Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere. —Cic. De Natur. Deor. 1. i.
Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quod nescias, quam ista effutientem nauseare, atque ipsum sibi displicere.-Cic.De Natur.迪尔。1. i.
LONDON: Printed by Eliz. Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleet Street, near St. Dunstan’s Church.
伦敦:由Eliz.Holt, for Thomas Basset, at the George in Fleet Street, near St. Dunstan's Church.
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TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY, BARON HERBERT OF CARDIFF LORD ROSS, OF KENDAL, PAR, FITZHUGH, MARMION, ST. QUINTIN, AND SHURLAND;
to the right honourable Thomas, earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, Baron Herbert of cardiff lord ross, of kendal, par, fitzhugh, marmion, st.Quintin, and Shurland;
LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY’S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL; AND LORD LIEUTENANT OF THE COUNTY OF WILTS, AND OF SOUTH WALES.
英国国王最尊贵的枢密院主席;威尔斯郡和南威尔斯郡的中尉大人。
This Treatise, which is grown up under your lordship’s eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your lordship for that protection which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader’s fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for truth than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of this Treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of Novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of men’s heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. It is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion; and though it be not yet current by the public stamp, yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your lordship can give great and convincing instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, from whom your lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient reason, were there no other, why I should dedicate this Essay to your lordship; and its having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your lordship think fit that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the world, I hope it may be a reason, some time or other, to lead your lordship further; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the world an earnest of something that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my lord, shows what a present I here make to your lordship; just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless things receive a value when they are made the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude: these you have given me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your lordship, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own greatness, I can with confidence brag, I here make your lordship the richest present you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest obligations to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours I have received from your lordship; favours, though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the forwardness, concern, and kindness, and other obliging circumstances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts, I had almost said friendship. This, my lord, your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions, even to others when I am absent, that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows: but it would be want of good manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of, and every day tell me I am indebted to your lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship. This I am sure, I should write of the UNDERSTANDING without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,
这篇论文是在您的关注下成长起来的,并在您的命令下冒险进入了这个世界,现在,根据一种自然的权利,它来到您的身边,寻求您几年前承诺的保护。我不认为任何名字,无论多么伟大,放在一本书的开头,就能掩盖其中的缺点。印刷品必须以其自身的价值或读者的喜好来决定其成败。但是,对于真理来说,没有什么比一个公平的、没有偏见的听证会更值得期待的了,没有人比老爷更有可能为我争取到这一点,因为老爷被允许在她比较隐蔽的地方与她有过如此亲密的接触。众所周知,老爷对事物最抽象、最普遍的知识的推测已经有了很大的进展,超出了一般的范围或普通的方法,所以你对这篇论文的设计的允许和赞同,至少会使它不至于不经阅读就被谴责,而且会使那些可能被认为不值得考虑的部分稍加权衡,因为它们有些不符合常理。对新事物的指责在那些以时尚来判断人的头脑的人中是很可怕的,除了公认的教义,他们不允许有任何正确的东西。真理第一次出现时,几乎没有人通过投票把它带到任何地方:新的观点总是被怀疑,而且通常被反对,没有任何其他原因,只是因为它们还不普遍。但是,真理就像黄金一样,并不因为刚从矿井中出来而有所减少。它的价格是由试验和检验决定的,而不是由任何古老的时尚决定的;尽管它还没有被公众认可,但它可能和自然界一样古老,而且肯定不会更不真实。只要您愿意向公众介绍您对迄今为止不为人知的真理的一些重大而全面的发现,您就可以提供大量令人信服的例子,除非是对少数人,而您的主人并不愿意完全隐瞒它们。如果没有其他原因,仅此一点就足以让我把这篇论文献给老爷;它与老爷的那套更高尚、更庞大的科学体系中的某些部分有一些对应关系,老爷对其进行了如此新颖、准确和富有启发性的起草,如果老爷允许我夸口,我认为这已经很光荣了,我在这里和那里都陷入了一些与你不完全相同的想法。如果大人认为,在您的鼓励下,这应该出现在世界上,我希望这可以成为一个理由,在某个时候,引导大人进一步发展;您可以允许我说,您在这里给了世界一个预言,如果他们能忍受这个,将真正值得他们期待。大人,这说明我在这里给大人的礼物是什么;就像穷人给他的富人和大邻居的礼物一样,他的花篮或水果不会被人嫌弃,尽管他自己有更多的东西,而且更完美。不值钱的东西在被作为尊重、敬重和感激的祭品时就有了价值:你给了我如此强大和特殊的理由,让我在最高程度上为你的主人拥有这些东西,如果它们能给它们的东西增加一个价格,与它们本身的伟大相称,我可以自信地吹嘘,我在这里给你的主人带来了你所收到的最丰富的礼物。我确信,我有最大的义务寻求一切机会承认我从大人那里得到的一长串恩惠;这些恩惠虽然本身是巨大而重要的,但由于伴随着这些恩惠而来的远见卓识、关心和善意,以及其他令人感激的情况,使其更加重要。对于这一切,您还高兴地加上一句话,这句话给所有其他的事情带来了更大的分量和回味:您允许我继续受到您的某种程度的尊敬,并允许我在您的美好想法中占有一席之地,我几乎可以说是友谊。这一点,大人,您的言行在任何场合都不断地显示出来,甚至在我不在的时候也是如此,所以我提一下大家都知道的事情并不是虚荣心,但如果不承认这么多人见证的事情,并且每天都告诉我我对大人有恩,那就是没有礼貌了。我希望他们能帮助我表达感激之情,因为他们让我相信我对老爷的承诺是巨大的、不断增长的。我相信,如果我不是非常了解这些,我应该在没有任何了解的情况下写下UNDERSTANDING,而不是抓住这个机会向全世界证明我有多么的感激,以及我有多么的。
Your Lordship’s most humble and most obedient servant,
阁下最谦卑和最顺从的仆人。
2 Dorset Court, 24th of May, 1689
多塞特法院2号,1689年5月24日
I have put into thy hands what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours. If it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows has no less sport, though a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise—the UNDERSTANDING—who does not know that, as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight than any of the other. Its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure. Every step the mind takes in its progress towards Knowledge makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.
我把我一些闲暇和繁重时间的消遣交给了你。如果这本书对你的任何一个人来说都是幸运的,而你在阅读时的乐趣只有我写这本书时的一半,你就会认为你的钱和我的努力一样,都是浪费的。不要误以为这是对我工作的赞扬;也不要因为我在做这件事时很高兴,就认为我现在对它很有好感。啄食云雀和麻雀的人,虽然猎物不多,但也不失为一种运动;而不知道这篇论文的主题--理解力--的人,就不会知道,由于它是灵魂中最崇高的能力,所以它比其他任何能力的运用都更大、更持久。它对真理的探索是一种捕猎和狩猎,其中的追求本身就是一种很大的乐趣。在追求知识的过程中,心灵的每一步都会有一些发现,这些发现不仅是新的,而且是最好的,至少在当时是这样。
For the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket, and, not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter’s satisfaction; every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight; and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition.
因为理解力,就像眼睛一样,只通过自己的视觉来判断对象,不能不对它所发现的东西感到高兴,对它所逃避的东西感到遗憾,因为它是未知的。因此,凡是把自己提高到救济篮之上,并且不满足于靠乞讨来的意见碎片懒散地生活,把自己的思想放在工作上,去寻找和追寻真理的人,(无论他照到什么)都不会错过猎人的满足感;他追求的每一刻都会以某种喜悦来回报他的痛苦;他有理由认为他的时间没有浪费,即使他不能夸耀有什么大收获。
This, Reader, is the entertainment of those who let loose their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them, since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: but if they are taken upon trust from others, it is no great matter what they are; they are not following truth, but some meaner consideration; and it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thyself I know thou wilt judge candidly, and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy censure. For though it be certain that there is nothing in this Treatise of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded, yet I consider myself as liable to mistakes as I can think thee, and know that this book must stand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject, and made a thorough acquaintance with their own understandings; but for my own information, and the satisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it.
读者,这就是那些放任自己的思想并在写作中追随它们的人的娱乐;你不应该羡慕他们,因为如果你愿意在阅读中利用自己的思想,他们也会给你提供类似的消遣机会。如果它们是你自己的,我就是指它们:但如果它们是从别人那里得到的信任,它们是什么并不重要;它们不是在遵循真理,而是一些更卑鄙的考虑;如果他只是按照别人的指示说或想,那就不值得关心他说或想。如果你为自己判断,我知道你会坦率地判断,那么无论你怎么责备,我都不会受到伤害或冒犯。因为尽管可以肯定的是,这篇论文中没有任何我不完全相信的真理,但我认为自己和你一样容易犯错,并知道这本书必须在你那里站住脚,而不是根据我对它的任何看法,而是你自己的看法。如果你觉得书中没有什么新意或对你有启发,你也不能因此而责备我。这本书不是为那些已经掌握了这一主题,并对自己的理解有了全面了解的人准备的;而是为了让我自己了解,并让一些承认自己没有充分考虑的朋友满意。
Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what OBJECTS our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.
如果要让你知道这篇文章的来龙去脉,我应该告诉你,五六个朋友在我的房间里聚会,讨论一个非常遥远的话题,发现他们很快就陷入了困境,因为各方面都出现了困难。在我们困惑了一阵子之后,没有更接近解决那些令我们困惑的问题,我想到我们走错了路;在我们着手进行这种性质的调查之前,有必要检查我们自己的能力,看看我们的理解力是否适合处理什么问题。我向大家提出了这个建议,大家都欣然同意;于是,大家同意将此作为我们的第一次调查。一些匆忙而未消化的想法,关于我以前从未考虑过的问题,我把它们记下来,准备在下一次会议上讨论,这就是这篇论述的第一个入口;这篇论述在偶然的情况下开始,通过恳求而继续;通过不连贯的包裹而写;在长时间的忽视之后,在我的幽默感或场合允许的情况下,又重新开始;最后,在一个退休的地方,我的健康使我有时间,它被带到了你现在看到的这个顺序中。
This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz., that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest anything wanting, I shall be glad that what I have written gives thee any desire that I should have gone further. If it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the subject; for when I put pen to paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper; but the further I went the larger prospect I had; new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is, and that some parts of it might be contracted, the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy, to make it shorter. I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers. But they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse, will pardon me if mine has prevailed on me, where I think I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence, that the same notion, having different respects, may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse, and that so it has happened in many parts of this: but waiving that, I shall frankly avow that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument, and expressed it different ways, with a quite different design. I pretend not to publish this Essay for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions; to such masters of knowledge I profess myself a scholar, and therefore warn them beforehand not to expect anything here, but what, being spun out of my own coarse thoughts, is fitted to men of my own size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths which established prejudice, or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every side; and when the notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me; or out of the ordinary road, as I suspect they will appear to others, it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves or others, that what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible; though afterwards the mind found little difference in the phrases, and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But everything does not hit alike upon every man’s imagination. We have our understandings no less different than our palates; and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong constitutions. The truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me, for this reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it. I have so little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered this Essay might be of some use to others, as I think it has been to me, I should have confined it to the view of some friends, who gave the first occasion to it. My appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract speculations, or prepossessed with different notions, should mistake or not comprehend my meaning.
这种不连续的写作方式,除了其他原因外,可能还造成了两个相反的缺点,即:其中可能说得太少和太多。如果你发现有什么不足,我会很高兴我写的东西能让你希望我再进一步。如果你觉得太多,你必须责备这个问题;因为当我提笔写的时候,我认为我在这个问题上要讲的所有内容都会包含在一张纸上;但我越往前走,我的前景就越大;新的发现使我继续前进,所以它不由自主地发展到现在的规模。我不否认,它可能会被缩减到比现在更窄的范围内,它的某些部分可能会被收缩,它的写作方式,通过抓取,以及许多长时间的中断,很容易造成一些重复的内容。但要承认事实,我现在太懒了,或者说太忙了,无法使其缩短。我不是不知道,当我明知故犯地放任自己的错误时,我对自己的名声是多么的不屑一顾,因为这很容易让最有判断力的人感到厌恶,而他们总是最优秀的读者。但是,他们知道懒惰容易满足于任何借口,如果我的借口占了上风,请原谅我,我认为我有一个非常好的借口。因此,我不会在我的辩护中说,同一个概念,有不同的方面,可能方便或需要证明或说明同一论述的几个部分,而且这篇文章的许多部分都是如此:但放弃这一点,我将坦率地承认,我有时在同一个论点上花了很长时间,并以不同的方式表达它,但目的完全不同。我假装不是为了让那些思想深刻、理解力强的人了解这篇论文;对于这样的知识大师,我自称是个学者,因此事先警告他们,不要指望这里有什么东西,而是从我自己的粗浅思想中提炼出来的、适合我这样的人的东西,对他们来说,也许我花了一些功夫让他们的思想明白和熟悉一些真理,而这些真理的既定偏见或思想本身的抽象性可能会使他们难以接受。有些对象需要从每一个方面来考虑;当概念是新的,就像我承认其中一些概念对我来说是新的;或者是超出常规的,就像我怀疑它们在其他人看来是新的一样,不是一个简单的观点就能让它进入每个人的理解,或者以清晰而持久的印象将它固定在那里。我相信,很少有人没有在自己或他人身上看到,以一种方式提出的东西非常晦涩难懂,而以另一种方式表达的东西却非常清晰易懂;尽管事后人们发现这些短语没有什么不同,并想知道为什么一个人比另一个人更难理解。但是,每个人的想象力都不尽相同。我们的理解力不亚于我们的味觉;如果他认为每个人都能以同样的方式享受同样的真理,那么他就可能希望以同样的烹饪方式来款待每个人:肉可能是一样的,营养也很好,但不是每个人都能接受这种调料;如果你想让一些人,甚至是强壮的人接受它,就必须以另一种方式来打扮它。事实是,那些建议我出版这本书的人,因为这个原因,建议我按原样出版:既然我已经被带到国外,我希望不管是谁,只要花心思去读它,就应该理解它。我对印刷品没有什么好感,如果我不是因为这篇文章对别人有帮助而感到高兴,就像我认为它对我有帮助一样,我应该把它限制在一些朋友的视野中,是他们给了我这个机会。因此,我出现在印刷品中的目的是为了尽可能地发挥作用,我认为有必要使我要讲的东西对各种读者都尽可能地容易理解。我宁可让那些善于猜测、目光敏锐的人抱怨我在某些地方很乏味,也不愿让那些不习惯于抽象猜测、或对不同概念有偏好的人误解或不理解我的意思。
It will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity or insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing age; it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this Essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But, if it may be permitted to speak freely of those who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write, methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence to publish a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that respect he owes the public, who prints, and consequently expects men should read, that wherein he intends not they should meet with anything of use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found allowable in this Treatise, yet my design will not cease to be so; and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present. It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure, which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Men’s principles, notions, and relishes are so different, that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. I acknowledge the age we live in is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easy to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet nobody ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half a dozen, this Treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry and rail at it, he may do it securely, for I shall find some better way of spending my time than in such kind of conversation. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness, though in one of the meanest ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge;—which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree that Philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit or incapable to be brought into well-bred company and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding; though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it which ought to be examined or corrected, that I hope I shall be pardoned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into.
我可能会被指责为一种巨大的虚荣心或无礼,假装要指导我们这个充满智慧的时代;当我承认我出版这篇论文是希望它对其他人有用时,这也算不上什么。但是,如果允许我们随意谈论那些假装谦虚地谴责他们自己写的东西毫无用处的人,我认为为任何其他目的出版一本书更有虚荣或无礼的味道;他非常不尊重他欠公众的那份尊重,因为他印刷并因此希望人们阅读,他不打算让他们遇到对自己或他人有用的东西。如果在这篇论述中没有发现其他可允许的东西,但我的设计不会停止;我的意图的良好性应该成为我目前的无价值的一些借口。主要是这一点使我免于受到指责的恐惧,我期望比更好的作家更能逃脱这种指责。人们的原则、观念和爱好是如此不同,以至于很难找到一本让所有的人都高兴或不高兴的书。我承认我们所处的时代不是最不了解的,因此也不是最容易满足的。如果我没有好运气去取悦别人,但也不应该得罪我。我明确地告诉我的所有读者,除了半打以外,这篇论文最初不是为他们准备的;因此,他们不需要费心去做这个数字。但是,如果有人认为适合对它进行愤怒和抨击,他可以放心地这样做,因为我将找到比这种谈话更好的方式来打发我的时间。我将永远感到满意,因为我真诚地追求真理和有用的东西,尽管是以一种最卑微的方式。在这个时代,学术界并非没有大师级的建设者,他们在推动科学发展方面的伟大设计将为后人留下永恒的纪念碑:但每个人都不能指望成为波义耳或西登纳姆;在这个时代,产生了像伟大的惠根尼斯和无可比拟的先生这样的大师。牛顿等大师的时代,能作为一个底层劳动者受雇于人,稍微清理一下地面,清除一些阻碍知识的垃圾,已经是很有志气了。如果聪明和勤劳的人的努力没有被学识渊博但轻率地使用不雅观、受影响或难以理解的术语所困扰,这些术语被引入科学,并在那里成为一种艺术,以至于哲学--除了对事物的真正了解--被认为不适合或不能够被带入有教养的公司和礼貌的谈话,那么世界上肯定会有更大的进步。模糊而无意义的言语形式,以及对语言的滥用,长期以来一直被当作科学的奥秘;而生硬而误用的词语,几乎没有任何意义,根据规定,有权利被误认为是深刻的学问和推测的高度,以至于不容易说服那些说话的人或听话的人,他们只是无知的幌子,阻碍真正的知识。闯入虚荣和无知的圣殿,我想对人类的理解会有一些帮助;尽管很少有人会认为他们在用词上会欺骗或被欺骗。我希望我在第三本书中对这一问题进行了长时间的讨论,并努力使它变得如此简单,以至于无论这种弊端的顽固性,还是这种时尚的盛行,都不能成为那些不注意自己话语的含义,不愿意让人探究其表达的意义的人的借口,我会得到原谅的。
I have been told that a short Epitome of this Treatise, which was printed in 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because INNATE IDEAS were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left either of the notion or proof of spirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this Treatise, I shall desire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false foundations is not to the prejudice but advantage of truth, which is never injured or endangered so much as when mixed with, or built on, falsehood. In the Second Edition I added as followeth:—
有人告诉我,1688年印刷的这篇论文的简短摘要被一些人不加阅读地谴责,因为其中否认了先天观念;他们过于草率地得出结论,如果不假设先天观念,就不会有什么精神的概念或证明。如果有人对这篇论文的开头有同样的看法,我希望他能把它读完;然后我希望他能相信,消除错误的基础不是对真理的损害,而是对真理的好处,因为真理在与谬误混合或建立在谬误之上时,永远不会受到如此大的伤害或危害。在第二版中,我添加了以下内容:--
The bookseller will not forgive me if I say nothing of this New Edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, shall make amends for the many faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be known that it has one whole new chapter concerning Identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. These I must inform my reader are not all new matter, but most of them either further confirmation of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it.
如果我对这个新版本只字不提,书商是不会原谅我的,他保证,这个新版本将通过其正确性来弥补前者的许多错误。他还希望人们知道,它有一个关于身份的全新章节,并在其他地方做了许多补充和修正。我必须告诉我的读者,这些并不都是新内容,而是大部分都是对我说过的话的进一步确认,或者是解释,以防止别人对以前印刷的内容产生误解,而不是我对它的任何改变。
I must only except the alterations I have made in Book II. chap. xxi.
我只必须排除我在第二册第二十一章中所作的改动。
What I had there written concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deserved as accurate a view as I am capable of; those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity, those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of men’s minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that which gives the last determination to the Will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness; as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right; thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I seek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whencesoever it comes. But what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have, or to recede from anything I have writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book, nor have, from anything that has been urged against it, found reason to alter my sense in any of the points that have been questioned. Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers, at least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow; or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to others’ apprehensions in my way of treating them; so it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood.
我在那里写的关于自由和意志的内容,我认为应该得到我所能提供的最准确的看法;这些主题在各个时代都让世界上有学问的人遇到了问题和困难,这些问题和困难让道德和神学这些人们最关心的知识部分感到困惑。经过对人的思想工作的仔细检查,以及对他们的动机和观点的严格审查,我发现有理由改变我以前关于在所有自愿行动中给予意志最后决定的想法。我不能不以同样的自由和准备向世人承认这一点;就像我最初发表的在我看来是正确的东西一样;我认为自己更应该放弃和抛弃自己的任何观点,而不是反对别人的观点,当真理出现反对它时。因为我只追求真理,而且无论何时何地,我都欢迎真理的到来。但是,无论我有多大的勇气放弃我的任何观点,或者在我写的任何东西中出现任何错误的第一个证据时就退缩;但我必须承认,我还没有幸运地从那些针对我书中任何部分的印刷品的例外情况中得到任何启示,也没有从被敦促反对它的任何东西中找到理由来改变我在任何被质疑的地方的感觉。我手中的主题是否需要更多的思考和关注,而不是粗略的读者,至少是那些有倾向性的读者愿意允许的;或者我的表达方式中是否有任何晦涩难懂的地方给它蒙上了一层阴影,而这些概念在我处理它们的方式中变得难以理解;所以,我发现我的意思经常被误解,而我也没有好运地被到处正确地理解。
Of this the ingenious author of the Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man has given me a late instance, to mention no other. For the civility of his expressions, and the candour that belongs to his order, forbid me to think that he would have closed his Preface with an insinuation, as if in what I had said, Book II. ch. xxvii, concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to, I went about to make virtue vice and vice virtue, unless he had mistaken my meaning; which he could not have done if he had given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief design of that chapter, plainly enough set down in the fourth section and those following. For I was there not laying down moral rules, but showing the original and nature of moral ideas, and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations, whether these rules were true or false: and pursuant thereto I tell what is everywhere called virtue and vice; which “alters not the nature of things,” though men generally do judge of and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place and sect they are of.
