,并以身作则向他人索取更大的价值。

—Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan


Contemporary liberal democracies did not emerge out of the shadowy mists of tradition. Like communist societies, they were deliberately created by human beings at a definite point in time, on the basis of a certain theoretical understanding of man and of the appropriate political institutions that should govern human society. WhileJjberal democracy cannot trace its theoretical origins to a single author like Karl Marx, it does claim to be based on specific rational principles whose rich intellectual ancestry we can readily trace. The principles underlying American democracy, codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, were based on the writings of Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and the other American Founding Fathers, who in turn derived many of their ideas from the English liberal tradition of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. If we are to uncover the selfunderstanding of the world’s oldest liberal democracy—a selfunderstanding that has been adopted by many democratic societies outside North America—we need to look back to the political writings of Hobbes and Locke. For while these authors anticipate many of Hegel’s assumptions concerning the nature of the “first man,” they and the AngloSaxon liberal tradition that flows from them take a decidedly different attitude toward the desire for recognition.

当代自由民主国家并不是从传统的朦胧迷雾中出现的。就像共产主义社会一样,它们是人类在一个明确的时间点上,根据对人和应该管理人类社会的适当政治机构的某种理论理解而有意创造的。虽然自由主义民主不能像卡尔·马克思那样把它的理论渊源追溯到单一的作者身上,但它确实声称是基于特定的理性原则,我们可以很容易地追溯其丰富的知识渊源。编入《独立宣言》和《宪法》的美国民主的基本原则是基于杰斐逊、麦迪逊、汉密尔顿和其他美国开国元勋的著作,而他们的许多想法又来自于托马斯·霍布斯和约翰·洛克的英国自由主义传统。如果我们要揭示世界上最古老的自由主义民主的自我理解 —— 一种被北美以外的许多民主社会所采用的自我理解 —— 我们就需要回顾霍布斯和洛克的政治著作。因为尽管这些作者预见到了黑格尔关于 “第一人” 性质的许多假设,但他们和从他们那里流传出来的盎格鲁·撒克逊自由主义传统对承认的愿望采取了明显不同的态度。

Thomas Hobbes is today primarily known for two things: his characterization of the state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,” and his doctrine of absolute monarchical sovereignty, which is frequently compared unfavorably to the more “liberal” Locke’s assertion of a right of revolution against tyranny. But while Hobbes was by no means a democrat in the contemporary sense of the term, he was most definitely a liberal, and his philosophy was the fountainhead from which modern liberalism sprang. For it was Hobbes who first established the principle that the legitimacy of government stems from the rights of those governed, rather than from the divine right of kings, or from the natural superiority of those who rule. In this respect, the differences between him on the one hapoV and Locke or the author of the American Declaration of Independence on the other, are trivial when compared with the gulf that separates Hobbes from writers closer to him in time like Filmer and Hooker.

托马斯·霍布斯今天主要因两件事而闻名:他对自然状态的描述是 “孤独、贫穷、下流、野蛮和短暂”,以及他的绝对君主主权学说,该学说经常与更 “自由” 的洛克关于反对暴政的革命权利的主张进行不利比较。但是,虽然霍布斯绝不是当代意义上的民主派,但他绝对是一个自由主义者,他的哲学是现代自由主义产生的源泉。因为正是霍布斯首先确立了这样一个原则,即政府的合法性源于被统治者的权利,而不是源于国王的神权,或源于统治者的自然优势。在这方面,与霍布斯与洛克或《美国独立宣言》作者之间的差异相比,霍布斯与费尔默和胡克等在时间上更接近他的作家之间的鸿沟是微不足道的。

Hobbes derives his principles of right and justice from his characterization of man in the state of nature. Hobbes’s state of nature is an “inference from the Passions” that may never have existed as a general stage of human history, but which is everywhere latent when civil society breaks down—coming into the open, for example, in places like Lebanon after that country’s descent into civil war in the mid1970s. Just like Hegel’s bloody battle, Hobbes’s state of nature is meant to illuminate the human condition as it arises out of the interaction of most permanent and fundamental human passions.

霍布斯从他对自然状态下的人的描述中得出了他的权利和正义原则。霍布斯的自然状态是一种 “激情的推论”,它可能从未作为人类历史的一般阶段而存在过,但当公民社会瓦解时,这种推论无处不在 —— 例如,在黎巴嫩这样的地方,当该国在 1970 年代中期陷入内战之后,这种推论就开始公开化了。就像黑格尔的血腥战斗一样,霍布斯的自然状态是为了照亮人类的状况,因为它产生于人类最持久和最基本的激情的互动中。

The similarities between Hobbes’s “state of nature” and Hegel’s bloody battle are striking. In the first place, both are characterized by extreme violence: the primary social reality is not love or concord, but a war of “every man against every man.” And, although Hobbes does not use the term “struggle for recognition,” the stakes in his original war of all against all are essentially the same as for Hegel:

霍布斯的 “自然状态” 和黑格尔的血腥战斗之间的相似之处是惊人的。首先,两者都以极端的暴力为特征:主要的社会现实不是爱或和谐,而是一场 “每个人对每个人” 的战争。而且,尽管霍布斯没有使用 “争取承认的斗争” 这一术语,但他最初的所有人对所有人的战争中的利害关系与黑格尔基本相同。

So that in the nature of man we find three principal causes of quarrel: first, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory … the third [makes men invade] for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.

因此,在人的本性中,我们发现争吵的三个主要原因:第一,竞争;第二,不自信;第三,荣耀…… 第三种[使人们为了琐碎的事情,如一句话,一个微笑,一个不同的意见,以及任何其他被低估的迹象,无论是直接在他们身上,还是通过反映在他们的亲属,他们的朋友,他们的国家,他们的职业,或他们的名字,而入侵。

According to Hobbes, men may fight over necessities, but more often than not, they fight over “trifles”—in other words, over recognition. Hobbes the great materialist ends up describing the nature of the “first man” in terms that are not much different from those of the idealist Hegel. That is, the passion that first and foremost drives men into the war of all against all is not covetousness for material possessions, but the satisfaction of the pride and vanity of a few ambitious men. For Hegel’s “desire for a desire,” or the quest for “recognition,” can be understood as none other than the human passion that we generally call “pride” or “self-respect” (when we approve of it), and “vanity,” “vainglory,” or “amour-propre” (when we don’t).

根据霍布斯的说法,人们可能会为了必需品而争斗,但更多的时候,他们是为了 “小事” —— 换句话说,为了承认而争斗。霍布斯这位伟大的唯物主义者最后用与唯心主义者黑格尔的术语描述了 “第一个人” 的性质,这与黑格尔的术语没有多大区别。也就是说,首先驱使人们进入全民对抗战争的激情不是对物质财富的觊觎,而是对少数野心家的骄傲和虚荣心的满足。因为黑格尔的 “欲望的欲望”,或对 “承认” 的追求,可以理解为不是别的,而是我们通常称之为 “骄傲” 或 “自尊”(当我们赞同它时),以及 “虚荣”、“虚荣” 或 “爱慕”(当我们不赞同时)的人类激情。

In addition, both philosophers understand that the instinct for selfpreservation is in some sense the strongest and most widely snared of the natural passions. For Hobbes, this instinct, along with “such things as are necessary to commodious living,” was the passion that most strongly inclined man toward peace. Both Hegel and Hobbes see in the primordial battle a fundamental tension between, on the one hand, man’s pride or desire for recognition, which induces him to risk his life in a prestige battle, and his fear of violent death, which inclines him to back down and accept a life of slavery in return for peace and security. And finally, Hobbes would accept Hegel’s contention that the bloody battle led, historically, to the relationship of lordship and bondage as one combatant, fearful of his life, submitted to the other. The domination of slaves by masters for Hobbes is despotism, a condition which does not remove man from the state of nature because slaves serve masters only under the implicit threat of force.

此外,两位哲学家都明白,自我保护的本能在某种意义上是自然激情中最强烈和最广泛的诱饵。对霍布斯来说,这种本能与 “商品生活所必需的东西” 一起,是最强烈地使人倾向于和平的激情。黑格尔和霍布斯都在原始战斗中看到了一种基本的紧张关系,一方面是人的骄傲或渴望得到承认,这促使他在一场声望之战中冒着生命危险,另一方面是他对暴力死亡的恐惧,这使他倾向于退缩,接受奴役的生活以换取和平和安全。最后,霍布斯会接受黑格尔的论点,即血腥的战斗在历史上导致了领主和奴役的关系,因为一个战斗者害怕自己的生命,而服从于另一个战斗者。对霍布斯来说,主人对奴隶的统治是专制主义,这种状况并没有使人脱离自然状态,因为奴隶只是在隐含的武力威胁下为主人服务。

Where Hobbes and Hegel differ fundamentally, however, and where the AngloSaxon tradition of liberalism takes its decisive turn, is in the relative moral weight assigned to the passions of pride or vanity (i.e., “recognition”) on the one hand, and the fear of violent death, on the other. Hegel, as we have seen, believes that the willingness to risk one’s life in a battle for pure prestige is in some sense what makes human beings human, the foundation of human freedom. Hegel does not “approve,” in the end, the highly unequal relationship of master and slave, and knows full well it is both primitive and oppressive. He understands, however, that it is a necessary stage of human history in which both terms of the class equation, masters and slaves, preserve something importantly human. The consciousness of the master is for him in a certain sense higher and more human than that of the slave, for by submitting to the fear of death the slave does not succeed in rising above his animal nature, and therefore is less free than the master. Hegel, in other words, finds something morally praiseworthy in the pride of the aristocrat-warrior who is willing to risk his life, and something ignoble in the slavish consciousness that seeks selfpreservation above all else.

然而,霍布斯和黑格尔的根本分歧之处,也是盎格鲁·撒克逊自由主义传统的决定性转折之处,在于一方面赋予骄傲或虚荣(即 “承认”)的激情以相对的道德重量,另一方面则是对暴力死亡的恐惧。正如我们所看到的,黑格尔认为,愿意冒着生命危险为纯粹的声望而战,在某种意义上是使人类成为人的原因,是人类自由的基础。说到底,黑格尔并不 “赞同” 主人和奴隶的高度不平等关系,他清楚地知道这种关系既原始又压抑。然而,他明白,这是人类历史的一个必要阶段,在这个阶段,阶级等式的两个条件,即主人和奴隶,都保留了一些重要的人性。对他来说,主人的意识在某种意义上比奴隶的意识更高、更有人性,因为通过屈服于死亡的恐惧,奴隶没有成功地超越他的动物本性,因此不如主人那样自由。换句话说,黑格尔在愿意冒生命危险的贵族战士的骄傲中发现了一些道德上值得赞扬的东西,而在寻求自我保护高于一切的奴性意识中发现了一些可耻的东西。

Hobbes, on the other hand, finds nothing whatsoever morally redeeming in the pride (or more properly, vanity) of the aristocratic master: indeed, it is precisely this desire for recognition, this willingness to fight over a “trifle” like a medal or a flag, that is the source of all violence and human misery in the state of nature. For him, the strongest human passion is the fear of violent death, and the strongest moral imperative—the “law of nature”—is the preservation of one’s own physical existence. Selfpreservation is the fundamental moral fact: all concepts of justice and right for Hobbes are founded in the rational pursuit of selfpreservation, while injustice and wrong are those things that lead to violence, war, and death.

另一方面,霍布斯认为贵族主人的骄傲(或更恰当地说是虚荣)没有任何道德上的救赎:事实上,正是这种对认可的渴望,这种为勋章或旗帜等 “小事” 而战的意愿,才是自然状态下所有暴力和人类痛苦的根源。对他来说,人类最强烈的激情是对暴力死亡的恐惧,而最强烈的道德要求 —— “自然法则” —— 是保护自己的身体存在。自我保护是基本的道德事实:对霍布斯来说,所有正义和正确的概念都建立在对自我保护的理性追求上,而不正义和错误是那些导致暴力、战争和死亡的事情。

The centrality of the fear of death is what leads Hobbes to the modern liberal state. For in the state of nature, prior to the establishment of positive law and government, the “right of nature” for every man to preserve his own existence, gives him the right to whatever means he judges necessary to accomplish that end, including violent ones. Where men have no common master, the inevitable result is the anarchic war of all against all. The cure for this anarchy is government, established on the basis of a social contract, under which all men agree to “lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.” The only source of a state’s legitimacy is its ability to protect and preserve those rights that individuals possess as human beings. For Hobbes, the fundamental human right was the right to life, that is, to the preservation of every human being’s physical existence, and the only legitimate government was one that could adequately preserve life and prevent a return to the war of all against all.

对死亡的恐惧是导致霍布斯进入现代自由主义国家的核心原因。因为在自然状态下,在建立实在法和政府之前,每个人维护自己生存的 “自然权利” 使他有权采取他认为必要的任何手段来实现这一目的,包括暴力手段。在人们没有共同主人的地方,不可避免的结果是所有人对所有人的无政府战争。治疗这种无政府状态的方法是政府,它建立在社会契约的基础上,在这种契约下,所有的人都同意 “放下对一切事物的权利,满足于对他人的自由,就像他允许他人对自己的自由一样。” 国家合法性的唯一来源是它有能力保护和维护个人作为人所拥有的那些权利。对霍布斯来说,基本人权是生命权,也就是保护每个人的身体存在,而唯一合法的政府是能够充分保护生命并防止回到所有人对所有人的战争。

Peace and preservation of the right to life does not come cost-free, however. Fundamental to Hobbes’s social contract is an agreement that in return for the preservation of their physical existences, men will give up their unjust pride and vanity. Hobbes demands, in other words, that men give up their struggle to be recognized, in particular,their struggle to be recognized as superior on the basis of their willingness to risk their lives in a prestige battle. The side of man that seeks to show himself superior to other men, to dominate them on the basis of superior virtue, the noble character who struggles against his “human all too human” limitations, is to be persuaded of the folly of his pride. The liberal tradition that springs from Hobbes therefore explicitly takes aim at those few who would seek to transcend their “animal” natures, and constrains them in the name of a passion that constitutes man’s lowest common denominator—selfpreservation. Indeed, it is a denominator common not only to human beings, but to the “lower” animals as well. Contrary to Hegel, Hobbes believes that the desire for recognition and the noble contempt for “mere” life is not the beginning of man’s freedom but the source of his misery. Hence the title of Hobbes’s most famous book: explaining that “God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, called him King of the Proud” Hobbes compares his state to the Leviathan because it is “King of all the children of pride.“1 1 The Leviathan does not satisfy that pride, but subdues it.

然而,和平和维护生命权并不是无代价的。霍布斯的社会契约的根本是一项协议,即作为对保护其物质存在的回报,人们将放弃其不公正的骄傲和虚荣。换句话说,霍布斯要求人们放弃他们为得到承认而进行的斗争,特别是放弃他们在愿意冒着生命危险进行声望斗争的基础上被承认为优越的斗争。人的那一面试图显示自己优于其他人,以优越的美德为基础支配他们,那个与 “人之常情” 的局限性作斗争的高尚人物,要被说服他的骄傲是愚蠢的。因此,源自霍布斯的自由主义传统明确地瞄准了那些试图超越其 “动物” 本性的少数人,并以一种构成人类最低限度的共同标准 —— 自我保护的激情的名义来限制他们。事实上,这不仅是人类共同的分母,也是 “低等” 动物共同的分母。与黑格尔相反,霍布斯认为,对认可的渴望和对 “单纯” 生命的高尚蔑视不是人的自由的开始,而是人的痛苦的来源。因此,霍布斯最有名的书的标题是:解释说 “上帝阐述了利维坦的巨大力量,称他为骄傲的国王”,霍布斯把他的国家比作利维坦,因为它是 “所有骄傲的孩子的国王”1 1 利维坦并没有满足这种骄傲,而是制服了它。

The distance from Hobbes to the “spirit of 1776” and to modern liberal democracy is a very short one. Hobbes believed in absolute monarchical sovereignty, not because of any inherent right of kings to rule, but because he believed that a monarch could be invested with something approaching popular consent. Consent of the governed, he believed, could not only be obtained, as we would have it today, through free, secret-ballot, multiparty elections on the basis of universal suffrage, but through a kind of tacit consent expressed in a citizen’s willingness to live under a particular government and abide by its laws. For Hobbes there was a very clear difference between despotism and legitimate government, even though the two might look similar on the outside (i.e., both taking the form of absolute monarchy): a legitimate ruler had popular consent, while the despot did not. Hobbes’s preference for one-man rule over parliamentary or democratic rule reflected his belief in the necessity of strong government to suppress the proud, and not because he contested the principle of popular sovereignty as such.

从霍布斯到 “1776 年的精神”,再到现代自由民主,这段距离非常短。霍布斯相信绝对的君主主权,不是因为国王有任何固有的统治权,而是因为他相信君主可以得到接近民众同意的东西。他认为,被统治者的同意不仅可以像我们今天所拥有的那样,通过自由的、无记名投票的、基于普选权的多党选举来获得,而且可以通过公民愿意生活在一个特定的政府之下并遵守其法律来表达一种默许。对霍布斯来说,专制主义和合法政府之间有一个非常明显的区别,尽管两者在外表上看起来很相似(即都采取绝对君主制的形式):合法统治者有民众的同意,而专制者没有。霍布斯倾向于一人统治而不是议会或民主统治,这反映了他相信强大的政府有必要压制骄傲的人,而不是因为他对人民主权的原则本身有异议。

The weakness in Hobbes’s argument was the tendency of legitimate monarchs to quietly slide over into being despots; without an institutional mechanism like elections for registering popular consent, it would frequently be difficult to know whether a particular monarch had such consent or not. Thus it was relatively easy forJohn Locke to modify Hobbes’s doctrine of monarchical sovereignty into one of parliamentary or legislative sovereignty based on majority rule. Locke agreed with Hobbes that selfpreservation was the most fundamental passion, and that the right to life was the fundamental right from which all others were derived. While his vision of the state of nature is softer than that of Hobbes, he agreed that it tended to degenerate into a state of war or anarchy, and that legitimate government grew out of the need to protect man from his own violence. But Locke pointed out that absolute monarchs could violate man’s right to selfpreservation, as when a king arbitrarily stripped a subject of his possessions and life. The cure for this was not absolute monarchy but limited government, a constitutional regime providing safeguards for the citizen’s fundamental human rights and whose authority derived from the consent of the governed. According to Locke, Hobbes’s natural right to selfpreservation implied a right of revolution against a tyrant who used his power unjustly against the interests of his people. It is this right that is referred to in the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of the necessity for “one people to dissolve the political bonds which have connected them with another.”

霍布斯论点的弱点是合法的君主有悄悄滑向专制的趋势;如果没有像选举这样的体制机制来登记民众的同意,往往很难知道某位君主是否有这种同意。因此,对约翰·洛克来说,将霍布斯的君主主权学说修改为基于多数人统治的议会或立法主权学说,是相对容易的。洛克同意霍布斯的观点,认为自我保护是最基本的激情,生命权是基本权利,所有其他权利都来自于此。虽然他对自然状态的看法比霍布斯更柔和,但他同意自然状态有退化为战争或无政府状态的趋势,而且合法政府是从保护人类免受自身暴力的需要中发展起来的。但洛克指出,绝对君主可能会侵犯人的自保权,如国王任意剥夺一个臣民的财产和生命。解决这个问题的办法不是绝对君主制,而是有限政府,一个为公民的基本人权提供保障的宪法制度,其权力来自被统治者的同意。根据洛克的观点,霍布斯的自我保护的自然权利意味着有权利对不公正地利用其权力侵害其人民利益的暴君进行革命。独立宣言》第一段提到的正是这种权利,其中提到 “一个民族必须解除将他们与另一个民族联系在一起的政治纽带”。

Locke would not quarrel with Hobbes’s relative evaluation of the moral merits of recognition versus selfpreservation: the former had to be sacrificed to the latter, which was the fundamental right of nature from which all other rights are derived. Locke, in contrast to Hobbes, would argue that man had a right not simply to a bare physical existence, but to a comfortable and potentially wealthy one as well; civil society existed not just to preserve social peace, but to protect the right of the “industrious and rational” to create abundance for all men through the institution of private property. Natural poverty is replaced by social plenty, such that “a king of a large and fruitful territory [in America] feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day laborer in England.”

Locke would not quarrel with Hobbes's relative evaluation of the moral merits of recognition versus self-preservation: the former had to be sacrificed to the latter, which was the fundamental right of nature from which all other rights are derived. 与霍布斯相反,洛克会认为,人不仅有权利获得赤裸裸的物质生存,而且还有权利获得舒适和潜在的财富;公民社会的存在不仅仅是为了维护社会和平,而是为了保护 “勤劳和理性” 的权利,通过私有财产制度为所有人创造富足。自然的贫困被社会的富足所取代,如 “一个拥有大片多产领土的国王在美国的饮食、住宿和衣着都不如英国的一个日工”。

The first man of Locke is similar to that of Hobbes and differs radically from that of Hegel, however: while he struggles for recognition in the state of nature, he must be educated to subordinate his desire for recognition to the desire to preserve his own life, and to the desire to endow that life with material comfort. Hegel’s first man desires not material possessions but another desire, the recognition by others of his freedom and humanity, and in pursuit of recognition shows himself to be indifferent to the “things of this world,” beginning with private property and ending with his own life. The first man of Locke, by contrast, enters into civil society not simply to protect those material possessions he has in the state of nature, but to open up the possibility of obtaining more without limit.

然而,洛克的第一人与霍布斯的第一人相似,与黑格尔的第一人有根本的不同:虽然他在自然状态下为获得承认而奋斗,但他必须接受教育,使他对承认的欲望服从于维护自己生命的欲望,服从于赋予这种生命以物质享受的欲望。黑格尔的第一个人渴望的不是物质财富,而是另一种欲望,即他人对他的自由和人性的承认,为了追求承认,他表明自己对 “这个世界的东西” 无动于衷,首先是私有财产,最后是他自己的生命。相比之下,洛克的第一个人进入公民社会,不仅仅是为了保护他在自然状态下拥有的那些物质财富,而是为了开辟无限制地获得更多的可能性。

Despite the efforts of some recent scholars to see the roots of the American regime in classical republicanism, the American founding was thoroughly if not wholly imbued with the ideas of


John Locke. Thomas Jefferson’s “self-evident” truths about the right of men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were not essentially different from Locke’s natural rights to life and property. The American founders believed that Americans possessed these rights as human beings, prior to the establishment of any political authority over them, and that the primary purpose of government was to protect those rights. The list of rights with which Americans believe themselves imbued by nature has expanded beyond life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to include not only those enumerated in the Bill of Rights, but others like the “right to privacy” of more recent invention. Whatever the specific set of rights enumerated, however, American liberalism and that of other constitutional republics similar to it share a common selfunderstanding that these rights stake out a sphere of individual choice where the power of the state is strictly limited.

约翰·洛克的思想。托马斯·杰斐逊关于人的生命、自由和追求幸福的权利的 “不言而喻” 的真理,与洛克的生命和财产的自然权利没有本质区别。美国建国者认为,美国人在对他们建立任何政治权力之前就拥有这些权利,而政府的主要目的是保护这些权利。美国人认为自己被自然赋予的权利清单已经超出了生命、自由和追求幸福的范围,不仅包括《权利法案》中列举的权利,还包括像最近发明的 “隐私权” 这样的其他权利。然而,无论列举的是哪种具体权利,美国自由主义和与之相似的其他宪政共和国都有一个共同的自我理解,即这些权利划定了个人选择的范围,国家的权力受到严格限制。

To an American schooled in the thought of Hobbes, Locke, Jefferson, and the other American Founding Fathers, Hegel’s honoring of the aristocratic master who risks his life in a prestige battle must sound very Teutonic and perverse. It is not that any of these AngloSaxon thinkers failed to recognize Hegel’s first man as an authentic human type. It is rather that they saw the problem of politics as being in some sense the effort to persuade the would-be master to accept the life of the slave in a kind of classless society of slaves. This is because they rated the satisfaction derived from recognition much lower than Hegel, particularly when weighed against the pain of “man’s lord and master,” death. Indeed, they believed the fear of violent death and the desire for comfortable selfpreservation to be so strong that these passions would override man’s desire for recognition in the mind of any rational man schooled in his own selfinterest. This is the origin of our almost instinctive reaction that Hegel’s prestige battle is irrational.

对于一个接受过霍布斯、洛克、杰斐逊和其他美国开国元勋思想教育的美国人来说,黑格尔对冒着生命危险参加声望之战的贵族主人的尊崇,听起来一定是非常日耳曼式的、反常的。并不是说这些盎格鲁·撒克逊的思想家们没有认识到黑格尔的第一个人是一个真实的人类类型。相反,他们认为政治问题在某种意义上是说服未来的主人在一种无阶级的奴隶社会中接受奴隶的生活的努力。这是因为他们对从承认中获得的满足感的评价比黑格尔低得多,特别是在与 “人的主宰和主人” —— 死亡的痛苦相权衡时。事实上,他们认为对暴力死亡的恐惧和对舒适的自我保护的渴望是如此强烈,以至于在任何以自我利益为学校的理性人的心中,这些激情会超越人对承认的渴望。这就是我们几乎本能的反应的起源,即黑格尔的声望之争是非理性的。

In fact, opting for the life of a slave over that of a master is not obviously more rational, unless one accepts the higher relative moral weight given to selfpreservation over recognition in the AngloSaxon tradition. It is precisely the moral primacy accorded selfpreservation or comfortable selfpreservation in the thought of Hobbes and Locke that leaves us unsatisfied. Beyond establishing rules for mutual selfpreservation, liberal societies do not attempt to define any positive goals for their citizens or promote a particular way of life as superior or desirable to another. Whatever positive content life may have has to be filled by the individual himself. That positive content can be a high one of public service and private generosity, or it can be a low one of selfish pleasure and personal meanness. The state as such is indifferent. Indeed, government is committed to the tolerance of different “lifestyles,” except when the exercise of one right impinges on another. In the absence of positive, “higher” goals, what usually fills the vacuum at the heart of Lockean liberalism is the openended pursuit of wealth, now liberated from the traditional constraints of need and scarcity.

事实上,选择奴隶的生活而不是主人的生活并不明显更合理,除非人们接受在盎格鲁·撒克逊传统中给予自我保护的相对道德权重高于承认。恰恰是霍布斯和洛克的思想中赋予自我保护或舒适的自我保护的道德优先地位让我们不满意。除了为相互的自我保护制定规则之外,自由主义社会并不试图为其公民界定任何积极的目标,也不提倡某种特定的生活方式比另一种方式优越或可取。无论生活有什么积极的内容,都必须由个人自己来填补。这种积极的内容可以是高层次的公共服务和私人慷慨,也可以是低层次的自私快乐和个人卑劣。国家本身是无动于衷的。事实上,政府致力于容忍不同的 “生活方式”,除非一种权利的行使会影响到另一种权利。在缺乏积极的、“更高的” 目标的情况下,通常填补洛克自由主义核心的真空的是对财富的无限追求,现在已经从传统的需求和稀缺性的约束中解放出来。

The limitations of the liberal view of man become more obvious if we consider liberal society’s most typical product, a new type of individual who has subsequently come to be termed pejoratively as the bourgeois: the human being narrowly consumed with his own immediate selfpreservation and material wellbeing, interested in the community around him only to the extent that it fosters or is a means of achieving his private good. Lockean man did not need to be publicspirited, patriotic, or concerned for the welfare of those around him; rather, as Kant suggested, a liberal society could be made up of devils, provided they were rational. It was not clear why the citizen of a liberal state, particularly in its Hobbesian variant, would ever serve in the army and risk his life for his country in war. For if the fundamental natural right was selfpreservation of the individual, on what grounds could it ever be rational for an individual to die for his country rather than trying to run away with his money and his family? Even in times of peace, Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided no reason why society’s best men should choose public service and statesmanship over a private life of money-making. Indeed, it was not clear why Lockean man should become active in the life of his community, be privately generous to the poor, or even make the sacrifices necessary to raise a family.

如果我们考虑一下自由主义社会最典型的产物 —— 一种后来被贬称为资产阶级的新型个体,自由主义的人观的局限性就会变得更加明显:人狭隘地消费于他自己眼前的自我保护和物质福利,对他周围的社会感兴趣的程度只在于它能促进或成为实现他私人利益的手段。洛克式的人不需要热心公益、爱国,也不需要关心周围人的福祉;相反,正如康德所言,自由主义社会可以由魔鬼组成,只要他们是理性的。不清楚为什么自由主义国家的公民,特别是在霍布斯的变体中,会在军队中服役并在战争中为国家冒生命危险。因为如果基本的自然权利是个人的自我保护,那么个人为国家献身而不是带着钱和家人逃跑,又有什么理由是合理的呢?即使在和平时期,霍布斯或洛克的自由主义也没有提供任何理由让社会上最优秀的人选择公共服务和政治家而不是私人赚钱的生活。事实上,并不清楚为什么洛克式的人应该积极参与社区生活,私下里对穷人慷慨解囊,甚至做出养家糊口的必要牺牲。

Beyond the practical question of whether one can create a viable society in which all publicspiritedness is missing, there is an even more important issue as to whether there was not something deeply contemptible about a man who cannot raise his sights higher than his own narrow selfinterests and physical needs. Hegel’s aristocratic master risking his life in a prestige battle is only the most extreme example of the human impulse to transcend merely natural or physical need. Is it not possible that the struggle for recognition reflects a longing for self-transcendence that lies at the root not only of the violence of the state of nature and of slavery, but also of the noble passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and publicspiritedness? Is recognition not somehow related to the entire moral side of man’s nature, the part of man that finds satisfaction in the sacrifice of the narrow concerns of the body for an objective or a principle that lies beyond the body? By not rejecting the perspective of the master in favor of that of the slave, by identifying the master’s struggle for recognition as somehow at the core of what is human, Hegel seeks to honor and preserve a certain moral dimension to human life that is entirely missing in the society conceived of by Hobbes and Locke. Hegel, in other words, understands man as a moral agent whose specific dignity is related to his inner freedom from physical or natural determination. It is this moral dimension, and the struggle to have it recognized, that is the motor driving the dialectical process of history.


But how are the struggle for recognition and the risk of death in the primordial bloody battle related to moral phenomena that are more familiar to us? T o answer this question, we need to look more deeply at recognition and try to understand the side of the human personality out of which it arises.


“Then we’ll expunge all such things [from the just city],” I said, “beginning with the verse:


I would rather be on the soil, a slave to another


To a man without lot whose means of life are not great


Than rule over all the dead who have perished …”

而不是统治所有已经灭亡的死者…… "

—Socrates, in Plato’s Republic, Book 3


The “desire for recognition” sounds like a strange and somewhat artificial concept, the more so when it is said to be the primary motor driving human history. “Recognition” enters our vocabulary from time to time, for example when one of our colleagues retires and is given a watch “in recognition for years of service.” But we do not normally think about political life as a “struggle for recognition.” To the extent we generalize about politics, we are much more likely to view it as a competition for power between economic interests, a struggle to divide up wealth and the other good things in life.

“对认可的渴望” 听起来是一个奇怪的、有点矫揉造作的概念,当它被说成是推动人类历史的主要动力时,就更显得奇怪了。“认可” 不时地进入我们的词汇,例如,当我们的一位同事退休后被授予一块手表,“以表彰其多年的服务”。但我们通常不认为政治生活是一场 “争取认可的斗争”。就我们对政治的概括而言,我们更有可能把它看作是经济利益集团之间的权力竞争,是分割财富和生活中其他美好事物的斗争。

The concept underlying “recognition” was not invented by Hegel. It is as old as Western political philosophy itself, and refers to a thoroughly familiar part of the human personality. Over the millennia, there has been no consistent word used to refer to the psychological phenomenon of the “desire for recognition”: Plato spoke of thymos, or “spiritedness,” Machiavelli of man’s desire for glory, Hobbes of his pride or vainglory, Rousseau of his amour propre, Alexander Hamilton of the love of fame and James Madison of ambition, Hegel of recognition, and Nietzsche of man as the “beast with red cheeks.” All of these terms refer to that part of man which feels the need to place value on things—himself in the first instance, but on the people, actions, or things around him as well. It is the part of the personality which is the fundamental source of the emotions of pride, anger, and shame, and is not reducible to desire, on the one hand, or reason on the other. The desire for recognition is the most specifically political part of the human personality because it is what drives men to want to assert themselves over other men, and thereby into Kant’s condition of “asocial sociability.” It is not surprising that so many political philosophers have seen the central problem of politics as one of taming or harnessing the desire for recognition in a way that would serve the political community as a whole. Indeed, the project of taming the desire for recognition has been so successful in the hands of modern political philosophy that we citizens of modern egalitarian democracies often fail to see the desire for recognition in ourselves for what it is.

“承认” 的基本概念不是黑格尔发明的。它与西方政治哲学本身一样古老,指的是人类人格中一个完全熟悉的部分。几千年来,没有一个一致的词被用来指称 “对承认的渴望” 这一心理现象。柏拉图说的是 thymos 或 “spiritedness”,马基雅维利说的是人对荣誉的渴望,霍布斯说的是他的骄傲或虚荣,卢梭说的是他的 amour propre,亚历山大·汉密尔顿说的是对名声的热爱,詹姆斯·麦迪逊说的是野心,黑格尔说的是认可,尼采说人是 “脸颊发红的野兽”。所有这些术语都是指人的那一部分,它觉得需要对事物 —— 首先是对自己,但也对他周围的人、行为或事物 —— 进行估价。这是人格中的一部分,是骄傲、愤怒和羞耻等情绪的基本来源,它一方面不能被欲望还原,另一方面也不能被理性还原。对承认的欲望是人类人格中最具体的政治部分,因为它是驱使人们想要对其他人宣称自己的原因,从而进入康德的 “非社会性社会性” 的状态。如此多的政治哲学家将政治的核心问题视为驯服或驾驭认可欲望的问题,并不令人惊讶,因为这将有助于整个政治社会。事实上,驯服承认的欲望的项目在现代政治哲学手中是如此成功,以至于我们这些现代平等主义民主国家的公民常常看不到自己身上的承认欲望是什么。

The first extended analysis of the phenomenon of the desire for recognition in the Western philosophical tradition appears, quite appropriately, in the book that stands at the very head of that tradition, Plato’s Republic. The Republic records a conversation between the philosopher Socrates and two young aristocratic Athenians, Glaucon and Adeimantus, who seek to describe the nature of a just city “in speech.” Such a city, like cities “in reality,” needs a class of guardians or warriors to defend it from external enemies. According to Socrates, the chief characteristic of these guardians is thymos, a Greek word that may somewhat awkwardly be translated as “spiritedness.“3 He compares a man with thymos to a noble dog who is capable of great courage and anger fighting strangers in defense of his own city. In his first approach to the problem, Socrates describes thymos from the outside: we only know that it is associated with courage—that is, the willingness to risk one’s life—and with the emotion of anger or indignation on behalf of one’s own.

对西方哲学传统中渴望得到承认的现象的第一次扩展分析,非常恰当地出现在这本站在该传统之首的书中,即柏拉图的《共和国》。共和国》记录了哲学家苏格拉底和两个年轻的雅典贵族格劳孔和阿迪曼图斯之间的对话,他们试图 “用语言” 描述一个公正城市的性质。这样的城市,就像 “现实中” 的城市一样,需要有一类守护者或战士来保护它免受外敌的侵扰。根据苏格拉底的说法,这些守护者的主要特征是 thymos,这个希腊词可能有点笨拙地被翻译成 “spiritedness”。在他对这个问题的第一种处理方式中,苏格拉底从外部描述了 thymos:我们只知道它与勇气 —— 即愿意冒生命危险 —— 以及与代表自己的愤怒或愤慨的情绪有关。

Socrates then returns to a more detailed analysis of thymos in Book IV, which contains his famous tripartite division of the soul. Socrates notes that the human soul has a desiring part which is made up of many different desires, the most vivid of which are hunger and thirst. These desires all take a similar form of impelling man toward something—food or drink—outside of himself. But, Socrates notes, there are times when a man refrains from drinking even when he is thirsty. He and Adeimantus readily agree that there is a separate part of the soul, the reasoning or calculating part, that may induce a human being to act contrary to desire—for example, when the thirsty man fails to drink because he knows the water is contaminated. Are desire and reason then the only two parts of the soul, sufficient to explain human behavior? Can one, for example, explain all cases of selfrestraint as reason’s pitting one desire against another desire, for example greed against lust or longterm security against short-term pleasure?

然后,苏格拉底在第四卷中回到了对 thymos 的更详细的分析,其中包含了他著名的灵魂的三方划分。苏格拉底指出,人的灵魂有一个欲望的部分,由许多不同的欲望组成,其中最生动的是饥饿和口渴。这些欲望都采取类似的形式,促使人走向自身之外的东西 —— 食物或饮料。但是,苏格拉底指出,有些时候,即使是在口渴的时候,人也会忍住不喝。他和 Adeimantus 都同意,灵魂中有一个独立的部分,即推理或计算的部分,可能会促使人的行为与欲望相反 —— 例如,当口渴的人不喝水,因为他知道水被污染了。那么,欲望和理性是灵魂的唯一两部分,足以解释人类行为吗?例如,我们能不能把所有自我约束的情况解释为理智把一种欲望与另一种欲望对立起来,例如贪婪与欲望,或长期安全与短期快乐?

Adeimantus is ready to agree that thymos is reallyjust another kind of desire, when Socrates tells the story of a certain Leontius who wants to look at a pile of corpses lying by the public executioner:

当苏格拉底讲到某个 Leontius 的故事时,Adeimantus 准备同意 thymos 真的只是另一种欲望,他想看看躺在公共刽子手身边的一堆尸体。

He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself turn away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face. But finally, overpowered by the desire, he opened his eyes wide, ran toward the corpses and said: “Look, you damned wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.”

他想看,但同时他又很厌恶,让自己转过身去;有一阵子他挣扎着,捂住了自己的脸。但最后,他被欲望压倒了,他睁大眼睛,向尸体跑去,说 “看吧,你们这些该死的可怜虫,尽情享受这美好的景象吧。”

One could interpret the internal struggle going on within Leontius as nothing more than the struggle between two desires: the desire to look at the corpses, competing with a natural disgust at viewing a dead human body. This would be in keeping with Hobbes’s somewhat mechanistic psychology: he interprets the will as simply “the last appetite in deliberating” and therefore as the victory of the most powerful or tenacious desire. But to interpret Leontius’s behavior as nothing more than a clash of desires does not explain his anger with himself. For he presumably would not have been angry had he succeeded in restraining himself: on the contrary, he would have felt a different but related emotion, pride. A moment’s reflection will indicate that Leontius’s anger could come from neither the desiring part nor from the calculating part of the soul, because Leontius was not indifferent to the outcome of his inner struggle. It therefore had to come from a third and altogether different part, which Socrates calls thymos. This anger arising from thymos is, as Socrates points out, potentially an ally of reason in helping to suppress wrong or foolish desires, but nonetheless is distinct from reason.

人们可以把莱昂修斯内心的挣扎解释为不过是两种欲望之间的斗争:看尸体的欲望,与对看死人的自然厌恶相抗衡。这与霍布斯的机械主义心理学相一致:他把意志解释为只是 “审议中的最后欲望”,因此是最强大或最顽强的欲望的胜利。但把莱昂修斯的行为解释为不过是欲望的冲突,并不能解释他对自己的愤怒。因为如果他成功地克制了自己,他大概不会生气:相反,他会感到一种不同但相关的情绪,即骄傲。稍微思考一下就会发现,列昂尼德的愤怒既不可能来自灵魂的欲望部分,也不可能来自灵魂的计算部分,因为列昂尼德对自己内心挣扎的结果并非无动于衷。因此,它必须来自第三个完全不同的部分,苏格拉底称之为 thymos。正如苏格拉底所指出的那样,这种来自 thymos 的愤怒有可能是理性的盟友,有助于抑制错误或愚蠢的欲望,但还是与理性不同。

Thymos emerges in the Republic as being somehow related to the value one sets on oneself, what we today might call “selfesteem.” Leontius believed himself to be the type of individual who could comport himself with a certain dignity and selfrestraint, and when he failed to live up to his own sense of selfesteem, he grew angry with himself. Socrates suggests a relationship between anger and “selfesteem” by explaining that the nobler a man is—that is, the more highly he evaluates his own worth—the more angry he will become when he has been dealt with unjustly: his spirit “boil[s] and become[s] harsh,” forming an “alliance for battle with what seems just” even if he “suffers in hunger, cold, and everything of the sort…“9 Thymos is something like an innate human sense of justice: people believe that they have a certain worth, and when other people act as though they are worth less—when they do not recognize their worth at its correct value—then they become angry. The intimate relationship between self-evaluation and anger can be seen in the English word synonymous with anger, “indignation.” “Dignity” refers to a person’s sense of selfworth; “indignation” arises when something happens to offend that sense of worth. Conversely, when other people see that we are not living up to our own sense of selfesteem, we feel shame; and when we are evaluated justly (i.e., in proportion to our true worth), we feel pride.

Thymos 在《共和国》中出现,与一个人对自己的评价有一定的关系,也就是我们今天所说的 “自尊”。列昂尼德认为自己是那种能够以某种尊严和自我克制来约束自己的人,而当他未能达到自己的自尊感时,他就对自己感到愤怒。苏格拉底提出了愤怒和 “自尊” 之间的关系,他解释说,一个人越高贵 —— 也就是说,他对自己的价值评价越高 —— 当他受到不公正的对待时,他就会变得越愤怒:他的精神 “沸腾,变得苛刻”,形成一个 “与看似公正的东西战斗的联盟”,即使他 “遭受饥饿、寒冷和一切类似的痛苦。…… ”9 Thymos 类似于人类与生俱来的正义感:人们相信自己有一定的价值,当其他人表现得好像他们的价值较低时 —— 当他们不承认自己的价值为正确价值时 —— 他们就会愤怒。自我评价和愤怒之间的密切关系可以从与愤怒同义的英语单词 “愤慨” 中看出。“尊严” 指的是一个人的自我价值感;当某些事情发生时,冒犯了这种价值感,就会产生 “不尊严”。相反,当其他人看到我们没有达到自己的自尊感时,我们会感到羞愧;而当我们被公正地评价时(即与我们的真实价值相称),我们会感到自豪。

Anger is a potentially all-powerful emotion, capable of overwhelming, as Socrates points out, natural instincts like hunger, thirst, and selfpreservation. But it is not a desire for any material object outside the self; if we can speak of it at all as a desire, it is a desire for a desire, that is, a desire that that person who evaluated us too low should change his opinion and recognize us according to our own estimate of our worth. Plato’s thymos is therefore nothing other than the psychological seat of Hegel’s desire for recognition: for the aristocratic master in the bloody battle is driven by the desire that other people evaluate him at his own sense of selfworth. Indeed, he is driven into a bloody rage when that sense of selfworth is denigrated. Thymos and the “desire for recognition” differ somewhat insofar as the former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with value, whereas the latter is an activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness share the same valuation. It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding recognition. But esteem is not a “thing” like an apple or a Porsche: it is a state of consciousness, and to have subjective certainty about one’s own sense of worth, it must be recognized by another consciousness. Thus thymos typically, but not inevitably, drives men to seek recognition.

愤怒是一种潜在的无所不能的情绪,能够压倒,正如苏格拉底指出的那样,压倒饥饿、口渴和自我保护等自然本能。但它不是对自我之外的任何物质对象的欲望;如果我们可以把它说成是一种欲望的话,它是对一种欲望的欲望,也就是说,它希望那个对我们评价过低的人应该改变他的看法,按照我们自己对自己价值的估计来承认我们。因此,柏拉图的 thymos 无非是黑格尔的承认欲望的心理位置:因为血腥战斗中的贵族主人是被别人以他自己的自我价值感来评价他的欲望所驱使的。事实上,当这种自我价值感被诋毁时,他就会被驱赶到血腥的愤怒中。Thymos 和 “承认的欲望” 有些不同,因为前者指的是灵魂的一部分,它赋予物体以价值,而后者是 thymos 的一种活动,它要求另一个意识分享同样的评价。一个人有可能在自己身上感受到 thymotic 的自豪感,而不要求得到承认。但自尊不是像苹果或保时捷那样的 “东西”:它是一种意识状态,要对自己的价值感有主观的确定性,就必须得到另一个意识的承认。因此,thymos 通常,但不是不可避免地,驱使人去寻求承认。

Let us consider, for a moment, a small but revealing example of thymos in the contemporary world. Vaclav Havel, before he became president of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1989, spent a great deal of time in and out of jails for his activities as a dissident and founding member of the human rights organization Charter 77. His sojourns in prison evidently gave him considerable time to think about the system that had jailed him, and about the real nature of the evil that it represented. In his essay “The Power of the Powerless,” published in the early 1980s before the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe were a twinkle in Gorbachev’s eye, Havel tells the following story of a greengrocer:

让我们考虑一下,当代世界中一个很小但很有启示意义的例子。瓦茨拉夫·哈维尔在 1989 年秋天成为捷克斯洛伐克总统之前,因其作为持不同政见者和人权组织 “77 宪章” 的创始成员的活动而在监狱里进进出出了很长时间。他在监狱中的逗留显然给了他相当多的时间来思考监禁他的制度,以及它所代表的邪恶的真正性质。哈维尔在 80 年代初发表的文章《无权者的力量》中,讲述了一个菜农的故事,当时东欧的民主革命在戈尔巴乔夫眼中还只是昙花一现。

The manager of a fruit and vegetable shop places in his window, among the onions and carrots, the slogan: “Workers of the World, Unite!” Why does he do it? What is he trying to communicate to the world? Is he genuinely enthusiastic about the idea of unity among the workers of the world? Is his enthusiasm so great that he feels an irrepressible impulse to acquaint the public with his ideals? Has he really given more than a moment’s thought to how such a unification might occur and what it would mean? …

一家水果和蔬菜店的经理在他的橱窗里,在洋葱和胡萝卜之间,贴上了这样的标语:“世界工人,团结起来!” 他为什么这样做?他想向世界传达什么?他是否真正热衷于世界工人之间团结的想法?他的热情如此之高,以至于他感到有一种不可抗拒的冲动要让公众了解他的理想?他是否真正考虑过这种统一如何发生以及它意味着什么?. .

Obviously, the greengrocer is indifferent to the semantic content of the slogan on exhibit; he does not put the slogan in this window from any personal desire to acquaint the public with the ideal it expresses. This, of course, does not mean that his action has no motive or significance at all, or that the slogan communicates nothing to anyone. The slogan is really a sign, and as such it contains a subliminal but very definite message. Verbally, it might be expressed this way: “I, the greengrocer XY, live here and I know what I must do. I behave in the manner expected of me. I can be depended upon and am beyond reproach. I am obedient and therefore I have the right to be left in peace.” This message, of course, has an addressee: it is directed above, to the greengrocer’s superior, and at the same time it is a shield that protects the greengrocer from potential informers. The slogan’s real meaning, therefore, is rooted firmly in the greengrocer’s existence. It reflects his vital interests. But what are those vital interests?

很明显,这位菜农对展出的标语的语义内容无动于衷;他把标语放在这个橱窗里,并不是出于让公众认识它所表达的理想的个人愿望。当然,这并不意味着他的行为完全没有动机或意义,也不意味着这个口号没有向任何人传达任何信息。口号实际上是一个标志,因此它包含一个潜意识的但非常明确的信息。在口头上,它可以这样表达。“我,菜农 XY,住在这里,我知道我必须做什么。我的行为符合人们对我的期望。我是可以信赖的,也是无可指责的。我很听话,因此我有权利得到安宁。” 当然,这条信息有一个收件人:它是针对上面的,针对菜农的上级,同时它也是保护菜农不受潜在告密者影响的盾牌。因此,这个口号的真正含义牢牢地扎根于菜农的存在。它反映了他的重要利益。但这些重要的利益是什么?