关于这一点,《关于人的本质的论述》的聪明作者给了我一个最新的例子,不提其他。因为他表达的礼貌和属于他的坦率,让我无法想象他在序言的结尾会有这样的暗示,好像我在第二册第二十七章中所说的,关于人的行为所依据的第三条规则,我打算把它说成是一种规则。除非他误解了我的意思;如果他认真考虑一下我当时的论点是什么,以及那一章的主要目的是什么,他就不会这样做了,这一点在第四节和后面的章节中已经说得很清楚。因为我在那里不是制定道德规则,而是说明道德观念的起源和性质,并列举了人们在道德关系中使用的规则,无论这些规则是真的还是假的:据此,我告诉了人们在各地被称为美德和恶习的东西;这 "没有改变事物的本质",尽管人们通常根据他们所在的地方和教派的尊敬和时尚来判断和命名他们的行为。
If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said, Bk. I. ch. ii. sect. 18, and Bk. II. ch. xxviii. sect. 13, 14, 15 and 20, he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call virtue and vice. And if he had observed that in the place he quotes I only report as a matter of fact what OTHERS call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception. For I think I am not much out in saying that one of the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is—that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men, according to which they are there called virtues or vices. And whatever authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his Old English Dictionary, I daresay it nowhere tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit, called and counted a virtue, in one place, which, being in disrepute, passes for and under the name of vice in another. The taking notice that men bestow the names of ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ according to this rule of Reputation is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making vice virtue or virtue vice. But the good man does well, and as becomes his calling, to be watchful in such points, and to take the alarm even at expressions, which, standing alone by themselves, might sound ill and be suspected.
如果他不厌其烦地思考我所说的,Bk.I. ch. ii. sect.18, and Bk. II. ch. xxviii. sect.13、14、15和20节,他就会知道我对正确和错误的永恒和不可改变的性质,以及我所说的美德和恶习的看法。如果他注意到,在他引用的地方,我只是把别人所说的美德和恶习作为事实报告,他就不会发现有什么大的例外。因为我认为,我说世界上用来作为道德关系的基础或衡量标准的规则之一是,几种行为在人的几个社会中找到不同的尊重和声誉,根据这种尊重和声誉,它们被称为美德或恶习。无论博学的洛德先生在他的《古英语词典》中提到了什么权威,我敢说它没有任何地方告诉他(如果我呼吁它的话),同样的行为在一个地方没有信誉,被称为美德,而在另一个地方,由于不受欢迎,被称为恶习。注意到人们根据这一声誉规则赋予 "美德 "和 "恶习 "的名称,这就是我所做的,或者可以说是我所做的,使恶习成为美德或恶习。但是,好的人做得很好,就像他的工作一样,在这些方面保持警惕,甚至对那些单独的、可能听起来有问题并被怀疑的表达方式也保持警惕。
‘Tis to this zeal, allowable in his function, that I forgive his citing as he does these words of mine (ch. xxviii. sect. II): “Even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute, Philip, iv. 8;” without taking notice of those immediately preceding, which introduce them, and run thus: “Whereby even in the corruption of manners, the true boundaries of the law of nature, which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers,” &c. By which words, and the rest of that section, it is plain that I brought that passage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general measure of what men called virtue and vice throughout the world was the reputation and fashion of each particular society within itself; but to show that, though it were so, yet, for reasons I there give, men, in that way of denominating their actions, did not for the most part much stray from the Law of Nature; which is that standing and unalterable rule by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of their actions, and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices. Had Mr. Lowde considered this, he would have found it little to his purpose to have quoted this passage in a sense I used it not; and would I imagine have spared the application he subjoins to it, as not very necessary. But I hope this Second Edition will give him satisfaction on the point, and that this matter is now so expressed as to show him there was no cause for scruple.
正是由于这种热心,在他的职能中是可以允许的,所以我原谅他引用了我的这些话(第二十八章,第二节)。"即使是受启发的教师的劝告也不怕诉诸于普通的声誉,菲利普,四,8;"而没有注意到紧接着的那些话,这些话介绍了它们,并这样说。"因此,即使在礼仪败坏的情况下,自然法则的真正界限,即应该成为美德和恶习的规则,也被很好地保留下来。因此,即使是受启发的教师的劝告,"等等。通过这句话和该节的其他部分,可以看出我把圣保罗的那段话拿来,并不是为了证明一般的人都是这样。保罗的这段话,并不是为了证明世界上人们所谓的美德和恶习的一般衡量标准是每个特定社会内部的声誉和时尚;而是为了表明,虽然是这样,但由于我在那里给出的理由,人们在这样称呼他们的行为时,大多数情况下并没有偏离自然法则;这是一个长期和不可改变的规则,他们应该据此判断其行为的道德正确性和严重性,并相应地将其称为美德或恶习。如果洛德先生考虑到这一点,他就会发现在我没有使用的意义上引用这段话对他的目的没有什么影响;而且我想他也会省去他对这段话的应用,因为这不是很有必要。但我希望第二版会让他在这一点上感到满意,而且这件事现在已经表达得很清楚了,让他知道没有理由再顾虑了。
Though I am forced to differ from him in these apprehensions he has expressed, in the latter end of his preface, concerning what I had said about virtue and vice, yet we are better agreed than he thinks in what he says in his third chapter (p. 78) concerning “natural inscription and innate notions.” I shall not deny him the privilege he claims (p. 52), to state the question as he pleases, especially when he states it so as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have said. For, according to him, “innate notions, being conditional things, depending upon the concurrence of several other circumstances in order to the soul’s exerting them,” all that he says for “innate, imprinted, impressed notions” (for of innate IDEAS he says nothing at all), amounts at last only to this—that there are certain propositions which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is born, does not know, yet “by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation,” it may AFTERWARDS come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirmed in my First Book. For I suppose by the “soul’s exerting them,” he means its beginning to know them; or else the soul’s ‘exerting of notions’ will be to me a very unintelligible expression; and I think at best is a very unfit one in this, it misleading men’s thoughts by an insinuation, as if these notions were in the mind before the ‘soul exerts them,’ i. e. before they are known;—whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the mind but a capacity to know them, when the ‘concurrence of those circumstances,’ which this ingenious author thinks necessary ‘in order to the soul’s exerting them,’ brings them into our knowledge.
虽然我不得不在他在序言的后半部分就我关于美德和恶习的说法所表达的这些忧虑中与他意见相左,但在他在第三章(第78页)关于 "自然的铭文和先天的观念 "的说法中,我们的意见比他认为的更一致。我不会拒绝他所要求的特权(第52页),即按他的意愿陈述问题,特别是当他陈述问题时,没有留下任何与我所说的相反的内容。因为,按照他的说法,"先天的观念是有条件的,取决于其他几种情况的同时发生,以便灵魂发挥它们",他为 "先天的、印记的、印象的观念 "所说的一切(因为对于先天的观念,他根本没有说)。最后,他只说了这样一句话:有些命题,虽然灵魂从一开始,或者当一个人出生时,并不知道,但 "通过外在感官的帮助,以及以前一些培养的帮助,"它可能在以后肯定会知道其真相。这不外乎是我在第一本书中所申明的。因为我想,他所说的 "灵魂发挥它们的作用 "是指它开始认识它们;否则,灵魂 "发挥概念 "对我来说是一个非常难以理解的表达方式;我认为在这一点上最多是一个非常不合适的表达方式,它通过暗示来误导人们的思想,好像这些概念在 "灵魂发挥它们的作用",即在认识它们之前就已经在头脑中了。而实际上在它们被认识之前,它们在头脑中没有任何东西,只有认识它们的能力,当 "那些情况的同时发生 "时,这位聪明的作者认为 "为了让灵魂发挥它们",必须把它们带入我们的知识。
P. 52 I find him express it thus: ‘These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the soul as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in children and idiots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation.’ Here, he says, they ‘exert themselves,’ as p. 78, that the ‘soul exerts them.’ When he has explained to himself or others what he means by ‘the soul’s exerting innate notions,’ or their ‘exerting themselves;’ and what that ‘previous cultivation and circumstances’ in order to their being exerted are—he will I suppose find there is so little of controversy between him and me on the point, bating that he calls that ‘exerting of notions’ which I in a more vulgar style call ‘knowing,’ that I have reason to think he brought in my name on this occasion only out of the pleasure he has to speak civilly of me; which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done everywhere he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as some others have done, a title I have no right to.
P.52 我发现他是这样表达的。'这些自然的观念并没有在灵魂上打下烙印,以至于它们自然而然地、必然地发挥自己的作用(甚至在儿童和白痴身上),而不需要外在感官的任何帮助,也不需要先前的某种培养。在这里,他说,它们'发挥自己',正如第78页所说的'灵魂发挥它们'。当他向自己或别人解释了他所说的'灵魂发挥先天的概念'或它们'发挥自己'的意思;以及为了发挥它们的'先前的培养和环境'是什么时,我想他会发现在这一点上我和他之间的争议很小,只是他称'发挥概念',而我以更粗俗的方式称之为'认识',所以我有理由认为他在这个场合提起我的名字只是出于他对我说文明的乐趣。我必须感激地承认,他在提到我的任何地方都做到了这一点,而不是像其他一些人那样,把一个我无权使用的头衔赋予我。
There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myself to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one who will give himself the pains to read ought to employ in reading; or else that I have written mine so obscurely that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Whichever of these be the truth, it is myself only am affected thereby; and therefore I shall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be said in answer to those several objections I have met with, to passages here and there of my book; since I persuade myself that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false, will be able to see that what is said is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.
这样的例子太多了,所以我认为对我的读者和我自己来说,可以得出这样的结论:要么我的书写得很清楚,足以让那些以关注和漠不关心的态度来阅读的人正确地理解,而这是每个愿意花心思阅读的人在阅读时应该采用的方式;要么我的书写得很模糊,去修补它是徒劳的。无论哪种说法是真的,受影响的只是我自己;因此,我将不再麻烦我的读者,对我遇到的那些反对意见,对我书中的一些段落,我认为可以说些什么;因为我相信,只要他认为这些反对意见足够重要,足以关心它们是真的还是假的,就能看到所说的不是没有根据,就是没有违背我的教义,当我和我的反对者都被充分理解时。
If any other authors, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have published their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an essay, I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader’s time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others, in so hasty a confutation of what I have written.
如果有其他作者,小心翼翼地防止他们的好想法被遗失,发表了他们对我的文章的指责,并对它给予了这样的荣誉,即他们不会让它成为一篇文章,我让公众去重视他们对批评之笔的义务,并且不会在我的这种闲置或不成熟的工作中浪费读者的时间,以减少任何人对自己的满意,或给其他人,对我所写的东西进行如此草率的驳斥。
The booksellers preparing for the Fourth Edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said was this:—
准备出版我的《论语》第四版的书商给了我通知,如果我有时间,我可以做任何我认为合适的补充或修改。于是我认为有必要通知读者,除了我在这里和那里做的几处更正外,还有一处改动是必须提及的,因为它贯穿全书,对正确理解有重要影响。我当时是这样说的:----。
CLEAR and DISTINCT ideas are terms which, though familiar and frequent in men’s mouths, I have reason to think every one who uses does not perfectly understand. And possibly ‘tis but here and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them. I have therefore in most places chose to put DETERMINATE or DETERMINED, instead of CLEAR and DISTINCT, as more likely to direct men’s thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, i. e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined, to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.
清晰和明确的概念是一些术语,虽然在人们口中很熟悉,也很常见,但我有理由认为每一个使用的人都不完全理解。可能只有在这里和那里,才会有一个人不厌其烦地考虑它们,以至于知道他自己或其他人对它们的确切含义。因此,我在大多数地方选择用DETERMINATE或DETERMINED,而不是CLEAR和DISTINCT,因为这样更有可能引导人们的思维,使他们理解我在这个问题上的意思。通过这些名称,我指的是头脑中的一些对象,并因此而确定,也就是说,它是在那里看到和感知到的。我认为,当它在任何时候客观地存在于心灵中,并在那里被确定下来时,它被附在一个名称或发音上,并且没有变化地被确定下来,而这个名称或发音将稳定地成为心灵中的那个对象或确定的概念的标志,这就可以适当地被称为确定的或确定的概念。
To explain this a little more particularly. By DETERMINATE, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it: by DETERMINED, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it. I say SHOULD be, because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language as to use no word till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men’s thoughts and discourses.
请更具体地解释一下这一点。DETERMINATE,当应用于一个简单的概念时,我的意思是,当这个概念被说成是在它里面时,它的头脑在它的视野中,或者在它本身中感知到的那个简单的外观:DETERMINED,当应用于一个复杂的概念时,我的意思是,当这个概念存在于它里面,或者应该存在于它里面,当一个人给它命名时,它是由确定数量的某些简单或不太复杂的概念组成的,以它的视野中的比例和情况结合起来,并且在它本身看到。我说应该是,因为不是每一个人,也许也不是任何一个人,对自己的语言如此谨慎,直到他在头脑中看到他决心使之成为标志的确切的确定的想法时才使用任何一个词。这一点的缺失是导致人们的思想和讨论中出现不小的模糊和混乱的原因。
I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men’s discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination.
我知道在任何语言中都没有足够的词汇来回答进入人们讨论和推理中的所有各种想法。但这并不妨碍任何人在使用任何术语时,在他的脑海里有一个确定的想法,他把这个想法作为标志,并在当前的讨论中稳定地把它附在上面。如果他不这样做,或者不能这样做,他就会徒劳地假装有清晰或明确的想法:很明显,他的想法不是这样的;因此,在使用这种没有精确确定的术语的地方,除了模糊和混乱之外,不可能有什么期待。
Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end; the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for. I have made choice of these terms to signify, (1) Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. (2) That this idea, thus determined, i.e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.
基于这一点,我认为确定的概念是一种不容易出错的说话方式,而不是清晰明确的:如果人们对他们推理、询问或争论的一切都有这种确定的概念,他们就会发现他们的大部分疑问和争论都结束了;使人类困惑的问题和争论的最大部分取决于对词语的可疑和不确定的使用,或(这是同)不确定的概念,它们被用来代表。我选择这些术语是为了表示:(1)心灵的某些直接对象,它感知到并在它面前,与它用作标志的声音不同。(2) 这样确定的理念,即心灵本身所拥有的,知道的,在那里看到的,被确定为没有任何变化的名称,而该名称被确定为该精确的理念。如果人们在他们的调查和讨论中有这种确定的想法,他们就会发现他们自己的调查和讨论有多远,并避免他们与他人的最大部分争议和争吵。
Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the Association of Ideas, the other of Enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves, after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay had the second impression.
除此以外,书商会认为我有必要告诉读者,这里增加了两章全新的内容;一章是思想的联系,另一章是热情。这两章以及其他一些以前从未印刷过的较大的补充内容,他已承诺按照同样的方式和目的自行印刷,就像这篇论文第二版时那样。
In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered. The greatest part of what is new is contained in the twenty-first chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.
在第六版中,增加或改变的内容很少。大部分新内容都包含在第二本书的第21章中,任何人如果认为值得,都可以用很少的精力将其抄写在前一版本的空白处。
1. An Inquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.
1.对理解愉快和有用的探索。
Since it is the UNDERSTANDING that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires and art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am that all the light we can let in upon our minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.
既然是理解力使人凌驾于其他可感知的生命之上,并使他拥有对他们的所有优势和支配权;那么,即使是为了它的高尚,它也肯定是一个值得我们努力探究的主题。理解力,就像眼睛一样,虽然它使我们看到和感知所有其他事物,但却没有注意到它自己;它需要艺术和努力,把它放在远处,使它成为自己的目标。但是,不管在这种探究的道路上有什么困难;不管是什么让我们对自己如此蒙在鼓里;我确信,我们能让我们的思想得到的所有光亮,我们能与我们自己的理解相识,不仅会非常愉快,而且会给我们带来巨大的好处,引导我们的思想去寻找其他事物。
2. Design.
2.设计。
This, therefore, being my purpose—to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, together with the grounds and degrees of BELIEF, OPINION, and ASSENT;—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any SENSATION by our organs, or any IDEAS in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have; and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge; or the grounds of those persuasions which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.
因此,这就是我的目的--探究人类知识的原始性、确定性和范围,以及信仰、观点和认同的理由和程度;我目前不会去管心灵的物理考虑。我现在不会去管心灵的物理问题,也不会去研究它的本质是什么;或者通过我们的精神的运动或我们身体的改变,我们的器官会产生任何感觉,或者我们的理解会产生任何想法;以及这些想法的形成,任何或所有的想法,是否取决于物质。这些猜测,无论多么好奇和有趣,我都会拒绝,因为在我现在的设计中,这些猜测已经超出了我的范围。就我目前的目的而言,考虑一下人的辨别能力就足够了,因为它们被用于与之相关的对象。如果我能够用这种历史性的、朴素的方法,说明我们的理解力是如何达到我们对事物的那些概念的;能够对我们知识的确定性提出任何措施;或者对那些在人与人之间发现的、如此不同的、完全矛盾的信念的理由,我想我在这个场合并没有完全误用自己的想法。然而,在某处以如此肯定和自信的方式断言,如果他看到人类的观点,观察他们的反对意见,同时考虑到他们所接受的喜爱和奉献,以及他们所坚持的决心和热切,也许有理由怀疑,要么根本就没有所谓的真理,要么人类没有足够的手段来达到对真理的确定认识。
3. Method.
3.方法。
It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persuasion. In order whereunto I shall pursue this following method:— First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.
因此,我们有必要找出意见和知识之间的界限;并研究在我们没有确切知识的情况下,我们应该通过什么措施来调节我们的同意和缓和我们的说服力。为此,我将采取以下方法:--首先,我将探究人所观察到的、自己意识到的、在其头脑中拥有的那些观念、概念或其他任何你想称之为的东西的起源;以及理解力获得它们的方式。
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.
其次,我将努力说明理解力通过这些观念所拥有的知识;以及它的确定性、证据和范围。
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of FAITH or OPINION: whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge. And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of ASSENT.
第三,我将对 "信仰 "或 "观点 "的性质和理由进行一些调查:我指的是我们对任何命题的真实性给予的同意,但我们对其真实性并没有确定的认识。在这里,我们将有机会研究 "同意 "的原因和程度。
4. Useful to know the Extent of our Comprehension.
4.有助于了解我们的理解力的程度。
If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affectation of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view; how far it has faculties to attain certainty; and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.
如果通过对理解力的性质的调查,我可以发现它的能力;它们能达到多远;它们与哪些事物在任何程度上是相称的;以及它们在哪些方面让我们失望,我想这可能有助于说服人的忙碌的头脑,使其在处理超出其理解力的事物时更加谨慎;在它达到其最大限度时停止;并在安静地无视那些经检查发现超出我们能力范围的事物中坐下来。这样,我们也许就不应该出于一种普遍知识的影响,提出问题,使自己和他人对我们的理解不适合的事物产生争论;对我们无法在头脑中形成任何清晰或明确的认识,或者(也许经常发生)我们根本没有任何概念的事物感到困惑。如果我们能找出理解力能在多大程度上扩展它的视野;它在多大程度上有能力达到确定性;以及在哪些情况下它只能判断和猜测,我们就可以学会满足于我们在这种状态下所能达到的目标。
5. Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns.
5.我们的能力适合于我们的国家和关注的问题。
For though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) [words in Greek], whatsoever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery, the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable. And it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us; and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things, we shall do much what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly.
虽然我们的理解力与事物的广度相差甚远,但我们将有足够的理由赞美我们的丰收者,因为他赐予我们的知识比例和程度远远超过我们这所房子里的所有其他居民。人们有理由对上帝认为适合他们的东西感到满意,因为他已经给了他们(如圣彼得所说)[希腊语],凡是生活便利和美德信息所必需的东西;并且把今生的舒适供给和通向更好的道路放在他们发现的范围内。无论他们的知识对任何事物的普遍或完美理解有多短,它都能保证他们的重大关切,即他们有足够的光来引导他们认识他们的造物主,并看到他们自己的职责。如果人们不大胆地与自己的体质争吵,不因为自己的手不够大而丢掉自己的祝福,他们就能找到足够的事情来忙活自己的头脑,用自己的手来做各种事情,并感到满意。如果我们愿意把我们的思想用于对我们有用的事情上,我们就不会有太多理由抱怨我们的思想狭隘;因为他们很有能力这样做。如果我们低估了我们知识的优势,忽视了改善它以达到它被赋予的目的,因为有些东西是它所不能达到的,这将是一种不可原谅的,以及幼稚的抱怨。一个无所事事、不务正业的仆人不愿意在烛光下做事,就不能以他没有广阔的阳光为借口。在我们里面设立的蜡烛对我们所有的目的来说都足够明亮。我们用它所做的发现应该使我们满意;这样我们就会正确地使用我们的理解力,当我们以适合我们能力的方式和比例来对待所有的对象,并在这些基础上向我们提出这些对象;而不是强硬地或无理地要求证明,并要求确定性,而这只是可能性,而且足以支配我们所有的关切。如果我们不相信一切,因为我们不能肯定地知道所有的事情,我们将做得很明智,就像一个人不使用他的腿,而是坐着不动而灭亡,因为他没有翅膀可以飞。
6. Knowledge of our Capacity a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness.
6.6. 对我们能力的了解是对怀疑主义和懒惰的治疗。
When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success; and when we have well surveyed the POWERS of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor on the other side, question everything, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge.
当我们了解自己的力量时,我们就会更好地知道应该承担什么,并希望获得成功;当我们很好地调查了自己思想的力量,并对我们可能从它们那里得到的东西作出一些估计时,我们就不会倾向于坐以待毙,根本不把心思放在工作上,因为对任何事情都感到绝望;也不会在另一方面质疑一切,并放弃所有知识,因为有些事情是无法理解的。对水手来说,知道他的线的长度是非常有用的,尽管他不能用它来探查海洋的所有深度。他最好知道它有足够长的长度,以便在必要的地方到达海底,指导他的航行,并告诫他不要遇到可能毁掉他的浅滩。我们在这里的任务不是要知道所有的事情,而是要知道那些与我们的行为有关的事情。如果我们能找出那些措施,使一个有理性的生物,在人在这个世界上的那种状态下,可以而且应该支配他的观点和取决于此的行动,我们就不必为其他一些事情逃脱我们的知识而感到烦恼。
7. Occasion of this Essay.
7.本论文的场合。
This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of Being; as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.
这也是这篇关于理解力的文章的最初起因。因为我认为,要满足人的思想很容易陷入的几个问题,第一步就是对我们自己的理解进行调查,检查我们自己的能力,看看它们适合做什么事情。在这样做之前,我怀疑我们的出发点是错误的,我们徒劳地寻求满足于对与我们最有关的真理的安静和肯定的占有,而我们却把我们的思想放进存在的浩瀚海洋;仿佛所有那无边的范围是我们理解力的自然和毫无疑问的占有,在那里没有什么可以免于它的决定,或逃避它的理解。因此,人们把他们的探究延伸到他们的能力之外,让他们的思想徘徊在那些他们找不到可靠立足点的深处,难怪他们会提出问题和增加争论,而这些问题和争论从未得到任何明确的解决,只是为了继续和增加他们的怀疑,并最终在完美的怀疑论中证实他们。然而,如果充分考虑到我们的理解能力,一旦发现我们的知识范围,并找到确定事物的启蒙部分和黑暗部分之间的界限的地平线;在我们能理解的和不能理解的事物之间,人们也许会不那么顾忌地默认一个人的公开无知,而在另一个人身上更有利地运用他们的思想和讨论。
8. What Idea stands for.
8.理念代表着什么。
Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this inquiry into human Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word IDEA, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the OBJECT of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by PHANTASM, NOTION, SPECIES, or WHATEVER IT IS WHICH THE MIND CAN BE EMPLOYED ABOUT IN THINKING; and I could not avoid frequently using it. I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such IDEAS in men’s minds: every one is conscious of them in himself; and men’s words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.