Let us take note: if the greengrocer had been instructed to display the slogan, “I am afraid and therefore unquestioningly obedient,” he would not be nearly as indifferent to its semantics, even though the statement would reflect the truth. The greengrocer would be embarrassed and ashamed to put such an unequivocal statement of his own degradation in the shop window, and quite naturally so, for he is a human being and thus has a sense of his own dignity. To overcome this complication, his expression of loyalty must take the form of a sign which, at least on its textual surface, indicates a level of disinterested conviction. It must allow the greengrocer to say, “What’s wrong with the workers of the world uniting?” Thus the sign helps the greengrocer to conceal from himself the low foundations of his obedience, at the same time concealing the low foundations of power. It hides them behind the facade of something high. And that something is ideology.

让我们注意到:如果菜农被指示展示 “我很害怕,因此毫无疑问地服从” 这样的标语,他就不会对其语义无动于衷,尽管这句话反映的是事实。在商店的橱窗里放上这样一个关于他自己的堕落的明确声明,菜农会感到尴尬和羞愧,这很自然,因为他是一个人,因此对自己的尊严有一种感觉。为了克服这种复杂的情况,他对忠诚的表达必须采取一种标志的形式,至少在其文字的表面上,表明一种无私的信念。它必须让菜农说:“全世界的工人联合起来有什么不好?” 因此,这个标志帮助菜农向自己隐瞒了他服从的低下基础,同时也隐瞒了权力的低下基础。它把它们隐藏在高大上的东西的外表之下。而这个东西就是意识形态。

In reading this passage one is struck immediately by Havel’s use of the word “dignity.” Havel depicts the greengrocer as an ordinary man of no particular education or stature, who nonetheless would feel ashamed to display a sign saying “I am afraid.” What is the nature of this dignity that is the source of the man’s inhibition? Havel notes that such a sign would be a more honest statement than displaying the communist slogan. Moreover, in communist Czechoslovakia everyone understood that one was forced to do things one didn’t want to do out of fear. Fear itself, the instinct for selfpreservation, is a natural instinct universally shared by all men: Why, then, not admit that one is a human being and therefore afraid?

在阅读这段文字时,人们立刻被哈维尔对 “尊严” 一词的使用所震撼。哈维尔把菜农描绘成一个没有受过特别教育或没有地位的普通人,但他会为展示一个 “我很害怕” 的标志而感到羞耻。这个人的尊严的本质是什么,它是这个人的禁忌的来源?哈维尔指出,这样的标志将是一个比展示共产主义口号更诚实的声明。此外,在共产主义的捷克斯洛伐克,每个人都明白,一个人被迫做自己不想做的事情是出于恐惧。恐惧本身,即自我保护的本能,是所有人普遍拥有的一种自然本能。那么,为什么不承认自己是一个人,因此害怕呢?

The reason, ultimately, has to do with the fact that the greengrocer believes he has a certain worth. That worth is related to his belief that he is something more than a fearful and needy animal who can be manipulated by his fears and needs. He believes, even if he cannot articulate this belief, that he is a moral agent who is capable of choice, who can resist his natural needs for the sake of principle.


Of course, as Havel points out, the greengrocer is able to sidestep this internal debate because he can simply display a highminded communist slogan and fool himself that he is principled rather than fearful and abject. In a way, his situation is like that of Socrates’ character Leontius who gave in to his desire to view the corpses. Both the greengrocer and Leontius believed they had a certain worth related to their capacity for choice, that they were “better than” their natural fears and desires. Both, in the end, were vanquished by their natural fear or desire. The only difference was that Leontius was honest about his own weakness and condemned himself for it, while the greengrocer failed to confront his own degradation because ideology provided him a convenient excuse. Havel’s story teaches us two things: first, that the feeling of dignity or selfworth that is at the root of thymos is related to man’s view that he is in some way a moral agent capable of real choice, and second, that this self-perception is innate to or characteristic of all human beings, whether they are great and proud conquerors or humble greengrocers. As Havel puts it,

当然,正如哈维尔所指出的,这个菜农能够回避这种内部辩论,因为他可以简单地展示一个高大上的共产主义口号,欺骗自己说他是有原则的,而不是恐惧和卑微的。在某种程度上,他的情况就像苏格拉底笔下的莱昂修斯一样,他屈服于自己观看尸体的欲望。菜农和 Leontius 都相信他们有一定的价值,这与他们的选择能力有关,他们 “比” 他们的自然恐惧和欲望要好。最后,两人都被他们的自然恐惧或欲望所征服。唯一的区别是,莱昂修斯对自己的弱点是诚实的,并为此谴责自己,而菜农则没有面对自己的堕落,因为意识形态为他提供了一个方便的借口。哈维尔的故事告诉我们两件事:第一,作为 thymos 根源的尊严或自我价值的感觉与人的观点有关,即他在某种程度上是一个能够进行真正选择的道德代理人;第二,这种自我认知是与生俱来的,或者说是所有人类的特征,无论他们是伟大而骄傲的征服者还是卑微的菜农。正如哈维尔所说

The essential aims of life are present naturally in every person. In everyone there is some longing for humanity’s rightful dignity, for moral integrity, for free expression of being and a sense of transcendence over the world of existences.


On the other hand, Havel notes that “each person is capable, to a greater or lesser degree, of coming to terms with living within the lie.” His condemnation of the post-totalitarian communist state revolves around the damage that communism has done to people’s moral character, to their belief in their capacity to act as moral agents—the greengrocer’s absent sense of dignity when he agrees to put up the sign “Workers of the World, Unite!” Dignity and its opposite, humiliation, are the two most common words used by Havel in describing life in communist Czechoslovakia. Communism humiliated ordinary people by forcing them to make a myriad of petty, and sometimes not so petty, moral compromises with their better natures. These took the form of putting up a sign in one’s store window, or signing a petition denouncing a colleague for doing something the state did not like, or simply remaining silent when that colleague was unjustly persecuted. The seedy post-totalitarian states of the Brezhnev era tried to make everybody morally complicit not through terror but, ironically enough, by dangling before them the fruits of modern consumer culture. These were not the spectacular baubles that fueled the greed of the American investment banker of the 1980s, but small things like a refrigerator, a bigger apartment, or a vacation in Bulgaria, which loomed large to people with few material possessions. Communism, in a much more thoroughgoing way than “bourgeois” liberalism, fortified the desiring part of the soul against the thymotic part. Havel’s charge against communism is not at all that it failed in its promise to deliver the material plenty of industrial efficiency, or that it disappointed the hopes of the working class or the poor for a better life. On the contrary, it did offer them these things in a Faustian bargain, requiring them to compromise their moral worth in return. And in making this bargain, the victims of the system became its perpetuators, while the system itself took on a life of its own independently of anyone’s desire to participate in it.

另一方面,哈维尔指出,“每个人或多或少都有能力接受生活在谎言中的事实”。他对后极权主义共产主义国家的谴责是围绕着共产主义对人们的道德品质、对他们作为道德主体的能力的信念所造成的损害展开的 —— 当杂货商同意挂出 “世界工人,团结起来!” 的牌子时,他的尊严感消失了。尊严和它的反面 —— 羞辱,是哈维尔在描述共产主义捷克斯洛伐克的生活时最常使用的两个词。共产主义羞辱普通人,迫使他们对自己美好的本性做出无数琐碎的,有时甚至不那么琐碎的道德妥协。这些形式包括在自己的商店橱窗里挂个牌子,或者签署请愿书,谴责一个同事做了国家不喜欢的事情,或者在这个同事受到不公正的迫害时简单地保持沉默。勃列日涅夫时代肮脏的后极权主义国家试图使每个人在道德上成为共犯,不是通过恐怖,而是通过在他们面前晃动现代消费文化的果实,这是很讽刺的。这些并不是激发 1980 年代美国投资银行家的贪婪的壮观的装饰品,而是像冰箱、更大的公寓或在保加利亚度假这样的小东西,它们对物质财富不多的人来说是很重要的。共产主义以一种比 “资产阶级” 自由主义更彻底的方式,强化了灵魂中的欲望部分,使之与甲状腺部分对抗。哈维尔对共产主义的指控,根本不是说它没有履行承诺,没有提供工业效率的物质财富,也不是说它让工人阶级或穷人对更好的生活的希望失望。相反,它确实在浮士德式的交易中向他们提供了这些东西,要求他们牺牲自己的道德价值作为回报。在做这个交易时,这个系统的受害者成为了它的延续者,而这个系统本身也有了自己的生命,与任何人参与它的愿望无关。

Of course, what Havel identifies as “the general unwillingness of consumption-oriented people to sacrifice some material certainties for the sake of their own spiritual and moral integrity” is a phenomenon that is hardly unique to communist societies. In the West, consumerism induces people to make moral compromises with themselves daily, and they lie to themselves not in the name of socialism but of ideas like “selfrealization” or “personal growth.” And yet, there is an important difference: in communist societies, it was difficult to have a normal life, and next to impossible to have a “successful” one, without suppressing one’s thymos to a greater or lesser degree. One could not be a simple carpenter or electrician or doctor without “going along” in some fashion,

当然,哈维尔所指出的 “以消费为导向的人们普遍不愿意为了自己的精神和道德的完整性而牺牲一些物质上的确定性” 的现象,几乎不是共产主义社会独有的。在西方,消费主义诱使人们每天向自己做出道德上的妥协,他们不是以社会主义的名义,而是以 “自我实现” 或 “个人成长” 等理念来欺骗自己。然而,有一个重要的区别:在共产主义社会,如果不或多或少地压制自己的胸怀,就很难有正常的生活,几乎不可能有一个 “成功” 的生活。如果不以某种方式 “顺从”,就不可能成为一个简单的木匠或电工或医生。

just as the greengrocer did, and one certainly could not be a successful writer or professor or television journalist without implicating oneself rather fully in the system’s deceit. If one were thoroughly honest and wanted to retain one’s sense of inner selfworth, there was only one alternative (assuming one was not among the increasingly small circle of people who still believed sincerely in Marxist-Leninist ideology). That was to drop out of the system altogether and become, like Vladimir Bukovsky, Andrey Sakharov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, or Havel himself, professional dissidents. But this meant breaking with the desiring side of life altogether, and exchanging such simple material gratifications as a regular job and apartment for an ascetic life of jail, mental institution, or exile. For the great mass of people whose thymotic sides were not nearly so well developed, normal life meant acceptance of a petty, day-to-day moral degradation.

一个人不可能成为一个简单的木匠或电工或医生,而不以某种方式 “随波逐流”,就像菜农那样,一个人当然也不可能成为一个成功的作家或教授或电视记者,而不把自己完全卷入系统的欺骗之中。如果一个人彻底诚实,并想保持内心的自我价值感,那么只有一个选择(假设他不在越来越小的圈子里,仍然真诚地相信马克思列宁主义意识形态)。那就是完全退出体制,像弗拉基米尔·布科夫斯基、安德烈·萨哈罗夫、亚历山大·索尔仁尼琴或哈维尔本人一样,成为职业异议人士。但这意味着与生活中的欲望完全决裂,并将诸如固定工作和公寓等简单的物质满足换成监狱、精神病院或流放的苦行僧式生活。对于大多数人来说,他们的胸怀还没有那么发达,正常的生活意味着接受琐碎的、日常的道德堕落。

In Plato’s story of Leontius and Havel’s fable of the greengrocer—at the beginning and the end of the Western tradition of political philosophy, so to speak—we see a humble form of thymos emerge as a central factor in political life. Thymos appears to be related to a good political order in some way, because it is the source of courage, publicspiritedness, and a certain unwillingness to make moral compromises. The good political order needs to be something more than a mutual non-aggression pact, according to these writers; it must also satisfy man’s just desire for recognition of his dignity and worth.

在柏拉图的 Leontius 故事和 Havel 的菜农寓言中 —— 可以说是西方政治哲学传统的开始和结束 —— 我们看到一种卑微的 thymos 形式作为政治生活的核心因素出现。Thymos 似乎在某种程度上与良好的政治秩序有关,因为它是勇气、公益心和某种不愿意做出道德妥协的来源。根据这些作家的说法,良好的政治秩序需要的不仅仅是一个相互不侵犯的契约;它还必须满足人类对其尊严和价值的认可的公正愿望。

But thymos and the desire for recognition are much broader phenomena than these two examples would suggest. The process of valuation and self-valuation pervades many aspects of day-today life that we commonly think of as economic: man is truly “the beast with red cheeks.”

但是,thymos 和对认可的渴望是比这两个例子所表明的更广泛的现象。评价和自我评价的过程充斥着我们通常认为是经济的日常生活的许多方面:人确实是 “红脸蛋的野兽”。

Chapter 16: The Beast with Red Cheeks

第 16 章:红脸蛋的怪兽

Yet, if God wills that [this war] continue until the wealth piled up by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid by another drawn by the sword, still it must be said, as was said three thousand years ago, “The


judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.”


—Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 1865

阿布拉罕·林肯,第二次就职演说,1865 年 3 月

Thymos as it emerges in the Republic or in Havel’s account of the greengrocer constitutes something like an innate human sense of justice, and as such is the psychological seat of all the noble virtues like selflessness, idealism, morality, self-sacrifice, courage, and honorability. Thymos provides an all-powerful emotional support to the process of valuing and evaluating, and allows human beings to overcome their most powerful natural instincts for the sake of what they believe is right or just. People evaluate and assign worth to themselves in the first instance, and feel indignation on their own behalf. But they are also capable of assigning worth to other people, and feeling anger on behalf of others. This occurs most often when an individual is a member of a class of people that perceives itself as being treated unjustly, for example, a feminist on behalf of all women, or a nationalist on behalf of his ethnic group. Indignation on one’s own behalf then extends to the class as a whole and engenders feelings of solidarity. There are also instances of anger on behalf of classes of people to which one does not belong. The just rage of radical white abolitionists against slavery before the American Civil War, or the indignation that people around the world have felt against the apartheid system in South Africa, are both manifestations of thymos. Indignation in these cases arises because the victim of racism is not being treated with the worth that the person feeling indignation believes they are due as human beings, that is, because the victim of racism is not recognized.

在《共和国》或哈维尔关于菜农的叙述中出现的 Thymos 构成了某种类似于人类与生俱来的正义感,因此它是所有高尚美德,如无私、理想主义、道德、自我牺牲、勇气和荣誉感的心理所在。Thymos 为估价和评价过程提供了全能的情感支持,并允许人类为了他们认为正确或公正的东西克服他们最强大的自然本能。人们首先评价和分配自己的价值,并为自己感到愤慨。但他们也有能力给其他人分配价值,并代表他人感到愤怒。这种情况最常发生在一个人是一个阶级的成员,认为自己受到了不公正的对待,例如,一个女权主义者代表所有妇女,或者一个民族主义者代表他的民族群体。代表自己的愤慨会延伸到整个阶级,并产生团结的感觉。也有代表自己不属于的阶级的愤怒的例子。美国内战前,激进的白人废奴主义者对奴隶制的正义愤怒,或者世界各地的人们对南非种族隔离制度的愤慨,都是 thymos 的表现。在这些情况下,愤慨的产生是因为种族主义的受害者没有得到感到愤慨的人认为他们作为人应有的价值,也就是说,因为种族主义的受害者没有被承认。

The desire for recognition arising out of thymos is a deeply paradoxical phenomenon because the latter is the psychological seat of justice and selflessness while at the same time being closely related to selfishness. The thymotic self demands recognition for its own sense of the worthiness of things, both itself and of other people. The desire for recognition remains a form of selfassertion, a projection of one’s own values on the outside world, and gives rise to feelings of anger when those values are not recognized by other people. There is no guarantee that the thymotic selfs sense of justice will correspond to that of other selves: What is just for the anti-apartheid activist, for example, is completely different for the pro-apartheid Afrikaner, based on differing evaluations of black dignity. In fact, since the thymotic self usually begins by evaluating itself, the likelihood is that it will overvalue itself: as Locke says, no man is a good judge in his own case.

从 thymos 中产生的对认可的渴望是一个非常矛盾的现象,因为后者是正义和无私的心理位置,同时又与自私密切相关。胸怀天下的自我要求承认自己对事物的价值感,包括自己和他人的价值。对认可的渴望仍然是一种自我主张的形式,是一个人对外部世界的价值观的投射,当这些价值观不被其他人认可时,就会产生愤怒的感觉。没有人能够保证百里挑一的自我的正义感会与其他自我的正义感相对应。例如,对于反种族隔离的活动家来说,什么是公正的,对于支持种族隔离的非洲人来说则完全不同,因为他们对黑人的尊严有不同的评价。事实上,由于胸有成竹的自我通常是从评价自己开始的,所以它很可能会高估自己:正如洛克所说,没有人在自己的案件中是一个好的法官。

The selfassertive nature of thymos leads to the common confusion of thymos and desire. In fact, the selfassertion arising from thymos and the selfishness of desire are very distinct phenomena. Take the example of a wage dispute between management and organized labor in an automobile factory. Most contemporary political scientists, following a Hobbesian psychology that reduces the will to desire and reason alone, would interpret such disputes as conflicts between “interest groups,” that is, between the desire of the managers and the desire of the workers to have a greater part of the economic pie. Reason, such a political scientist would assert, induces each side to follow a bargaining strategy that maximizes the economic benefits to itself or, in the case of a strike, minimizes the costs, until the relative strength of each produces a compromise outcome.

thymos 的自我主张的性质导致了 thymos 和欲望的常见混淆。事实上,由 thymos 产生的自我主张和欲望的自私性是非常不同的现象。以一家汽车厂的管理层和有组织的劳工之间的工资纠纷为例。大多数当代政治学家,遵循霍布斯的心理学,把意志简化为欲望和理性,会把这种争端解释为 “利益集团” 之间的冲突,也就是说,管理者的欲望和工人的欲望之间的冲突,以获得更大的经济蛋糕。这样的政治学家会断言,理性会促使每一方采取讨价还价的策略,使自己的经济利益最大化,或者在罢工的情况下,使成本最小化,直到每一方的相对实力产生一个妥协的结果。

But in fact, this is a considerable simplification of the psychological process that goes on internally on both sides. The striking worker does not carry a sign saying “I am a greedy person and want all the money I can extract from management,” any more than Havel’s greengrocer was willing to put out the sign saying “I am afraid.” Rather, the striker says (and thinks to himself): “I am a good worker; I am worth much more to my employer than I am currently being paid. Indeed, given the profits that I have allowed the company to earn, and given the kinds of wages that are paid for comparable work in other industries, I am being unfairly underpaid; indeed, I am being …” at which point the worker would resort to a biological metaphor whose meaning is that his human dignity is being violated. The worker, just like the greengrocer, believes that he has a certain worth. The worker demands higher pay, of course, because it pays his mortgage and buys food for his children, but he wants it also as a sign of his worth. The anger that arises in job disputes seldom has to do with the absolute level of wages, but rather arises because management’s wage offer does not adequately “recognize” the dignity of the worker. And this explains why strikers feel much more intense anger at a strikebreaker than at the management itself. Even though the strikebreaker is nothing more than a tool of management, he is despised as an abject person whose own sense of dignity was overwhelmed by his desire for immediate economic gain. Unlike the other strikers, the strikebreaker’s desire won out over his thymos.

但事实上,这是对双方内部进行的心理过程的相当简化。罢工的工人并没有举着牌子说:“我是一个贪婪的人,想要从管理层那里榨取所有的钱”,就像哈维尔的杂货店老板愿意打出 “我很害怕” 的牌子一样。相反,前锋说(并在心里想)。“我是个好工人;我对我的雇主的价值比我目前的工资高得多。事实上,考虑到我让公司赚取的利润,以及考虑到其他行业可比工作的工资种类,我被不公平地低估了;事实上,我被…… ” 在这一点上,工人将诉诸于一个生物比喻,其含义是他的人类尊严被侵犯了。这名工人,就像那个菜农一样,认为自己有一定的价值。当然,工人要求更高的工资,因为这可以支付他的抵押贷款和为他的孩子购买食物,但他希望这也是他价值的标志。在工作纠纷中产生的愤怒很少与工资的绝对水平有关,而是因为管理层的工资提议没有充分 “承认” 工人的尊严。这也解释了为什么罢工者对破坏者的愤怒比对管理层本身的愤怒要强烈得多。尽管罢工者只不过是管理层的一个工具,但他被鄙视为一个卑微的人,他自己的尊严感被他对眼前经济利益的渴望所淹没。与其他罢工者不同,罢工者的欲望战胜了他的尊严。

We readily understand economic selfinterest, but frequently ignore the way it is intimately bound up with thymotic selfassertion. Higher wages satisfy both the desire for material things of the desiring part of the soul, and the desire for recognition of the thymotic part. In political life, economic claims are seldom presented as simple demands for more; they are usually couched in terms of “economic justice.” To dress up an economic demand as a claim on behalf of justice toward oneself can be done as an act of pure cynicism, but more often than not it reflects the real power of thymotic anger on the part of people who believe, consciously or not, that their dignity is ultimately at stake in disputes over money. Indeed, much of what is commonly interpreted as economic motivation dissolves into a kind of thymotic desire for recognition. This was understood perfectly well by the father of political economy, Adam Smith. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that the reason men seek riches and shun poverty has very little to do with physical necessity. This is because “the wages of the meanest labourer” can supply the necessities of nature, such as “food and clothing, the comfort of a house, and of a family,” and that much of the income even of poor people is spent on things that are, strictly speaking, “conveniences, which may be regarded as superfluities.” Why, then, do men seek to “better their condition” by seeking the toil and bustle of economic life? The answer is:

我们很容易理解经济上的自我利益,但经常忽视它与胸怀的自我主张紧密相连的方式。更高的工资既满足了灵魂中欲望部分对物质的渴望,也满足了情感部分对认可的渴望。在政治生活中,经济要求很少作为简单的要求被提出来;它们通常以 “经济正义” 的术语来表述。把经济要求打扮成代表对自己的正义的要求,可以作为一种纯粹的玩世不恭的行为,但更多的时候,它反映了人们的愤怒的真正力量,他们自觉或不自觉地认为,他们的尊严在金钱的争端中最终受到威胁。事实上,许多通常被解释为经济动机的东西,都溶入了一种对认可的胸怀。政治经济学之父亚当·斯密对此理解得非常透彻。在《道德情操论》中,斯密认为,人们之所以追求财富,避开贫穷,与身体的需要关系不大。这是因为 “最卑微的劳动者的工资” 可以提供自然界的必需品,如 “食物和衣服,房屋和家庭的舒适”,而且即使是穷人的大部分收入都花在了严格意义上的 “便利,可被视为多余的东西” 上。那么,为什么人们要通过寻求经济生活的劳累和喧嚣来 “改善自己的状况” 呢?答案是。

To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all the agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him… . The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it either places him out of sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, they have, however, scarce any fellowfeeling with the misery and distress which he suffers …

被人观察,被人关注,被人以同情、赞美和赞许的方式注意到,这就是我们可以提议从它那里得到的所有好处。我们感兴趣的是虚荣心,而不是轻松或快乐。但是虚荣心总是建立在我们是被关注和赞许的对象的信念之上。富人以他的财富为荣,因为他觉得这些财富自然而然地吸引了全世界的注意力,而且人类愿意和他一起享受所有令人愉快的情绪,而他的处境的优势很容易激发他的情绪。. . 相反,穷人则为自己的贫穷感到羞耻。他觉得,这使他不被人类所注意,或者,如果他们注意到他,他们对他所遭受的苦难和困境几乎没有任何同感……

There is a level of poverty where economic activity is undertaken for the fulfillment of natural needs, such as in the droughtstricken African Sahel during the 1980s. But for most other regions in the world, poverty and deprivation are relative rather than absolute concepts arising from money’s role as a symbol for worth. The officiai “poverty line” in the United States represents a standard of living much higher than that of well-off people in certain Third World countries. This does not mean that poor people in the United States are more satisfied than well-to-do people in Africa or South Asia, however, for their sense of selfworth receives many more daily affronts. Locke’s observation that a king in America “feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a daylaborer in England” neglects thymos and thus misses the point entirely. The king in America has a sense of dignity missing entirely from the English daylaborer, a dignity that is born of his freedom, self-sufficiency, and the respect and recognition he receives from the community around him. The daylaborer may eat better, but he is totally dependent on an employer to whom he is virtually invisible as a human being.