我认为有必要就这次对人类理解力的探究说这么多。但是,在我继续谈我对这个问题的看法之前,我必须在这里请读者原谅我经常使用IDEA这个词,他将在以下论文中看到这个词。我认为,这个词最能代表人在思考时的理解对象,我用它来表达幻觉、概念、物种或任何能让人在思考中使用的东西的意思;我不能避免经常使用它。我想大家会很容易同意,人的头脑中存在着这样的观念:每个人都意识到自己有这样的观念;人的言行会让他确信别人有这样的观念。
Our first inquiry then shall be,—how they come into the mind.
那么我们的第一个问题就是:它们是如何进入头脑的。
1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.
1.我们如何获得任何知识的方式,足以证明它不是天生的。
It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain INNATE PRINCIPLES; some primary notions, KOIVAI EVVOIAI, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.
在一些人中,有一种既定的观点,即在理解力中存在着某些内在的原则;一些初级的概念,KOIVAI EVVOIAI,字符,就像印在人的头脑中一样;灵魂在其最初的存在中接受,并将其带入世界。只要我说明(我希望我将在本论述的以下部分说明),人如何在没有任何先天印象的帮助下,勉强通过使用他们的自然能力来获得他们所拥有的所有知识,并在没有任何原始概念或原则的情况下达到确定性,就足以说服没有偏见的读者相信这一假设的虚假性了。因为我想,任何人都会很容易地同意,如果假设上帝给了一个生物视觉,并且有能力通过眼睛从外部物体上接受颜色,那么就会很无礼;如果我们在自己身上看到适合获得这些知识的能力,就像它们最初印在头脑中一样,把一些真理归于自然的印象和天生的特性,这也是同样不合理的。
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
但是,由于一个人在寻找真理的过程中,如果他的想法稍微偏离了普通的道路,就不能不受到指责,所以我将列出使我对这种观点的真实性产生怀疑的原因,作为我犯错误的借口,如果我犯了错误的话;我让那些和我一样决定在任何地方接受真理的人考虑这些原因。
2. General Assent the great Argument.
2.2.普遍同意是伟大的论点。
There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain PRINCIPLES, both SPECULATIVE and PRACTICAL, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.
没有什么比存在某些原则更理所当然的了,这些原则既是具体的,也是实际的,(因为他们说的是两者),是全人类普遍认同的:因此,他们认为,这些原则必须是人的灵魂在最初存在时接受的不变的印象,他们把这些印象带入世界,就像他们的任何固有的能力一样必然和真实。
3. Universal Consent proves nothing innate.
3.普遍同意证明没有什么是天生的。
This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.
这种从普遍同意中得出的论点有一个不幸之处,那就是如果事实是真的,有某些真理是所有人类都同意的,那也不能证明它们是天生的,如果有任何其他方法可以证明人们如何在他们确实同意的事情上达成普遍同意,我想这是可以做到的。
4. “What is is,” and “It is possible for the same Thing to be and not to be,” not universally assented to.
4."是什么就是什么","同一事物有可能是,也有可能不是",没有得到普遍赞同。
But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.
但是,更糟糕的是,这种被用来证明先天原则的普遍同意的论点,在我看来是证明没有这样的原则:因为没有任何东西是全人类普遍同意的。我将从推测性的开始,并以那些被放大的证明原则为例,"凡是有的,就是有的 "和 "同一事物不可能有,也不可能没有";在所有其他原则中,我认为这些原则最有资格被称为先天性的。这些格言有如此固定的声誉,被普遍接受,如果有人质疑它,无疑会被认为是奇怪的。但我要冒昧地说,这些命题远未得到普遍认同,以至于人类中有很大一部分人对它们还不甚了解。
5. Not on Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.
5.没有自然地印在脑海中,因为儿童、白痴等不知道。
For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind’s perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, THEY must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is CAPABLE of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words “to be in the understanding” have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, “Whatsoever is, is,” and “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.
因为,首先,很明显,所有的儿童和白痴都对它们没有丝毫的理解和思考。在我看来,如果说有一些真理印在灵魂上,但它却没有察觉或理解,这似乎是一个矛盾:印记,如果它意味着什么,无非是使某些真理被察觉。因为在我看来,把任何东西印在心灵上而不被心灵所感知,是难以理解的。因此,如果儿童和白痴有灵魂,有思想,在他们身上有这些印象,他们就必须不可避免地感知它们,并必然知道和同意这些真理;既然他们没有,显然就不存在这些印象了。因为如果它们不是自然印记的概念,它们怎么可能是天生的呢?如果它们是印记的概念,它们怎么可能是未知的?说一个概念在头脑中留下了印记,但同时又说头脑对它一无所知,从未注意到它,这就是把这个印象说成是虚无的。没有任何命题可以说是存在于头脑中的,它从未知道,它从未意识到。因为如果任何一个命题都可以,那么,根据同样的理由,所有真实的命题,而且心灵永远能够同意的命题,都可以说是在心灵中,并被印证:因为,如果任何一个可以说是在心灵中,而它从未知道,那一定只是因为它能够知道它;所以,心灵对它永远要知道的所有真理都是如此。因为一个人可能活了很久,最后却死于对许多真理的无知,而这些真理他的头脑是有能力知道的,而且是肯定的。因此,如果认识能力是所争论的自然印象,那么按照这种说法,一个人所认识的所有真理都是先天的;这个伟大的观点不会有更多的意义,而只是一种非常不恰当的说话方式;虽然它假装主张相反的观点,但说的与那些否认先天原则的人没有什么不同。因为我认为,没有人否认过心灵有能力认识若干真理。他们说,能力是天生的;知识是后天的。但是,那么这种对某些先天格言的争论是为了什么呢?如果真理可以印在理解力上而不被察觉,那么我看不出心灵有能力知道的任何真理在其原始方面会有什么区别:它们必须都是先天的或都是偶然的:人要去区分它们是徒劳的。因此,谈论理解力中的先天概念的人,不可能(如果他是指任何不同种类的真理)指理解力中从未感知过的、还完全不知道的真理。因为如果这些 "存在于理解中 "的词有任何适当的含义,它们就意味着被理解。因此,在理解中,而不被理解;在头脑中,而从不被感知,都是一种说法,即任何东西都在头脑或理解中,而不在头脑或理解中。因此,如果这两个命题:"凡是有的,就是有的 "和 "同一事物不可能有,也不可能没有 "是天生的,儿童不可能不知道它们:婴儿和所有有灵魂的人,必然在他们的理解中拥有它们,知道它们的真理,并同意它。
6. That men know them when they come to the Use of Reason answered.
6.6.当人们开始运用理性的时候,他们就知道了。
To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, WHEN THEY COME TO THE USE OF REASON; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:
为了避免这种情况,人们通常会回答说,当人们使用理性时,都知道并同意它们;这就足以证明它们是与生俱来的。我回答说。
7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For, to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things: either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men’s reason, assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.
7.怀疑的表达方式,几乎没有任何意义,对于那些先入为主,甚至连他们自己说的话都不屑一顾的人来说,是很明显的理由。因为,如果要把这个答案以任何可容忍的意义应用于我们目前的目的,它必须意味着这两件事中的一件:或者,一旦人们开始使用理性,这些假定的本地铭文就会被他们知道和观察到;或者,人的理性的使用和行使,有助于他们发现这些原则,并肯定会使他们知道。
8. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.
8.如果理性发现了它们,这并不能证明它们是天生的。
If they mean, that by the use of reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,—that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
如果他们的意思是,通过使用理性,人们可以发现这些原则,这就足以证明它们是天生的;他们的论证方式将是这样的,即:无论理性能向我们发现什么真理,并使我们坚定地同意,这些都是自然地印在头脑中的;因为这种普遍的同意,是它们的标志,只不过是这样而已。无论理性能向我们发现什么真理,并使我们坚定地同意,这些真理都是自然而然地印在头脑中的;因为这种普遍的同意是它们的标志,只相当于这样,即通过使用理性,我们能够对它们有一定的了解和同意;通过这种方式,数学家的格言和他们从中推导出的定理之间将没有区别。所有这些都必须同样被允许是与生俱来的;它们都是通过使用理性而发现的,是一个有理性的生物肯定会知道的真理,如果他正确地运用他的思想。
9. It is false that Reason discovers them.
9.理性发现它们是假的。
But how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.
但是,这些人怎么会认为有必要使用理性来发现那些被认为是天生的原则呢,因为理性(如果我们可以相信他们的话)只不过是一种从已经知道的原则或命题中推导出未知真理的能力?我们当然不可能认为那是天生的,我们需要用理性来发现;除非如我所说,我们将理性教给我们的所有确定的真理都视为天生的。我们不妨认为,要使我们的眼睛发现可见的物体,就必须使用理性,就像要使理解力看到最初刻在它上面的东西,而且在它被理解力感知之前不可能存在于理解力中一样。因此,让理性发现那些如此刻印的真理,是说,使用理性向人发现了他以前所知道的东西:如果人在使用理性之前就有那些先天刻印的真理,但在使用理性之前却总是对它们一无所知,这实际上是在说,人在同一时间知道和不知道它们。
10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims.
10.在发现这两条格言时没有使用推理。
It will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?
这里也许会说,数学证明和其他非先天性的真理在提出后并不被同意,在这里它们与这些格言和其他先天性真理是有区别的。我将有机会在第一次提出时谈到同意,特别是在以后。在这里,我只允许,而且是非常容易地允许,这些格言和数学证明在这一点上是不同的:前者需要理智,使用证明,以使它们得到我们的同意;而后者,一经理解,就会被接受和同意,不需要任何起码的推理。但我还是要指出,这就暴露了这种诡计的弱点,它要求用理性来发现这些一般的真理:因为必须承认,在发现这些真理时,根本就没有使用推理。我想,那些给出这个答案的人不会主动确认,对 "同一事物不可能存在和不存在 "这一格言的认识是我们理性的推论。因为这将破坏他们似乎很喜欢的自然的恩惠,而他们使这些原则的知识取决于我们的思想劳动。因为所有的推理都是在寻找,都是在摸索,都需要努力和应用。怎么能以任何可容忍的意义来推测,自然界所留下的印记,作为我们理性的基础和指南,应该需要用理性来发现它?
11. And if there were this would prove them not innate.
11.如果有的话,这将证明它们不是天生的。
Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that “men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason,” be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.
那些愿意花点心思去思考理解力的运作的人,会发现心灵对某些真理的这种随时的同意,既不取决于本地的铭文,也不取决于理性的使用,而是取决于一种与这两者完全不同的心灵能力,正如我们将在下文中看到的。因此,理性在促使我们同意这些格言方面没有任何作用,如果说 "人们在使用理性时知道并同意这些格言 "是指使用理性帮助我们认识这些格言,那是完全错误的;如果是真的,就会证明它们不是天生的。
12. The coming of the Use of Reason not the Time we come to know these Maxims.
12.使用理性的到来不是我们认识这些格言的时候。
If by knowing and assenting to them “when we come to the use of reason,” be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?” And a great part of illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men’s coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.
如果说,"当我们开始使用理性时 "知道并同意它们,是指这是它们开始被心灵注意的时候;儿童一旦开始使用理性,他们也会知道并同意这些格言;这也是错误和轻率的。首先,它是错误的;因为很明显,这些格言并不像使用理性那么早在头脑中出现;因此,使用理性的到来被错误地指定为发现它们的时间。我们可以在儿童身上观察到多少使用理性的例子,在他们对这一格言有任何认识之前的很长一段时间,"同一事物不可能存在和不存在?"很多文盲和野蛮人在多年前,甚至在他们的理性年龄,都没有思考过这个和类似的一般命题。我承认,人们在使用理性之前,不会了解这些被认为是与生俱来的一般和更抽象的真理;我还说,那时也不会。之所以如此,是因为在他们开始使用理性之前,那些一般的抽象观念并没有在头脑中形成,而那些被误认为是先天原则的一般格言就是关于它们的,但实际上是通过同样的方式发现的,并通过同样的步骤将真理引入和带入头脑,就像其他几个命题一样,从来没有人如此奢侈地认为是先天的。我希望在本论述的后续部分能说明这一点。因此,我允许人们在获得这些一般真理的知识之前,有必要使用理性;但否认人们使用理性是发现这些真理的时间。
13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.
13.据此,它们与其他可知的真理没有区别。
In the mean time it is observable, that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims “when they come to the use of reason,” amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,—that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man’s life; but when is uncertain. And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from other by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.
同时,我们可以看到,人们 "在使用理性时 "知道并同意这些格言的说法,实际上只相当于这样,即在使用理性之前,这些格言从未被知道或注意过,但在人的一生中,有可能在之后的某个时候被同意;但何时被同意则不确定。所有其他可知的真理也是如此,因此,这些真理在我们使用理性时并没有任何优势,也没有与其他真理的区别;也没有因此被证明是天生的,而是恰恰相反。
14. If coming to the Use of Reason were the Time of their Discovery, it would not prove them innate.
14.如果使用理性是发现它们的时间,那就不能证明它们是天生的。
But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men ‘assent to them when they come to the use of reason,’ is no more but this,—that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.
但是,第二,如果它们被认识和同意的确切时间是真的,当人们开始使用理性的时候;这也不能证明它们是天生的。这种论证方式就像假设本身是错误的一样轻率。因为,根据什么样的逻辑,可以看出任何概念在最初的构成中是自然地印在头脑中的,因为它是在头脑的一种能力开始发挥自己的作用时才被观察和赞同的?因此,如果认为使用语言的时间是这些格言首次被认可的时间(这可能与人们使用理性的时间一样真实),那么就可以很好地证明它们是天生的,就像说它们是天生的一样,因为人们在使用理性的时候认可了它们。因此,我同意这些主张先天原则的人的观点,即在头脑中没有对这些一般的、不言而喻的格言的认识,直到它开始行使理性;但我否认,开始使用理性是它们第一次被注意到的确切时间;如果那是确切的时间,我否认这将证明它们是先天的。这个命题的意思是,人 "在开始使用理智的时候同意这些格言",这句话的真实含义不外乎是:提出一般的抽象概念,理解一般的名称,是理性能力的伴随物,与理性能力一起成长,儿童通常不会得到这些一般的概念,也不会学习代表这些概念的名称,直到他们对熟悉的和更具体的概念锻炼了很长时间的理智,他们通过与他人的普通谈话和行动,被承认能够进行理性对话。如果当人们开始使用理性时,对这些格言的认同在任何其他意义上都是真实的,我希望它能被证明;或者至少,在这个或任何其他意义上,它如何证明它们是天生的。
15. The Steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.
15.心灵获得若干真理的步骤。
The senses at first let in PARTICULAR ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the MATERIALS about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call “the use of reason.” For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing.
感官起初让特定的观念进入,并提供了空荡荡的柜子,而头脑逐渐熟悉了其中的一些观念,它们被保存在记忆中,并为它们起了名字。之后,思想进一步发展,将它们抽象化,并逐渐学会使用一般名称。这样一来,头脑中就有了思想和语言,有了行使其讨论能力的材料。随着这些给它提供就业机会的材料的增加,理性的使用变得日益明显。但是,尽管拥有一般的观念和使用一般的语言和理性通常是一起成长的,但我看不出这如何能证明它们是天生的。我承认,对某些真理的认识在头脑中是非常早的;但以一种方式表明它们不是天生的。因为,如果我们观察一下,我们会发现这仍然是关于观念的,不是先天的,而是后天的;它是关于那些首先由外部事物打下的烙印,婴儿最早接触到的,对他们的感官产生最频繁的印象。在这样得到的观念中,心灵发现有些是一致的,有些是不同的,这可能是在它有任何记忆的使用时;在它能够保留和感知不同的观念时。但无论是否如此,可以肯定的是,它在拥有文字的使用权或达到我们通常所说的 "理性的使用 "之前就已经这样了。因为孩子在会说话之前就知道甜和苦的区别(即甜不是苦),就像他后来知道(当他会说话时)艾草和糖葫芦不是同一种东西一样。
16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness.
16.对假定的先天性真理的同意取决于对其术语的含义有清晰明确的想法,而不是取决于其先天性。
A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same ground and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same ground also that he may come to know afterwards “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those generic terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;—whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.
一个孩子不知道三和四等于七,直到他能够数出七,并且得到了平等的名称和概念;然后,在解释这些词的时候,他很快就同意,或者说察觉到这个命题的真理。但他并不是因为这是一个与生俱来的真理而欣然同意,也不是因为他需要使用理性而在这之前没有同意;而是当他在头脑中确定了这些名字所代表的清晰而明确的概念时,真理就出现在他的面前。然后,他以同样的理由和方法知道这个命题的真理,就像他以前知道棍子和樱桃不是同一种东西一样;也是基于同样的理由,他后来可能会知道 "同一种东西不可能是又不可能是",这将在下文中更充分地表明。因此,任何人在拥有这些格言所涉及的一般观念之前,或在知道代表这些格言的一般术语的含义之前,或在他的头脑中把这些术语所代表的观念放在一起之前,时间就越晚,他就越会同意这些格言。-这些术语和它们所代表的理念,并不比猫或黄鼠狼的术语更与生俱来,他必须待到时间和观察使他熟悉这些术语;然后他就有能力知道这些格言的真理,在第一次使他把这些理念放在脑海中,并观察它们是同意还是不同意,正如这些命题所表达的那样。因此,一个人知道十八和十九等于三十七,就像他知道一和二等于三一样,是不言而喻的;但一个孩子却不像另一个孩子那么快就知道;不是因为缺乏理性,而是因为十八和十九以及三十七这两个词所代表的观念,不像一、二和三所表示的那样,那么快就能得到。
17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.
17.一经提出和理解就同意,证明它们不是天生的。
This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For, since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
因此,当人们开始使用理性的时候,这种对普遍同意的回避就失效了,而且在那些所谓的先天性真理和后来获得和学习的其他真理之间没有任何区别,人们努力确保对他们所谓的格言的普遍同意,他们说,这些格言一经提出,并理解它们所提出的术语,就会得到普遍同意:看到所有的人,甚至儿童,一听到和理解这些术语,就会同意这些命题,他们认为这就足以证明它们是天生的。因为,既然人们一旦理解了这些话,就会承认它们是毋庸置疑的真理,那么他们就会推断,这些命题肯定是首先存在于理解力中的,不需要任何教导,头脑在第一次提出时就会立即合上并同意,此后就不会再怀疑了。
18. If such an Assent be a Mark of Innate, then “that one and two are equal to three, that Sweetness if not Bitterness,” and a thousand the like, must be inate.
18.如果这种同意是天生的标志,那么 "一和二等于三,如果不是苦,就是甜",以及无数类似的说法,一定是天生的。
In answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. That “two bodies cannot be in the same place” is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” that “white is not black,” that “a square is not a circle,” that “bitterness is not sweetness.” These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct, ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing, what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate proposition as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one, “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two, “The same is not different”; by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c., innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.
在回答这个问题时,我想知道,在第一次听到和理解一个命题的术语时,对该命题的随时同意是否是先天原则的某个标志?如果不是,那么这种普遍的同意作为它们的证明是徒劳的:如果说它是先天的标志,那么他们就必须允许所有这种一听就普遍同意的命题是先天的,这样他们就会发现自己有大量的先天原则。因为基于同样的理由,即一听到和理解这些术语就表示同意,人们就会认为这些格言是先天的,他们也必须承认关于数字的几个命题是先天的;因此,一和二等于三,二和二等于四,以及许多其他类似的数字命题,大家一听到和理解这些术语就表示同意,必须在这些先天的公理中占有一席之地。这也不仅仅是数字的特权,以及关于其中几个数字的命题;但即使是自然哲学和所有其他科学,也提供了一经理解就肯定会得到赞同的命题。"两个物体不可能在同一个地方 "是一个真理,没有人比这些格言更坚持 "同一事物不可能存在和不存在","白色不是黑色","方形不是圆形","苦味不是甜味"。这些和其他无数的命题,至少和我们有不同的想法一样多,每个人在他的头脑中,一听到并知道这些名字代表什么,就一定会同意。如果这些人忠实于他们自己的规则,并在第一次听到和理解这些术语时就表示同意,作为先天的标志,他们不仅必须允许有多少个先天命题,就有多少个人有不同的想法,而且有多少个人可以提出命题,其中不同的想法被否定。因为每一个命题,其中一个不同的想法被否定了另一个,在第一次听到和理解这些术语时,肯定会得到赞同,就像这个一般的命题,"同一事物不可能是和不是",或者是它的基础,也是两者中最容易理解的,"相同的不是不同的";根据这种说法,他们将有大量的这种先天命题,而不提任何其他的。但是,由于任何命题都不可能是先天的,除非它所涉及的观念是先天的,这就等于假设我们对颜色、声音、味道、身材等的所有观念都是先天的,没有比这更违背理性和经验的了。我承认,在听到和理解这些术语时,普遍和随时的同意是自证的一个标志;但自证不是取决于先天的印象,而是取决于其他东西,(正如我们将在下文中表明的那样)属于几个命题,而这些命题还没有人奢侈到假装是天生的。
19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.
19.在这些普遍的格言之前,这种不太普遍的命题是已知的。
Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that “one and two are equal to three,” that “green is not red,” &c., are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.
也不要说,那些更特殊的不言而喻的命题,如 "一和二等于三","绿色不是红色 "等等,一听就被认为是那些更普遍的命题的结果,而这些命题被看作是先天的原则;因为任何一个人,只要不厌其烦地观察理解力的变化,就一定会发现这些命题以及类似的不太普遍的命题,都是由先天的原则造成的。因为任何一个人,只要不厌其烦地观察理解力的变化,就一定会发现,这些以及类似的不太普遍的命题,是那些完全不知道那些更普遍的格言的人肯定知道并坚定地赞同的;因此,在头脑中比那些(它们被称为)第一原则更早,不能欠它们的同意,而它们在一听之下就被接受。
20. One and one equal to Two, &c., not general nor useful answered.
20.一和一等于二,等等,不是一般的回答,也没有用。
If it be said, that these propositions, viz. “two and two are equal to four,” “red is not blue,” &c., are not general maxims nor of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propositions can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted, and assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.
如果有人说,这些命题,即 "二加二等于四","红色不是蓝色 "等等,不是一般的格言,也没有什么大用处,我回答说,这对听觉和理解的普遍认同的论证没有任何意义。因为,如果那是先天的确定标志,那么无论什么命题,只要一听到理解就会得到普遍的赞同,那就必须被承认为先天的命题,就像这句格言一样,"同一事物不可能是和不是",它们在这个基础上是平等的。至于更一般的区别,这使这句格言离先天性更远;与那些更特殊的不言而喻的命题相比,那些一般的和抽象的观念对我们的最初理解更加陌生;因此,在它们被承认和被成长中的理解力所赞同之前,需要更长的时间。至于这些被放大的格言的用处,当它在适当的地方被更充分地考虑时,也许不会像一般人想象的那么大。
21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.
21.这些格言在提出之前有时并不为人所知,这证明它们不是天生的。
But we have not yet done with “assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms.” It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any such,) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others’ teaching than nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them cannot refuse their assent to.
但是,我们还没有完成 "一听就同意命题,并理解其条款 "的讨论。我们应该首先注意到,这并不是它们与生俱来的标志,而是一个相反的证明;因为它假定,一些理解和知道其他事物的人,在这些原则被提出来之前是不知道的;一个人在从别人那里听到这些真理之前可能不知道。因为,如果它们是天生的,那么为了获得同意,还需要提出来吗?如果它们存在于理解中,通过自然和原始的印象,(如果有的话)它们不可能不知道?或者说,提出它们是否比自然界更清楚地印在头脑中?如果是这样,那么结果就是,一个人在被这样教导之后,比他以前更了解它们。因此,这些原则通过别人的教导可能会比自然界的印象更明显:这与先天原则的观点不一致,并没有给它们带来什么权威性;相反,这使它们不适合成为我们所有其他知识的基础;正如它们被假装成的那样。不可否认的是,人在被提出后,首先熟悉了许多这些不言而喻的真理:但很明显的是,无论谁这样做,他都会发现自己开始知道一个他以前不知道的命题,而且从那时起他就不再质疑;这不是因为它是天生的,而是因为考虑到这些话中包含的事物的性质,无论他如何或何时被带去思考它们,他都不会有其他想法。如果在第一次听到和理解这些术语时就同意的东西必须是先天的原则,那么每一个有根据的观察,从特殊情况中引出的一般规则,必须是先天的。但可以肯定的是,并非所有的人,而只是聪明的人,一开始就对这些观察结果感兴趣,并把它们还原成一般的命题:这些命题不是天生的,而是从先前对特殊事例的熟悉和思考中收集的。当有观察力的人提出这些建议时,没有观察力的人,当他们被提出来时,就不能拒绝他们的同意。
22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.
22.在提出之前就隐约知道,意味着心灵能够理解它们,否则就意味着什么都没有。
If it be said, the understanding hath an IMPLICIT knowledge of these principles, but not an EXPLICIT, before this first hearing (as they must who will say “that they are in the understanding before they are known,”) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,—that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.
如果说,在第一次听到这些原则之前,理解力对这些原则有一个暗示性的知识,而不是一个明确的知识(因为他们必须说 "在认识它们之前,它们就在理解力中"),那么就很难想象一个隐含在理解力中的原则是什么意思,除非是这样,即头脑能够理解并坚定地同意这种命题。因此,所有的数学论证以及第一原理都必须作为头脑中的固有印象来接受;我担心他们不会允许它们成为这样的印象,因为他们发现论证一个命题比在论证时同意它更难。很少有数学家会愿意相信,他们所画的所有图都是自然界刻在他们头脑中的那些先天性特征的副本。
23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.
23.一听就同意的论点,是基于没有先例的错误假设。
There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything DE NOVO; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We BY DEGREES get ideas and names, and LEARN their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such, terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, “That an apple is not fire,” when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this proposition, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be”; because that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that. But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being; the business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.
我担心,上述论点还有一个弱点,它将说服我们,因此那些格言被认为是与生俱来的,人们一听就承认了;因为他们同意没有人教过的命题,也没有从任何论证或演示的力量中接受,只是对术语的简单解释或理解。在我看来,这里面隐藏着这样一个谬误,即人们被认为没有被教过,也没有从新学过任何东西;而事实上,他们被教过,也确实学到了一些他们以前不知道的东西。因为,首先,很明显,他们已经学会了这些术语和它们的含义;这两者都不是与生俱来的。但这还不是全部的知识:命题所涉及的观念本身并不是与生俱来的,就像它们的名字一样,而是后来才得到的。因此,在所有一听就同意的命题中,命题的术语、它们所代表的观念,以及它们所代表的观念本身,都不是天生的,我很想知道在这种命题中还有什么是天生的。因为我很乐意让任何人说出那个命题的术语或观念是先天的。我们逐级获得概念和名称,并学习它们之间的适当联系;然后,对于用这种术语提出的命题,我们已经学会了它们的含义,并且在其中表达了我们的想法中的一致或不一致,我们一开始就会听到同意;尽管对于其他命题,本身是确定和明显的,但它们涉及的是不那么快或那么容易得到的想法,我们同时也没有能力表示同意。因为,尽管一个孩子很快就同意了这个命题:"苹果不是火,"当他通过熟悉的了解,把这两种不同事物的概念清楚地印在了他的脑海里,并且知道了苹果和火这两个名字代表了它们;但是,也许过了好几年,这个孩子才会同意这个命题:"同一事物不可能既是又不是"。因为,虽然这些词可能很容易学,但它们的含义比孩子们所接触的那些可感事物所附的名称更广泛、更全面、更抽象,所以他需要更长时间才能学会它们的确切含义,而且需要更多的时间在他的头脑中形成它们所代表的一般概念。在这之前,你要想让任何一个孩子同意由这些一般术语组成的命题,都是徒劳的;但是一旦他得到了这些观念,知道了它们的名字,他就会立即同意上述命题中的一个和另一个:而且是出于同样的原因,即因为他发现他头脑中的观念是一致的或不一致的,因为代表它们的词语在命题中是相互肯定或否定的。但是,如果命题是用代表他头脑中还没有的观念的词语向他提出的,那么,对于这样的命题,无论其本身是真的还是假的,他既不表示同意也不表示反对,而是一无所知。因为语言只是空洞的声音,除了它们是我们观念的标志之外,我们只能在它们与我们所拥有的那些观念相对应时对它们表示赞同,而不能再进一步。但是,关于知识以何种步骤和方式进入我们的头脑,以及几种程度的同意的理由,由于是下面论述的内容,在此只需触及它,作为使我怀疑那些先天原则的一个原因就可以了。
24. Not innate because not universally assented to.
24.不是天生的,因为不是普遍认同的。
To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,—that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these men’s own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms; nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.
在结束这个关于普遍同意的论点时,我同意这些先天性原则的捍卫者的观点,即如果它们是先天性的,它们就必须得到普遍同意。因为在我看来,一个真理是与生俱来的,但却没有得到认同,这就像一个人知道一个真理,但同时却对它一无所知一样,是无法理解的。但是,根据这些人自己的承认,它们不可能是与生俱来的;因为那些不理解这些术语的人不同意它们;那些理解这些术语但从未听说或想到这些命题的人中的大部分也不同意;我认为,这至少是人类的一半。但是,即使人数少得多,也足以破坏普遍的同意,从而表明这些命题不是天生的,如果只有儿童不知道这些命题的话。
25. These Maxims not the first known.
25.这些格言并不是最早知道的。
But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions: which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of: that the wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for: this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, “That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join in these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.
但是,为了不让我被指责从我们不知道的婴儿的思想中进行论证,并从他们表达之前的理解中得出结论,我接下来说,这两个一般的命题不是最初拥有儿童思想的真理,也不是所有后天和偶然的概念的前身:如果它们是天生的,它们必须是。无论我们能否确定,这都不重要,儿童肯定有一个开始思考的时间,而且他们的言行也向我们保证他们会这样做。因此,当他们有能力思考、有能力了解、有能力同意的时候,是否可以合理地认为他们对自然界所印下的那些概念一无所知,如果有的话?能否以任何合理的方式想象他们能感知来自外部事物的印象,而同时对自然界自己注意在内部印上的那些特征一无所知?难道他们可以接受和同意外来的概念,而不知道那些被认为是交织在他们存在的原则中,并以不可磨灭的字符印在那里,成为他们所有获得的知识和未来推理的基础和指南的概念?这就等于让大自然白费力气;或者至少是写得很糟糕;因为它的字不能被那些对其他事物看得很清楚的眼睛读懂:而那些被认为是真理最清晰的部分和我们所有知识的基础的东西是很糟糕的,它们没有被首先知道,而没有这些东西就可以得到其他一些事物的毫无疑问的知识。孩子当然知道,喂它的奶妈既不是它玩耍的猫,也不是它害怕的黑麋鹿:它拒绝的虫子或芥末,不是它哭着要的苹果或糖:这一点它当然而且毫无疑问地确信:但有人会说,它是凭借这个原则,即 "同一事物不可能是和不是",才如此坚定地同意它的知识的这些和其他部分?或者说,儿童在这个年龄段对这个命题有任何概念或理解,而在这个年龄段,它显然知道许多其他真理?如果有人说,儿童用他们的奶瓶和摇铃加入这些一般的抽象猜测,也许可以公正地认为他对自己的观点有更多的激情和热忱,但却不如这个年龄的人真诚和真实。
26. And so not innate.
26.所以不是天生的。
Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;—it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else. Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.
因此,虽然有几个一般性的命题,一提出来就能得到人们持续不断的赞同,这些人已经掌握了更普遍和更抽象的概念,并为它们起了名字;但在那些年幼的人身上却找不到这些命题,而这些人却知道其他的事情,它们不能假装得到聪明人的普遍赞同,因此决不能被认为是天生的;任何天生的真理(如果有的话)不可能不知道,至少对任何知道其他事情的人是如此。因为,如果它们是先天的真理,它们就一定是先天的思想:在头脑中没有什么真理是它从未思考过的。由此可见,如果有任何先天的真理,它们必然是第一个被思考的;第一个出现的。
27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shows itself clearest.
27.不是先天的,因为它们出现得最少,而先天的东西显示得最清楚。
That the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this further argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine that in THEIR minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one’s view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,) can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men’s principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will, I fear find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation and useful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion to speak more at large, l.4, c. 7.
我们正在讨论的一般格言不为儿童、白痴和大部分人所知,这一点我们已经充分证明了:由此可见,它们没有得到普遍的认同,也不是一般的印象。但是,这里面还有一个反对它们是先天性的论据:如果这些性格是原生的和原始的印象,它们应该在那些我们没有发现它们的脚步的人身上表现得最完美和最清晰;在我看来,这是一个强有力的推测,它们不是先天性的,因为它们最不为那些人所知,如果它们是先天性的,它们必须以最强的力量和活力发挥自己。因为儿童、白痴、野蛮人和文盲是所有其他人中受习俗或借来的观点影响最小的;学习和教育没有把他们的本源思想铸造成新的模子;也没有通过引入外来的和经过研究的学说,混淆自然写在那里的那些美丽的字符;人们可以合理地想象,在他们的头脑中,这些先天的概念应该对每个人的观点公平开放,正如人们确信儿童的思想那样。我们可以很好地预期,这些原则应该是自然人完全知道的;这些原则被立即印在灵魂上,(正如这些人所认为的)不可能依赖于身体的结构或器官,这是他们与其他人之间唯一公认的区别。人们会认为,根据这些人的原则,所有这些天生的光束(如果有的话),在那些没有保留、没有隐藏的艺术的人身上,应该完全闪耀出它们的光辉,让我们不再怀疑它们的存在,就像我们不再怀疑它们对快乐的热爱和对痛苦的厌恶一样。但可惜的是,在儿童、白痴、野蛮人和文盲中,能找到什么一般的格言? 什么普遍的知识原则?他们的概念很少,而且很狭窄,只是从那些他们最常接触的对象中借来的,而且这些对象给他们的感官留下了最频繁和最强烈的印象。一个孩子知道他的奶妈和他的摇篮,渐渐地还知道更年长的玩物;一个年轻的野蛮人,也许根据他部落的时尚,他的脑子里充满了爱和狩猎。但是,如果有人从一个没有受过教育的孩子,或者一个森林里的野生居民那里,期望得到这些抽象的格言和被称为科学的原则,恐怕会发现自己错了。在印第安人的小屋里很少提到这种一般性的命题:更不用说在儿童的思想中发现它们,或者在自然人的头脑中发现它们的任何印象。它们是习惯于那种谈话或学习的有学问的民族的学校和学院的语言和业务,那里经常发生争论;这些格言适合于人为的论证,对说服有帮助,但对发现真理或推进知识没有多大帮助。但是,关于它们对知识进步的小用处,我将有机会更详细地谈论,l.4,c.7。
28. Recapitulation.
28.复述。
I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration. And probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.
我不知道这在演示大师们看来是多么的荒谬。可能任何人一听都会不以为然。因此,我必须对偏见稍作休战,并请大家不要指责我,直到我在本论述的后续部分听完,我非常愿意接受更好的判断。既然我公正地追求真理,我就不会为被说服而感到遗憾,因为我太喜欢自己的观念了;我承认我们都很容易这样,当应用和研究使我们的头脑变得温暖时。
Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if THESE “first principles” of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no OTHER speculative maxims can (I suppose), with better right pretend to be so.
就整个问题而言,我看不出有什么理由认为这两个推测性的格言是天生的:因为它们没有得到普遍的赞同;它们如此普遍地得到的赞同,不外乎是一些不被认为是天生的命题与它们同样得到的赞同:而且因为给予它们的赞同是以另一种方式产生的,并不是来自自然的铭文,正如我毫不怀疑地在下面的论述中表明的那样。如果这些知识和科学的 "第一原则 "被发现不是天生的,那么其他推测性的格言就不能(我想)更好地假装是天生的。
1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received as the forementioned speculative Maxims.
1.没有任何道德原则像前面提到的推测性格言那样明确,那样被普遍接受。
If those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning PRACTICAL Principles, that they come short of an universal reception: and I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, “What is, is”; or to be so manifest a truth as this, that “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” Whereby it is evident that they are further removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind is stronger against those moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraved on the mind; which, if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to everybody. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty; no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones because it is not so evident as “the whole is bigger than a part,” nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration: and therefore it is our own faults if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.
如果我们在前一章中讨论的那些推测性格言没有得到全人类的实际普遍赞同,正如我们在那里所证明的那样,那么关于实践性原则,就更明显了,它们没有得到普遍接受:我想很难举出任何一条道德规则,可以假装得到 "是什么,就是什么 "这样普遍和随时的赞同;或者是这样一个明显的真理,即 "同一事物不可能既是又不是。"由此可见,它们与先天的称号相去甚远;对它们是心灵上的本源印象的怀疑,比其他道德原则更强烈。这并不是说它使它们的真理受到了质疑。它们同样是真实的,尽管不是同样明显的。那些推测性的格言带有它们自己的证据:但道德原则需要推理和讨论,以及一些思维的锻炼,以发现它们真理的确定性。它们并不像刻在心灵上的自然特性那样开放;如果有这样的特性,它们本身就必须是可见的,而且通过它们自己的光亮是确定的,是人人都知道的。但这并不妨碍它们的真实性和确定性;就像三角形的三个角等于两个直角的真实性和确定性一样,因为它不像 "整体大于部分 "那样明显,也不像一听就能接受。这些道德规则是可以证明的,这就足够了:因此,如果我们不对它们有一定的了解,那就是我们自己的错了。但是,许多人对它们一无所知,其他人对它们的认同也很迟钝,这都清楚地证明了它们不是与生俱来的,而是不经搜索就能看到的。
2. Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.
2.信仰和正义不是所有人都拥有的原则。
Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth that is universally received, without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? JUSTICE, and keeping of contracts, is that which most men seem to agree in. This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of justice one with another. I grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another: but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as a practical principle who acts fairly with his fellow-highwayman, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with. Justice and truth are the common ties of society; and therefore even outlaws and robbers, who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves; or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?
是否有任何这样的道德原则,让所有的人都同意,我呼吁任何对人类历史有一定了解的人,在他们自己的烟囱的烟雾之外向外看。毋庸置疑,普遍接受的实用真理在哪里,因为它必须是与生俱来的?公正和遵守合同,是大多数人似乎都同意的。这是一个被认为可以延伸到贼窝和最大的恶棍联盟的原则;而那些对人性本身的灭绝走得最远的人,则彼此保持信任和正义的规则。我承认,歹徒们自己也是这样做的:但他们并没有把这些当作自然界的固有规律。他们在自己的社区内把它们作为方便的规则来实行:但不可能想象他把正义作为一个实际的原则,公平地对待他的同路人,同时又掠夺或杀死他遇到的下一个诚实的人。正义和真理是社会的共同纽带;因此,即使是与世界上所有的人决裂的亡命之徒和强盗,他们之间也必须保持信仰和公平的规则;否则,他们就不能在一起。但是,有人会说,那些靠欺诈或抢劫为生的人有他们所允许和赞同的与生俱来的真理和正义的原则吗?
3. Objection: though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts answered.
3.反对:虽然人们在实践中否认它们,但在他们的思想中却承认它们。
Perhaps it will be urged, that the tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I answer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But, since it is certain that most men’s practices, and some men’s open professions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent, (though we should look for it only amongst grown men,) without which it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, it is very strange and unreasonable to suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles, derived from nature, are there for operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) DO continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing: these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are INCLINATIONS OF THE APPETITE to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge regulating our practice. Such natural impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; since, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite; which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.
也许有人会说,他们头脑中的默许同意了他们的做法,而他们的做法却与之相矛盾。我回答说,首先,我一直认为人的行为是他们思想的最好解释者。但是,既然可以肯定的是,大多数人的做法,以及一些人公开的职业,不是质疑就是否认这些原则,那么就不可能建立一种普遍的同意,(尽管我们只应该在成年男子中寻找这种同意),没有这种同意就不可能得出这些原则是与生俱来的。其次,假设先天的实践原则仅止于思考,这是非常奇怪和不合理的。源自自然的实践原则是为了操作,必须产生一致的行动,而不是勉强对其真理的推测性认同,否则它们与推测性格言的区别是徒劳的。我承认,大自然给人带来了对幸福的渴望和对痛苦的厌恶:这些确实是与生俱来的实用原则,它们(作为实用原则应该)持续不断地发挥作用,不停地影响我们的所有行为:这些可以在所有人和所有时代中观察到,稳定而普遍;但这些是对善的渴望的包含,而不是对真理的理解的印象。我不否认有一些自然的倾向印在人的头脑中;从最初的感觉和知觉开始,就有一些东西对他们来说是感激的,而另一些则是不受欢迎的;有些东西是他们所倾向的,而另一些则是他们所逃避的:但这并不能说明头脑中的先天特征,这些特征将成为规范我们行为的知识原则。在理解力上的这种自然印象远没有在此得到证实,这是一个反对它们的论据;因为,如果有某些由自然界印在理解力上的特征,作为知识的原则,我们就不能不察觉它们不断地在我们身上运作并影响我们的知识,就像我们对意志和食欲的其他印象一样;它们永远是我们所有行为的恒定泉源和动机,我们永远感到它们在强烈推动我们。
4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ERGO not innate.
4.道德规则需要证明,ERGO不是天生的。
Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is, that I think THERE CANNOT ANY ONE MORAL RULE BE PROPOSED WHEREOF A MAN MAY NOT JUSTLY DEMAND A REASON: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate; or so much as self-evident, which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common sense who asked on the one side, or on the other side went to give a reason WHY “it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.” It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms assents to it for its own sake or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of morality and foundation of all social virtue, “That should do as he would be done unto,” be proposed to one who never heard of it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shows it not to be innate; for if it were it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least as soon as heard and understood) be received and assented to as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be DEDUCED; which could not be if either they were innate or so much as self-evident.
另一个让我对任何先天的实践原则产生怀疑的原因是,我认为不可能提出任何一条道德规则,而人们可能不会理直气壮地要求提供理由:如果它们是先天的,那将是完全可笑和荒谬的;或者说是不言而喻的,每一个先天的原则都必须是这样的,不需要任何证据来确定其真理,也不需要任何理由来获得其认可。他将被认为是没有常识的,因为他一方面要求,另一方面又要给出一个理由,为什么 "同一事物不可能存在和不存在"。它带有自己的光芒和证据,不需要其他证明:理解这些条款的人为了它自己而同意它,否则没有什么能说服他去做。但是,如果向一个从未听说过但有能力理解其含义的人提出 "己所不欲,勿施于人 "这条最不可动摇的道德规则和所有社会美德的基础;他难道不会问一个理由吗?而提出这个建议的人难道没有义务向他说明这个建议的真实性和合理性吗?这清楚地表明它不是与生俱来的;因为如果它是与生俱来的,它既不需要也不接受任何证明;而是必须(至少在听到和理解之后)被接受和赞同为一个不容置疑的真理,一个人决不能怀疑。因此,所有这些道德规则的真实性显然取决于它们的其他前因,而且它们必须从这些前因中获得;如果它们是天生的或不言自明的,就不可能是这样。
5. Instance in keeping Compacts
5.保持契约的实例
That men should keep their compacts is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality. But yet, if a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason:—Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if a Hobbist be asked why? he will answer:—Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old philosophers had been asked, he would have answered:—Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.
人应该遵守自己的契约,这当然是一条伟大而不可否认的道德规则。但是,如果有人问一个基督徒,为什么一个人必须遵守他的诺言,他将给出这样的理由:因为拥有永生和死亡权力的上帝要求我们这样做。但如果有人问一个霍比特人为什么,他会回答:"因为公众需要它,如果你不这样做,利维坦会惩罚你。如果有人问一位老哲学家,他会回答:"因为不这样做是不诚实的,是低于人的尊严的,是与美德相反的,是人性的最高完善。
6. Virtue generally approved not because innate, but because profitable.
6.德行普遍得到认可,不是因为天生的,而是因为有利可图。
Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves; which could not be if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God. I grant the existence of God is so many ways manifest, and the obedience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature: but yet I think it must be allowed that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender. For, God having, by an inseparable connexion, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify those rules to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of interest as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred, which, if once trampled on and profaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have, yet it shows that the outward acknowledgment men pay to them in their words proves not that they are innate principles: nay, it proves not so much as that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice; since we find that self-interest, and the conveniences of this life, make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them, whose actions sufficiently prove that they very little consider the Lawgiver that prescribed these rules; nor the hell that he has ordained for the punishment of those that transgress them.