在为满足自然需求而开展经济活动的地方,存在一定程度的贫困,例如 1980 年代非洲萨赫勒地区的干旱。但是对于世界上大多数其他地区来说,贫穷和匮乏是相对的,而不是绝对的概念,这是因为金钱作为价值的象征。美国的官方 “贫困线” 代表了比某些第三世界国家的富人的生活水平高得多。然而,这并不意味着美国的穷人比非洲或南亚的富人更满意,因为他们的自我价值感每天都受到更多的侮辱。洛克认为,美国的国王 “吃的、住的、穿的都不如英国的日工”,这句话忽略了 thymos,因此完全没有抓住重点。美国的国王有一种英国日工完全没有的尊严感,这种尊严源于他的自由、自给自足,以及他从周围社区得到的尊重和认可。日工可能吃得更好,但他完全依赖于一个雇主,而他作为一个人几乎是不存在的。

The failure to understand the thymotic component of what is normally thought of as economic motivation leads to vast misinterpretations of politics and historical change. For example, it is very common to assert that revolutions are caused by poverty and deprivation, or to believe that the greater the poverty and deprivation, the greater the revolutionary potential. Tocqueville’s famous study of the French Revolution, however, shows that just the reverse happened: in the thirty or forty years preceding the revolution, France experienced an unprecedented period of economic growth, coupled with a series of well-intentioned but poorly thought-through liberalizing reforms on the part of the French monarchy. The French peasantry was far more prosperous and independent on the eve of the revolution than their counterparts in Silesia or East Prussia, as was the middle class. They became combustible material for the revolution, however, because the liberalization of political life that took place toward the end of the eighteenth century allowed them to feel their relative deprivation much more acutely than anyone in Prussia, and to express their anger over it. In the contemporary world, only the poorest and richest countries tend to be stable. Those countries that are modernizing economically tend to be the least stable politically because growth itself promotes new expectations and demands. People compare their situation not with that of traditional societies, but with that of wealthy countries, and grow angry as a result. The commonly perceived “revolution of rising expectations” is as much a thymotic phenomenon as one arising out of desire.

未能理解通常被认为是经济动机的胸怀成分,导致了对政治和历史变革的巨大误解。例如,断言革命是由贫穷和匮乏引起的,或者认为贫穷和匮乏越严重,革命的潜力就越大,这是很常见的。然而,托克维尔对法国革命的著名研究表明,情况恰恰相反:在革命之前的三四十年间,法国经历了一个前所未有的经济增长期,再加上法国君主制方面一系列意图良好但考虑不周的自由化改革。在革命前夕,法国农民比他们在西里西亚或东普鲁士的同行要繁荣和独立得多,中产阶级也是如此。然而,他们成为了革命的可燃材料,因为 18 世纪末发生的政治生活自由化使他们比普鲁士的任何人都能更敏锐地感受到他们的相对贫困,并为此表达他们的愤怒。在当代世界,只有最穷和最富的国家往往是稳定的。那些经济上正在现代化的国家往往在政治上最不稳定,因为增长本身就会促进新的期望和要求。人们不是把自己的情况与传统社会的情况相比较,而是与富裕国家的情况相比较,并因此而变得愤怒。人们普遍认为的 “期望值上升的革命” 既是一种胸有成竹的现象,也是一种由欲望产生的现象。

There are other cases where thymos has been confused with desire. Historians attempting to explain the American Civil W ar must give an account of why Americans were willing to endure the appalling suffering brought on by a war that killed six hundred thousand men out of a population of thirty-one million, or almost 2 percent of the total. A number of twentieth-century historians, emphasizing economic factors, have tried to interpret the war as a struggle between an industrializing, capitalist North and a traditional, planter South. But these sorts of explanations are somehow unsatisfactory. The war was initially fought under the banner of largely non-economic goals—for the North, preservation of the Union, and, in the South, maintenance of their “peculiar institution” and the way of life it represented. But there was a further issue as well, which Abraham Lincoln, wiser than many of his later interpreters, pointed to when he said that “everyone knew” that slavery was “somehow the cause” of the conflict. Many Northerners were, of course, opposed to emancipation and hoped to settle the war early through compromise. But Lincoln’s determination to see the war through to the end, evident in his own stern admonition that he would be willing to see the war go on even if it consumed the fruits of “the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil,” was, economically speaking, incomprehensible. Such exchanges make sense only to the thymotic part of the soul.

还有其他一些情况,thymos 与欲望被混淆了。试图解释美国内战的历史学家必须说明,为什么美国人愿意忍受一场战争带来的骇人听闻的痛苦,这场战争使 31 万人口中的 60 万人丧生,即几乎占总人口的 2%。一些 20 世纪的历史学家强调经济因素,试图将这场战争解释为工业化、资本主义的北方和传统的、种植者的南方之间的斗争。但这些解释在某种程度上是不令人满意的。战争最初是在很大程度上非经济目标的旗帜下进行的 —— 在北方,维护联邦,在南方,维护他们的 “特殊体制” 和它所代表的生活方式。但还有一个问题,亚伯拉罕·林肯比他后来的许多解释者更明智,他说 “每个人都知道” 奴隶制是冲突的 “某种原因”,并指出了这一点。当然,许多北方人反对解放奴隶制,并希望通过妥协早日解决战争。但林肯决心将战争进行到底,从他自己的严厉告诫中可以看出,他愿意看到战争继续下去,即使它消耗了 “债券人 250 年来的无偿劳动” 的成果,从经济上讲,这是不可理解的。这样的交流只有在灵魂的胸怀部分才有意义。

There are any number of examples of the desire for recognition operating in contemporary American politics. Abortion, for example, has been one of the most neuralgic issues on the American social agenda for the past generation, and yet it is an issue with almost no economic content. The debate over abortion centers over a conflict in rights between the unborn and women, but in fact reflects a deeper disagreement over the relative dignity of the traditional family and the woman’s role in it, on the one hand, and that of the self-sufficient, working woman on the other. The sides in this debate feel indignation on behalf of either aborted fetuses or women dying at the hands of incompetent abortionists, but they feel indignation on their own behalf as well: the traditional mother because she feels abortion somehow degrades the respect due motherhood, and the working woman because the absence of abortion rights diminishes her dignity as the equal of men. The indignity of racism in modern America lies only partly in the physical deprivation brought on by poverty among blacks: much of its pain lies in the fact that in the eyes of many whites, a black is (in Ralph Ellison’s phrase) an “invisible man,” not actively hated but unseen as a fellow human being. Poverty merely adds to that invisibility. Virtually the entire civil liberties and civil rights agendas, while having certain economic components, are essentially thymotic contests over recognition of competing understandings of justice and human dignity.

在当代美国政治中,有任何数量的例子可以说明对承认的渴望。例如,在过去的一代中,堕胎一直是美国社会议程上最具神经性的问题之一,但这是一个几乎没有经济内容的问题。关于堕胎的争论集中在未出生婴儿和妇女之间的权利冲突上,但实际上反映了更深层次的分歧,一方面是传统家庭和妇女在其中的作用的相对尊严,另一方面是自给自足的职业妇女的作用。在这场辩论中,双方都为被堕胎的胎儿或死于无能的堕胎者之手的妇女感到愤慨,但他们也为自己感到愤慨:传统的母亲,因为她觉得堕胎在某种程度上降低了对母亲的尊重,而职业妇女,因为没有堕胎权降低了她作为与男人平等的尊严。在现代美国,种族主义的羞辱性仅部分在于黑人贫困带来的物质匮乏:它的大部分痛苦在于,在许多白人眼中,黑人是(用拉尔夫·埃里森的话说)一个 “看不见的人”,不是主动被憎恨,而是作为一个同胞被看不见。贫穷只是增加了这种不可见性。实际上,整个公民自由和民权议程,虽然有某些经济成分,但本质上是对正义和人类尊严的竞争性理解的认可的竞争。

There is a thymotic aspect to many other activities that are normally seen as instances of natural desire. For example, sexual conquest is usually notjust a matter of physical gratification—one does not always need a partner for that—but reflects in addition the need to have one’s desirability “recognized” by the other. The self that is being recognized is not necessarily the same as the self of Hegel’s aristocratic master, or the moral self of Havel’s greengrocer. But the deepest forms of erotic love involve a longing for the lover’s recognition of something more than one’s physical characteristics, a longing for what amounts to a recognition of one’s worth.

许多其他通常被视为自然欲望实例的活动都有胸有成竹的一面。例如,性征服通常不仅仅是身体上的满足 —— 并不总是需要一个伴侣来满足 —— 而是反映了让自己的可取性得到对方 “承认” 的需要。被认可的自我不一定与黑格尔的贵族主人的自我相同,也不一定与哈维尔的菜农的道德自我相同。但是,最深层的情爱形式涉及到对情人承认比自己身体特征更多的东西的渴望,对相当于承认自己价值的东西的渴望。

These examples of thymos are not meant to prove that all economic activity, all erotic love, and all politics can be reduced to the desire for recognition. Reason and desire remain parts of the soul distinct from thymos. Indeed, in many ways they constitute the dominant parts of the soul for modern, liberal man. Human beings covet money because they want things, not just recognition, and with the liberation of human acquisitiveness that took place in early modern times, the growth in the number and variety of material desires has been explosive. And they crave sex because it—well, feels good. I have taken note of the thymotic dimensions of greed and lust precisely because the primacy of desire and reason in the modern world tends to obscure the role that thymos or recognition plays in day-to-day life. Thymos frequently manifests itself as an ally of desire—as in the case of the worker’s demand for “economic justice”—and is thus easily confused with desire.

这些关于 thymos 的例子并不是要证明所有的经济活动、所有的情欲之爱和所有的政治都可以归结为对承认的欲望。理性和欲望仍然是灵魂的一部分,与 thymos 不同。事实上,在许多方面,它们构成了现代自由主义者的灵魂的主导部分。人类觊觎金钱,因为他们想要的是东西,而不仅仅是认可。随着现代早期人类获取性的解放,物质欲望的数量和种类都在爆炸性地增长。他们渴望性,因为它 —— 嗯,感觉很好。我注意到贪婪和欲望的胸怀,正是因为欲望和理性在现代世界的首要地位往往掩盖了胸怀或认可在日常生活中的作用。Thymos 经常表现为欲望的盟友 —— 如工人对 “经济正义” 的要求 —— 因此很容易与欲望相混淆。

The desire for recognition has also played a critical role in bringing about the anti-communist earthquake in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. Certainly, many Eastern Europeans wanted an end to communism for less than elevated economic reasons, that is, because they thought that this would pave the way toward West German living standards. The fundamental impulse for the reforms undertaken in the Soviet Union and China was in a certain sense economic, what we have identified as the inability of centralized command economies to meet the requirements of “postindustrial” society. But the desire for prosperity was accompanied by a demand for democratic rights and political participation as ends in themselves, in other words, for a system that implemented recognition on a routine and universal basis. The would-be coup makers of August 1991 deceived themselves that the Russian people would trade “their freedom for a piece of sausage,” in the words of one of the defenders of the Russian parliament.

对承认的渴望在促成苏联、东欧和中国的反共地震中也发挥了关键作用。当然,许多东欧人希望结束共产主义的原因并不是高高在上的经济原因,也就是说,因为他们认为这将为实现西德的生活标准铺平道路。苏联和中国进行改革的基本动力在某种意义上是经济上的,也就是我们所认定的中央集权的指令性经济无法满足 “后工业化” 社会的要求。但是对繁荣的渴望伴随着对民主权利和政治参与本身的要求,换句话说,对一个在常规和普遍基础上实施承认的制度的要求。1991 年 8 月的政变制造者自欺欺人地认为俄罗斯人民会用 “他们的自由来换取一根香肠”,用俄罗斯议会的一位捍卫者的话说。

We cannot understand the totality of the revolutionary phenomenon unless we appreciate the working of thymotic anger and the demand for recognition that accompanied communism’s economic crisis. It is a curious characteristic of revolutionary situations that the events which provoke people to take the greatest risks and set in motion the crumbling of governments are seldom the large ones that historians later describe as fundamental causes, but rather small and seemingly incidental ones. For example, in Czechoslovakia, the Civic Forum opposition group was formed out of popular indignation at the jailing of Havel himself, which occurred despite the communist Jakes regime’s earlier promise of liberalization. Large crowds began to gather in the streets of Prague in November 1989 initially after rumors—subsequently discovered to be false—that a student had been killed by the security police. In Romania, the chain of events that brought down the Ceaucescu regime in December 1989 began with protests in the town of Timisoara over the jailing of an ethnic Hungarian cleric, Father Tokes, who had been an active campaigner for the rights of the Hungarian community there. In Poland, hostility toward the Soviets and their Polish communist allies was fed for decades by Moscow’s unwillingness to admit responsibility for the Soviet NKVD’s murder of Polish officers in the Katyn forest in 1940. One of the first acts undertaken by Solidarity when it entered the government after the round table agreement in the spring of 1989 was to demand from the Soviets a full accounting of the Katyn murders. A similar process was going on in the Soviet Union itself, where many of the survivors of the Stalin years were demanding an accounting from those who had committed the crimes, and rehabilitation for those who were the victims. Perestroïka and political reform cannot be understood separately from the desire to simply tell the truth about the past, and to restore dignity to those who had disappeared voicelessly into the Gulag. The anger that swept aside countless local party officials in 1990 and 1991 arose not only over systemic economic grievances, but over issues of personal corruption and arrogance, like the party first secretary in Volgograd who was drummed out of office for using party funds to buy himself a Volvo.

如果我们不理解伴随着共产主义经济危机的胸怀愤怒和对承认的要求的作用,我们就无法理解革命现象的整体性。革命形势的一个奇怪的特点是,激起人们承担最大风险并启动政府崩溃的事件,很少是历史学家后来描述为根本原因的大事件,而是小的和看似偶然的事件。例如,在捷克斯洛伐克,“公民论坛” 反对派团体的成立是出于民众对哈维尔本人被监禁的愤慨,尽管共产党的杰克斯政权早先承诺要实现自由化,但还是发生了这种情况。1989 年 11 月,大量人群开始聚集在布拉格的街头,最初是在有传言说一名学生被安全警察杀害后 —— 后来发现是假的。在罗马尼亚,1989 年 12 月使齐奥塞斯库政权倒台的一连串事件开始于蒂米什瓦拉镇的抗议活动,抗议者是一位匈牙利族教士托克斯神父,他一直是当地匈牙利社区权利的积极宣传者。在波兰,几十年来,由于莫斯科不愿意承认对 1940 年苏联内务人民委员会在卡廷森林谋杀波兰军官一事负责,因此对苏联及其波兰共产主义盟友充满了敌意。团结工会在 1989 年春天达成圆桌会议协议后进入政府时,采取的第一个行动就是要求苏联对卡廷谋杀案作出全面说明。类似的过程在苏联本身也在进行,那里的许多斯大林时代的幸存者要求那些犯下罪行的人作出交代,并为那些受害者提供康复服务。Perestroïka 和政治改革不能与简单地讲述过去的真相和恢复那些无声无息地消失在古拉格的人的尊严的愿望分开理解。1990 年和 1991 年席卷无数地方党员官员的愤怒不仅来自于系统性的经济不满,还来自于个人腐败和傲慢问题,比如伏尔加格勒的党委第一书记就因为用党费给自己买了一辆沃尔沃而被赶下台。

The Honecker regime in East Germany was critically weakened by a series of events in 1989: a refugee crisis, in which hundreds of thousands fled to West Germany, its loss of Soviet support, and finally by the opening of the Berlin Wall. Even at that point, however, it was not clear that socialism was dead in East Germany; what swept the Socialist Unity party out of power completely and discredited its new leaders Krenz and Modrow were revelations about the opulence of Honecker’s personal residence in the suburb of Wandlitz. Now, strictly speaking, the enormous anger that these revelations provoked was somewhat irrational. There were many causes for complaint against communist East Germany, above all relating to the country’s lack of political freedom and its low standard of living when compared to West Germany. Honecker for his part did not live in a modern version of the Palace of Versailles; his home was that of a wellto-do burgher in Hamburg or Bremen. But the well-known and longstanding charges against communism in East Germany did not raise nearly the degree of thymotic anger on the part of average East Germans as viewing the Honecker residence on their television screens. For the tremendous hypocrisy those images revealed, on the part of a regime that was explicitly devoted to equality, deeply offended people’s sense of justice and was sufficient to get them into the streets to demand a total end to the Communist party’s power.

1989 年的一系列事件严重削弱了东德的昂纳克政权:难民危机,数十万人逃往西德;失去苏联的支持;最后是柏林墙的开启。然而,即使在那个时候,社会主义在东德也并不明显;使社会主义统一党完全下台并使其新领导人克伦茨和莫德罗名誉扫地的,是关于昂纳克在万德利茨郊区的私人住宅的奢华的披露。现在,严格说来,这些揭露所激起的巨大愤怒是有些不理性的。对共产主义东德的抱怨有很多原因,首先是这个国家缺乏政治自由,与西德相比生活水平低。就昂纳克而言,他并没有住在现代版的凡尔赛宫里;他的家是汉堡或不来梅的一个富裕的乡下人。但是,在东德,对共产主义的众所周知的长期指控并没有像在电视屏幕上看到昂纳克的住所那样,引起普通东德人的愤怒。因为这些画面揭示了一个明确致力于平等的政权的巨大虚伪,深深地冒犯了人们的正义感,足以让他们走上街头,要求彻底结束共产党的权力。

Finally, there was the case of China. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform created a whole new horizon of economic opportunities for a generation of young Chinese coming of age in the 1980s, who could now start businesses, read foreign newspapers, and study in the United States and other Western countries for the first time since the revolution. The students reared in this climate of economic freedom had economic complaints, of course, particularly concerning the mounting inflation in the late 1980s that was steadily eroding the purchasing power of most city dwellers. But reformed China was a place of vastly greater dynamism and opportunity than under Mao, particularly for those privileged children of the elite attending universities in Beijing, Xian, Canton, and Shanghai. A nd yet, these students were precisely the ones who demonstrated for greater democracy, first in 1986, and then again in the spring of 1989 on the anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s death. As the protest went on, however, they became angry with their lack of a voice, and with the party and government for failing to recognize them and the justice of their complaints. They wanted Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, or other top Chinese leaders to meet with them personally, and began to demand that in the longer run their participation be institutionalized. W hether all of them wanted institutionalization to ultimately take the form of representative democracy was unclear, but the underlying demand was that they be taken seriously as adults whose opinions were due a degree of respect and deference.

最后,还有中国的情况。邓小平的经济改革为 20 世纪 80 年代成年的一代中国年轻人创造了全新的经济机会,他们现在可以创业,阅读外国报纸,并自革命以来第一次到美国和其他西方国家学习。当然,在这种经济自由的氛围中长大的学生在经济上也有抱怨,特别是 80 年代末日益严重的通货膨胀,正在逐步侵蚀大多数城市居民的购买力。但改革后的中国比毛泽东时代有更大的活力和机会,特别是对那些在北京、西安、广州和上海的大学就读的精英子女来说。然而,这些学生恰恰是那些为更大的民主而示威的人,先是在 1986 年,然后在 1989 年春天胡耀邦的死忌日再次示威。然而,随着抗议活动的进行,他们对自己缺乏发言权,对党和政府不承认他们和他们的申诉的公正性感到愤怒。他们希望邓小平、赵紫阳或其他中国最高领导人能亲自会见他们,并开始要求从长远来看,将他们的参与制度化。他们是否都希望制度化最终采取代议制民主的形式还不清楚,但基本要求是他们作为成年人被认真对待,他们的意见应得到一定程度的尊重和敬重。

All of these cases from the communist world illustrate in one way or another the workings of the desire for recognition. Both reform and revolution were undertaken for the sake of a political system that would institutionalize universal recognition. More than that, however, thymotic anger played a critical role in catalyzing revolutionaryevents. People did not go into the streets of Leipzig, Prague, Timisoara, Beijing, or Moscow demanding that the government give them a “postindustrial economy,” or that the supermarkets be full of food. Their passionate anger was aroused over their perceptions of relatively small acts of injustice like the jailing of a priest or the refusal of powerful officials to accept a list of demands.

所有这些来自共产主义世界的案例都以这样或那样的方式说明了对承认的渴望的运作情况。改革和革命都是为了建立一个能使普遍承认制度化的政治制度。然而,不仅如此,甲状腺素的愤怒在催化革命事件中发挥了关键作用。人们并没有走上莱比锡、布拉格、蒂米什瓦拉、北京或莫斯科的街头,要求政府给他们一个 “后工业经济”,或要求超市里充满食物。他们的愤怒是由于他们对相对较小的不公正行为的看法而引起的,比如一个牧师被监禁,或者有权势的官员拒绝接受一个要求清单。

Historians later interpret these as secondary or triggering causes, which they are; but that does not make them less necessary in bringing about the final revolutionary chain of events. Revolutionary situations cannot occur unless at least some people are willing to risk their lives and their comfort for a cause. The courage to do so cannot arise out of the desiring part of the soul, but must come from the thymotic part. The man of desire, Economic Man, the true bourgeois, will perform an internal “cost-benefit analysis” which will always give him a reason for working “within the system.” It is only thymotic man, the man of anger who is jealous of his own dignity and the dignity of his fellow citizens, the man who feels that his worth is constituted by something more than the complex set of desires that make up his physical existence—it is this man alone who is willing to walk in front of a tank or confront a line of soldiers. And it is frequently the case that without such small acts of bravery in response to small acts of injustice, the larger train of events leading to fundamental changes in political and economic structures would never occur.

历史学家后来将这些解释为次要的或触发性的原因,它们确实是;但这并不意味着它们在促成最终的革命事件链方面的必要性降低。除非至少有一些人愿意为一项事业冒着生命和安逸的风险,否则革命的局面不可能发生。这样做的勇气不能从灵魂的欲望部分产生,而必须来自胸怀的部分。有欲望的人,经济人,真正的资产阶级,会进行内部的 “成本·效益分析”,这将永远给他一个 “在系统内” 工作的理由。只有百里挑一的人,嫉妒自己和同胞的尊严的愤怒的人,感到自己的价值是由比构成他的物质存在的一系列复杂的欲望更多的东西构成的人 —— 只有这种人愿意走在坦克前面或与一排士兵对抗。而且经常的情况是,如果没有这种针对小的不公正行为的小的勇敢行为,导致政治和经济结构发生根本变化的更大的事件就不会发生。

Chapter 17: The Rise and Fall of Thymos

第 17 章:Thymos 的崛起和衰落

Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that.


—Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols


Man’s sense of selfworth and the demand that it be recognized has, up till now, been presented as the source of the noble virtues like courage, generosity, and publicspiritedness, as the seat of resistance to tyranny, and as a reason for the choice of liberal democracy. But there is a dark side to the desire for recognition as well, a dark side that has led many philosophers to believe that thymos is the fundamental source of human evil.

人类的自我价值感和对自我价值被承认的要求,到目前为止,一直被认为是勇气、慷慨和热心公益等高尚美德的来源,是抵抗暴政的所在,也是选择自由民主的原因。但是,对承认的渴望也有黑暗的一面,这种黑暗的一面使许多哲学家相信,thymos 是人类邪恶的根本来源。

Thymos initially came into being for us as an evaluation of one’s own worth. Havel’s example of the greengrocer indicates that this sense of worth is frequently related to the feeling that one is “more than” one’s natural desires, that one is a moral agent capable of free choice. This rather humble form of thymos can be thought of as a feeling of self-respect, or, in currently fashionable language, “selfesteem.” It is possessed to a greater or lesser degree by virtually all human beings. Having a modest sense of self-respect seems to be important to everybody, important to their ability to function in the world and the satisfaction they feel with their lives. It is, according to Joan Didion, what enables us to say “no” to other people without self-reproach.

对我们来说,Thymos 最初是作为对一个人自身价值的评价而出现的。哈维尔关于菜农的例子表明,这种价值感经常与一个人 “超过” 自己的自然欲望的感觉有关,即一个人是一个能够自由选择的道德主体。这种相当卑微的 thymos 形式可以被认为是一种自尊的感觉,或者,用目前流行的语言来说,是 “自尊”。几乎所有的人都或多或少地拥有这种感觉。拥有适度的自尊感似乎对每个人都很重要,对他们在世界上发挥作用的能力以及对他们的生活感到满意很重要。根据琼·迪迪安的说法,它使我们能够对其他人说 “不” 而不感到自责。

The existence of a moral dimension in the human personality that constantly evaluates both the self and others does not, however, mean that there will be any agreement on the substantive content of morality. In a world of thymotic moral selves, they will be constantly disagreeing and arguing and growing angry with one another over a host of questions, large and small. Hence thymos is, even in its most humble manifestations, the starting point for human conflict.

然而,人类人格中存在一个不断评价自我和他人的道德维度,并不意味着在道德的实质内容上会有任何一致。在一个由道德自我组成的世界里,他们将不断产生分歧和争论,并在一系列大大小小的问题上相互生气。因此,即使在其最卑微的表现中,thymos 也是人类冲突的起点。

Moreover, there is no guarantee that a human being’s evaluation of his own worth will remain within the bounds of this “moral” self. Havel believes that there is a germ of moral judgment and sense of “rightness” in all men; but even if we accept this generalization, we would have to admit that it is much less developed in some people than in others. One can demand recognition not only for one’s moral worth, but also for one’s wealth, or power, or physical beauty as well.

此外,不能保证一个人对自己价值的评价会保持在这个 “道德” 自我的范围内。哈维尔认为,所有的人都有道德判断和 “正确性” 意识的萌芽;但即使我们接受这一概括,我们也不得不承认,它在某些人身上的发展程度远远低于其他。一个人不仅可以要求承认自己的道德价值,也可以要求承认自己的财富、或权力、或身体的美丽。

More importantly, there is no reason to think that all people will evaluate themselves as the equals of other people. Rather, they may seek to be recognized as superior to other people, possibly on the basis of true inner worth, but more likely out of an inflated and vain estimate of themselves. The desire to be recognized as superior to other people we will henceforth label with a new word with ancient Greek roots, megalothymia. Megalothymia can be manifest both in the tyrant who invades and enslaves a neighboring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in the concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven. Its opposite is isothymia, the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people. Megalothymia and isothymia together constitute the two manifestations of the desire for recognition around which the historical transition to modernity can be understood.

更重要的是,没有理由认为所有的人都会把自己评价为与其他人平等的人。相反,他们可能会寻求被认可为优于其他人,可能是基于真正的内在价值,但更可能是出于对自己的夸大和虚荣的估计。渴望被公认为比其他人优越的愿望,我们将用一个具有古希腊血统的新词来标记,即巨乳症。巨人症既可以表现在侵略和奴役邻国人民以使他们承认他的权威的暴君身上,也可以表现在希望被承认为贝多芬最重要的诠释者的音乐会钢琴家身上。它的反面是 isothymia,即渴望被承认为与其他人平等的人。巨人症和异人症共同构成了渴望被承认的两种表现,围绕这两种表现可以理解向现代性的历史过渡。

It is clear that megalothymia is a highly problematic passion for political life, for if recognition of one’s superiority by another person is satisfying, it stands to reason that recognition by all people will be more satisfying still. Thymos, which first came to light as a humble kind of self-respect, can thus also manifest itself as the desire to dominate. This latter, dark side of thymos was of course present right from the outset in Hegel’s description of the bloody battle, since the desire for recognition provoked the primordial battle and ultimately led to the domination by the master of the slave. The logic of recognition ultimately led to the desire to be universally recognized, that is, to imperialism.

显然,巨蟹座对于政治生活来说是一种很有问题的激情,因为如果一个人的优越性被另一个人承认是令人满意的,那么按理说,被所有人承认会更加令人满意。Thymos 最初是作为一种谦卑的自尊而出现的,因此也可以表现为支配的欲望。当然,在黑格尔对血战的描述中,thymos 的这一黑暗面从一开始就存在,因为对承认的渴望引发了原始的战斗,并最终导致了主人对奴隶的统治。承认的逻辑最终导致了被普遍承认的欲望,也就是说,导致了帝国主义。

Thymos, either in the humble form of the greengrocer’s sense of dignity, or in the form of megalothymia—the tyrannical ambition of a Caesar or a Stalin—has been a central subject of Western political philosophy, even if the phenomenon has been given a different name by each thinker. Virtually everyone who has thought seriously about politics and the problems of ajust political order has had to contend with the moral ambiguities of thymos, trying to make use of its positive aspects and seeking a way to neutralize its dark side.

Thymos,无论是以菜农的尊严感的卑微形式,还是以巨无霸的形式 —— 凯撒或斯大林的暴虐野心 —— 都是西方政治哲学的核心主题,即使这一现象被每个思想家赋予了不同的名称。几乎所有认真思考过政治和公正的政治秩序问题的人,都不得不与 thymos 的道德模糊性作斗争,试图利用它的积极方面,并寻求一种方法来中和它的黑暗面。

Socrates enters into an extended discussion of thymos in the Republic because the thymotic part of the soul turns out to be crucial for the construction of his just city “in speech.“3 This city, like any city, has foreign enemies and needs to be defended from outside attack. It therefore needs a class of guardians who are courageous and publicspirited, who are willing to sacrifice their material desires and wants for the sake of the common good. Socrates does not believe that courage and publicspiritedness can arise out of a calculation of enlightened selfinterest. Rather, they must be rooted in thymos, in the just pride of the guardian class in themselves and in their own city, and their potentially irrational anger against those who threaten it. Thus for Socrates, thymos is an innately political virtue necessary for the survival of any political community, because it is the basis on which private man is drawn out from the selfish life of desire and made to look toward the common good. But Socrates also believes that thymos has the capability to destroy political communities as well as to cement them together. He hints at the various points in the Republic, for instance when he compares the thymotic guardian to a ferocious watchdog who can bite his master as well as a stranger if not properly trained. Construction of ajust political order therefore requires both the cultivation and the taming of a thymos, and the greater part of the first six books of the Republic is devoted to the proper thymotic education of the guardian class.

苏格拉底在《共和国》中对 thymos 进行了长时间的讨论,因为灵魂的 thymotic 部分对于他的正义之城 “在言语中” 的建设是至关重要的。因此,它需要一类有勇气和公益心的守护者,他们愿意为了公共利益而牺牲自己的物质欲望和愿望。苏格拉底不相信勇气和公心可以从开明的自我利益的计算中产生。相反,它们必须植根于 thymos,植根于监护人阶层对自己和自己的城市的公正的骄傲,以及他们对威胁它的人可能的非理性的愤怒。因此,对苏格拉底来说,thymos 是一种天生的政治美德,对任何政治共同体的生存都是必要的,因为它是私人从自私的欲望生活中被吸引出来并使之面向共同利益的基础。但苏格拉底也认为,thymos 有能力摧毁政治共同体,也有能力将它们巩固在一起。他在《共和国》中暗示了这一点,例如,他把胸怀大志的守护者比作一只凶猛的看门狗,如果没有经过适当的训练,它既可以咬主人,也可以咬陌生人。因此,建设一个公正的政治秩序需要培养和驯服一个百夫长,而《共和国》前六卷的大部分内容都是关于监护人阶层的适当百夫长教育。

The megalothymia of would-be masters to dominate other people through imperialism was an important theme in a good deal of medieval and early modern political thought, which referred to the phenomenon as the quest for glory. The struggle of ambitious princes for recognition was broadly assumed to be a general characteristic both of human nature and of politics. It did not necessarily connote tyranny or injustice in an era when the legitimacy of imperialism was frequently taken for granted. St. Augustine, for example, lists the desire for glory among the vices, but one of the least pernicious and potentially a source of human greatness.


Megalothymia understood as the desire for glory was central to the thought of the first early modern thinker to break decisively with the Aristotelian tradition of medieval Christian political philosophy, Niccolô Machiavelli. Machiavelli is known at present primarily as the author of a number of shockingly frank maxims about the ruthless nature of politics, for example that it is better to be feared than loved, or that one should keep one’s word only when it is in one’s interest to do so. Machiavelli was the founder of modern political philosophy, who believed that man could become master of his own earthly house if he took his cues not from the way men ought to live, but the way they actually live. Rather than trying to make human beings good through education, as Plato taught, Machiavelli sought to create a good political order out of man’s badness: badness could be made to serve good ends if it were channeled through the appropriate institutions.


Machiavelli understood that megalothymia in the form of the desire for glory was the basic psychological drive behind the ambition of princes. Nations may on occasion conquer their neighbors as a matter of necessity, in self-defense, or to build up population and resources for the future. But above and beyond such considerations was the desire of man to be recognized—the pleasure that a Roman general felt during his triumph when his opponent was paraded through the streets in chains to the cheers of the multitude. For Machiavelli, the desire for glory was not an exclusive characteristic of princes or aristocratic governments. It infected republics as well, as in the case of the rapacious Athenian and Roman empires, where democratic participation had the effect of increasing the state’s ambition and providing a more effective military instrument for expansion.

马基雅弗利明白,以对荣誉的渴望为形式的巨细靡遗是王公贵族野心背后的基本心理动力。国家有时会出于自卫的需要而征服邻国,或为未来积累人口和资源。但在这些考虑之上的是人类被认可的欲望 —— 当罗马将军在胜利时,当他的对手在众人的欢呼声中被戴上锁链在街上游行时,他感到很高兴。对马基雅维利来说,对荣誉的渴望并不是王子或贵族政府的专有特征。它也感染了共和国,就像贪婪的雅典和罗马帝国一样,在那里,民主参与产生了增加国家野心的效果,为扩张提供了更有效的军事工具。

While the desire for glory is a universal characteristic of man,1 0 Machiavelli saw that it created special problems by leading ambitious men to tyranny, and the rest to slavery. His solution to this problem was different from Plato’s, and became characteristic of subsequent republican constitutionalism. Rather than try to educate the thymotic princes or guardians, as Plato had suggested, thymos would be counterpoised to thymos. Mixed republics, in which the thymotic ambitions of princes and the aristocratic few could be balanced against the thymotic desire for independence on the part of the people, could ensure a degree of liberty. Machiavelli’s mixed republic was, therefore, an early version of the separation of powers familiar in the American Constitution.


After Machiavelli there began another, perhaps more ambitious project with which we are already familiar. Hobbes and Locke, the founders of modern liberalism, sought to eradicate thymos from political life altogether, and to replace it with a combination of desire and reason. These early modern English liberals saw megalothymia in the form of passionate and stubborn pride of princes, or the otherworldly fanaticism of militant priests, as the chief cause of war, and in the process took aim at all forms of pride. Their denigration of aristocratic pride was continued by any number of Enlightenment writers, including Adam Ferguson, James Steuart, David Hume, and Montesquieu. In the civil society envisioned by Hobbes, Locke, and other early modern liberal thinkers, man needs only desire and reason. The bourgeois was an entirely deliberate creation of early modern thought, an effort at social engineering that sought to create social peace by changing human nature itself. Instead of pitting the megalothymia of the few against that of the many, as Machiavelli had suggested, the founders of modern liberalism hoped to overcome megalothymia altogether by pitting, in effect, the interests of the desiring part of human nature against the passions of its thymotic part.

在马基雅维利之后,开始了另一个也许是更雄心勃勃的项目,我们已经熟悉了。霍布斯和洛克是现代自由主义的创始人,他们试图从政治生活中完全消除 thymos,并以欲望和理性的结合取代它。这些近代早期的英国自由主义者认为,王公贵族热情而顽固的骄傲,或好战的牧师的另类狂热,是战争的主要原因,并在这个过程中瞄准了所有形式的傲慢。他们对贵族骄傲的诋毁被任何数量的启蒙作家所延续,包括亚当·弗格森、詹姆斯·斯泰尔、大卫·休谟和孟德斯鸠。在霍布斯、洛克和其他早期现代自由主义思想家所设想的公民社会中,人只需要欲望和理性。资产阶级是早期现代思想的一个完全有意的创造,是一种社会工程的努力,试图通过改变人性本身来创造社会和平。现代自由主义的创始人并没有像马基雅弗利所建议的那样,让少数人的巨蟹座与多数人的巨蟹座对立起来,而是希望通过让人类本性中的欲望部分的利益与胸怀部分的激情对立起来,从而完全克服巨蟹座。

The social embodiment of megalothymia, and the social class against which modern liberalism declared war, was the traditional aristocracy. The aristocratic warrior did not create wealth, he stole it from other warriors, or more precisely from the peasantry whose surplus he appropriated. He did not act on the basis of economic rationality, selling his labor to the highest bidder: indeed, he did not work at all but fulfilled himself in his leisure. His behavior was fenced in by dictates of pride and codes of honor, which did not permit him to do things beneath his dignity like engage in commerce. And for all the decadence of many aristocratic societies, the core of the aristocrat’s being was related, as for Hegel’s primordial master, to his willingness to risk his life in a bloody battle. W ar therefore remained central to the aristocratic way of life, and war, as we well know, is “economically suboptimal.” Much better, then, to convince the aristocratic warrior of the vanity of his ambitions, and to transform him into a peaceful businessman, whose self-enriching activities would serve to enrich those around him as well.

巨人症的社会体现,也是现代自由主义宣战的社会阶层,是传统的贵族阶层。贵族战士并不创造财富,他从其他战士那里偷取财富,或者更准确地说,从农民那里偷取财富,他占有农民的剩余。他没有在经济理性的基础上采取行动,把自己的劳动卖给出价最高的人:事实上,他根本不工作,而是在闲暇时满足自己。他的行为被自尊心和荣誉准则所束缚,不允许他做有损尊严的事情,比如从事商业活动。尽管许多贵族社会都很堕落,但就像黑格尔的原始主人一样,贵族存在的核心与他在血腥战斗中冒生命危险的意愿有关。因此,战争仍然是贵族生活方式的核心,而战争,正如我们所知道的,是 “经济上的次优选择”。因此,更好的办法是说服贵族战士相信他的野心是虚无的,并将他转变为一个和平的商人,他的自我充实活动也将有助于充实他周围的人。

The “modernization” process described by contemporary social science can be understood as the gradual victory of the desiring part of the soul, guided by reason, over the soul’s thymotic part, played out in countless countries around the world. Aristocratic societies were virtually universal across different human cultures, from Europe to the Middle East to Africa to South and East Asia. Economic modernization required notjust the creation of modern social structures like cities and rational bureaucracies, but the ethical victory of the bourgeois way of life over the thymotic life of the aristocrat. In one society after another, Hobbes’s deal has been offered to the old class of aristocrats: namely, that they trade in their thymotic pride for the prospect of a peaceful life of unlimited material acquisition. In some countries like Japan, this trade was made overtly: the modernizing state set up members of the former samurai or warrior class as businessmen, whose enterprises grew into the twentieth-century zaibatsus. In countries like France, the trade was declined by many parts of the aristocracy, which fought a series of hopeless rearguardactions to preserve their thymotic ethical order. That struggle continues today in many Third World countries, where the descendants of warriors face the same decision as to whether they should hang up their swords as family heirlooms and take up instead the computer terminal and office.

当代社会科学所描述的 “现代化” 进程可以被理解为灵魂的欲望部分在理性指导下对灵魂的胸怀部分的逐步胜利,在全世界无数国家上演。贵族社会在不同的人类文化中几乎是普遍的,从欧洲到中东到非洲到南亚和东亚。经济现代化不仅需要建立现代社会结构,如城市和合理的官僚机构,而且需要资产阶级的生活方式在伦理上战胜贵族的无情生活。在一个又一个的社会中,霍布斯的交易被提供给旧的贵族阶层:即他们用他们的甲骨文的骄傲换取无限物质获取的和平生活的前景。在一些国家,如日本,这种交易是公开进行的:现代化的国家将前武士或武士阶层的成员设置为商人,他们的企业发展成为二十世纪的财阀。在法国这样的国家,这种贸易被贵族阶层的许多部分所拒绝,他们进行了一系列无望的反击,以维护他们的甲骨文伦理秩序。这场斗争今天在许多第三世界国家仍在继续,在那里,战士的后代面临着同样的决定,即他们是否应该挂起作为传家宝的剑,转而拿起电脑终端和办公室。

By the time we arrive at the American founding, the victory of Lockean principles in North America—and thereby the victory of the desiring part of the soul over the thymotic part—was almost complete. The right to “the pursuit of happiness” proclaimed in the American Declaration of Independence was conceived largely in terms of the acquisition of property. Lockeanism is the broad framework for the Federalist papers, that great defense of the American Constitution written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. For example, in the famous Federalist 10, which defends representative government as the cure for popular government’s disease of faction, James Madison asserts that protection of man’s diverse faculties, and particularly the “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,“was the “first object of government.”

当我们到达美国建国时,洛克原则在北美的胜利 —— 从而灵魂的欲望部分战胜了感情部分 —— 几乎已经完成。美国《独立宣言》中宣布的 “追求幸福” 的权利在很大程度上是以获得财产的方式来设想的。洛克主义是《联邦党人》文件的广泛框架,该文件是亚历山大·汉密尔顿、詹姆斯·麦迪逊和约翰·杰伊为美国宪法撰写的伟大辩护。例如,在著名的《联邦党人第 10 号》中,詹姆斯·麦迪逊为代议制政府辩护,认为它是治疗民众政府派系疾病的良药,他声称,保护人类的各种能力,特别是 “获得财产的不同和不平等的能力” 是 “政府的首要目标”。

While the American Constitution’s Lockean heritage is undeniable, the authors of the Federalist nonetheless demonstrated an awareness that the desire for recognition could not simply be banished from political life. Indeed, prideful selfassertion was understood to be one end of or motive for political life, and good government required that it have adequate scope. They sought to channel the desire for recognition into positive or at least harmless directions, much as Machiavelli had sought to do. While Madison referred to factions based on economic “interests” in Federalist 10, he distinguished them from other factions based on “passions,” or more precisely, people’s passionate opinions about right and wrong: “A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points” or “an attachment to different leaders.” Political opinions were an expression of self-love, and became inextricably bound up with a person’s evaluation of himself and his own worth: “As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, [man’s] opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.“1 6 Thus factions result not just from the clash between the desiring parts of different men’s souls (i.e., economic interests), but between their thymotic parts as well. And so in Madison’s day, American politics was dominated by differences over issues like temperance, religion, slavery, and the like, just as ours is dominated by abortion rights, school prayer, and freedom of speech.

虽然美国宪法的洛克遗产是不可否认的,但《联邦党人》的作者们还是表现出一种意识,即不能简单地从政治生活中驱逐承认的欲望。事实上,自豪的自我主张被认为是政治生活的一个目的或动机,而良好的政府要求它有足够的范围。他们试图把对承认的渴望引向积极的或至少是无害的方向,就像马基雅维利所做的那样。虽然麦迪逊在《联邦党人》第 10 期中提到了基于经济 “利益” 的派别,但他将它们与基于 “激情” 的其他派别区分开来,或者更准确地说,是人们对是非的热衷:“对关于宗教、关于政府和其他许多问题的不同意见的热衷” 或 “对不同领导人的依附”。政治观点是自爱的表现,并与一个人对自己的评价和自己的价值密不可分。“只要他的理性和自爱之间存在联系,人的意见和他的激情就会相互影响;前者将成为后者依附的对象。”1 6 因此,派别的产生不仅是由于不同人的灵魂的欲望部分(即经济利益)之间的冲突,而且也是他们的感情部分之间的冲突。因此,在麦迪逊的时代,美国政治被节制、宗教、奴隶制等问题的分歧所支配,就像我们的政治被堕胎权、学校祈祷和言论自由所支配一样。

In addition to the myriad of passionate opinions that will be asserted by a large number of relatively weak individuals, the authors of the Federalist believed that political life had to contend with the “love of fame” which was, according to Hamilton, “the ruling passion of the noblest minds”1 8 —that is, the desire for glory on the part of strong and ambitious men. Megalothymia as well as isothymia remained a problem for the founders. The American Constitution was seen by Madison and Hamilton as an institutional means not of repressing these different expressions of thymos, but rather of channeling them into safe, indeed productive, outlets. Thus Madison saw popular government—the process of running for office, making political speeches, debating, writing editorials, voting in elections, and the like—as a benign way to indulge man’s natural pride and inclination toward thymotic selfassertion, provided it could be spread out over a relatively large republic. The democratic political process was important not just as a means of making decisions or “aggregating interests,” but as a process, that is, as a stage for the expression of thymos, where men could seek recognition for their own views. On the higher and potentially more dangerous level of the megalothymia of great and ambitious men, constitutional government was explicitly established as a way of using ambition “to counteract ambition.” The different branches of government were seen as avenues for the advancement of powerful ambitions, but the system of checks and balances would ensure that these ambitions canceled each other out and prevented the emergence of tyranny. An American politician could harbor ambitions to be a Caesar or a Napoleon, but the system would allow him or her to be no more than a Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan—hemmed in by powerful institutional constraints and political forces on all sides, and forced to realize their ambition by being the people’s “servant” rather than their master.

除了大量相对软弱的个人会主张无数充满激情的观点之外,《联邦党人》的作者们认为,政治生活必须与 “爱名” 相抗衡,按照汉密尔顿的说法,这是 “最崇高思想的支配性激情”18 —— 也就是说,强壮和野心勃勃的人对荣誉的渴望。巨人症和异人症对创始人来说仍然是一个问题。麦迪逊和汉密尔顿认为,美国宪法是一种制度性手段,不是为了压制这些不同的胸怀表现,而是为了将它们引导到安全的、实际上是有成效的渠道。因此,麦迪逊认为民众政府 —— 竞选公职、发表政治演说、辩论、撰写社论、在选举中投票等过程 —— 是放纵人类自然骄傲和自我主张倾向的一种良性方式,只要它能在一个相对较大的共和国中传播。民主政治进程的重要性不仅仅是作为一种决策或 “利益聚合” 的手段,而是作为一个过程,也就是说,作为一个表达 thymos 的舞台,人们可以为自己的观点寻求认可。在更高和可能更危险的伟大和雄心勃勃的人的巨蟹座水平上,宪法政府被明确确立为利用野心 “抵制野心” 的一种方式。政府的不同部门被视为推进强大野心的途径,但制衡制度将确保这些野心相互抵消,防止暴政的出现。一个美国政治家可能怀有成为凯撒或拿破仑的野心,但这个制度将允许他或她不过是一个吉米·卡特或罗纳德·里根 —— 被强大的制度约束和各方的政治力量所包围,被迫通过成为人民的 “仆人” 而不是主人来实现他们的野心。

The attempt of liberal politics in the Hobbes-Locke tradition to banish the desire for recognition from politics or to leave it constrained and impotent left many thinkers feeling quite uneasy. Modern society would henceforth be composed of what C. S. Lewis called “men without chests”: that is, people who were composed entirely of desire and reason, but lacking that proud selfassertiveness that was somehow at the core of man’s humanity in earlier ages. For the chest was what made man man: “by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal.“1 9 The greatest and most articulate champion of thymos in modern times, and the prophet of its revival, was Friedrich Nietzsche, the godfather of presentday relativism and nihilism. Nietzsche was once described by a contemporary as an “aristocratic radical,” a characterization he did not dispute. Much of his work can be seen, in a certain sense, as a reaction to what he saw as the rise of an entire civilization of “men without chests,” a society of bourgeois who aspired to nothing more than their own comfortable selfpreservation. For Nietzsche, the very essence of man was neither his desire nor his reason, but his thymos: man was above all a valuing creature, the “beast with red cheeks” who found life in his ability to pronounce the words “good” and “evil.” As his character Zarathustra says,

霍布斯·洛克传统中的自由主义政治试图将承认的欲望从政治中驱逐出去,或者让它受到约束而无能为力,这让许多思想家感到相当不安。现代社会从此将由 C·S·刘易斯所说的 “没有胸膛的人” 组成:即完全由欲望和理性组成的人,但缺乏那种自豪的自我主张,而这种主张在早先的时代是人类的核心。因为胸部是使人成为人的原因。在现代,最伟大的、最明确的 “胸怀” 的拥护者,也是 “胸怀” 复兴的预言家,是当今相对主义和虚无主义的教父弗里德里希·尼采。尼采曾被一位当代人描述为 “贵族式的激进分子”,他对这一描述没有异议。在某种意义上,他的大部分作品可以被看作是对他所看到的整个 “没有胸膛的人” 的文明的反动,这个社会的资产阶级只追求他们自己舒适的自我保护。对尼采来说,人的本质既不是他的欲望,也不是他的理性,而是他的 thymos:人首先是一个有价值的生物,是 “红脸蛋的野兽”,他在发音 “善” 和 “恶” 的能力中找到生命。正如他笔下的查拉图斯特拉所说

Verily, men gave themselves their good and evil. Verily, they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve himself—he alone created a meaning for things, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself “man,” which means: the esteemer.