因此,根据人们对幸福的不同期待或对自己的建议,自然会出现关于道德规则的各种意见;如果实用原则是与生俱来的,并由上帝之手立即印在我们的头脑中,就不可能出现这种情况。我承认,上帝的存在在很多方面都是显而易见的,我们对他的服从也是与理性的光辉相一致的,以至于大部分人都为自然法则作证:但我认为,必须允许一些道德规则得到人类的普遍认可,而不知道或不承认道德的真正基础;这只能是上帝的意志和法律,他在黑暗中看到人,手中有奖赏和惩罚,并有足够的力量叫最骄傲的犯罪者承担责任。因为,上帝通过一种不可分割的联系,把美德和公众的幸福联系在一起,并使其实践成为维护社会的必要条件,而且明显有利于所有与有德行的人打交道的人;难怪每个人不仅允许,而且向他人推荐和赞扬这些规则,因为他从这些规则的遵守中肯定会获得自己的利益。他可以出于兴趣和信念,喊出那些神圣的东西,如果这些东西一旦被践踏和亵渎,他自己就不会有安全保障。虽然这并不影响这些规则显然具有的道德和永恒的义务,但它表明,人们在言语中对它们的外在认可并不证明它们是天生的原则。因为我们发现,自我利益和今生的便利,使许多人在外表上对这些规则表示认可,而他们的行为足以证明,他们很少考虑规定这些规则的立法者;也很少考虑他为惩罚那些违反规则的人而规定的地狱。
7. Men’s actions convince us, that the Rule of Virtue is not their internal Principle.
7.人的行为让我们相信,美德的规则不是他们的内在原则。
For, if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall find that they have no such internal veneration for these rules, nor so full a persuasion of their certainty and obligation. The great principle of morality, ‘To do as one would be done to,’ is more commended than practised. But the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madness, and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps CONSCIENCE will be urged as checking us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved.
因为,如果我们出于礼貌,不允许大多数人的职业过于真诚,而是认为他们的行为是他们思想的解释者,我们就会发现,他们对这些规则没有如此内在的崇敬,也没有如此充分地相信它们的确定性和义务。道德的伟大原则,即 "己所不欲,勿施于人",得到的赞扬多于实践。但是,违反这一规则不可能是更大的罪恶,而教导他人,说它不是道德规则,也没有义务,则会被认为是疯狂的,并且违背了人们在自己违反规则时牺牲的利益。也许,人们会认为 "理智 "是对我们这种违反行为的制约,因此,规则的内部义务和建立将被保留下来。
8. Conscience no Proof of any innate Moral Rule.
8.8. 良心不能证明任何天生的道德规则。
To which I answer, that I doubt not but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience on work; which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or gravity of our own actions; and if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid.
对此我的回答是,我不怀疑,许多人可能通过他们了解其他事物的同样方式,同意一些道德规则,并确信它们的义务。其他人也可能从他们的教育、公司和他们国家的风俗习惯中得到同样的想法;这种说服力,无论如何得到,都将有助于使良知发挥作用;这只不过是我们自己对自己行为的道德正确性或严重性的意见或判断;如果良知是先天原则的证明,那么相反的原则也可能是先天原则;因为一些具有相同良知倾向的人,会去做其他人避免的事情。
9. Instances of Enormities practised without Remorse.
9.毫无悔意地实施暴行的例子。
But I cannot see how any men should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate, and stamped upon their minds. View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilized people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice; as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in childbirth; or despatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where, at a certain age, they kill or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought desperate, are carried out and laid on the earth before they are dead; and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance or pity. It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people professing Christianity, to bury their children alive without scruple. There are places where they eat their own children. The Caribbees were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpose, and when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten. The virtues whereby the Tououpinambos believed they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. They have not so much as a name for God, and have no religion, no worship. The saints who are canonized amongst the Turks, lead lives which one cannot with modesty relate. A remarkable passage to this purpose, out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large, in the language it is published in.
但我不明白,如果这些道德准则是与生俱来的,并印在他们的脑海中,他们怎么会自信和平静地违反这些道德准则。请看一支洗劫城镇的军队,看看他们对道德原则有什么看法或感觉,或者对他们所做的一切暴行有什么良知的触动。抢劫、谋杀、强奸,都是人们不受惩罚和指责的运动。难道不是有整个国家,以及那些最文明的人,在他们中间,暴露他们的孩子,让他们在田野里被饥饿或野兽吃掉是一种惯例;就像生孩子一样,很少受到谴责或忌讳?在一些国家,如果孩子死于分娩,他们不是仍然把他们和他们的母亲放在同一个坟墓里;或者,如果一个假装的占星家宣布他们有不吉利的星星,他们就把他们扔掉吗?还有一些地方,到了一定的年龄,他们就会杀死或揭发他们的父母,而没有任何悔意?在亚洲的一个地方,当病人的情况被认为是绝望的时候,他们会在死前被抬出来放在地上;然后被留在那里,暴露在风和天气中,在没有援助或怜悯的情况下死亡。在信奉基督教的Mingrelians中,人们很熟悉将他们的孩子活埋,没有任何顾忌。有些地方,他们吃自己的孩子。加勒比人习惯于阉割他们的孩子,目的是把他们养肥后吃掉。Garcilasso de la Vega告诉我们,在秘鲁有一个民族,他们习惯于把女俘虏身上的孩子养大吃掉,为此他们把女俘虏当做小妾,当她们过了生育期,母亲也被杀死吃掉。图欧比南波斯人认为他们有资格进入天堂的美德是复仇和吃掉大量的敌人。他们连上帝的名字都没有,也没有宗教,没有崇拜。在土耳其人中被封为圣人的人,他们的生活是无法谦虚地描述的。鲍姆加登的航行中,有一段引人注目的文字,这本书不是每天都能见到的,我将用它出版的语言详细地写下来。
Ibi (sc. prope Belbes in Aegypto) vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos, qui amentes et sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant et venerentur. Insuper et eos, qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum poenitentiam et paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenem habent, domos quos volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et quod majus est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis vero vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maximae fortunae ducunt loco. Audivimus haec dicta et dicenda per interpretem a Mucrelo nostro. Insuper sanctum ilium, quern eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprime commendari, eum esse hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritate praecipuum; eo quod, nec faminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum. (Peregr. Baumgarten, 1. ii. c. i. p. 73.)
Ibi (sc. prope Belbes in Aegypto) vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem。这就是我们所做的,马赫梅特人,我们这些友善的人,没有任何理由,支持圣洁的人。我和我的朋友们,你们的生命力是有限的,我们自愿为你们做苦工,为你们做苦工,为你们提供圣洁的服务。Ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenem habent, domos quos volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et quod major est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur.因此,凡是活着的人,都会展现出巨大的荣耀;尸体或庙宇或纪念碑都会被扩大,而且会有更大的财富。请听我们对我们的Mucrelo nostro的解释的haec dicta和dicenda。在圣洁的殿堂里,在这个地方,公众都会赞扬他,他是圣洁的人,是神圣的人,是完美的人;他不是家人,也不是孩子,而是与人交往的人。(Peregr. Baumgarten, 1. ii. c. i. p. 73.)
Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of conscience: nay, in many places innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy. And if we look abroad to take a view of men as they are, we shall find that they have remorse, in one place, for doing or omitting that which others, in another place, think they merit by.
那么那些与生俱来的正义、虔诚、感恩、公平、贞洁的原则在哪里?或者说,那些向我们保证存在着这种根深蒂固的规则的普遍共识在哪里呢?在决斗中的谋杀,当时尚使其成为光荣时,人们没有良心上的悔恨:不,在许多地方,在这种情况下的清白是最大的耻辱。如果我们把目光投向国外,看看人们的现状,我们就会发现,在一个地方,他们会因为做或不做别人认为值得的事情而感到懊悔,而在另一个地方,他们则认为值得。
10. Men have contrary practical Principles.
10.人有相反的实际原则。
He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or, rule of virtue to be thought on, (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies,) which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others.
仔细阅读人类的历史,深入观察人类的各个部落,冷眼旁观他们的行为,他就会确信,几乎没有什么道德原则可以命名,也没有什么美德规则可以思考。(只有那些对维持社会团结绝对必要的规则除外,这些规则在不同的社会之间通常也被忽视),这些规则在某处或其他地方没有被整个人类社会的普遍风尚所轻视和谴责,这些风尚受与其他社会完全相反的实际观点和生活规则的支配。
11. Whole Nations reject several Moral Rules.
11.整个国家拒绝若干道德规则。
Here perhaps it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good where men, though they transgress, yet disown not the law; where fear of shame, censure, or punishment, carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce what every one of them certainly and infallibly knew to be a law; for so they must who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is possible men may sometimes own rules of morality which in their private thoughts they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown and cast off a rule which they could not in their own minds but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant that all men they should have to do with knew it to be such: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity: and one who, confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore little less than a contradiction to suppose, that whole nations of men should, both in their professions and practice, unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere universally, and with public approbation or allowance, transgressed, can be supposed innate.—But I have something further to add in answer to this objection.
在这里,也许有人会反对,说规则不为人所知,因为它被破坏了,这不是一个论据。我同意这种反对意见,因为人们虽然违反了法律,但却不承认法律;因为害怕羞耻、责备或惩罚,所以对法律有某种敬畏。但是,不可能想象整个国家的人都公开拒绝和放弃他们每个人都肯定和无误地知道是法律的东西;因为他们必须这样做,因为它自然地印在他们的头脑中。人们有时可能会拥有一些在他们私下里并不认为是真实的道德规则,只是为了让自己在那些被认为有义务的人中保持声誉和尊重。但是,我们不能想象,整个社会的人都会公开地、自称是不承认和抛弃一条他们自己心里肯定是法律的规则;也不能不知道,所有与他们打交道的人都知道这是一条法律。因此,他们中的每一个人都必须从其他人那里得到对一个自称没有人性的人应有的蔑视和憎恶:一个混淆了已知的和自然的是非标准的人,不能不被看作是他们的和平和幸福的自称的敌人。无论什么实用的原则是与生俱来的,每个人都不能不知道它是公正和善良的。因此,假设整个国家的人在他们的职业和实践中都一致地、普遍地对他们每个人都知道是真实的、正确的和好的东西撒谎,这不啻是一种矛盾。这足以让我们相信,任何在任何地方被普遍地、被公众认可或允许地违反的实践规则都不能被认为是天生的。
12. The generally allowed breach of a rule proof that it is not innate.
12.一般允许违反规则的证明,它不是天生的。
The breaking of a rule, say you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the GENERALLY ALLOWED breach of it anywhere, I say, is a proof that it is not innate. For example: let us take any of these rules, which, being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men, fewest people have had the impudence to deny or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this: “Parents, preserve and cherish your children.” When, therefore, you say that this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either that it is an innate principle which upon all occasions excites and directs the actions of all men; or else, that it is a truth which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and assent to. But in neither of these senses is it innate. FIRST, that it is not a principle which influences all men’s actions, is what I have proved by the examples before cited: nor need we seek so far as the Mingrelia or Peru to find instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay, and destroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongst the Greeks and Romans to expose, without pity or remorse, their innocent infants. SECONDLY, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also false. For, “Parents preserve your children,” is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all: it being a command, and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some such proposition as this: “It is the duty of parents to preserve their children.” But what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known or supposed without a lawmaker, or without reward and punishment; so that it is impossible that this, or any other, practical principle should be innate, i.e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, innate: for that punishment follows not in this life the breach of this rule, and consequently that it has not the force of a law in countries where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itself evident. But these ideas (which must be all of them innate, if anything as a duty be so) are so far from being innate, that it is not every studious or thinking man, much less every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct; and that one of them, which of all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the idea of God,) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident to any considering man.
你说,违反规则并不能证明它是未知的。我同意这一点:但我说,普遍允许在任何地方违反它,就证明它不是天生的。例如:让我们来看看这些规则中的任何一条,它们是人类理性最明显的推论,也符合大部分人的自然倾向,很少有人厚颜无耻地否认或不顾一切地怀疑。如果说有什么可以被认为是自然形成的,我想没有什么能比这更公平地假装是天生的。"父母,请保护和珍惜你的孩子"。因此,当你说这是一个天生的规则时,你是什么意思?要么是指它是一个天生的原则,在任何情况下都能激发和指导所有人的行动;要么是指它是一个所有人都印在脑海中的真理,因此他们知道并赞同。但在这两种意义上,它都不是天生的。首先,它不是影响所有人行为的原则,这一点我已经通过前面所举的例子证明了:我们也不需要到明格利亚或秘鲁去寻找那些忽视、虐待、毁灭他们孩子的例子;或者只把它看作是某些野蛮人和野蛮民族的残暴行为,因为我们记得在希腊人和罗马人中,暴露他们无辜的婴儿是一种熟悉而不被谴责的做法。其次,说这是一个与生俱来的真理,人人皆知,也是错误的。因为,"父母要保护你们的孩子",与先天的真理相去甚远,它根本就不是真理:它是一个命令,而不是一个命题,所以不可能有真理或谬误。为了使它能够被认同为真理,它必须被简化为这样的命题。"父母有责任保护他们的孩子"。但是,如果没有法律,就无法理解什么是责任;如果没有立法者,或者没有奖惩,就无法知道或推测出法律;因此,这个或任何其他的实际原则不可能是与生俱来的,也就是说,不可能在头脑中留下印记。因此,如果不假定上帝、法律、义务、惩罚和此后的生活等观念是与生俱来的,那么这条原则或任何其他实际原则就不可能是与生俱来的,也就是说,在普遍允许的做法与它背道而驰的国家里,它不具有法律的效力,这一点本身就很明显。但是,这些观念(如果作为一种义务,它们都必须是与生俱来的)远远不是与生俱来的,以至于不是每一个善于学习或思考的人,更不是每一个出生的人,都能在他们身上找到清晰和明确的观念;其中一个观念,在所有其他观念中似乎最有可能是与生俱来的,但却不是如此,(我是指上帝的观念),我想,在下一章,对任何有思想的人来说都会显得非常明显。
13. If men can be ignorant of what is innate, certainty is not described by innate principles.
13.如果人可以对先天的东西一无所知,那么确定性就不是由先天的原则来描述的。
From what has been said, I think we may safely conclude that whatever practical rule is in any place generally and with allowance broken, cannot be supposed innate; it being impossible that men should, without shame or fear, confidently and serenely, break a rule which they could not but evidently know that God had set up, and would certainly punish the breach of, (which they must, if it were innate,) to a degree to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor. Without such a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that anything is his duty. Ignorance or doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appetite; but let any one see the fault, and the rod by it, and with the transgression, a fire ready to punish it; a pleasure tempting, and the hand of the Almighty visibly held up and prepared to take vengeance, (for this must be the case where any duty is imprinted on the mind,) and then tell me whether it be possible for people with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against a law which they carry about them in indelible characters, and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether men, at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an Omnipotent Law-maker, can, with assurance and gaiety, slight and trample underfoot his most sacred injunctions? And lastly, whether it be possible that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and supreme Lawgiver, all the bystanders, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the same sense both of the law and Law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike or laying the least blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men’s appetites; but these are so far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full swing they would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments that will overbalance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the law. If, therefore, anything be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law, all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it. For if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate principles are insisted on, and urged to no purpose; truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them; but men are in the same uncertain floating estate with as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, great enough to make the transgression very uneligible, must accompany an innate law; unless with an innate law they can suppose an innate Gospel too. I would not here be mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate law I thought there were none but positive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i.e. without the help of positive revelation.
从上面所说的,我认为我们可以安全地得出结论,无论任何地方的实用规则被普遍和允许地破坏,都不能被认为是与生俱来的;人们不可能毫无羞耻或恐惧,自信和平静地破坏一个他们不能但显然知道上帝已经设立的规则,并且肯定会惩罚违反者,(如果它是与生俱来的,他们必须这样做),以至于使违反者得到非常不公平的交易。如果没有这样的知识,一个人永远无法确定任何事情是他的责任。对法律的无知或怀疑,希望逃避法律制定者的知识或权力,或类似的情况,可能使人屈服于当前的食欲;但让任何一个人看到错误,并通过它的棒子,以及与违法行为一起,准备好惩罚它的火。然后告诉我,在这样的前景下,在这样确定的知识下,人们是否有可能肆无忌惮地违反他们随身携带的、不可磨灭的法律,而且在他们违反法律的时候还盯着他们的脸?当人们感到自己身上有一个全能的法律制定者的印记时,他们是否可以放心地、愉快地轻视和践踏他最神圣的禁令?最后,当一个人如此公开地藐视这个天生的法律和最高的法律制定者时,所有的旁观者,是的,甚至是人民的长官和统治者,对法律和法律制定者都充满了同样的感觉,他们是否有可能默默地纵容,而不表明他们的厌恶或对其进行丝毫指责?人的食欲中确实有行动的原则;但这些原则远远不是天生的道德原则,如果让它们充分发挥作用,它们会把人带到所有道德的颠覆中去。道德法则被设定为对这些过高欲望的遏制和约束,它们只能通过奖励和惩罚来实现,这些奖励和惩罚将抵消任何人在违反法律时向自己提出的满足。因此,如果有什么东西作为法律印在所有人的脑海中,所有人都必须有一个确定的、不可避免的知识,即违反法律将受到确定的、不可避免的惩罚。因为如果人们对先天的东西一无所知或心存疑虑,那么坚持先天的原则就毫无意义;真理和确定性(所假装的东西)根本无法通过它们得到保障;但人们在有它们和没有它们的情况下,处于同样不确定的浮动状态。对不可避免的惩罚有一个明显的认识,足以使违法行为变得非常不可接受,这必须伴随着先天的法律;除非有了先天的法律,他们也可以假设有先天的福音。我不会在这里误解,好像因为我否认先天的法律,就认为除了积极的法律之外没有其他法律。先天的法则和自然的法则之间有很大的区别,前者是在我们的头脑中印下的东西,后者是我们在不了解的情况下,通过使用和适当地应用我们的自然能力,可以获得知识的东西。我认为他们同样放弃了真理,因为他们走到了相反的极端,要么肯定先天的法律,要么否认有一种法律是可以通过自然之光,即不需要正面启示的帮助来了解的。
14. Those who maintain innate practical Principles tell us not what they are.
14.那些坚持先天实用原则的人没有告诉我们它们是什么。
The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is so evident that I think I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent; and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us WHICH THEY ARE. This might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion; and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity, who, declaring that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living, are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are distracted with. But, in truth, were there any such innate principles there would be no need to teach them. Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy than to know what, and how many, they were. There could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers; and it is like then every system would be ready to give them us by tale. But since nobody, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles; since even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they are. It is easy to foresee, that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypotheses, and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches; a plain evidence that there are no such innate truths. Nay, a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves, that, by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive how anything can be capable of a law that is not a free agent. And upon that ground they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot put MORALITY and MECHANISM together, which are not very easy to be reconciled or made consistent.
人与人之间在实践原则方面的差异是如此明显,以至于我认为我不需要再多说什么来表明,通过这种普遍认同的标志不可能找到任何先天的道德规则;这足以让人怀疑这种先天原则的假设只是一种随心所欲的意见;因为那些如此自信地谈论它们的人却很少告诉我们它们是什么。这可以说是对那些强调这种观点的人的期望;这也让人有机会怀疑他们的知识或慈善,他们宣称上帝已经在人的头脑中打下了知识的基础和生活的规则,但却对他们的邻居的信息或人类的安静如此不利,以至于没有向他们指出,在人所困扰的各种情况下,它们是什么。但是,事实上,如果有任何这样的先天原则,就没有必要教他们。如果人们发现这种先天性的命题印在他们的脑海中,他们就会很容易地把它们与他们后来学习和推导出来的其他真理区分开来;没有什么比知道它们是什么和有多少更容易了。对它们的数量没有任何怀疑,就像对我们手指的数量没有任何怀疑一样;就像那时每个系统都会准备好通过故事给我们提供它们。但据我所知,既然还没有人敢于给出它们的目录,他们就不能责备那些怀疑这些先天原则的人;因为即使是那些要求人们相信存在这种先天命题的人,也没有告诉我们它们是什么。不难预见,如果不同教派的人去给我们列出那些先天的实践原则,他们只会列出适合他们独特假设的原则,并适合支持他们特定学校或教会的教义;这就是没有这种先天真理的明显证据。不,很多人都没有在自己身上找到任何这种先天的道德原则,以至于通过否认人类的自由,从而使人成为赤裸裸的机器,他们不仅拿走了先天的,而且拿走了所有的道德规则,对于那些无法想象不是自由人的东西怎么会有法律的人来说,他们没有可能相信任何这种规则。在这个基础上,他们必须拒绝所有的美德原则,因为他们不能把道德和机械放在一起,这不容易调和或一致。
15. Lord Herbert’s innate Principles examined.
15.赫伯特勋爵的先天性原则受到审查。
When I had written this, being informed that my Lord Herbert had, in his book De Veritate, assigned these innate principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find in a man of so great parts, something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my inquiry. In his chapter De Instinctu Naturali, I met with these six marks of his Notitice Communes:—1. Prioritas. 2. Independentia. 3. Universalitas. 4. Certitudo. 5. Necessitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis conservationem. 6. Modus conformationis, i.e. Assensus nulla interposita mora. And at the latter end of his little treatise De Religione Laici, he says this of these innate principles: Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae, nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiae, p.3 And Veritates nostrae catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei emata in foro interiori descriptae.
当我写完这篇文章后,得知赫伯特勋爵在他的《真理》一书中提到了这些先天的原则,我立即向他咨询,希望能在一个如此优秀的人身上找到一些能让我在这一点上满意的东西,并结束我的调查。在他的De Instinctu Naturali一章中,我看到了他的Notitice Communes的这六个标志:1.Prioritas。2.独立性。3.普遍性。4.4. 确信。5.Necessitas,即他所解释的,faciunt ad hominis conservationem。6.6. Modus conformationis,即Assensus nulla interposita mora。在他的小论文De Religione Laici的后半部分,他对这些先天的原则是这样说的。Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quae ubique vigent veritates.Sunt enim in ipsa mente caelitus descriptae, nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxiae, p.3 And Veritates nostrae catholicae, quae tanquam indubia Dei emata in foro interiori descriptae.
Thus, having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of God, he proceeds to set them down, and they are these:—1. Esse aliquod supremum numen. 2. Numen illud coli debere. 3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimum esse rationem cultus divini. 4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis. 5. Dari praemium vel paenam post hanc vitam transactam. Though I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to, yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions in foro interiori descriptae. For I must take leave to observe:—
因此,在给出了先天原则或普通概念的标志,并断言它们是由上帝之手印在人的头脑中的,他接着列出了它们,它们是:-1.Esse aliquod supremum numen。2.Numen illud coli debere.3.Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimal esse rationem cultus divini.4.4. Resipiscendum esse a peccatis.5.5. Dari praemium vel paenam post hanc vitam transactam.虽然我认为这些都是明确的真理,而且如果解释得当,一个有理性的生物很难不表示赞同,但我认为他远远没有证明这些是内部描述中的先天印象。因为我必须注意到:-
16. These five either not all, or more than all, if there are any.
16.这五个人要么不是全部,要么超过全部,如果有的话。
First, that these five propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common notions written on our minds by the finger of God; if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other propositions which, even by his own rules, have as just a pretence to such an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as at least some of these five he enumerates, viz. ‘Do as thou wouldst be done unto.’ And perhaps some hundreds of others, when well considered.