诚然,人们把他们的善和恶都交给自己。诚然,他们没有采取它,他们没有发现它,它也没有从天上传来的声音。只有人把价值放在事物中以保存自己,只有他为事物创造了意义,一种人类的意义。因此,他称自己为 “人”,意思是:尊贵的人。

To esteem is to create: hear this, you creators! Esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure.Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear this, you creators!


Which values men created was not, for Nietzsche, the central issue, for there were a “thousand and one goals” which men followed. Each of the peoples of the earth had its own “language of good and evil,” which their neighbors could not understand. What constituted the essence of man was the act of valuing itself, of giving oneself worth and demanding recognition for it. The act of evaluating was inherently inegalitarian, for it required distinguishing between better and worse. And therefore Nietzsche was interested only in the manifestation of thymos that led men to say that they were better than others, megalothymia. The terrible consequence of modernity was the effort of its creators Hobbes and Locke to strip man of his evaluative powers in the name of physical security and material accumulation. Nietzsche’s well-known doctrine of the “will to power” can be understood as the effort to reassert the primacy of thymos as against desire and reason, and to undo the damage that modern liberalism had done to man’s pride and selfassertiveness. His work is a celebration of Hegel’s aristocratic master and his struggle to the death for pure prestige, and a thunderous condemnation of a modernity that had so fully accepted the morality of the slave that it was not even aware such a choice had been made.

在尼采看来,人类创造的哪种价值观并不是核心问题,因为人类有 “一千零一个目标” 可以遵循。地球上的每个民族都有自己的 “善恶语言”,他们的邻居无法理解。构成人的本质的是评价自己的行为,赋予自己价值并要求得到承认。评价行为本质上是不平等的,因为它需要区分更好和更坏。因此,尼采只对导致人们说自己比别人好的 thymos 的表现感兴趣,即 megalothymia。现代性的可怕后果是其创造者霍布斯和洛克以身体安全和物质积累的名义努力剥夺人的评价能力。尼采众所周知的 “权力意志” 学说可以被理解为是为了重新确认 “胸怀” 相对于欲望和理性的首要地位,并消除现代自由主义对人的自豪感和自我主张的损害。他的作品是对黑格尔的贵族主人及其为纯粹的声望而进行的殊死搏斗的赞美,也是对现代性的雷鸣般的谴责,因为现代性已经完全接受了奴隶的道德,甚至没有意识到已经做出了这种选择。

Despite the changing vocabulary that has been used to describe the phenomenon of thymos or the desire for recognition, it should be very clear that this “third part” of the soul has been a central concern of the philosophical tradition that stretches from Plato to Nietzsche. It suggests a very different way of reading the historical process, not as the story of the unfolding of modern natural science or of the logic of economic development, but rather as the emergence, growth, and eventual decline of megalothymia. Indeed, the modern economic world could only emerge after desire had been liberated, so to speak, at the expense of thymos. The historical process that begins with the master’s bloody battle ends in some sense with the modern bourgeois inhabitant of contemporary liberal democracies, who pursues material gain rather than glory.

尽管用来描述 thymos 或认可欲望现象的词汇不断变化,但应该非常清楚的是,灵魂的这个 “第三部分” 一直是从柏拉图到尼采的哲学传统的核心关切。它提出了一种非常不同的解读历史进程的方式,不是作为现代自然科学的展开或经济发展逻辑的故事,而是作为巨蟹座的出现、成长和最终衰退。事实上,现代经济世界只有在欲望被解放之后才能出现,可以说是以牺牲 thymos 为代价。从主人的血战开始的历史进程在某种意义上以当代自由民主国家的现代资产阶级居民结束,他们追求的是物质利益而不是荣耀。

Today nobody studies the thymos systematically as part of their education, and the “struggle for recognition” is not part of our contemporary political vocabulary. The desire for glory that for Machiavelli was so normal a part of the human makeup—that inordinate striving to be better than others, to make as many people as possible recognize one’s superiority—is no longer an acceptable way to describe one’s personal goals. It is in fact a characteristic we attribute to people that we don’t like, those tyrants who have arisen among us like Hitler, Stalin, or Saddam Hussein. Megalothymia—the desire to be recognized as superior— lives on under a variety of guises in day-to-day life, and, as we shall see in Part Five, much of what we find satisfying in our lives would not be possible without it. But in terms of what we say about ourselves, it has been ethically vanquished in the modern world.

今天,没有人系统地研究 thymos 作为他们教育的一部分,而且 “争取承认” 也不是我们当代政治词汇的一部分。对马基雅维利来说,对荣耀的渴望是人类构成中非常正常的一部分 —— 那种无度的努力要比别人好,要让尽可能多的人承认自己的优越性 —— 不再是描述个人目标的可接受方式。事实上,这是我们赋予那些我们不喜欢的人的特征,那些在我们中间出现的暴君,如希特勒、斯大林或萨达姆·侯赛因。巨人症 —— 被公认为高人一等的欲望 —— 在日常生活中以各种名义存在,而且,正如我们将在第五部分看到的那样,如果没有它,我们在生活中发现的许多令人满意的事情是不可能的。但就我们对自己的评价而言,它在现代世界中已经被道德所征服。

The attack on megalothymia and its lack of respectability in our presentday world therefore should incline us to agree with Nietzsche that those early modern philosophers who wanted to banish the more visible forms of thymos from civil society have been quite successful. What has taken the place of megalothymia is a combination of two things. The first is a blossoming of the desiring part of the soul, which manifests itself as a thoroughgoing economization of life. This economization extends from the highest things to the lowest, from the states of Europe who seek not greatness and empire, but a more integrated European Community in 1992,to the college graduate who performs an internal cost-benefit analysis of the career options open to him or her.

因此,对巨乳症的攻击以及它在我们当今世界上的不受尊重,应该使我们倾向于同意尼采的观点,即那些想把更明显的巨乳症形式从公民社会中驱逐出去的早期现代哲学家已经相当成功。取代巨乳症的是两件事的结合。首先是灵魂中欲望部分的绽放,它表现为生活的彻底节约。这种经济化从最高级的东西延伸到最低级的东西,从欧洲国家不寻求伟大和帝国,而是在 1992 年寻求一个更加一体化的欧洲共同体,到大学毕业生对向他或她开放的职业选择进行内部成本效益分析。

The second thing that remains in place of megalothymia is an all-pervasive isothymia, that is, the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people. This in its various manifestations includes the thymos of Havel’s greengrocer, the anti-abortion protester, or the animal rights advocate. While we do not use the words “recognition” and “thymos” to describe our personal goals, we do use words like “dignity,” “respect,” “self-respect,” and “selfesteem” all too frequently, and these nonmaterial factors even enter into the career calculations of the typical college graduate. Such concepts permeate our political life and are indispensable to an understanding of the democratic transformation that has occurred around the world in the late twentieth century.

第二件事是,取代巨蟹座的是一种普遍存在的异蟹座,也就是希望被承认为与其他人平等的愿望。这在其不同的表现形式中包括哈维尔的菜农、反堕胎抗议者或动物权利倡导者的胸怀。虽然我们不使用 “承认” 和 “thymos” 来描述我们的个人目标,但我们确实经常使用 “尊严”、“尊重”、“自尊” 和 “自重” 等词,这些非物质因素甚至进入了典型大学毕业生的职业计算中。这样的概念渗透到我们的政治生活中,对于理解 20 世纪末世界各地发生的民主变革是不可或缺的。

We are thus left with an apparent contradiction. The founders of the AngloSaxon tradition of modern liberalism sought to banish thymos from political life, and yet the desire for recognition remains all around us in the form of isothymia. Was this an unexpected outcome, the result of failure to suppress what ultimately could not be suppressed in human nature? Or is there a higher understanding of modern liberalism that tries to preserve the thymotic side of the human personality rather than exiling it from the realm of politics?

因此,我们留下了一个明显的矛盾。现代自由主义的盎格鲁·撒克逊传统的创始人试图将 thymos 从政治生活中驱逐出去,然而对承认的渴望却以 isothymia 的形式存在于我们周围。这是一个意外的结果,是未能压制人类本性中最终无法压制的东西的结果吗?还是对现代自由主义有更高的理解,即试图保留人类人格中胸腺的一面,而不是将其放逐到政治领域?

There is in fact such a higher understanding, and to see it, we must return to Hegel and to the unfinished account of his historical dialectic in which the struggle for recognition plays a key role.


The complete, absolutely free man, definitively and completely satisfied by what he is, the man who is perfected and completed in and by this satisfaction, will be the Slave who has “overcome” his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress. History is the history of the working Slave.

完整的、绝对自由的人,明确地、完全地满足于他是什么的人,在这种满足中得到完善和完成的人,将是 “克服” 他的奴隶制的奴隶。如果说无所事事的主宰是一种僵局,那么与此相反,劳作的奴隶制则是所有人类、社会和历史进步的来源。历史是劳动奴隶的历史。

—Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel


We left off our account of the Hegelian dialectic several chapters ago at a very early point in the historical process—in fact, at the conclusion of the beginning period of human history, when man first risked his life in a battle for pure prestige. The state of war that prevailed in Hegel’s “state of nature” (remembering that Hegel himself never used such a term) did not lead directly to the establishment of civil society based on a social contract, as it did for Locke. Rather, it led to the relationship of lordship and bondage, when one of the primordial combatants, fearing for his life, “recognized” the other and agreed to be his slave. The social relationship of lordship and bondage was not a stable one in the long term, however, because neither the master nor the slave was ultimately satisfied in his desire for recognition. This absence of satisfaction constituted a “contradiction” in slave-owning societies, and generated the impulse toward further historical progress. Man’s first human act may have been his willingness to risk his life in the bloody battle, but he did not thereby become a fully free and therefore satisfied man. This could come about only in the course of subsequent historical evolution.

我们在几章前对黑格尔辩证法的叙述是在历史进程的一个非常早期的点上结束的 —— 事实上,是在人类历史的起始时期的结束,当时人类第一次冒着生命危险为纯粹的威望而战。在黑格尔的 “自然状态” 中盛行的战争状态(记住,黑格尔本人从未使用过这样的术语)并没有直接导致基于社会契约的公民社会的建立,正如它对洛克所做的那样。相反,它导致了领主和奴役的关系,当原始的战斗者之一,担心自己的生命,“承认” 对方,并同意成为他的奴隶。然而,领主与奴役的社会关系从长远来看并不稳定,因为无论是主人还是奴隶,最终都无法满足其对承认的渴望。这种不满足构成了奴隶主社会的 “矛盾”,并产生了进一步历史进步的冲动。人类的第一个行为可能是他愿意在血腥的战斗中冒着生命危险,但他并没有因此成为一个完全自由的人,因此也没有得到满足。这只能在随后的历史演变过程中实现。

The master and the slave are left unsatisfied for different reasons. The master is in some sense more human than the slave because he is willing to overcome his biological nature for the sake of a non-biological end, recognition. By risking his life, he demonstrates that he is free. The slave, by contrast, follows Hobbes’s advice and gives in to his fear of violent death. In so doing he remains a needy and fearful animal, incapable of overcoming his biological or natural determination. But the slave’s lack of freedom, his incomplete humanity, is the source of the master’s dilemma. For the master desires recognition by another human being, that is, recognition of his worth and human dignity by another human being possessing worth and dignity. But by winning the prestige battle, he is recognized by one who has become a slave, whose humanity was unachieved due to his having given in to his natural fear of death. The master’s worth is therefore recognized by someone not quite human.

主人和奴隶因为不同的原因而得不到满足。主人在某种意义上比奴隶更有人性,因为他愿意为了一个非生物性的目的 —— 承认,而克服自己的生物性。通过冒着生命危险,他证明了自己是自由的。相比之下,奴隶听从霍布斯的建议,屈服于他对暴力死亡的恐惧。在这样做的时候,他仍然是一个有需要的和恐惧的动物,没有能力克服他的生物或自然决定。但是,奴隶的缺乏自由,他不完整的人性,是主人困境的根源。因为主人渴望得到另一个人的承认,也就是说,他的价值和人类尊严得到另一个拥有价值和尊严的人的承认。但通过赢得声望之战,他得到了一个已经成为奴隶的人的认可,由于他屈服于对死亡的自然恐惧,他的人性没有得到实现。因此,主人的价值被一个不太像人的人所承认。

This corresponds to our own commonsense experience of recognition: we value praise or recognition of our worth much more highly if it comes from somebody we respect, or whose judgment we trust, and most of all if it is freely given rather than coerced. Our pet dog “recognizes” us in some sense when he wags his tail in greeting when we come home; but he recognizes everybody as well in a similar fashion—the postman, or a burglar—because the dog is instinctually conditioned to do so. Or, to take a more political example, the satisfaction of a Stalin or a Saddam Hussein on hearing the adulation of a crowd that has been bused into a stadium and forced to cheer on pain of death is presumably less than that experienced by a democratic leader like a Washington or a Lincoln when accorded genuine respect by a free people.

这与我们自己对认可的常识性经验相吻合:如果赞美或对我们价值的认可来自我们尊重的人,或我们信任的人的判断,而且最重要的是如果它是自由给予的而不是强迫的,我们会更加重视。我们的宠物狗在某种意义上 “认出” 了我们,当我们回家时,它摇着尾巴打招呼;但它也会以类似的方式认出每个人 —— 邮递员或小偷 —— 因为狗本能地有条件这样做。或者,举一个更政治化的例子,斯大林或萨达姆·侯赛因在听到被安排到体育场并被迫以死亡为代价欢呼的人群的赞美时的满足感,大概比华盛顿或林肯这样的民主领导人在得到自由人民的真正尊重时的满足感要少。

This then constitutes the tragedy of the master: he risks his life for the sake of recognition on the part of a slave who is not worthy of recognizing him. The master remains less than satisfied. Moreover, the master remains fundamentally unchanging over time. He does not need to work, because he has a slave to work for him, and he has easy access to all of the things that are necessary to maintain his life. His life therefore becomes a static and unchanging one of leisure and consumption; he can be killed, as Kojève points out, but he cannot be educated. The master can of course risk his life again and again in mortal combats with other masters, for control of a province or for the succession to someone’s throne. But the act of risking one’s life, while deeply human, is also perpetually identical to itself. The ceaseless conquest and re-conquest of provinces does not change man’s qualitative relationship to other men or to his natural environment, and therefore does not provide a motor for historical progress.


The slave is also unsatisfied. His lack of satisfaction, however, leads not to deadening stasis, as in the case of the master, but to creative and enriching change. By submitting to the master, the slave of course is not recognized as a human being: on the contrary, he is treated as a thing, a tool for the satisfaction of the master’s wants. Recognition is entirely one-way. But this total absence of recognition is what leads the slave to desire change.


The slave recovers his humanity, the humanity he lost on account of the fear of violent death, through work. Initially, the slave is forced to work for the master’s satisfaction on account of the former’s fear of death. But the motive for his labor eventually changes. Instead of working for fear of immediate punishment, he begins to do it out of a sense of duty and self-discipline, in the course of which he learns to suppress his animal desires for the sake of work. In other words, he develops something like a work ethic. More importantly, through work the slave begins to realize that as a human being, he is capable of transforming nature, that is, of taking the materials of nature and freely changing them into something else based on a preexisting idea or concept. The slave uses tools; he can use tools to make tools, and thereby invents technology. Modern natural science is not the invention of idle masters, who have everything they want, but of slaves who are forced to work and who do not like their present condition. Through science and technology, the slave discovers that he can change nature, not only the physical environment into which he is born, but his own nature as well.


For Hegel, in contrast to Locke, work became totally liberated from nature. The point of work was not simply to satisfy natural needs, or even newly minted desires. Work itself represented freedom because it demonstrated man’s ability to overcome natural determination, to create through his labor. There was no such thing as work “in accordance with nature”; truly human work began only when man demonstrated his mastery over nature. Hegel also had a very different understanding of the meaning of private property than did Locke. Lockean man acquired property in order to satisfy his desires; Hegelian man sees property as a kind of “objectification” of himself in a thing—for example, a house, a car, a piece of land. Property is not an intrinsic characteristic of things; it exists only as a matter of social convention when men agree to respect each other’s property rights. Man derives satisfaction owning property not only for the needs that it satisfies, but because other men recognize it. The protection of private property is a legitimate end of civil society for Hegel, as it is for Locke and for Madison. But Hegel sees property as a stage or aspect of the historical struggle for recognition, as something that satisfies thymos as well as desire.

对黑格尔来说,与洛克相比,工作变得完全从自然中解放出来了。工作的意义不只是为了满足自然的需要,甚至是新产生的欲望。工作本身代表着自由,因为它展示了人类克服自然决定的能力,通过他的劳动创造。不存在 “顺应自然” 的工作;真正的人类工作只有在人类表现出对自然的掌握时才开始。黑格尔对私有财产的意义的理解也与洛克非常不同。洛克式的人获得财产是为了满足他的欲望;黑格尔式的人把财产看作是他自己在某一事物中的一种 “对象化” —— 例如,一所房子、一辆汽车、一块土地。财产不是事物的内在特征;它的存在只是作为一种社会惯例,当人们同意尊重彼此的财产权时。人从拥有财产中获得满足感,不仅是因为它满足了人们的需求,而且是因为其他人认可它。对黑格尔来说,保护私有财产是公民社会的一个合法目的,对洛克和麦迪逊来说也是如此。但黑格尔认为,财产是争取承认的历史斗争的一个阶段或方面,是满足 “你” 和欲望的东西。

The master demonstrates his freedom by risking his life in a bloody battle, thereby indicating his superiority to natural determination. The slave, by contrast, conceives of the idea of freedom by working for the master, and in the process realizes that as a human being he is capable of free and creative labor. The slave’s mastery of nature is the key to his understanding of mastery tout court. The potential freedom of the slave is historically much more significant than the actual freedom of the master. The master is free; he enjoys his freedom in an immediate, unreflective sense by doing what he pleases and consuming what he wants. On the other hand, the slave only conceives of the idea of freedom, an idea that occurs to him as a result of his work. The slave, however, is not free in his own life; there is a discrepancy between his idea of freedom and his actual condition. The slave is therefore more philosophic: he must consider freedom in the abstract before he is able to enjoy it in reality, and must invent for himself the principles of a free society before living in one. The slave’s consciousness is therefore higher than the consciousness of the master, because it is more selfconscious, that is, reflective of itself and its own condition.


The principles of 1776 or 1789, of liberty and equality, did not spring into the heads of slaves spontaneously. The slave does not begin by challenging the master, but rather goes through a long and painful process of self-education as he teaches himself to overcome his fear of death and claim his rightful freedom. The slave, reflecting on his condition and the abstract idea of freedom, throws up several preliminary versions of freedom before he hits on the right one. The preliminary versions are for Hegel as for Marx ideologies, that is, intellectual constructs not true in themselves but reflective of the underlying substructure of reality, the reality of lordship and bondage. While containing the germ of the idea of freedom, they serve to reconcile the slave to the reality of his lack of freedom. Hegel in the Phenomenology identifies several of these slave ideologies, including philosophies like Stoicism and skepticism. But the most important slave ideology, and the one that leads most directly to the realization of societies based on liberty and equality here on earth, is Christianity, the “absolute religion.”

1776 年或 1789 年的自由和平等的原则,并没有自发地涌现在奴隶的头脑中。奴隶不是从挑战主人开始的,而是经历了一个漫长而痛苦的自我教育过程,他教导自己克服对死亡的恐惧,要求获得应有的自由。奴隶在反思自己的状况和自由的抽象概念时,在他找到正确的自由之前,抛出了几个初步的自由版本。对黑格尔和马克思来说,这些初步版本都是意识形态,也就是说,知识结构本身并不真实,而是反映了现实的基本次级结构,即领主地位和束缚的现实。虽然包含了自由思想的萌芽,但它们的作用是使奴隶与他缺乏自由的现实相协调。黑格尔在《现象学》中指出了这些奴隶意识形态中的几种,包括斯多葛主义和怀疑主义等哲学。但最重要的奴隶意识形态,以及最直接导致在地球上实现基于自由和平等的社会的意识形态,是基督教,“绝对宗教”。

Hegel speaks of Christianity as the “absolute religion” not out of any kind of narrow-minded ethnocentrism, but because of the objective historical relationship that existed between Christian doctrine and the emergence of liberal democratic societies in W estern Europe—a relationship that was accepted by any number of later subsequent thinkers such as Weber and Nietzsche. The idea of freedom received its penultimate form in Christianity, according to Hegel, because this religion was the first to establish the principle of the universal equality of all men in the sight of God, on the basis of their faculty for moral choice or belief. That is, Christianity maintained that man was free: free not in the formal Hobbesian sense of freedom from physical constraint, but morally free to choose between right or wrong. Man was fallen, a naked and needy animal, but he was also capable of spiritual regeneration through his capacity for choice and belief. Christian freedom was an inner condition of the spirit, and not an external condition of the body. The thymotic sense of selfworth felt by both Socrates’ Leontius and Havel’s greengrocer has something in common with the inner dignity and freedom of the Christian believer.

黑格尔把基督教说成是 “绝对的宗教”,并不是出于任何狭隘的民族中心主义,而是因为基督教教义与西欧自由民主社会的出现之间存在着客观的历史关系 —— 这种关系被后来的许多思想家,如韦伯和尼采所接受。黑格尔认为,自由的概念在基督教中得到了倒数第一的形式,因为这个宗教是第一个确立了所有人在上帝面前普遍平等的原则,其基础是他们的道德选择或信仰能力。也就是说,基督教认为人是自由的:不是霍布斯式的摆脱身体束缚的自由,而是道德上的自由,可以选择正确或错误。人是堕落的,是赤裸裸的、需要帮助的动物,但他也能够通过选择和信仰的能力获得精神上的重生。基督徒的自由是精神的内在条件,而不是身体的外部条件。苏格拉底笔下的 Leontius 和哈维尔笔下的菜农所感受到的自我价值感,与基督教信徒的内在尊严和自由有共同之处。

The Christian understanding of freedom implies universal human equality, but for different reasons than for HobbesianLockean liberals. The American Declaration of Independence asserts that “all men are created equal,” presumably because they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. Hobbes and Locke based their belief in human equality on the equality of natural endowments: the former said men were equal because they were equally capable of killing one another, while the latter pointed to their equality of faculties. Locke noted, however, that children are not the equals of their parents, and he like Madison believed that men had unequal faculties for acquiring property. Equality in a Lockean state therefore means something like equality of opportunity.

基督教对自由的理解意味着普遍的人类平等,但与霍布斯·洛克式的自由主义者的理由不同。美国《独立宣言》宣称 “人人生而平等”,大概是因为他们被创造者赋予了某些不可剥夺的权利。霍布斯和洛克把他们对人类平等的信念建立在自然禀赋的平等上:前者说人是平等的,因为他们有同样的能力互相残杀,而后者则指出他们的能力是平等的。然而,洛克指出,儿童并不等同于他们的父母,而且他和麦迪逊一样认为,人在获得财产方面有不平等的能力。因此,洛克国家的平等意味着类似于机会平等的东西。

Christian equality, by contrast, is based on the fact that all men are equally endowed with one specific faculty, the faculty for moral choice. All men can accept or reject God, do good or evil. The Christian perspective on equality is illustrated by Dr. Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 1964. In one memorable phrase, he said he had a dream that his four little children “will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” Note that King did not say that they should be judged according to their talent or merit, or that he wanted them to rise as far as their ability would permit. For King, a Christian minister, human dignity did not reside in man’s reason or cleverness, but in his character, that is, his moral character, his ability to distinguish right from wrong. People who are manifestly unequal in terms of beauty, talent, intelligence, or skill, are nonetheless equal insofar as they are moral agents. The homeliest and most awkward orphan can have a more beautiful soul in the eyes of God than the most talented pianist or the most brilliant physicist.

相比之下,基督教的平等是基于这样一个事实:所有的人都被平等地赋予了一种特殊的能力,即道德选择的能力。所有的人都可以接受或拒绝上帝,行善或作恶。1964 年,马丁·路德·金博士在林肯纪念堂的台阶上发表的 “我有一个梦想” 的演讲说明了基督教的平等观点。在一个令人难忘的短语中,他说他有一个梦想,即他的四个小孩子 “有一天会生活在一个国家,在那里他们不会因为他们的肤色而被评判,而是根据他们的性格内容”。请注意,金并没有说应该根据他们的才能或功绩来判断他们,也没有说他希望他们在能力允许的范围内上升。对金这位基督教牧师来说,人的尊严不在于人的理性或聪明,而在于他的性格,即他的道德品质,他辨别是非的能力。在美貌、天赋、智力或技能方面明显不平等的人,只要是道德主体,就都是平等的。在上帝的眼里,最温馨、最笨拙的孤儿可能比最有才华的钢琴家或最杰出的物理学家拥有更美丽的灵魂。

Christianity’s contribution, then, to the historical process was to make clear to the slave this vision of human freedom, and to define for him in what sense all men could be understood to have dignity. The Christian God recognizes all human beings universally, recognizes their individual human worth and dignity. The Kingdom of Heaven, in other words, presents the prospect of a world in which the isothymia of every man—though not the megalothymia of the vainglorious—will be satisfied.

那么,基督教对历史进程的贡献就是向奴隶阐明这种人类自由的愿景,并为他界定在何种意义上可以理解为所有的人都有尊严。基督教的上帝普遍承认所有的人,承认他们个人的人类价值和尊严。换句话说,天国展现了一个世界的前景,在这个世界里,每个人的异性思维 —— 尽管不是虚荣心的巨额思维 —— 都将得到满足。

The problem with Christianity, however, is that it remains just another slave ideology, that is, it is untrue in certain crucial respects. Christianity posits the realization of human freedom not here on earth but only in the Kingdom of Heaven. Christianity, in other words, had the right concept of freedom, but ended up reconciling real-world slaves to their lack of freedom by telling them not to expect liberation in this life. According to Hegel, the Christian did not realize that God did not create man, but rather that man had created God. He created God as a kind of projection of the idea of freedom, for in the Christian God we see a being who is the perfect master of himself and of nature. But the Christian then proceeded to enslave himself to this God that he himself created. He reconciled himself to a life of slavery on earth in the belief that he would be redeemed later by God, when in fact he could be his own redeemer. Christianity was thus a form of alienation, that is, a new form of slavery where man enslaved himself to something that he himself created, thereby becoming divided against himself.


The last great slave ideology, Christianity, articulated for the slave a vision of what human freedom should be. Even though it did not provide him with a practical way out of his slavery, it permitted him to see more clearly his objective: the free and autonomous individual who is recognized for his freedom and autonomy, recognized universally and reciprocally by all men. The slave, through his work, did much of the job of liberating himself: he mastered nature and transformed it according to his own ideas, and he came to a self-awareness of the possibility of his own freedom. For Hegel, then, completion of the historical process required only a secularization of Christianity, that is, a translation of the Christian idea of freedom into the here-and-now. It also required one more bloody battle, the battle in which the slave liberates himself from the master. And Hegel regarded his own philosophy as a transformation of Christian doctrine, one that was no longer based on myth and scriptural authority, but on the slave’s achievement of absolute knowledge and selfconsciousness.


The human historical process started with the battle for pure prestige, in which the aristocratic master sought recognition for his willingness to risk his life. By overcoming his nature, the master showed he was the freer and more authentic human being. But it was the slave and his work, not the master and his fighting, that propelled the historical process forward. The slave initially accepted his slavery out of fear of death, but unlike Hobbes’s rational man seeking selfpreservation, Hegel’s slave was never content with himself. That is, the slave still possessed thymos, a sense of his own worth and dignity, and a desire to live something other than a merely slavish life. His thymos was expressed in the pride he took in his own work, in his ability to manipulate the “almost worthless materials” of nature and transform them into something bearing his imprint. It was also revealed in the idea he had of freedom: his thymos led him to imagine the abstract possibility of a free being with worth and dignity, long before his own worth and dignity were recognized by anyone else. Unlike Hobbes’s rational man, he did not try to repress his own pride. On the contrary, he did not feel himself a full human being until he had achieved recognition. It was the slave’s continuing desire for recognition that was the motor which propelled history forward, not the idle complacency and unchanging self-identity of the master.

人类的历史进程始于纯粹的威望之争,在这场斗争中,贵族主人因其愿意冒生命危险而寻求认可。通过克服自己的天性,主人表明他是更自由、更真实的人。但推动历史进程的是奴隶和他的工作,而不是主人和他的战斗。奴隶最初是出于对死亡的恐惧而接受他的奴役,但与霍布斯的理性人寻求自我保护不同,黑格尔的奴隶从未对自己感到满足。也就是说,奴隶仍然拥有 thymos,一种对他自己的价值和尊严的感觉,以及一种对生活的渴望,而不仅仅是一种奴役的生活。他的 thymos 表现在他对自己的工作感到骄傲,表现在他有能力操纵自然界中 “几乎没有价值的材料”,并将它们转化为带有他的印记的东西。它还体现在他对自由的想法中:他的胸怀使他想象出一个具有价值和尊严的自由人的抽象可能性,这比他自己的价值和尊严被其他人承认还要早。与霍布斯的理性人不同,他并没有试图压制自己的骄傲。相反,在他获得承认之前,他并不觉得自己是一个完整的人。奴隶对认可的持续渴望是推动历史前进的动力,而不是主人的闲适自得和不变的自我认同。

Chapter 19: The Universal and Homogeneous State

第 19 章:普遍和同质的国家

Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daft der Staat ist.


—G. W. F. Hegel The Philosophy of Right

-黑格尔:《权利的哲学》(G·W. F·Hegel)

For Hegel, the French Revolution was the event that took the Christian vision of a free and equal society, and implemented it here on earth. In making this revolution, the former slaves risked their lives, and in so doing proved that they had overcome the very fear of death that had served originally to define them as slaves. The principles of liberty and equality were then carried to the rest of Europe by Napoleon’s victorious armies. The modern liberal democratic state that came into being in the aftermath of the French Revolution was, simply, the realization of the Christian ideal of freedom and universal human equality in the here-andnow. This was not an attempt to deify the state or give it a “metaphysical” significance absent in AngloSaxon liberalism. Rather, it constituted a recognition that it was man who had created the Christian God in the first place, and therefore man who could make God come down to earth and live in the parliament buildings, presidential palaces, and bureaucracies of the modern state.

对黑格尔来说,法国大革命是将基督教关于自由和平等社会的愿景,在地球上实施的事件。在这场革命中,前奴隶们冒着生命危险,并以此证明他们已经克服了对死亡的恐惧,而这种恐惧最初是用来界定他们为奴隶的。自由和平等的原则随后被拿破仑的胜利军队带到了欧洲其他地区。在法国大革命之后出现的现代自由民主国家,简单地说,就是实现了基督教关于自由和普遍的人类平等的理想。这并不是试图将国家神化或赋予它在盎格鲁·撒克逊自由主义中所没有的 “形而上学” 意义。相反,它构成了一种认识,即首先是人创造了基督教的上帝,因此人可以使上帝下凡,住在现代国家的议会大厦、总统府和官僚机构中。

Hegel gives us the opportunity to reinterpret modern liberal democracy in terms that are rather different from the AngloSaxon tradition of liberalism emanating from Hobbes and Locke. This Hegelian understanding of liberalism is at the same time a more noble vision of what liberalism represents, and a more accurate account of what people around the world mean when they say they want to live in a democracy. For Hobbes and Locke, and for their followers who wrote the American Constitution and Declaration of Independence, liberal society was a social contract between individuals who possessed certain natural rights, chief among which were the right to life—that is, selfpreservation— and to the pursuit of happiness, which was generally understood as the right to private property. Liberal society is thus a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens not to interfere with each other’s lives and property.

黑格尔给我们提供了一个机会,可以用与霍布斯和洛克产生的盎格鲁撒克逊自由主义传统相当不同的术语重新解释现代自由民主。黑格尔对自由主义的这种理解,同时也是对自由主义所代表的更高尚的愿景,以及对世界各地的人们说他们想生活在一个民主国家时的意思的更准确的描述。对于霍布斯和洛克,以及他们撰写美国宪法和独立宣言的追随者来说,自由社会是拥有某些自然权利的个人之间的社会契约,其中最主要的是生命权 —— 即自我保护 —— 和追求幸福的权利,这通常被理解为私有财产的权利。因此,自由社会是公民之间相互平等的协议,不干涉对方的生命和财产。

For Hegel, by contrast, liberal society is a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognize each other. If Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism can be interpreted as the pursuit of rational selfinterest, Hegelian “liberalism” can be seen as the pursuit of rational recognition, that is, recognition on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human being is recognized by all. What is at stake for us when we choose to live in a liberal democracy is not merely the fact that it allows us the freedom to make money and satisfy the desiring parts of our souls. The more important and ultimately more satisfying thing it provides us is recognition of our dignity. Life in a liberal democracy is potentially the road to great material abundance, but it also shows us the way to the completely nonmaterial end of recognition of our freedom. The liberal democratic state values us at our own sense of selfworth. Thus both the desiring and thymotic parts of our souls find satisfaction.

相比之下,对黑格尔来说,自由社会是公民之间相互承认对方的互惠和平等的协议。如果说霍布斯或洛克的自由主义可以被解释为追求理性的自我利益,那么黑格尔的 “自由主义” 则可以被视为追求理性的承认,即在普遍基础上的承认,其中每个人作为自由和自主的人的尊严被所有人承认。当我们选择生活在一个自由的民主制度中时,对我们来说利害攸关的不仅仅是它允许我们自由地赚钱和满足我们灵魂中的欲望部分的事实。它为我们提供的更重要、最终更令人满意的东西是对我们尊严的认可。自由民主国家的生活有可能是通往巨大的物质丰富的道路,但它也为我们指明了通往完全非物质的终点 —— 对我们自由的承认。自由民主国家以我们的自我价值感来评价我们。因此,我们灵魂中的欲望和胸怀部分都能得到满足。

Universal recognition solves the severe defect in recognition that existed in slaveholding societies and its many variants. Virtually every society prior to the French Revolution was either a monarchy or aristocracy, in which either one person (the king), or a few persons (the “ruling class” or the elite), were recognized. Their satisfaction at being recognized came at the expense of the great mass of people whose humanity was not acknowledged in return. Recognition could be rationalized only if it were put on a universal and equal basis. The internal “contradiction” of the master-slave relationship was solved in a state which successfully synthesized the morality of the master and the morality of the slave. The very distinction between masters and slaves was abolished, and the former slaves became the new masters—not of other slaves, but of themselves. This was the meaning of the “Spirit of 1776”—not the victory of yet another group of masters, not the rise of a new slavish consciousness, but the achievement of self-mastery in the form of democratic government. Something of both lordship and bondage was preserved in this new synthesis—the satisfaction of recognition on the part of the master, and the work of the slave.

普遍承认解决了在奴隶制社会及其许多变种中存在的严重的承认缺陷。在法国大革命之前,几乎所有的社会都是君主制或贵族制,其中有一个人(国王)或少数人(“统治阶层” 或精英)被承认。他们对被承认的满足感是以广大人民群众为代价的,他们的人性没有得到回报。只有在普遍和平等的基础上,承认才会合理化。主人与奴隶关系的内部 “矛盾” 在一个成功地综合了主人的道德和奴隶的道德的国家中得到了解决。主人和奴隶之间的区别被废除了,以前的奴隶成为新的主人 —— 不是其他奴隶的主人,而是自己的主人。这就是 “1776 年精神” 的意义 —— 不是另一群主人的胜利,不是一种新的奴性意识的兴起,而是以民主政府的形式实现自我管理。在这个新的综合体中保留了领主制和奴役制的一些内容 —— 主人得到承认的满足,奴隶的工作。

We can better understand the rationality of the universal recognition by contrasting it with other forms of recognition that are not rational. For example, a nationalist state, that is, a state in which citizenship is restricted to members of a particularnational, ethnic, or racial group, constitutes a form of irrational recognition. Nationalism is very much a manifestation of the desire for recognition, arising out of thymos. The nationalist is primarily preoccupied not with economic gain, but with recognition and dignity. Nationality is not a natural trait; one has nationality only if one is recognized by other people as having it. The recognition one seeks, however, is not for oneself as an individual, but for the group of which one is a member. In a sense, nationalism represents a transmutation of the megalothymia of earlier ages into a more modern and democratic form. Instead of individual princes struggling for personal glory, we now have entire nations demanding recognition of their nationhood. Like the aristocratic master, these nations have shown themselves willing to accept the risk of violent death for the sake of recognition, for their “place in the sun.”

我们可以通过与其他非理性的承认形式进行对比,更好地理解普遍承认的合理性。例如,民族主义国家,即公民权仅限于某一特定民族、族裔或种族群体成员的国家,构成了一种非理性的承认形式。民族主义在很大程度上是对承认的渴望的表现,产生于 thymos。民族主义者主要关注的不是经济利益,而是承认和尊严。国籍不是一种自然特征;只有当一个人被其他人承认拥有国籍时,他才拥有国籍。然而,一个人所寻求的承认,不是为自己作为一个人,而是为自己所处的群体。从某种意义上说,民族主义代表了早期的巨头主义向更现代、更民主的形式转变。与其说个别王子在为个人荣誉而奋斗,不如说我们现在有整个国家在要求承认他们的民族性。像贵族主人一样,这些国家已经表明他们愿意接受暴力死亡的风险,以获得承认,以获得他们的 “阳光下的地位”。

The desire for recognition based on nationality or race, however, is not a rational one. The distinction between human and nonhuman is fully rational: only human beings are free, that is, able to struggle for recognition in a battle for pure prestige. This distinction is based on nature, or rather, on the radical disjunction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom. The distinction between one human group and another, on the other hand, is an accidental and arbitrary byproduct of human history. And the struggle between national groups for recognition of their national dignity leads, on an international scale, to the same impasse as the prestige battle between aristocratic masters: one or another nation becomes a master, so to speak, and the other becomes a slave. The recognition available to either is defective for the same reasons that the original, individual relationship of lordship and bondage was unsatisfactory.


The liberal state, on the other hand, is rational because it reconciles these competing demands for recognition on the only mutually acceptable basis possible, that is, on the basis of the individual’s identity as a human being. The liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it must be homogeneous insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves. The rationality of this universal and homogeneous state is further evident in the fact that it is consciously founded on the basis of open and publicized principles, such as occurred in the course of the constitutional convention that led to the birth of the American republic. That is, the authority of the state does not arise out of age-old tradition or from the murky depths of religious faith, but as the result of a public debate in which the citizens of the state agree amongst one another on the explicit terms under which they will live together. It represents a form of rational selfconsciousness because for the first time human beings as a society are aware of their own true natures, and are able to fashion a political community that exists in conformity with those natures.


In what way can we say that modern liberal democracy “recognizes” all human beings universally?

我们在什么方面可以说现代自由主义民主普遍 “承认” 所有人类?

It does this by granting and protecting their rights. That is, any human child born on the territory of the United States or France or any of a number of other liberal states is by that very act endowed with certain rights of citizenship. No one may harm the life of that child, whether he or she is poor or rich, black or white, without being prosecuted by the criminal justice system. In time, that child will have the right to own property, which must be respected both by the state and by fellow citizens. This child will have the right to have thymotic options (i.e., opinions concerning value and worth) about any topic he or she conceives, and will have the right to publish and disseminate those opinions as broadly as possible. These thymotic opinions can take the form of religious belief, which may be exercised with complete freedom. And finally, when this child reaches adulthood, he or she will have the right to participate in the very government that establishes these rights in the first place, and to contribute to deliberations on the highest and most important questions of public policy. This participation can take the form of either voting in periodic elections, or the more active form of entering into the political process directly, for instance by running for office, or writing editorials in support of a person or position, or by serving in a public-sector bureaucracy. Popular selfgovernment abolishes the distinction between masters and slaves; everyone is entitled to at least some share in the role of master. Mastery now takes the form of the promulgation of democratically determined laws, that is, sets of universal rules by which man selfconsciously masters himself. Recognition becomes reciprocal when the state and the people recognize each other, that is, when the state grants its citizens rights and when citizens agree to abide by the state’s laws. The only limitations on these rights occur when they become self-contradictory, in other words, when the exercise of one right interferes with the exercise of another.


This description of the Hegelian state sounds virtually identical to the Lockean liberal state, which is similarly defined as a system for protecting a set of individual rights. The Hegel specialist will immediately object that Hegel was critical of Lockean or AngloSaxon liberalism, and would have rejected the notion that a Lockean United States of America or England constituted the final stage of history. He would of course be right in a certain sense. Hegel would never have endorsed the view of certain liberals in the AngloSaxon tradition, now primarily represented on the libertarian Right, who believe that government’s only purpose is to get out of the way of individuals, and that the latter’s freedom to pursue their selfish private interests is absolute. He would have rejected the version of liberalism that viewed political rights simply as a means by which men could protect their lives and their money or, in more contemporary language, their personal “lifestyles.”

对黑格尔国家的这种描述听起来与洛克的自由主义国家几乎相同,后者同样被定义为保护一系列个人权利的制度。黑格尔专家会立即反对说,黑格尔对洛克或盎格鲁·撒克逊的自由主义持批评态度,并会拒绝洛克式的美国或英国构成历史的最后阶段这一概念。当然,在某种意义上,他是对的。黑格尔绝不会赞同盎格鲁·撒克逊传统中某些自由主义者的观点,这些人现在主要代表自由主义右派,他们认为政府的唯一目的是摆脱个人的束缚,而后者追求其自私的私人利益的自由是绝对的。他将拒绝自由主义的版本,即把政治权利仅仅视为一种手段,通过这种手段,人们可以保护他们的生命和金钱,或者用更现代的语言,他们的个人 “生活方式”。

On the other hand, Kojève identified an important truth when he asserted that postwar America or the members of the European Community constituted the embodiment of Hegel’s state of universal recognition. For while the AngloSaxon democracies may have been founded on explicitly Lockean grounds, their selfunderstanding has never been purely Lockean. W e have seen, for example, how both Madison and Hamilton in the Federalist took account of the thymotic side of human nature, and how the former believed that one of the purposes of representative government was to give an outlet to men’s thymotic and passionate opinions. When people in contemporary America talk about their society and form of government, they frequently use language that is more Hegelian than Lockean. For example, during the civil rights era, it was perfectly normal for people to say that the purpose of a particular piece of civil rights legislation was to recognize the dignity of black people, or to fulfill the promise of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to allow all Americans to live in dignity and freedom. One did not need to be a Hegel scholar to understand the force of this argument; it was part of the vocabulary of the least educated and most humble citizen. (The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany makes explicit reference to human dignity.) The right to vote, in the United States and in other democratic countries, first for people who did not meet property qualifications, then for blacks and other ethnic or racial minorities, and for women, was never seen as an exclusively economic matter (i.e., that the right to vote allowed these groups to protect their economic interests), but was generally perceived as a symbol of their worth and equality, and was valued as an end in itself. The fact that the American Founding Fathers did not use the terms “recognition” and “dignity” did not prevent the Lockean language of rights from sliding effortlessly and invisibly into the Hegelian language of recognition.

另一方面,当 Kojève 断言战后的美国或欧洲共同体的成员构成了黑格尔的普遍承认状态的体现时,他确定了一个重要的事实。因为虽然盎格鲁·撒克逊的民主国家可能是建立在明确的洛克的基础上,但它们的自我理解从来都不是纯粹的洛克式的。例如,我们已经看到,麦迪逊和汉密尔顿在《联邦党人》中都考虑到了人类本性中多愁善感的一面,前者认为代议制政府的目的之一是为人们多愁善感和热情的意见提供一个出口。当当代美国人谈论他们的社会和政府形式时,他们经常使用黑格尔式的语言,而不是洛克式的语言。例如,在民权时代,人们说某项民权立法的目的是承认黑人的尊严,或履行《独立宣言》和《宪法》的承诺,让所有美国人生活在尊严和自由之中,这是非常正常的。人们不需要成为黑格尔学者来理解这种论点的力量;它是受教育程度最低、最卑微的公民的词汇的一部分。(德意志联邦共和国的宪法明确提到了人类尊严)。在美国和其他民主国家,首先是不符合财产资格的人,然后是黑人和其他族裔或种族少数群体,以及妇女的投票权,从来没有被视为一个完全的经济问题(即投票权允许这些群体保护他们的经济利益),而是普遍被视为他们价值和平等的象征,并被视为一个目的本身。美国开国元勋们没有使用 “承认” 和 “尊严” 这两个词,但这并不妨碍洛克式的权利语言毫不费力地、无形地滑向黑格尔式的承认语言。

The universal and homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition. The human historical process that leads up to it has been driven forward equally by the progressive unfolding of modern natural science, and by the struggle for recognition. The former emanates from the desiring part of the soul, which was liberated in early modern times and turned to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. This unlimited accumulation was made possible because of an alliance that was formed between desire and reason: capitalism is inextricably bound to modern natural science. The struggle for recognition, on the other hand, originated in the thymotic part of the soul. It was driven forward by the reality of slavery, which contrasted with the slave’s vision of mastery in a world where all men were free and equal in the sight of God. A full description of the historical process—a true Universal History—cannot really be complete without giving an account of both of these pillars, just as a description of the human personality is not complete that does not take account of desire, reason, and thymos. Marxism, “modernization theory,” or any other theory of history based primarily on economics will be radically incomplete unless it takes account of the thymotic part of the soul, and of the struggle for recognition as a major driver of history.

因此,历史终结时出现的普遍和同质的国家可以被看作是建立在经济和承认的双重支柱之上的。导致它的人类历史进程同样被现代自然科学的逐步展开和争取承认的斗争所推动。前者来自灵魂的欲望部分,它在现代早期得到解放,转向财富的无限积累。这种无限积累之所以成为可能,是因为欲望和理性之间形成了一种联盟:资本主义与现代自然科学密不可分。另一方面,争取承认的斗争则起源于灵魂的胸腺部分。奴隶制的现实推动了它的发展,它与奴隶在一个所有人在上帝面前都是自由和平等的世界中的主人翁的愿景形成了对比。对历史进程的全面描述 —— 真正的世界历史 —— 如果不对这两个支柱作出说明,就不可能真正完整,正如对人类人格的描述如果不考虑欲望、理性和 thymos 就不完整一样。马克思主义、“现代化理论” 或任何其他主要基于经济的历史理论,除非考虑到灵魂的胸怀部分,以及作为历史的主要驱动力的争取承认的斗争,否则将是根本不完整的。

We are now in a position to explicate more fully the interrelationship between liberal economics and liberal politics, and to give an account of the high degree of correlation between advanced industrialization and liberal democracy. There is, as stated earlier, no economic rationale for democracy; if anything, democratic politics is a drag on economic efficiency. The choice of democracy is an autonomous one, undertaken for the sake of recognition and not for the sake of desire.


But economic development creates certain conditions that make that autonomous choice more likely. This happens for two reasons. In the first place, economic development demonstrates to the slave the concept of mastery, as he discovers he can master nature through technology, and master himself as well through the discipline of work and education. As societies become better educated, slaves have the opportunity to become more conscious of the fact that they are slaves and would like to be masters, and to absorb the ideas of other slaves who have reflected on their condition of servitude. Education teaches them that they are human beings with dignity, and that they ought to struggle to have that dignity recognized. The fact that modern education teaches the ideas of liberty and equality is not accidental; these are slave ideologies that have been thrown up in reaction to the real situation in which slaves found themselves. Christianity and communism were both slave ideologies (the latter unanticipated by Hegel) that captured part of the truth. But in the course of time the irrationalities and self-contradictions of both were revealed: Communist societies, in particular, despite their commitment to principles of freedom and equality, were exposed as modern variants of slaveholding ones, in which the dignity of the great mass of people went unrecognized. The collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order.