首先,这五个命题不是所有的,就是超过所有的,那些由上帝的手指写在我们头脑中的普通概念;如果相信有任何东西是这样写的是合理的话。因为还有其他的命题,甚至根据他自己的规则,也有同样的借口,可以作为先天的原则,至少可以接受他列举的这五个命题中的一部分,即'你愿意怎么做就怎么做'。也许还有其他几百条,如果考虑周全的话。
17. The supposed marks wanting.
17.所谓的标记缺失。
Secondly, that all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions, viz. his first, second, and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For, besides that we are assured from history of many men, nay whole nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them, I cannot see how the third, viz. “That virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God,” can be an innate principle, when the name or sound virtue, is so hard to be understood; liable to so much uncertainty in its signification; and the thing it stands for so much contended about and difficult to be known. And therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle.
第二,在他的五个命题中的每一个都找不到他的所有标记,即他的第一、第二和第三标记与这两个命题都不完全一致;第一、第二、第三、第四和第六标记与他的第三、第四和第五命题不一致。因为,除了我们从历史上确信有许多人,甚至整个国家,怀疑或不相信其中的一些或全部内容外,我不明白第三条,即 "美德与虔诚相结合是对上帝最好的崇拜",怎么会是一个天生的原则,因为美德这个名字或声音是如此难以理解,其含义是如此不确定,它所代表的东西是如此多的争论和难以知道。因此,这不能不说是人类实践的一个非常不确定的规则,对我们的生活行为作用很小,因此非常不适合被指定为一个先天的实践原则。
18. Of little use if they were innate.
18.如果它们是先天性的,那就没什么用。
For let us consider this proposition as to its meaning, (for it is the sense, and not sound, that is and must be the principle or common notion,) viz. “Virtue is the best worship of God,” i.e. is most acceptable to him; which, if virtue be taken, as most commonly it is, for those actions which, according to the different opinions of several countries, are accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to God’s will, or to the rule prescribed by God—which is the true and only measure of virtue when virtue is used to signify what is in its own nature right and good—then this proposition, “That virtue is the best worship of God,” will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human life: since it will amount to no more but this, viz. “That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands”;—which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that God doth command; and so be as far from any rule or principle of his actions as he was before. And I think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this, viz. “That God is pleased with the doing of what he himself commands,” for an innate moral principle written on the minds of all men, (however true and certain it may be,) since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so will have reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles; since there are many which have as good a title as this to be received for such, which nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.
因为让我们考虑一下这个命题的含义,(因为它是意义,而不是声音,是而且必须是原则或共同的概念,)即:"美德是对上帝最好的崇拜,"即最能为他所接受;如果像最常见的那样,把美德看作是那些根据几个国家的不同意见被认为是值得称赞的行为,那么这个命题就离确定很远,它就不是真的。如果美德被认为是符合上帝旨意的行为,或符合上帝规定的规则--当美德被用来表示在其本身性质上是正确和良好的东西时,这是衡量美德的真正和唯一的标准--那么这个命题 "美德是对上帝最好的崇拜 "将是最真实和确定的,但在人类生活中却没有什么用处:因为它只相当于这个,即。"一个人当然知道这是真的,但却不知道上帝所命令的是什么;因此,他的行为与以前一样远离任何规则或原则。我认为很少有人会把一个不过如此的命题,即 "上帝喜欢做他自己命令的事",当作写在所有人心目中的先天道德原则,(不管它多么真实和确定),因为它教的东西太少了。无论谁这样做,都有理由认为数以百计的命题是先天的原则;因为有许多命题都有这样的好名声,但却没有人把它们列入先天原则的行列。
19. Scarce possible that God should engrave principles in words of uncertain meaning.
19.上帝几乎不可能把原则刻在意义不明的文字上。
Nor is the fourth proposition (viz. “Men must repent of their sins”) much more instructive, till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down. For the word peccata, or sins, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general ill actions that will draw punishment upon the doers, what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us; without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so? Indeed this is a very true proposition, and fit to be inculcated on and received by those who are supposed to have been taught WHAT actions in all kinds ARE sins: but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be innate principles; nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in men’s minds, and were innate principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will scarcely seem possible that God should engrave principles in men’s minds, in words of uncertain signification, such as VIRTUES and SINS, which amongst different men stand for different things: nay, it cannot be supposed to be in words at all, which, being in most of these principles very general names, cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, and the rules of them,—abstracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man must know, what language soever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no language at all, or never should understand the use of words, as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men. When it shall be made out that men ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that it is part of the worship of God not to kill another man; not to know more women than one not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not to take from another what is his, though we want it ourselves, but on the contrary, relieve and supply his wants; and whenever we have done the contrary we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more;—when I say, all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules, all of which come under these two general words made use of above, viz. virtutes et peccata virtues and sins, there will be more reason for admitting these and the like, for common notions and practical principles. Yet, after all, universal consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.
第四个命题(即 "人必须为自己的罪孽忏悔")也更有启发性,直到确定了罪孽所指的行为是什么。因为peccata或sins这个词,就像它通常表示的那样,一般是指会给行为人带来惩罚的不良行为,如果不知道那些会给我们带来祸害的具体行为是什么,那么告诉我们应该感到抱歉,并停止做那些会给我们带来祸害的事情,这又是多么伟大的道德原则?的确,这是一个非常正确的命题,适合由那些被认为已经被教导过的人灌输和接受,即各种行为都是罪过:但这和前者都不能被认为是天生的原则;如果它们是天生的,也没有任何用处,除非所有美德和恶习的具体措施和界限都刻在人们的头脑中,并且也是天生的原则,我认为这是很值得怀疑的。因此,我想,上帝几乎不可能把原则刻在人的头脑中,用含义不明确的词,如VIRTUES和SINS,它们在不同的人中代表不同的东西:不,它根本不可能被认为是用词,因为在大多数这些原则中,它们是非常一般的名字,只有知道它们下所包含的细节,才能理解。在实际的例子中,必须从行动本身的知识和行动的规则中采取措施--从文字中抽象出来,而且是在名称知识之前;一个人必须知道这些规则,无论他碰巧学什么语言,无论是英语还是日本,或者如果他根本不学语言,或者永远不懂使用文字,就像发生在哑巴和聋子身上的情况。当人们发现,不懂语言的人,或者没有被他们国家的法律和习俗教育过的人,知道不杀另一个人是崇拜上帝的一部分;不认识比一个人更多的女人,不堕胎;不暴露自己的孩子;不从别人那里拿走属于他的东西,尽管我们自己想要,但相反,缓解和供应他的需求。当我们做了相反的事情时,我们应该忏悔,感到抱歉,并决心不再这样做;--当我说,所有的人都将被证明实际上知道并允许所有这些以及其他一千条这样的规则,所有这些都属于上面使用的这两个一般的词,即。罪行和美德,就会有更多的理由接受这些和类似的东西,作为共同的概念和实践原则。然而,毕竟,对真理的普遍认同(如果在道德原则中存在的话),而这些真理的知识可以通过其他方式获得,那就很难证明它们是天生的;这就是我所主张的。
20. Objection, Innate Principles may be corrupted, answered.
20.反对意见:先天性原则可能会被破坏,已回答。
Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very material answer, viz. that the innate principles of morality may, by education, and custom, and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse, be darkened, and at last quite worn out of the minds of men. Which assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of universal consent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved; unless those men will think it reasonable that their private persuasions, or that of their party, should pass for universal consent;—a thing not unfrequently done, when men, presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument stands thus:—“The principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those that men of right reason admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and those of our mind, are men of reason; therefore, we agreeing, our principles are innate”;—which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to infallibility. For otherwise it will be very hard to understand how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles which are not, by depraved custom and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men: which is to say, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny and dissent from them. And indeed the supposition of SUCH first principles will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them, if they may, by any human power—such as the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions—be altered or lost in us: and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles and innate light, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty as if there were no such thing at all: it being all one to have no rule, and one that will warp any way; or amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning innate principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can or cannot, by education and custom, be blurred and blotted out; if they cannot, we must find them in all mankind alike, and they must be clear in everybody; and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain, in children and illiterate people, who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact and daily observation.
在这里,提供一个非常现成但不太重要的答案也没有什么意义,那就是道德的先天原则可能会因为教育和习俗,以及我们交谈的人的普遍意见而变得暗淡,并最终从人们的头脑中完全消失。他们的这一论断,如果是真的,就完全失去了普遍同意的论据,而这种关于先天原则的观点正是通过这种论据来证明的;除非那些人认为他们的私人劝说或他们党派的劝说应该成为普遍同意是合理的;当人们自以为是正确理性的唯一主人,把人类其他人的投票和意见视为不值得计算的时候,这种事情并非不经常发生。然后他们的论点是这样的:"全人类都承认的原则是真实的,是天生的;那些具有正确理性的人所承认的原则是全人类所承认的;我们,以及我们心中的人,是具有理性的人;因此,我们同意,我们的原则是天生的";这是一种非常漂亮的论证方式,是通往无误的捷径。因为否则就很难理解,怎么会有一些所有的人都承认并同意的原则;而这些原则却没有一个不被堕落的习俗和不良的教育从许多人的头脑中抹去:也就是说,所有的人都承认,但许多人却否认并反对它们。事实上,假设有这样的首要原则,对我们的作用不大;如果这些原则可能因任何人力--如我们老师的意愿或我们同伴的意见--而被改变或丧失,我们将像没有这些原则一样无所适从。尽管有了这些关于第一原则和先天之光的夸耀,我们仍将处于黑暗和不确定之中,就像根本不存在这样的东西一样:没有规则和一个会扭曲的规则,或者在各种相反的规则中,不知道哪个是正确的,这都是一种。但是,关于先天的原则,我希望这些人能够说,它们是否能够通过教育和习俗而被模糊和抹去;如果不能,我们必须在全人类中找到它们,它们在每个人身上都必须是清晰的;如果它们可能因外来的观念而发生变化,那么我们必须在离源头最近的地方,在儿童和文盲身上找到它们最清晰、最明确的,因为他们从外国观点中得到的印象最少。让他们选择自己喜欢的一面,他们一定会发现这与可见的事实和日常观察不一致。
21. Contrary Principles in the World.
21.世界上相反的原则。
I easily grant that there are great numbers of opinions which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and embraced as first and unquestionable principles; many whereof, both for their absurdity as well oppositions to one another, it is impossible should be true. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason are so sacred somewhere or other, that men even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.
我很容易承认,有大量的观点,被不同国家、不同教育和不同脾气的人接受和拥护为第一和不容置疑的原则;其中许多观点,由于其荒谬性和相互对立,不可能是真的。但是,所有这些命题,无论多么远离理性,在某处或其他地方都是如此神圣,以至于人们即使在其他问题上有良好的理解力,也会很快放弃他们的生命和他们最亲爱的东西,而不是让自己怀疑或让别人质疑它们的真理。
22. How men commonly come by their Principles.
22.人们通常是如何得出他们的原则的。
This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day’s experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of PRINCIPLES in religion or morality. For such, who are careful (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in,) instil into the unwary, and as yet unprejudiced, understanding, (for white paper receives any characters,) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.
无论看起来多么奇怪,这都是每天的经验所证实的;如果我们考虑到它产生的方式和步骤,也许就不会显得那么奇妙了;以及它是如何真正发生的,即那些从护士的迷信或老妇人的权威中衍生出来的教义,经过长时间和邻居们的同意,可以成长为宗教或道德方面的原则的尊严。因为那些小心翼翼(正如他们所说的)对儿童进行良好教育的人(很少有人没有为他们制定一套他们所相信的原则),会把他们想让他们保留和信奉的那些教义灌输给那些不知情的、还没有判断力的人(因为白纸可以接受任何字符)。这些教条在他们有任何理解的时候就被教给了他们;并且在他们成长的过程中,通过所有与他们有关的人的公开职业或默许,或者至少通过那些他们对其智慧、知识和虔诚有看法的人的确认,他们从不接受这些命题被提及,而是作为他们建立其宗教和礼仪的基础和依据,通过这些手段,他们有了无可置疑、不言自明和天生的真理的名誉。
23. Principles supposed innate because we do not remember when we began to hold them.
23.原则应该是与生俱来的,因为我们不记得我们何时开始持有这些原则。
To which we may add, that when men so instructed are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find anything more ancient there than those opinions, which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their parents with veneration; not because it is natural: nor do children do it where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.
对此,我们可以补充说,当受过这样教育的人长大成人,反思自己的思想时,他们找不到比那些观点更古老的东西,而这些观点是在他们的记忆开始记录他们的行为,或在他们出现任何新事物的时候被教导的;因此,他们毫不犹豫地得出结论,那些他们在自己身上找不到原始知识的主张,肯定是上帝和自然在他们心中留下的印象,而不是由任何其他人教导他们。他们接受并服从这些,就像许多人对他们的父母怀有敬意一样;不是因为这是自然的:孩子们在没有被这样教导的地方也会这样做;而是因为他们一直受到这样的教育,而且对这种尊重的开始没有印象,他们认为这是自然的。
24. How such principles come to be held.
24.这种原则是如何形成的。
This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind and the constitution of human affairs; wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings; nor be at quiet in their minds without SOME foundation or principle to rest their thoughts on. There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some reverenced propositions, which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings, and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and wrong; which some, wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some being taught that they ought not to examine, there are few to be found who are not exposed by their ignorance, laziness, education, or precipitancy, to TAKE THEM UPON TRUST.
如果我们考虑到人类的本性和人类事务的结构,就会发现这很有可能,而且几乎不可避免地会发生;在这里,大多数人如果不把时间用在他们的日常工作中,就无法生活;如果没有一些基础或原则来支撑他们的思想,他们的头脑也无法安静。几乎没有一个人的理解力如此漂浮和肤浅,没有一些受人尊敬的命题,这些命题对他来说是他推理的基础,也是他判断真理和谬误、正确和错误的原则;一些人由于缺乏技能和闲暇,另一些人缺乏倾向,还有一些人被教导说他们不应该检查,很少有人不因为他们的无知、懒惰、教育或轻率而把它们当作信任。
25. Further explained.
25.进一步解释。
This is evidently the case of all children and young folk; and custom, a greater power than nature, seldom failing to make them worship for divine what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure, parts, and will, who is there almost that dare shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is everywhere prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party? And where is the man to be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or atheist; which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more afraid to question those principles, when he shall think them, as most men do, the standards set up by God in his mind, to be the rule and touchstone of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most reverenced by others?
这显然是所有儿童和年轻人的情况;习惯是一种比自然更强大的力量,它很少不使他们把她使他们屈服于自己的思想和理解的东西当作神圣的东西来崇拜,这就难怪成年男子,要么在必要的生活事务中感到困惑,要么在追求快乐的过程中感到兴奋,不应该认真坐下来审查自己的信条;特别是当他们的原则之一是,原则不应受到质疑。如果人们有闲暇,有部分时间,有意愿,有谁敢动摇他过去所有思想和行为的基础,并忍受使自己长期完全陷入错误和误差的耻辱?有谁足够坚强,能够与那些敢于冒险反对其国家或政党的公认意见的人所准备的责难相抗衡?又有哪一个人能够耐心地准备承受异想天开、怀疑论者或无神论者的名号呢;他肯定会遇到这样的名号,谁会丝毫不顾忌任何常见的观点呢?当他像大多数人一样认为这些原则是上帝在他心中设立的标准,是所有其他观点的规则和试金石时,他就会更害怕质疑这些原则。当他发现这些原则是他自己所有思想中最早的,也是别人最崇敬的,还有什么能阻止他认为它们是神圣的呢?
26. A worship of idols.
26.对偶像的崇拜。
It is easy to imagine how, by these means, it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors; become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys, and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions. Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit. For, since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who through laziness or avocation do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proof themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up, from his education and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands.
不难想象,通过这些手段,人们是如何崇拜在他们心中树立的偶像的;越来越喜欢他们在那里长期熟悉的概念;在荒谬和错误上打上神圣的烙印;成为公牛和猴子的狂热支持者,并为捍卫自己的观点而争论、战斗和死亡。Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit.因为,由于灵魂的推理能力几乎一直在使用,虽然并不总是谨慎或明智地使用,但由于缺乏基础和立足点,在大多数人身上,他们由于懒惰或职业不做,或由于缺乏时间,或真正的帮助,或由于其他原因,不能深入到知识的原则,并追踪真理的源泉和原始,对他们来说,很自然,几乎不可避免地采取了一些借用的原则。这些原则被认为是其他事物的明显证据,所以他们认为自己不需要任何其他证据。谁要是把这些东西接受到他的头脑中,并以通常对原则的敬畏之心对待它们,从不冒险去研究它们,而是习惯于相信它们,因为它们是可以被相信的,那么他就可能从他的教育和他的国家的时尚中,把任何荒谬的东西当作先天的原则;并且通过对相同对象的长期研究,使他的视线如此模糊,以至于把寄存在他自己大脑中的怪物当作神的形象和他手艺的作品。
27. Principles must be examined.
27.必须对原则进行审查。
By this progress, how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed, in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men. And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one’s principles can be questioned. If they may and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the MARKS and CHARACTERS whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others: that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt; since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of any innate principles.
通过这种进展,有多少人得出了他们认为是与生俱来的原则,这一点可以从各种类型和程度的人所持有和争论的各种相反的原则中很容易看到。如果有人否认这是大多数人对其原则的真实性和证据的保证的方法,那么他也许会发现很难用其他方法来解释相反的信条,这些信条被坚定地相信,自信地宣称,而且许多人随时准备用他们的血来封印。事实上,如果先天的原则有特权,可以根据自己的权威被接受,而不需要审查,我不知道什么是不能相信的,也不知道任何人的原则如何被质疑。如果它们可以而且应该被检查和检验,我希望知道如何检验最初的和先天的原则;或者至少有理由要求提供标志和特征,以便将真正的先天原则与其他原则区分开来:这样,在各种各样的伪装者中,我可以避免在如此重要的一点上犯错误。当这一点做到了,我就会准备接受这些受欢迎的、有用的建议;在那之前,我可以谦虚地表示怀疑;因为我担心普遍的同意,也就是唯一产生的同意,几乎不能证明是一个足够的标志来指导我的选择,并向我保证任何天生的原则。
From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.
从上述内容来看,我认为没有什么实际的原则是所有人都同意的,因此也没有什么天生的原则。
1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate
1.原则不是天生的,除非他们的思想是天生的
Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the IDEAS which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the PROPOSITIONS made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For, where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.
如果那些想说服我们存在先天性原则的人不是把它们放在一起,而是分别考虑这些命题所包含的部分,他们也许就不会这么早地相信它们是先天性的。因为,如果构成这些真理的理念不是天生的,那么由它们构成的命题就不可能是天生的,或者我们对它们的认识是与生俱来的。因为,如果观念不是天生的,那么就有一个时期,头脑中没有这些原则;那么它们就不是天生的,而是来自于其他原始的。因为,如果观念本身不存在,就不可能有知识,不可能有同意,不可能有关于它们的精神或语言命题。
2. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with children
2.思想,特别是属于原则的思想,不是与生俱来的
If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of IDEAS ANSWERING THE TERMS WHICH MAKE UP THOSE UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE ESTEEMED INNATE PRINCIPLES. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor other, than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind.
如果我们认真考虑一下新生儿,我们就没有理由认为他们把许多想法带到了世界上。因为,除了他们在子宫里可能感受到的一些饥饿、口渴、温暖和一些疼痛的微弱想法之外,在他们身上丝毫看不出有任何固定的想法;特别是回答那些被认为是内在原则的普遍性建议的想法。人们可能会发现,后来的想法是如何逐步进入他们的头脑的;除了经验和对挡在他们面前的事物的观察,他们没有得到更多,也没有得到其他;这可能足以让我们确信,他们不是印在头脑中的原始特征。
3. Impossibility and Identity not innate ideas
3.不可能和身份不是天生的想法
“It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,” is certainly (if there be any such) an innate PRINCIPLE. But can any one think, or will any one say, that “impossibility” and “identity” are two innate IDEAS? Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they those which are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of IMPOSSIBILE EST IDEM ESSE, ET NON ESSE, that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger; or that makes it fond of the one and flee the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles which it never yet knew or understood? The names IMPOSSIBILITY and IDENTITY stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us, so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe, upon examination it will be found that many grown men want them.
"同一事物不可能存在,也不可能不存在",这当然是(如果有的话)一个天生的原则。但是,有人会认为,或者有人会说,"不可能 "和 "同一性 "是两个天生的观念吗?它们是所有的人都有的,并带入世界的吗?它们是那些在儿童中最先出现的,并且是所有后天获得的观念的前奏吗?如果它们是与生俱来的,它们就必须是这样。在孩子对白色或黑色、甜味或苦味有概念之前,他们是否对不可能性和特性有概念?难道是由于对这一原则的了解,它才得出结论说,在乳头上涂抹的艾草与以前从乳头上得到的味道不一样吗?是对 "不可能 "的实际了解,让孩子区分母亲和陌生人;还是让孩子喜欢一个人,逃离另一个人?还是心灵通过它从来没有过的想法来调节自己和它的同意?或者理解力从它从未知道或理解的原则中得出结论?不可能性和同一性这两个名字代表了两种观念,它们远远不是与生俱来的,也不是与生俱来的,我认为要在我们的理解中形成它们,需要非常谨慎和注意。它们远远不是与我们一起来到这个世界上的,与婴幼儿时期的想法相去甚远,我相信,经过研究,会发现许多成年人都想要它们。
4. Identity, an Idea not innate.
4.身份,一个不是与生俱来的想法。
If IDENTITY (to instance that alone) be a native impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us that we must needs know it even from our cradles, I would gladly be resolved by any one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same, with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear that our idea of SAMENESS is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths, but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose every one’s idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and thousands of his followers have. And which then shall be true? Which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate?
如果同一性(仅举一例)是一种天生的印象,因此对我们来说是如此清晰和明显,以至于我们甚至从摇篮里就必须知道它,那么我很乐意让任何一个七岁或七十岁的人解决这个问题,一个人,作为一个由灵魂和身体组成的生物,在他的身体改变时是否还是同一个人?欧福尔巴斯和毕达哥拉斯有相同的灵魂,他们是否是同一个人,尽管他们生活的年代相差甚远?还有,那只拥有相同灵魂的公鸡,与他们两个人是否也是一样的呢?由此可见,我们对 "SAMENESS "的概念并不是那么确定和清晰,以至于不值得被认为是我们与生俱来的。因为如果这些先天性的观念不明确、不清晰,以至于不能被普遍认识和自然认同,那么它们就不可能成为普遍的、毋庸置疑的真理的主题,而会成为永远不确定的不可避免的场合。因为,我想每个人对身份的概念都不会和毕达哥拉斯及其成千上万的追随者一样。那么,哪些是真的呢?哪一个是天生的?还是有两种不同的身份观念,都是天生的?