但经济发展创造了某些条件,使这种自主选择更有可能。这发生在两个原因上。首先,经济发展向奴隶展示了主宰的概念,因为他发现他可以通过技术来主宰自然,也可以通过工作和教育的纪律来主宰自己。随着社会教育程度的提高,奴隶们有机会更加意识到他们是奴隶并希望成为主人,并吸收其他奴隶对其奴役状况的反思。教育告诉他们,他们是有尊严的人,他们应该为使这种尊严得到承认而奋斗。现代教育教授自由和平等的思想并不是偶然的;这些都是奴隶的意识形态,是对奴隶们发现自己的真实处境的反应而提出的。基督教和共产主义都是奴隶制的意识形态(后者是黑格尔没有预料到的),它们抓住了部分真理。但随着时间的推移,两者的不合理性和自相矛盾性被揭示出来。尤其是共产主义社会,尽管他们致力于自由和平等的原则,但被暴露为奴隶制社会的现代变种,在这些社会中,广大人民的尊严没有得到承认。马克思主义意识形态在 20 世纪 80 年代末的崩溃,在某种意义上反映了生活在这种社会中的人达到了更高的理性水平,他们认识到只有在自由的社会秩序中才能得到理性的普遍承认。

The second way in which economic development encourages liberal democracy is because it has a tremendous leveling effect through its need for universal education. Old class barriers are broken down in favor of a general condition of equality of opportunity. While new classes arise based on economic status or education, there is an inherently greater mobility in society that promotes the spread of egalitarian ideas. The economy thus creates a kind of de facto equality before such equality arises de jure.


If human beings were nothing but reason and desire, they would be perfectly content to live in a South Korea under military dictatorship, or under the enlightened technocratic administration of Francoist Spain, or in a Guomindang-led Taiwan, hellbent on rapid economic growth. And yet, citizens of these countries are something more than desire and reason: they have a thymotic pride and belief in their own dignity, and want that dignity to be recognized, above all by the government of the country they live in.


The desire for recognition, then, is the missing link between liberal economics and liberal politics. W e have seen how advanced industrialization produces societies that are urban, mobile, increasingly well-educated, and free from traditional forms of authority like that of tribe, priest, or guild. W e saw that there was a high degree of empirical correlation between such societies and liberal democracy, without being able to fully explain the reason for that correlation. The weakness in our interpretive framework lay in the fact that we were seeking an economic explanation for the choice of liberal democracy, that is, an explanation that in one way or another arose out of the desiring part of the soul. But we should instead have looked at the thymotic part, at the soul’s desire for recognition. For the social changes that accompany advanced industrialization, in particular education, appear to liberate a certain demand for recognition that did not exist among poorer and less educated people. As people become wealthier, more cosmopolitan, and better educated, they demand not simply more wealth but recognition of their status. It is this completely non-economic, nonmaterial drive that can explain why people in Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China have all expressed a demand not just for market economics but for free governments by and for the people as well.


Alexandre Kojève, interpreting Hegel, maintained that the universal and homogeneous state would be the last stage in human history because it was completely satisfying to man. This was based, in the end, on his belief in the primacy of thymos, or the desire for recognition, as the most deep-seated and fundamental human longing. In pointing to the metaphysical, as well as psychological, importance of recognition, Hegel and Kojève perhaps saw more profoundly into the human personality than other philosophers like Locke or Marx, for whom desire and reason were paramount. While Kojève claimed that he had no trans-historical standard by which to measure the adequacy of human institutions, the desire for recognition in fact constituted such a standard. Thymos was in the end for Kojève a permanent part of human nature. The struggle for recognition arising out of thymos may have required an historical march of ten thousand years or more, but it was no less a constitutive part of the soul for Kojève than for Plato.

亚历山大·科耶夫(Alexandre Kojève)在解释黑格尔时坚持认为,普遍和同质的国家将是人类历史的最后阶段,因为它完全满足了人类。这归根结底是基于他对 thymos 的首要地位的信念,或对承认的渴望,作为人类最深层的基本渴望。在指出承认的形而上学以及心理学的重要性时,黑格尔和科耶夫也许比洛克或马克思等其他哲学家更深刻地看到了人类的个性,对他们来说,欲望和理性是最重要的。虽然科耶夫声称他没有跨历史的标准来衡量人类制度的充分性,但对承认的渴望事实上构成了这样一个标准。对科耶夫来说,Thymos 最终是人性的一个永久组成部分。从 thymos 中产生的争取承认的斗争可能需要一万年或更长时间的历史进程,但对 Kojève 来说,它不亚于柏拉图的灵魂的构成部分。

Kojève’s claim that we are at the end of history therefore stands or falls on the strength of the assertion that the recognition provided by the contemporary liberal democratic state adequately satisfies the human desire for recognition. Kojève believed that modern liberal democracy successfully synthesized the morality of the master and the morality of the slave, overcoming the distinction between them even as it preserves something of both forms of existence. Is this really true? In particular, has the megalothymia of the master been successfully sublimated and channeled by modern political institutions so that it no longer presents a problem for contemporary politics? Will man be forever content to be recognized simply as the equal of all other men, or will he not demand more in time? And if megalothymia has been so totally sublimated or channeled by modern politics, should we agree with Nietzsche that his is not a cause for celebration, but an unparalleled disaster?

因此,Kojève 关于我们处于历史的尽头的说法是站不住脚的,因为他断言当代自由民主国家提供的承认充分满足了人类对承认的渴望。科耶夫认为,现代自由民主成功地综合了主人的道德和奴隶的道德,克服了它们之间的区别,即使它保留了两种存在形式的一些东西。这真的是真的吗?特别是,主人的巨乳症是否已经被现代政治机构成功地升华和引导,以至于它不再成为当代政治的问题?人是否会永远满足于被承认为所有其他人的平等,或者他不会及时要求更多?如果巨乳症已经被现代政治完全升华或疏导,我们是否应该同意尼采的观点,即他不是一个值得庆祝的理由,而是一场无与伦比的灾难?

These are very longterm considerations, to which we will return in Part Five of this book.


In the meantime, we will look more closely at the actual transition in consciousness as it moves toward liberal democracy. The desire for recognition can take a variety of irrational forms before it is transformed into universal and equal recognition, such as those represented under the broad rubricsof religion and nationalism. That transition is never a smooth one, and it turns out that rational recognition coexists with irrational forms in most realword societies. More than that: the emergence and durability of a society embodying rational recognition appears to require the survival of certain forms of irrational recognition, a paradox that Kojève does not fully address.


In the preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explains that philosophy “is its own time apprehended in thought,” and that as a philosopher one can no more go beyond one’s time and predict the future than a man could leap over the giant statue that once stood on the island of Rhodes. Despite this warning we will look ahead to try to understand both the prospects and limitations of the current worldwide liberal revolution, and what effect it will have on international relations.

在《权利哲学》的序言中,黑格尔解释说,哲学 “是在思想中领悟到的自己的时间”,作为一个哲学家,他不可能超越自己的时间并预测未来,就像一个人不可能跃过曾经矗立在罗得岛的巨大雕像一样。尽管有这样的警告,我们还是要向前看,试图了解当前世界范围内的自由主义革命的前景和局限性,以及它对国际关系的影响。

Hic Rhodus, hic saltus

Hic Rhodus, hic saltus

Chapter 20: The Coldest of All Cold Monsters

第 20 章:最冷酷的怪物

Somewhere there are still peoples and herds, but not where we live, my brothers: here there are states. State? What is that? Well then, open your ears to me, for now I shall speak to you about the death of peoples.


State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it tells lies too; and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, am the people.” This is a lie! It was creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life.


It is annihilators who set traps for the many and call them “state”: they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over them …

是歼灭者为许多人设置了陷阱,并称他们为 “国家”:他们在他们身上悬挂了一把剑和一百个胃口……

This sign I give you: every people speaks its language of good and evil, which the neighbor does not understand. It has invented its own language of customs and rights. But the state tells lies in all the languages of good and evil; and whatever it says it lies—and whatever it has it has stolen.


—Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra


At the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy. In the past, people rejected liberal democracy because they believed that it was inferior to monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, fascism, communist totalitarianism, or whatever ideology they happened to believe in. But now, outside the Islamic world, there appears to be a general consensus that accepts liberal democracy’s claims to be the most rational form of government, that is, the state that realizes most fully either rational desire or rational recognition. If this is so, why then are all countries outside the Islamic world not democratic? Why does the transition to democracy remain so difficult for many nations whose people and leaderships have accepted democratic principles in the abstract? Why do we have the suspicion that certain regimes around the world currently proclaiming themselves democratic are unlikely to remain that way, while others are scarcely conceivable as anything other than stable democracies? And why is the current trend toward liberalism eventually likely to recede, even if it promises to be victorious in the long run?


The founding of a liberal democracy is meant to be a supremely rational political act, in which the community as a whole deliberates on the nature of the constitution and set of basic laws that will govern its public life. But one is frequently struck by the weakness of both reason and politics to achieve their ends, and for human beings to “lose control” of their lives, not just on a personal but on a political level. For example, many countries in Latin America were established as liberal democracies shortly after winning independence from Spain or Portugal in the nineteenth century, with constitutions modeled on those of the United States or Republican France. And yet, not one of them has succeeded in maintaining an unbroken democratic tradition up to the present. Opposition to liberal democracy in Latin America on a theoretical level has never been strong, except for brief challenges from fascism and communism, and yet liberal democrats have faced an uphill battle winning and keeping power. There are a number of nations like Russia which have known a variety of authoritarian forms of government, but until recently never true democracy. Other nations like Germany have had terrible difficulties achieving stable democracy, despite their firm rooting in the W estern European tradition, while France, the birthplace of liberty and equality, has seen five different democratic republics come and go since 1789.These cases stand in sharp contrast to the experience of most democracies of AngloSaxon origin, which have had a relatively easy time maintaining the stability of their institutions.

自由主义民主的建立是一种极其理性的政治行为,在这种行为中,整个社会将审议宪法的性质和管理其公共生活的一套基本法律。但是,人们经常会惊讶于理性和政治在实现其目的方面的弱点,以及人类对其生活的 “失控”,不仅是在个人层面,而且在政治层面。例如,拉丁美洲的许多国家在 19 世纪从西班牙或葡萄牙赢得独立后不久就建立了自由民主制度,其宪法是以美国或共和法国的宪法为蓝本的。然而,其中没有一个国家成功地将不间断的民主传统保持到现在。除了来自法西斯主义和共产主义的短暂挑战之外,拉丁美洲在理论层面上对自由民主的反对从来都很强烈,然而自由民主派却面临着一场赢得和保持权力的艰苦战斗。有一些国家,如俄罗斯,已经知道各种专制形式的政府,但直到最近,从来没有真正的民主。其他国家,如德国,尽管牢牢扎根于西欧传统,但在实现稳定的民主方面遇到了可怕的困难,而法国,这个自由和平等的发源地,自 1789 年以来已经见证了五个不同的民主共和国的出现和消失。这些情况与大多数源自盎格鲁·撒克逊的民主国家的经历形成了鲜明对比,后者在维持其机构的稳定性方面相对容易。

The reason why liberal democracy has not become universal, or remained stable once it has achieved power, lies ultimately in the incomplete correspondence between peoples and states. States are purposeful political creations, while peoples are preexisting moral communities. That is, peoples are communities with common beliefs about good and evil, about the nature of the sacred and the profane, which may have arisen from a deliberate founding in the distant past but which now exist largely as a matter of tradition. As Nietzsche says, “every people speaks its language of good and evil,” and has “invented its own language of customs and rights” that are reflected not just in the constitution and laws, but in the family, in religion, in class structure, in the daily habits and the ways of life that are honored. The realm of states is the realm of the political, the sphere of selfconscious choice about the proper mode of governance. The realm of peoples is subpolitical: it is the domain of culture and of society, whose rules are seldom explicit or selfconsciously recognized even by those who participate in them. When Tocqueville talks about America’s constitutional system of checks and balances, or the division of responsibilities between federal and state government, he is talking about states; but when he describes the sometimes fanatical spiritualism of Americans, their passion for equality, or the fact that they are addicted to practical rather than theoretical science, he is describing them as a people.

自由主义民主之所以没有普及,或者在取得政权后没有保持稳定,归根结底在于民族和国家之间的不完全对应。国家是有目的的政治创造物,而民族是预先存在的道德共同体。也就是说,民族是具有关于善与恶、关于神圣与世俗的性质的共同信仰的社区,这些信仰可能是在遥远的过去经过深思熟虑而产生的,但现在主要是作为一个传统问题而存在。正如尼采所说,“每个民族都说着自己的善恶语言”,并 “发明了自己的习俗和权利的语言”,这些语言不仅反映在宪法和法律中,而且反映在家庭、宗教、阶级结构、日常习惯和被尊重的生活方式中。国家的领域是政治的领域,是对适当的治理模式进行自我意识选择的领域。民族的领域是亚政治的:它是文化和社会的领域,其规则很少明确或自觉地被认可,即使是那些参与其中的人。当托克维尔谈到美国的制衡宪法体系,或联邦政府和州政府之间的责任划分时,他是在谈论州;但当他描述美国人有时狂热的精神主义,他们对平等的热情,或他们沉迷于实践而非理论科学时,他是在描述他们作为一个民族。

States impose themselves on top of peoples. In some cases, the state forms the people, as the laws of Lycurgus and Romulus were held to have formed the ethos of the people of Sparta and Rome, respectively, or as the rule of liberty and equality has shaped a democratic consciousness among the various immigrant peoples making up the United States of America. But states in many cases sit in uneasy tension with peoples, and in some instances might be said to be at war with their peoples—as when the Russian and Chinese communists sought forcibly to convert their populations to Marxist ideals. The success and the stability of liberal democracy therefore never depends simply on the mechanical application of a certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires a degree of conformity between peoples and states.

国家将自己强加于人民之上。在某些情况下,国家形成了人民,就像 Lycurgus 和 Romulus 的法律分别形成了斯巴达和罗马人民的精神,或者自由和平等的规则在组成美利坚合众国的各移民民族中形成了民主意识。但是,在许多情况下,国家与人民之间存在着不安的紧张关系,在某些情况下,可以说是与人民交战 —— 就像俄罗斯和中国的共产主义者试图强行将他们的人民转化为马克思主义的理想。因此,自由民主的成功和稳定从来都不是简单地取决于对某一套普遍原则和法律的机械应用,而是需要人民和国家之间有一定程度的一致性。

If we, following Nietzsche, define a people as a moral community sharing ideas of good and evil, then it becomes clear that peoples, and the cultures they create, originate in the thymotic part of the soul. That is to say, culture arises out of the capacity to evaluate, to say for instance that the person who defers to his elders is worthy, or that the human being who eats unclean animals like pigs is not. Thymos or the desire for recognition is thus the seat of what social scientists call “values.” It was the struggle for recognition, as we have seen, that produced the relationship of lordship and bondage in all of its various manifestations, and the moral codes that arose out of it—the deference of a subject to his monarch, the peasant to his landlord, the haughty superiority of the aristocrat, and so forth.

如果我们按照尼采的说法,将一个民族定义为一个共享善恶观念的道德共同体,那么很明显,民族以及他们所创造的文化,起源于灵魂的胸腺部分。也就是说,文化产生于评价的能力,比如说,听从长辈的人是有价值的,或者吃猪等不洁动物的人是没有价值的。因此,Thymos 或对认可的渴望是社会科学家所说的 “价值观” 的所在地。正如我们所看到的,正是为获得承认而进行的斗争产生了各种表现形式的领主和奴役关系,以及由此产生的道德规范 —— 臣民对君主的尊重、农民对地主的尊重、贵族的傲慢的优越感,等等。

The desire for recognition is also the psychological seat of two extremely powerful passions—religion and nationalism. By this I do not mean that religion and nationalism can be reduced to the desire for recognition; but the rootedness of these passions in thymos is what gives them their great power. The religious believer assigns dignity to whatever his religion holds sacred—a set of moral laws, a way of life, or particular objects of worship. He grows angry when the dignity of what he holds sacred is violated. The nationalist believes in the dignity of his national or ethnic group, and therefore in his own dignity qua member of that group. He seeks to have this particular dignity recognized by others, and, like the religious believer, grows angry if that dignity is slighted. It was a thymotic passion, the desire for recognition on the part of the aristocratic master, that started the historical process, and it was the thymotic passions of religious fanaticism and nationalism that have propelled it along through war and conflict over the centuries. The thymotic origins of religion and nationalism explain why conflicts over “values” are potentially much more deadly than conflicts over material possessions or wealth. Unlike money, which can simply be divided, dignity is something inherently uncompromisable: either you recognize my dignity, or the dignity of that which I hold sacred, or you do not. Only thymos, searching for “justice,” is capable of true fanaticism, obsession, and hatred.

对承认的渴望也是两种极其强大的激情的心理所在地 —— 宗教和民族主义。我这样说并不是说宗教和民族主义可以归结为对承认的渴望;但这些激情扎根于 thymos,是赋予它们巨大力量的原因。宗教信仰者将尊严赋予他的宗教所认为神圣的东西 —— 一套道德法则,一种生活方式,或特定的崇拜对象。当他认为神圣的东西的尊严受到侵犯时,他会感到愤怒。民族主义者相信他的民族或种族群体的尊严,因此也相信他自己作为该群体成员的尊严。他力图使这种特殊的尊严得到他人的承认,并且像宗教信仰者一样,如果这种尊严受到轻视,他会感到愤怒。正是一种百里挑一的激情,即贵族主人对承认的渴望,启动了历史进程,而正是宗教狂热和民族主义的百里挑一的激情,在几个世纪的战争和冲突中推动了它的发展。宗教和民族主义的起源解释了为什么关于 “价值观” 的冲突可能比关于物质财产或财富的冲突更致命。与可以简单分割的金钱不同,尊严是一种本质上不可妥协的东西:要么你承认我的尊严,或我认为神圣的东西的尊严,要么你不承认。只有寻找 “正义” 的 thymos 才会有真正的狂热、痴迷和憎恨。

Liberal democracy in its AngloSaxon variant represents the emergence of a kind of cold calculation at the expense of earlier moral and cultural horizons. Rational desire must win out over the irrational desire for recognition, particularly the megalothymia of prideful masters seeking recognition of their superiority. The liberal state growing out of the tradition of Hobbes and Locke engages in a protracted struggle with its own people. It seeks to homogenize their variegated traditional cultures and to teach them to calculate instead their own longterm selfinterest. In place of an organic moral community with its own language of “good and evil,” one had to learn a new set of democratic values: to be “participant,” “rational,” “secular,” “mobile,” “empathetic,” and “tolerant.“4 These new democratic values were initially not values at all in the sense of defining the final human virtue or good. They were conceived as having a purely instrumental function, habits that one had to acquire if one was to live successfully in a peaceful and prosperous liberal society. It was for this reason that Nietzsche called the state the “coldest of all cold monsters” that destroyed peoples and their cultures by hanging “a thousand appetites” in front of them.

自由民主在其盎格鲁·撒克逊的变体中代表了一种以牺牲早期道德和文化视野为代价的冷酷计算的出现。理性的欲望必须战胜非理性的承认欲望,特别是骄傲的主人寻求对其优越性的承认的巨细靡遗。从霍布斯和洛克的传统中成长起来的自由主义国家与自己的人民进行了一场持久的斗争。它试图使他们五花八门的传统文化同质化,教他们计算自己的长期利益。取而代之的是拥有自己的 “善恶” 语言的有机道德共同体,人们必须学习一套新的民主价值观:成为 “参与者”、“理性”、“世俗”、“流动”、“同情心” 和 “宽容”。它们被认为具有纯粹的工具性功能,是一个人如果要成功地生活在一个和平和繁荣的自由社会中所必须掌握的习惯。正是由于这个原因,尼采称国家是 “最冷酷的怪物”,它通过在人们面前悬挂 “一千个胃口” 来摧毁他们和他们的文化。

For democracy to work, however, citizens of democratic states must forget the instrumental roots of their values, and develop a certain irrational thymotic pride in their political system and a way of life. That is, they must come to love democracy not because it is necessarily better than the alternatives, but because it is theirs. Moreover, they must cease to see values like “tolerance” as merely a means to an end; tolerance in democratic societies becomes the defining virtue. Development of this kind of pride in democracy, or the assimilation of democratic values into the citizen’s sense of his own self, is what is meant by the creation of a “democratic” or “civic culture.” Such a culture is critical to the longterm health and stability of democracies, since no real-world society can long survive based on rational calculation and desire alone.

然而,为了使民主发挥作用,民主国家的公民必须忘记其价值观的工具性根源,并对其政治制度和生活方式产生某种非理性的自豪感。也就是说,他们必须爱上民主,不是因为它一定比其他选择更好,而是因为它是他们的。此外,他们必须不再把 “宽容” 这样的价值观看作是达到目的的手段;民主社会中的宽容成为决定性的美德。发展这种对民主的自豪感,或者将民主价值同化为公民的自我意识,就是创造 “民主” 或 “公民文化” 的意义所在。这种文化对于民主国家的长期健康和稳定至关重要,因为任何现实世界的社会都不可能仅仅依靠理性的计算和欲望而长期生存。

Culture—in the form of resistance to the transformation of certain traditional values to those of democracy—thus can constitute an obstacle to democratization. What, then, are some of the cultural factors that inhibit the establishment of stable liberal democracies?6 These fall into several categories.

文化 —— 以抵制某些传统价值向民主价值转变的形式 —— 因此可以构成民主化的障碍。那么,有哪些文化因素阻碍了稳定的自由民主国家的建立?6 这些因素可分为几类。

The first has to do with the degree and character of a country’s national, ethnic, and racial consciousness. There is nothing inherently incompatible between nationalism and liberalism; nationalism and liberalism were in fact closely allied in the national unity struggles of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century. Nationalism and liberalism were also associated in Poland’s drive for national rebirth in the 1980s, and are today closely connected in the independence struggles of the Baltic states from the USSR. The desire for national independence and sovereignty can be seen as one possible manifestation of the desire for selfdetermination and freedom, provided that nationality, race, or ethnicity do not become the exclusive basis for citizenship and legal rights. An independent Lithuania can be a fully liberal state provided it guarantees the rights of all its citizens, including any Russian minority that chooses to remain.

第一个问题与一个国家的民族、族裔和种族意识的程度和特点有关。民族主义和自由主义之间没有什么本质上的不相容;民族主义和自由主义实际上在 19 世纪德国和意大利的民族团结斗争中是紧密结合在一起的。民族主义和自由主义在 20 世纪 80 年代波兰的民族复兴运动中也有关联,今天在波罗的海国家脱离苏联的独立斗争中也有密切联系。对国家独立和主权的渴望可以被看作是对自决和自由的渴望的一种可能的表现,只要国籍、种族或民族不成为公民身份和法律权利的唯一基础。一个独立的立陶宛可以成为一个完全自由的国家,只要它保证所有公民的权利,包括任何选择留下的俄罗斯少数民族。

On the other hand, democracy is not likely to emerge in a country where the nationalism or ethnicity of its constituent groups is so highly developed that they do not share a sense of nation or accept one another’s rights. A strong sense of national unity is therefore necessary prior to the emergence of stable democracy, just as it preceded the emergence of democracy in countries such as Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Germany. The absence of such a sense of unity in the Soviet Union was one of the reasons why stable democracy could not emerge prior to that country’s breakup into smaller national units. Only 11 percent of Peru’s population are whites, descended from the Spanish conquerors; the remainder of the population is Indian, separated geographically, economically, and spiritually from the rest of the country. This separation will be a serious longterm obstacle to stable democracy in Peru. The same can be said about South Africa: not only is there a fundamental cleavage between blacks and whites, but the blacks themselves are divided into ethnic groups that have a long history of mutual antagonism.

另一方面,如果一个国家的组成群体的民族主义或民族性非常发达,以至于他们没有共同的民族意识或接受彼此的权利,那么民主就不可能在这个国家出现。因此,在稳定的民主制度出现之前,强烈的民族团结意识是必要的,就像在英国、美国、法国、意大利和德国等国家出现民主制度之前一样。苏联缺乏这样的团结意识是该国在分裂成更小的国家单位之前无法出现稳定民主的原因之一。秘鲁的人口中只有 11% 是白人,是西班牙征服者的后裔;其余的人口是印第安人,在地理上、经济上和精神上与该国其他地区分离。这种分离将是秘鲁稳定民主的一个严重的长期障碍。南非的情况也是如此:不仅黑人和白人之间存在着根本性的裂痕,而且黑人本身也被分成了具有悠久历史的相互对立的种族群体。