5. What makes the same man?
5.什么使同一个人?
Nor let any one think that the questions I have here proposed about the identity of man are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to show, that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity. He that shall with a little attention reflect on the resurrection, and consider that divine justice will bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it perhaps not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists; and will not be forward to think he, and every one, even children themselves, have naturally a clear idea of it.
也不要让任何人认为,我在这里提出的关于人的身份的问题是赤裸裸的空洞猜测;如果是这样,就足以表明,在人的理解中没有与生俱来的身份观念。如果他稍加注意思考复活,并考虑到神圣的正义将在最后一天将同样的人送上审判台,这些人在另一个世界里是快乐的还是痛苦的,他们在这一生中做得很好还是很糟糕,他也许会发现自己不容易解决什么是同一个人,或者身份在哪里;并且不会提前认为他和每个人,甚至孩子们自己,都自然地有一个明确的想法。
6. Whole and Part not innate ideas.
6.整体和部分不是先天的观念。
Let us examine that principle of mathematics, viz. THAT THE WHOLE IS BIGGER THAN A PART. This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so; which yet nobody can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it, WHOLE and PART, are perfectly relative; but the positive ideas to which they properly and immediately belong are extension and number, of which alone whole and part are relations. So that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too; it being impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number, I leave to be considered by those who are the patrons of innate principles.
让我们研究一下数学原理,即 "整体大于部分"。我认为,这被认为是先天的原则之一。我确信它有足够的资格被认为是这样的;然而,当他考虑到它所包含的概念,即整体和部分,是完全相对的,没有人会认为它是这样的;但它们正确和直接属于的正面概念是延伸和数量,只有整体和部分是关系。因此,如果整体和部分是与生俱来的观念,那么延伸和数量也必须是如此;如果对它所属的事物和它所依据的事物没有任何观念,就不可能有关系的观念。现在,人的头脑中是否自然而然地印上了延伸和数量的概念,我留待那些先天原则的拥护者来考虑。
7. Idea of Worship not innate.
7.7. 崇拜的观念不是天生的。
That GOD IS TO BE WORSHIPPED, is, without doubt, as great a truth as any that can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles. But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of GOD and WORSHIP are innate. That the idea the term worship stands for is not in the understanding of children, and a character stamped on the mind in its first original, I think will be easily granted, by any one that considers how few there be amongst grown men who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be anything more ridiculous than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, “That God is to be worshipped,” and yet that they know not what that worship of God is, which is their duty. But to pass by this.
毋庸置疑,上帝是要被敬拜的,这是能进入人类心灵的最伟大的真理,在所有实用的原则中应居于首位。但是,除非上帝和敬拜的观念是天生的,否则决不能认为这是天生的。崇拜这个词所代表的概念并不在儿童的理解中,也不是最初就印在脑海中的特征,我想任何一个人只要考虑到成年男子中很少有人对它有清晰明确的概念,就会很容易接受。我想,没有什么比说孩子们有这个与生俱来的实际原则,即 "要崇拜上帝",但他们却不知道什么是对上帝的崇拜,而这是他们的责任,更可笑的了。但是,这一点可以忽略不计。
8. Idea of God not innate.
8.8. 上帝的观念不是天生的。
If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of GOD may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity. Without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, and in the Caribbee islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo, in Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum Conversione, has these words: Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum, et hominis animam significet; nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.
如果有任何观念可以被认为是与生俱来的,那么在所有其他观念中,由于许多原因,上帝的观念可以被认为是与生俱来的;因为很难想象,如果没有一个与生俱来的上帝观念,怎么会有与生俱来的道德原则。如果没有制定法律的人的概念,就不可能有法律的概念和遵守法律的义务。除了在古人中注意到的无神论者,并在历史记录中留下烙印外,在这些后来的时代中,难道导航没有发现在索尔达尼亚湾、巴西和加勒比群岛等地的整个民族中没有上帝的概念,没有宗教?Nicholaus del Techo在Literis ex Paraquaria, de Caiguarum Conversione一书中有这样的话。Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum, et hominis animam significet; nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.
And perhaps, if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity upon their minds, and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason. And though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet perhaps we should hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magistrate’s sword, or their neighbour’s censure, tie up people’s tongues; which, were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do.
也许,如果我们注意观察不远处人们的生活和言论,我们就会有太多的理由担心,在更文明的国家,许多人的头脑中没有非常强烈和清晰的神性印象,而在讲坛上对无神论的抱怨也不是没有道理。尽管现在只有一些放荡不羁的可怜虫过于赤裸裸地承认了这一点;但是,如果不是因为害怕地方官的刀剑或邻居的指责而束缚了人们的舌头,也许我们应该从其他人那里听到更多的消息;如果消除了对惩罚或耻辱的担忧,他们会像生活一样公开宣称自己的无神论。
9. The name of God not universal or obscure in meaning.
9.神的名字不是普遍的,也不是含义模糊的。
But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary,) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For, though no nation were to be found without a name, and some few dark notions of him, yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind; no more than the names of fire, or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate; because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of men’s minds, any argument against the being of a God; any more than it would be a proof that there was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing nor a name for it; or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them. For, men being furnished with words, by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if they carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind,—the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the further; especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity. And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the minds of all that have but once heard of it is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it, that it seems stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as to want the notion of a God, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.
但是,如果所有的人都有上帝的概念,(但历史告诉我们,情况恰恰相反),这并不意味着关于他的想法是天生的。因为,尽管没有一个国家没有关于他的名字和一些黑暗的概念,但这并不能证明它们是心灵上的自然印象;就像火、太阳、热或数字的名字证明它们所代表的观念是天生的一样;因为这些东西的名字和它们的观念在人类中是如此普遍地被接受和了解。相反,没有这样的名字,或者人们头脑中没有这样的概念,也不是反对上帝存在的任何论据;就像它可以证明世界上没有负载石一样,因为大部分人既没有这样的概念,也没有这样的名字;或者可以证明没有不同种类的天使,或高于我们的智慧生命,因为我们没有这样不同种类的概念,也没有它们的名字。因为,人们通过自己国家的通用语言获得了词汇,就很难避免对那些与他们交谈时经常提到的事物的名称有某种想法。如果它们带有卓越、伟大或非凡的概念;如果忧虑和关注伴随着它;如果对绝对和不可抗拒的力量的恐惧使它在头脑中形成,那么这个想法就有可能越陷越深,越传越远;特别是如果它是这样一种想法,符合普通的理性之光,并且可以从我们知识的每个部分自然推导出来,就像上帝的概念一样。因为非凡的智慧和能力的明显标志如此明显地出现在所有受造物的作品中,以至于一个有理性的生物,只要认真思考一下,就不会错过发现神性的机会。发现这样一个存在必然会对所有曾经听说过它的人的思想产生影响,这种影响是如此之大,并伴随着思想和交流的重量,以至于在我看来,在任何地方发现整个国家的人如此野蛮地想要一个上帝的概念,比他们没有任何数字或火的概念更奇怪。
10. Ideas of God and idea of Fire.
10.上帝的观念和火的观念。
The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all generations: though yet the general reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate; but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people having once received so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again.
上帝的名字一旦在世界任何地方被提及,以表达一个优越的、强大的、有智慧的、不可见的存在,这种概念适合于普通的理性原则,而且人们总是有兴趣经常提及它,必然会将它传播得很远很广;并将它延续到所有世代。然而,这个名字的普遍接受,以及由此传达给人类中不善于思考的部分的一些不完善和不稳定的概念,并不证明这个概念是与生俱来的;而只是证明做出这个发现的人正确地运用了他们的理性,对事物的原因进行了成熟的思考,并将它们追溯到它们的本源;其他考虑不周的人一旦从他们那里接受了如此重要的概念,就不会轻易再失去它。
11. Idea of God not innate.
11.上帝的观念不是天生的。
This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no further than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate; since I think it may be truly said, that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it, how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides; and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of a God, till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.
这就是可以从上帝的概念中推断出的一切,如果它普遍存在于人类的所有部落中,并且被所有国家的成年男子普遍承认。因为我想,承认上帝的普遍性不会超过这个范围;如果这足以证明上帝的概念是与生俱来的,那么也会证明火的概念是与生俱来的;因为我认为可以真实地说,世界上没有一个人有上帝的概念,而他没有火的概念。我不怀疑,如果把一群幼童放在一个没有火的岛上,他们肯定不会对这种东西有任何概念,也不会为它命名,不管它在全世界是如何被接受和了解。也许他们的忧虑也会与上帝的任何名字或概念相去甚远,直到他们中的某个人用他的思想去探究事物的结构和原因,这将很容易引导他产生上帝的概念;一旦将这种概念传授给其他人,理性和他们自己思想的自然倾向,就会在他们中间传播和延续。
12. Suitable to God’s goodness, that all Men should have an idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him, answered.
12.适合上帝的仁慈,所有的人都应该有一个关于他的想法,因此自然而然地被他印证,回答。
Indeed it is urged, that it is suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand a concernment; and also, by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.
的确,有人认为,在人的头脑中烙下关于他自己的特征和概念,而不是让他们在如此重大的问题上处于黑暗和怀疑之中,这符合上帝的仁慈;而且,通过这种方式,可以确保像人这样聪明的生物对他应有的敬意和崇敬;因此,他已经这样做。
This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who use it in this case expect from it. For, if we may conclude that God hath done for men all that men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove, not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself, but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him; all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge, as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God (Acts xvii. 27); than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the same reason, say it is better for men that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether, by the force of this argument, they shall think that every man IS so. I think it a very good argument to say,—the infinitely wise God hath made it so; and therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom to say,—‘I think it best; and therefore God hath made it so.’ And in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the mind; since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to show, that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses,—which some people in the world, however of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without ideas of God and principles of morality, or at least have but very ill ones; the reason in both cases being, that they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers industriously that way, but contented themselves with the opinions, fashions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any further. Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there. And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England, he had been perhaps as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician as any in it; the difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other or further inquiries. And if he had not any idea of a God, it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it.
这个论点,如果它有任何力量,将证明比那些在本案中使用它的人所期望的更多。因为,如果我们可以得出结论,上帝为人们做了所有人们认为对他们最好的事情,因为这样做符合他的仁慈,这将证明,上帝不仅在人们的头脑中印下了对他自己的想法,而且他在那里以公平的角色明确地印下了人们应该知道或相信他的一切;他们应该顺从他的意志而做的一切;他还赋予他们符合它的意志和情感。毫无疑问,每个人都会认为这对人更好,而不是让他们在黑暗中摸索知识,就像圣保罗告诉我们所有国家都在追寻上帝(使徒行传第27章);不是让他们的意志与他们的理解发生冲突,他们的食欲与他们的责任发生冲突。罗马教派说,对人来说是最好的,也很适合上帝的仁慈,在地球上应该有一个无懈可击的争议法官;因此,有一个。而我,基于同样的理由,说对人来说,每个人自己都应该是无懈可击的。我让他们考虑,根据这个论点的力量,他们是否会认为每个人都是如此。我认为这是一个很好的论据,即无限智慧的上帝已经这样做了;因此,这是最好的。但在我看来,说 "我认为这是最好的,因此上帝让它如此",似乎有点太相信我们自己的智慧了。而在眼前的问题上,如果从这样的话题出发,认为上帝已经这样做了,那是徒劳的,因为某些经验告诉我们,他没有这样做。但是,上帝的仁慈对人来说并不缺乏,因为他给人配备了那些能力,这些能力将有助于充分发现这种存在的目的所需的一切事物;我毫不怀疑地表明,一个人通过正确使用他的自然能力,可以在没有任何先天原则的情况下获得对上帝和与他有关的其他事物的认识。上帝既然赋予人以他所拥有的这些知识能力,那么他的仁慈就没有义务在他的头脑中植入这些先天的观念,就像他给了他理智、双手和材料,就应该为他建造桥梁或房屋一样,而世界上有些人,无论他的身体多么好,要么完全缺乏这些东西,要么就是供应不足,就像其他人完全没有上帝的观念和道德的原则,或者至少有非常糟糕的观念。这两种情况的原因是,他们从来没有勤奋地利用他们的部分、能力和力量,而是满足于他们国家的观点、时尚和事物,因为他们发现它们,而没有进一步寻找。如果你或我出生在索尔达尼亚湾,我们的思想和观念可能不会超过居住在那里的霍屯督人的那些野蛮的思想。如果弗吉尼亚国王阿波坎卡纳在英国接受了教育,他也许和英国人一样是个有见识的神学家和优秀的数学家;他和一个更优秀的英国人之间的区别仅仅在于,他的能力的发挥被限制在他自己国家的方式、模式和观念之内,而从未被引导到任何其他或进一步的探索。如果他没有任何关于上帝的想法,那只是因为他没有追寻那些可以引导他的想法。
13. Ideas of God various in different Men.
13.不同的人对上帝有不同的看法。
I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his Maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God? He that shall observe in children the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings; nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects; to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How, by these means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter show.
我承认,如果有任何观念印在人的头脑中,我们有理由期待它应该是造物主的观念,作为上帝在他自己的作品上设置的标记,让人知道他的依赖性和责任;在这里应该出现人类知识的最初实例。但是,在儿童身上发现这样的概念有多晚呢?当我们发现它时,它与老师的观点和概念有多大的相似之处,而不是代表真神?观察孩子们的思维进展,从而使他们获得他们所拥有的知识的人,会认为他们首先和最熟悉的对象是那些对他们的理解产生最初印象的对象;他也不会发现任何其他的脚步声。我们很容易注意到他们的思想是如何扩大的,只有当他们熟悉了更多种类的可感对象;在他们的记忆中保留了关于它们的想法;获得了复合和扩大它们的技能,并以多种方式将它们组合起来。通过这些手段,他们是如何在头脑中形成人们对神灵的想法的,我将在下文中说明。
14. Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name.
14.在同一个名字下,对上帝的想法是相互矛盾和不一致的。
Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger, when we see that, in the same country, under one and the same name, men have far different, nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or sound, will scarce prove an innate notion of him.
当我们看到,在同一个国家,在同一个名字下,人们对上帝的想法有很大的不同,甚至经常是相反和不一致的想法和概念时,是否可以认为人们对上帝的想法是他自己的性格和标记,由他自己的手指刻在他们的头脑中?他们对一个名字或声音的认同,并不能证明他们对他有一种天生的概念。
15. Gross ideas of God.
15.对上帝的粗暴观念。
What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity were excluded. To which, if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, expressed in their images and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world, i.e. the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality of consent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, it will be only this:—that God imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language, a NAME for himself, but not any IDEA; since those people who agreed in the name, had, at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several parts of his providence, I answer: what they might be in the original I will not here inquire; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm. And he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13, (not to mention other testimonies,) will find that the theology of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the Abbe de Choisy more judiciously remarks in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 107/177, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all. 16. Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it.
他们承认并崇拜数以百计的神,他们能有什么真正的或可容忍的神的概念呢?他们所拥有的每一个神灵都是他们对神无知的无懈可击的证据,也是他们没有真正的神的概念的证明,在那里,统一性、无限性和永恒性被排除在外。除此之外,如果我们再加上他们对肉体的粗暴概念,表现在他们对神灵的形象和表现上;他们赋予他们的神灵的爱恋、婚姻、交媾、情欲、争吵和其他卑劣的品质;我们就没有什么理由认为异教徒世界,即人类的大部分,在他们的头脑中对上帝有这样的想法,而他本人出于对他们不应误解他的关心,是他的作者。这种普遍的认同,如果它能证明任何本地的印象,那也只能是这样:上帝在所有说同样语言的人的头脑中为他自己印上了一个名字,而不是任何理念;因为那些同意这个名字的人,同时又对所象征的事物有很不同的理解。如果他们说,异教徒所崇拜的各种神灵不过是表达那个不可理解的存在的若干属性或其天命的若干部分的形象化方式,我回答说:它们在原文中可能是什么,我不会在此询问;但它们在俗人的思想中是如此,我想没有人会肯定。查阅贝里特主教的航程,第13节,(更不用说其他证据了)就会发现,暹罗人的神学自称拥有多个神:或者,正如Choisy神父在他的《暹罗航行日志》(107/177)中更明智地指出,它包括承认根本没有上帝。16.16. 上帝的概念不是与生俱来的,尽管所有国家的智者都会有这种想法。
If it be said, that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But then this,
如果有人说,各国的智者都对神的统一性和无限性有了真正的概念,我同意。但是,这一点。
First, excludes universality of consent in anything but the name; for those wise men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.
首先,除了名字之外,排除了同意的普遍性;因为那些智者非常少,也许是一千人中的一个,这种普遍性是非常狭窄的。
Secondly, it seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men have of God were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties: since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate; for that also wise men have always had.
第二,在我看来,这清楚地证明,人们对上帝最真实和最好的观念不是印出来的,而是通过思考和冥想,以及正确使用他们的能力而获得的。因为世界上聪明和体贴的人,通过正确和谨慎地运用他们的思想和理智,在这个问题和其他事情上获得了真正的观念;而懒惰和不体贴的人,远远多于他们,从普通的传统和庸俗的概念中偶然获得了他们的观念,而没有对他们进行太多的思考。如果认为上帝的概念是天生的,因为所有的智者都有这种概念,那么美德也必须被认为是天生的;因为智者也一直有这种概念。
17. Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men.
17.人间常见的关于上帝的古怪、低级和可怜的想法。
This was evidently the case of all Gentilism. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and the true ideas of him. How many even amongst us, will be found upon inquiry to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians as well as Turks have had whole sects owning and contending earnestly for it,—that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few now amongst us who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with that own it,) yet I believe he that will make it his business may find amongst the ignorant and uninstructed Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that, though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man; much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. There was never any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them; though yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) UNIVERSAL CONSENT, such an one I easily allow; but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.
这显然是所有外邦人的情况。即使在只承认一个上帝的犹太人、基督教徒和伊斯兰教徒中,这种教义以及这些国家为教导人们对上帝的真正概念而采取的措施,也盛行到使人们对他有相同和真正的想法。甚至在我们当中,有多少人在被问及时,会发现他们把他想象成一个坐在天堂里的人;以及对他有许多其他荒唐和不合适的概念?基督徒和土耳其人都有整个教派拥有并认真地争论它--神是有形的,是人形的:虽然我们现在发现在我们中间自称是拟人者的人很少,(虽然我遇到的一些人拥有这种说法),但我相信,如果他愿意做他的工作,可以在无知和未受教育的基督徒中找到许多这种观点。只要与几乎任何年龄段的乡下人或几乎任何情况下的年轻人交谈,你就会发现,尽管上帝的名字经常出现在他们口中,但他们应用这个名字的概念是如此古怪、低级和可怜,以至于没有人能够想象它们是由一个有理性的人教导的;更不用说它们是由上帝的手指亲自写下的字符。我也不明白,上帝给我们的思想没有配备这些关于他自己的观念,怎么会比他把我们送到世界上的身体没有穿衣服,以及我们没有与生俱来的艺术或技能,更能减损上帝的仁慈。因为我们既然具备了达到这些目的的能力,如果我们没有这些能力,那就是我们缺乏勤奋和考虑,而不是他的恩赐。有一个上帝是肯定的,就像两条直线相交所形成的对角是相等的一样。没有任何一个有理性的生物,只要诚心诚意地研究这些命题的真实性,就不会不同意它们;但毋庸置疑的是,有许多人,由于没有把他们的思想用在这方面,所以对这一点和另一点都不了解。如果有人认为适合把这称为(这是它的最大范围)普遍同意,这样的同意我很容易允许;但这样的普遍同意并不能证明上帝的观念,就像它不能证明这种角度的观念是天生的。
18. If the Idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.
18.如果上帝的概念不是与生俱来的,就不能认为其他的是与生俱来的。
Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set any impression, any character, on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself; as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.
虽然对上帝的认识是人类理性最自然的发现,但对他的观念并不是与生俱来的,我想这一点从前面所说的内容中是显而易见的;我想很少会有其他的观念可以冒充它。如果上帝在人的理解力上设置了任何印象、任何特征,那么最合理的期望是,它应该是关于他自己的一些清晰而统一的概念;只要我们薄弱的能力能够接受这样一个不可理解和无限的对象。但是,我们的头脑一开始就没有我们最关心的那个概念,这是一个强烈的假设,反对所有其他先天的特征。我必须承认,就我所观察到的,我找不到任何东西,而且很高兴能得到任何其他的信息。
19. Idea of Substance not innate.
19.物质的概念不是天生的。
I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of SUBSTANCE; which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves; but we see, on the contrary, that since, by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all; and therefore signify nothing by the word SUBSTANCE but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i. e. of something whereof we have no idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.
我承认,还有一种观念对人类来说是很有用的,就像人们普遍谈论的那样;这就是物质的观念;我们既没有也不可能通过感觉或思考来拥有这种观念。如果自然界注意为我们提供任何观念,我们完全可以期望这些观念是我们自己的能力所无法获得的;但我们看到,恰恰相反,由于通过那些使其他观念进入我们头脑的方式,这不是,我们根本没有这样明确的观念;因此,SUBSTANCE这个词没有任何意义,只是一种不确定的假设,我们不知道是什么,也就是说,我们没有观念的东西,我们认为它是我们知道的那些观念的底层,或支持。
20. No Propositions can be innate, since no Ideas are innate.
20.没有任何命题可以是先天的,因为没有任何思想是先天的。
Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative or practical, principles, it may with as much probability be said, that a man hath 100 pounds sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that he hath there either penny, shilling, crown, or other coin out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think that certain PROPOSITIONS are innate when the IDEAS about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them are innate; for in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true idea of GOD and WORSHIP, will assent to this proposition, ‘That God is to be worshipped,’ when expressed in a language he understands; and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day. For, if we will allow savages, and most country people, to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe,) yet I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas, which therefore they must begin to have some time or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the IDEAS to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, “That the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow.” And therefore, if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the PROPOSITIONS made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many, they are.
无论我们谈论先天的、推测性的或实践性的原则,都有可能说,一个人口袋里有100英镑,但却否认他有一分钱、一先令、一克朗或其他硬币来凑足这笔钱;就像认为某些提议是先天的一样,因为它们所涉及的观念绝不可能是这样的。普遍的接受和同意根本不能证明其中所表达的观念是天生的;因为在许多情况下,无论观念是如何产生的,对表达这种观念的同意或不同意的话语的同意,都必然会随之而来。每一个对上帝和崇拜有真正概念的人,当用他理解的语言表达时,都会同意这个命题:'上帝是要被崇拜的';每一个有理性的人,今天没有想到这个问题,明天可能就会同意这个命题;然而,可以认为数以百万计的人今天都缺乏这些观念中的一个或两个。因为,如果我们允许野蛮人和大多数乡下人有关于上帝和崇拜的想法,(与他们的谈话不会让人相信),但我认为可以认为很少有孩子有这些想法,因此他们必须在某个时候开始有这些想法;然后他们也会开始同意这个命题,并在以后很少提出问题。但是,这种一听就同意的情况,并不能证明这些观念是与生俱来的,就像一个生来就瞎的人(明天会有白内障)对太阳、光、藏红花或黄色有与生俱来的观念一样;因为,当他的视力恢复后,他肯定会同意这个命题:"太阳是透明的,藏红花是黄色的。"因此,如果这种听觉上的认同不能证明先天的观念,那么由这些观念组成的命题就更不能证明了。如果他们有任何先天的观念,我很想知道他们是什么,有多少。
21. No innate Ideas in the Memory.
21.记忆中没有天生的思想。
To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory; and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before; unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For, to remember is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before. Without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never PERCEIVED by the mind was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is, either an actual perception, or else, having been an actual perception, is so in the mind that, by the memory, it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one’s observation. And then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember, as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without THAT consciousness is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it had never been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, DE NOVO, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours which, when out of view, can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is,—that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind;—that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind that are NOT in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.
对此,让我补充一下:如果有任何先天的观念,头脑中任何没有实际思考的观念,它们就必须存放在记忆中;并从那时起必须通过记忆进入视野;也就是说,当它们被记住时,必须知道它们以前曾在头脑中感知过;除非记忆可以没有记忆。因为,记忆是用记忆来感知任何东西,或者说是用意识来感知或知道它以前的情况。如果没有这一点,无论什么想法进入头脑都是新的,而不是被记住的;这种意识到它以前曾在头脑中出现过,是记忆与所有其他思维方式的区别。凡是从来没有被头脑感知过的想法,就从来没有在头脑中。凡是在头脑中的想法,要么是一种实际的感知,要么是在头脑中曾经是一种实际的感知,通过记忆,它可以再次成为一种实际的感知。每当有任何想法的实际感知而没有记忆时,这个想法对理解力来说是完全新的和未知的。每当记忆将任何观念带入实际视野时,它就会意识到它以前就在那里,而且对头脑来说并不完全是个陌生人。是否如此,我呼吁每个人的观察。然后,我想举一个例子,说明一个被认为是与生俱来的观念,(在通过下文提到的任何方式对它产生印象之前)任何人都可以恢复并记住它,因为它是他以前知道的一个观念;如果没有对以前感知的意识,就不会有记忆;无论什么观念在没有这种意识的情况下进入头脑,都不会被记住,或者不会从记忆中出来,也不能说在出现之前已经在头脑中了。因为不在实际视野中或不在记忆中的东西,在头脑中根本不存在,都是一体的,好像它从来没有出现过。假设一个孩子在认识和分辨颜色之前一直在使用他的眼睛;但后来白内障关闭了窗户,他在黑暗中度过了40或50年;在这段时间里,他完全失去了对曾经拥有的颜色概念的所有记忆。这就是我曾经与之交谈过的一个盲人的情况,他在小时候因患水痘而失去了视力,他对颜色的概念不比天生的盲人多。我想知道,是否有人能说这个人当时在头脑中对颜色有任何想法,比天生的盲人还多?我想没有人会说他们中的任何一个人心中有任何关于颜色的想法。他的白内障被治好了,然后他就有了颜色的概念(他不记得了),通过他恢复的视力,传达给他的头脑,而且是在没有意识到以前的认识的情况下。而现在他可以在黑暗中恢复并唤起这些想法。在这种情况下,所有这些颜色的概念,在看不见的时候,可以通过对以前的认识的意识来恢复,因此在记忆中,可以说是在头脑中。我对此的解释是:不管是什么观念,只要没有实际出现在视野中,就在头脑中,只有在记忆中才会出现;如果它不在记忆中,就不在头脑中;如果它在记忆中,就不能通过记忆进入实际视野,而不能感知到它是从记忆中出来的;这就是,它以前曾被认识过,现在被记住了。因此,如果有任何先天的观念,它们必须在记忆中,否则就不在头脑中;如果它们在记忆中,它们可以在没有任何外来印象的情况下被唤醒;而且只要它们被带入头脑,它们就会被记住,也就是说,它们会带来一种感知,即它们对头脑来说并非完全是新的。这是在记忆中或头脑中的东西和不在记忆中的东西之间的一个恒定的区别;不在记忆中的东西,只要它出现在那里,就显得完全是新的和未知的;而在记忆中或头脑中的东西,只要它被记忆所暗示,就显得不是新的,但头脑在自己身上发现它,并知道它以前就在那里。通过这一点,我们可以检验一下,在感觉或思考产生的印象之前,头脑中是否有任何先天的观念。我很想见见这样的人:当他开始使用理性的时候,或者在其他任何时候,他都记得其中的任何东西;而在他出生后,这些东西对他来说从来不是新的。如果有人说,脑海中有一些不在记忆中的想法,我希望他能解释一下,并使他所说的内容能够理解。
22. Principles not innate, because of little use or little certainty.
22.不是天生的原则,因为用处不大,或没有什么把握。
Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither these nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern SPECULATION, are of no great use; and those that concern PRACTICE, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us WHICH THEY ARE; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already: of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.
除了我已经说过的,还有一个原因,我怀疑这些或任何其他原则都不是天生的。我完全相信,无限智慧的上帝以完美的智慧创造了万物,因此我不能确信,为什么他要把一些普遍的原则印在人们的头脑中;其中那些被认为是天生的、涉及逻辑的原则没有什么用处;那些涉及实践的原则不是不言自明的;而且它们都不能与其他一些不被认为是天生的真理相区别。因为,用上帝的手指在脑海中刻下的字符,不比后来引入的字符更清晰,或无法与之区分,有什么用呢?如果有人认为有这样的先天观念和命题,而这些观念和命题的清晰性和有用性是可以与头脑中偶然出现的和后天获得的所有东西区分开来的,那么他告诉我们它们是什么就不难了;然后每个人都会成为判断它们是否是这样的合适人选。因为如果有这种先天的想法和印象,与所有其他的感知和知识明显不同,每个人都会发现它在自己身上是真的。关于这些所谓的先天格言的证据,我已经说过了:关于它们的用处,我将在以后有机会再谈。
23. Difference of Men’s Discoveries depends upon the different Application of their Faculties.
23.人的发现的不同取决于他们能力的不同应用。
To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men’s understanding; and some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences; though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow; others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles. And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only, by the by, to show how much OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS UPON THE RIGHT USE OF THOSE POWERS NATURE HATH BESTOWED UPON US, and how little upon SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE IN VAIN SUPPOSED TO BE IN ALL MANKIND FOR THEIR DIRECTION; which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose. And which since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.
总结:有些观念会直接提供给所有人理解;有些真理是由任何观念产生的,只要头脑中把它们变成命题:其他真理则需要把一连串的观念放在一起,对它们进行适当的比较,并用心进行推导,然后才能发现和赞同。第一类中的一些,因为它们普遍而容易被接受,所以被误认为是与生俱来的:但事实是,观念和概念并不比艺术和科学更与生俱来;尽管其中一些确实比其他的更容易提供给我们的能力;因此更普遍地被接受:尽管这也是根据我们身体的器官和我们思想的力量碰巧被使用;上帝为人们配备了各种能力和手段,根据他们的使用情况来发现、接受和保留真理。在人类的观念中可以发现的最大差异是,他们对自己的能力的不同使用。有些人(而且是最多的人)把事情托付给别人,错误地利用了他们的同意能力,懒洋洋地把他们的思想束缚在别人的口令和统治之下,而他们的责任是仔细研究这些教义,而不是盲目地、含蓄地接受这些教义;其他人只对一些少数事物运用他们的思想,对这些事物有了足够的了解,在这些事物上达到了很大的知识程度,而对其他一切都一无所知,因为他们从未把思想放开,去寻找其他问题。因此,三角形的三个角完全等于两个直角,这是一个可以确定的真理,我认为比许多作为原则的命题更明显;然而,有数以百万计的人,无论他们在其他方面多么专业,都不知道这一点,因为他们从来没有把他们的思想放在关于这种角的工作上。当然知道这个命题的人可能完全不知道其他命题的真相,在数学本身中,这些命题和这个命题一样清晰明了;因为在寻找这些数学真理的过程中,他的思想停滞不前,没有走到这一步。同样的情况也可能发生在我们对神性的存在的概念上。因为,尽管没有什么真理能比上帝的存在更明显地让人明白,但如果他满足于他在这个世界上发现的事物,因为它们满足了他的快乐和激情,而不进一步探究它们的原因、目的和令人钦佩的设计,并勤奋和专注地追求其中的思想,他就可能长期生活在没有任何关于这种存在的概念中。如果有人通过谈话把这样的概念灌输给他,他也许会相信它;但如果他从来没有研究过,他对它的认识不会比他更完美,因为他被告知,一个三角形的三个角等于两个直角,他相信它,而不去研究证明;他可能会同意一个可能的意见,但不知道它的真相;但他的能力,如果仔细使用,能够使他清楚和明显的认识。但这只是为了说明,我们的知识在多大程度上取决于正确使用自然赋予我们的那些能力,而在多大程度上取决于那些被认为存在于所有人类中以指导他们的固有原则;如果这些原则存在,所有人都不能不知道,否则他们就会毫无意义。既然所有人都不知道,也无法与其他偶然的真理区分开来,我们完全可以断定没有这样的真理。
24. Men must think and know for themselves.
24.人必须自己思考和了解。
What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell;—I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse. Truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS THEMSELVES; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men’s to find it. For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety; whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make anybody else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends. What he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.
这样怀疑先天的原则可能会受到人们的指责,他们很可能会说这是拔掉了知识和确定性的旧基础,我不知道;--我至少说服自己,我所追求的方式符合真理,为这些基础奠定了更坚实的基础。这一点我很确定,在接下来的论述中,我没有把放弃或追随任何权威作为自己的事业。真理是我唯一的目标;无论真理出现在哪里,我的思想都会不偏不倚地跟着走,而不介意其他人的脚步是否在这条路上。并不是说我想对其他人的意见给予应有的尊重;但毕竟,对真理的尊重是最大的:我希望不会有人认为我是傲慢地说,如果我们在泉源中,在对事物本身的思考中寻找它,并利用我们自己的思想而不是其他人的思想来寻找它,也许我们在发现理性和沉思的知识方面会取得更大进展。因为我认为我们可以合理地希望用别人的眼睛去看,也可以用别人的理解去认识。我们自己对真理和理性的考虑和理解有多少,我们就拥有多少真正的、真实的知识。其他人的意见在我们的大脑中漂浮,使我们没有一丁点更多的知识,尽管它们碰巧是真实的。在他们那里是科学,在我们那里只是意见;而我们只对崇高的名字表示赞同,并不像他们那样用自己的理性去理解那些使他们获得声誉的真理。亚里士多德当然是个有见识的人,但从来没有人认为他是这样,因为他盲目地接受并自信地宣扬别人的观点。如果接受别人的原则,而不对其进行研究,使他不能成为哲学家,我想这也很难使其他人成为哲学家。在科学领域,每个人都有他真正知道和理解的东西。他只相信和信任的东西,不过是一些碎片;无论这些碎片在整体上有多好,对于收集这些碎片的人来说,都不会有很大的增加。这种借来的财富,就像神仙的钱,虽然在他手中是金子,但在使用时也只是树叶和灰尘。
25. Whence the Opinion of Innate Principles.
25.什么时候开始有了 "先天原则 "的观点。
When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate. And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles,—THAT PRINCIPLES MUST NOT BE QUESTIONED. For, having once established this tenet,—that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving SOME doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon trust without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.
当人们发现一些一经理解就不会被怀疑的一般命题时,我知道,这是一个简短而容易的方法,可以得出它们是天生的结论。这一点一旦被接受,就会使懒惰的人从搜索的痛苦中解脱出来,并停止对所有曾经被称为先天的东西的怀疑的探究。对那些想成为大师和教师的人来说,把这一原则作为原则的原则,也是不小的好处,即原则是不容质疑的。因为一旦确立了这一原则--有先天的原则,就使他们的追随者必须接受一些教义;这就使他们不再使用自己的理智和判断力,并使他们相信和信任这些教义,而无需进一步审查:在这种盲目轻信的姿态下,他们可能更容易受到某种人的支配,并使其发挥作用,这些人有能力和职务来指导和引导他们。一个人对另一个人的权力也不小,他有权力成为原则的独裁者和不容置疑的真理的教师;并使一个人吞下那可能对他的目的有用的先天原则。如果他们研究一下人们认识许多普遍真理的方法,就会发现这些真理在人们的头脑中是由事物本身的存在产生的,只要适当地加以考虑;而且它们是通过应用那些自然界适合接受和判断它们的能力而发现的,只要适当地运用这些能力。
26. Conclusion.
26.结论。
To show HOW the understanding proceeds herein is the design of the following Discourse; which I shall proceed to when I have first premised, that hitherto,—to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge,—it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles. And since the arguments which are against them do, some of them, rise from common received opinions, I have been forced to take several things for granted; which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose task is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet;—it happening in controversial discourses as it does in assaulting of towns; where, if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no further inquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, designing to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a basis that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations: or at least, if mine prove a castle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on is, that I can only appeal to men’s own unprejudiced experience and observation whether they be true or not; and this is enough for a man who professes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.
为了说明理解力是如何在这里进行的,这就是下面的论述的目的;我将开始进行论述,首先我已经提出了一个前提,那就是到目前为止,为了清除我认为是唯一真实的基础,在此基础上建立我们自己的知识的概念,我必须说明我怀疑先天原则的理由。由于反对这些原则的论据,其中有些是来自普遍接受的观点,所以我不得不把一些事情视为理所当然;这对任何一个任务是表明任何信条的虚假性或不可能性的人来说都是难以避免的;这在有争议的论述中发生,就像在攻击城镇中发生一样;在那里,如果建立炮台的基础很牢固,就不会进一步询问它是谁借用的,也不会询问它属于谁,所以它为目前的目的提供了一个合适的平台。但在本论述的未来部分,我打算在我自己的经验和观察力所及的范围内,建造一座统一的、与自身一致的建筑物,我希望在这样的基础上建立它,我将不需要用道具和支撑物来支撑它,靠在借来的或求来的地基上:或者至少,如果我的城堡被证明是一座空中的城堡,我将努力使它成为一个整体,挂在一起。在此,我警告读者,不要期待不可否认的有力论证,除非我可以被允许享有特权,而这种特权在别人看来并不多见,即把我的原则视为理所当然;然后,我不怀疑,但我也能证明。对于我所依据的原则,我要说的是,无论这些原则是真是假,我只能求助于人们自己无偏见的经验和观察;对于一个自称只是坦率和自由地放下自己的猜想的人来说,这就足够了,因为他的猜想在某种程度上处于黑暗之中,除了对真理进行不偏不倚的探索之外,没有任何其他目的。
1. Idea is the Object of Thinking.
1.观念是思维的对象。
Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the IDEAS that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,—such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, HOW HE COMES BY THEM?
每个人都意识到自己在思考,而他在思考时应用的东西就是那里的观念,毫无疑问,人的头脑中有几个观念--如白、硬、甜、思考、运动、人、大象、军队、醉酒等词语所表达的那些观念:那么首先要问的是,他是怎么来的?
I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind;—for which I shall appeal to every one’s own observation and experience.
我知道这是一个公认的学说,即人在最初存在的时候就有自己的想法和原始性格,并印在他们的头脑中。我已经对这一观点进行了广泛的研究;我想,当我说明理解力从何而来,以及它们以何种方式和程度进入头脑时,我在前面的书中所说的话将更容易被接受;为此我将呼吁每个人自己的观察和经验。
2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.
2.2.所有思想都来自于感觉或反映。
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:—How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the MATERIALS of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the MATERIALS of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
那么,让我们假设心灵就像我们说的那样,是一张白纸,没有任何字符,没有任何思想:--它是如何被填充的呢?它是怎么来的呢?它是由人的忙碌和无边的想象力在上面画出的几乎是无穷无尽的种类而形成的巨大的储存物而来的?它的所有理性和知识的材料从何而来?对此,我的回答是,一个字,来自经验。我们所有的知识都是建立在经验之上的;而且它最终也是来自经验。我们对外部可感知物体的观察,或对我们自己所感知和反映的头脑内部运作的观察,都是为我们的理解提供了所有的思维材料。这两者是知识的源泉,我们所拥有的或可以自然拥有的所有观念都来自于此。
3. The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas
3.感觉的对象是思想的来源之一
First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those IDEAS we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.
首先,我们的感官,对特定的可感对象感兴趣,根据这些对象对它们产生影响的不同方式,将对事物的几种不同看法传达给头脑。因此,我们对黄、白、热、冷、软、硬、苦、甜,以及所有我们称之为感性品质的东西,都产生了这些观念;当我说感官传入心灵时,我的意思是,它们从外部物体传入心灵,在那里产生这些感知。我们所拥有的大多数观念的这一伟大来源,完全取决于我们的感官,并由它们衍生到理解力,我称之为感性。
4. The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them.
4.我们心灵的运作,是它们的另一个来源。
Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,—the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got;—which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds;—which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called INTERNAL SENSE. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term OPERATIONS here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.
第二,经验为理解力提供观念的另一个源泉是:感知我们自己的思想在我们内部的运作,因为它是关于它所得到的观念的;这些运作,当灵魂来思考和考虑时,确实为理解力提供了另一套观念,这是从外部事物中无法得到的。这就是感知、思考、怀疑、相信、推理、知道、愿意,以及我们自己头脑中的所有不同行为;我们意识到这些行为,并在自己身上观察到这些行为,就像我们从影响我们感官的物体中得到不同的观念一样,从这些观念中得到我们的理解。这种观念的来源,每个人都完全在自己体内;虽然它不是感觉,因为它与外部物体无关,但它非常像它,可以适当地称为内部感觉。但是,正如我把另一种感觉称为 "感觉",我也把它称为 "反思",它所提供的观念只是心灵通过反思自己的内部运作而获得的。那么,在本论述的以下部分中,我所说的反思,将被理解为:心灵对其自身的运作及其方式的注意,由于这种注意,在理解中产生了关于这些运作的观念。我说,这两个,即外部物质事物,作为感性的对象,以及我们自己的头脑的运作,作为反思的对象,对我来说是唯一的原点,我们所有的观念都是从这里开始的。我在这里使用的 "行动 "一词,从广义上讲,不仅包括心灵对其观念的行动,还包括有时由其产生的某种激情,如由任何思想产生的满足或不安。
5. All our Ideas are of the one or of the other of these.
5.我们所有的想法都是属于这其中的一种或另一种。
The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. EXTERNAL OBJECTS furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and THE MIND furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
在我看来,理解力如果不是从这两者之一得到的,就不会有任何想法的闪光点。外部物体为心灵提供了感性品质的观念,也就是它们在我们身上产生的所有不同的感知;而心灵则为理解力提供了关于其自身运作的观念。
These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the compositions made out of them we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding; and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted;—though perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.
当我们对它们进行了全面的调查,以及它们的几种模式和由它们组成的作品时,我们会发现它们包含了我们所有的观念;而且我们的头脑中没有任何东西不是通过这两种方式之一产生的。让任何一个人检查他自己的思想,并彻底搜查他的理解力;然后让他告诉我,他在那里拥有的所有原始观念,除了是他的感官对象,或者是他的思想活动,被视为他思考的对象之外,是否还有其他的观念。无论他想象中的知识总量有多大,只要仔细观察,他就会发现,除了这两种观念中的一种所印证的东西,他的头脑中没有任何观念;尽管可能有无限的多样性,被理解力所复合和扩大,正如我们将在下文中看到。
6. Observable in Children.
6.可在儿童身上观察到。
He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. It is BY DEGREES he comes to be furnished with them. And though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them. And if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or not, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere, when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind;—but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster, or a pine-apple, has of those particular relishes.
如果仔细考虑一下孩子刚来到这个世界时的状况,就会发现他没有什么理由认为他储存了大量的思想,而这些思想是他未来知识的来源。他是通过不同的等级来获得这些知识的。尽管在记忆开始记录时间或秩序之前,明显的和熟悉的品质的想法就已经打上了印记,但在一些不寻常的品质出现之前,往往已经很晚了,很少有人能回忆起他们认识这些品质的开始。如果值得的话,毫无疑问,一个孩子在长大成人之前,可能会被安排得只拥有很少的,甚至是普通的想法。但是,所有出生在这个世界上的人,都被永远影响他们的身体所包围,各种各样的想法,无论是否注意到,都会在孩子们的头脑中留下烙印。只要眼睛一睁开,光线和颜色就会随处可见;声音和一些有形的品质也会吸引他们适当的感官,并强行进入大脑;但是,我想,人们很容易就会同意,如果一个孩子被关在一个除了黑和白之外从未见过其他东西的地方,直到他长大成人,他对红色或绿色的想法也不会多于从小就没有尝过牡蛎或松树苹果的人对这些特别的味道的想法。
7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.
7.人们根据与之交谈的不同对象,对这些东西有不同的配备。
Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety; and from the operations of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though he that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them ATTENTIVELY, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture, or clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular.
这样,人们就会从外部获得更少或更多的简单想法,因为他们与之交谈的对象提供了更多或更少的多样性;从他们内心的思维活动中获得更多或更少的思考。因为,尽管思考他的思想活动的人,不能不对它们有简单而清晰的想法;但是,除非他把他的思想转向那边,并专心致志地考虑它们,否则他不会对他思想的所有活动以及其中可能观察到的一切有清晰而明确的想法,就像他不会对任何风景或时钟的部件和运动有所有特定的想法,他不会把眼睛转向它,并注意它的所有部件。这幅画或一个钟可能被放置得很好,以至于它们每天都会出现在他的面前;但他对它们所组成的所有部分只会有一个混乱的概念,直到他用心去考虑它们的每一个部分。
8. Ideas of Reflection later, because they need Attention.
8.反思的想法在后面,因为它们需要注意。
And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually, yet, like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in their mind clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inward upon itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation. Children when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them; forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Men’s business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.
因此,我们看到,为什么大多数孩子很晚才对他们自己的思想运作有了概念;而且有些孩子一生中对其中的大部分都没有任何非常清晰或完美的概念。因为,尽管它们不断地在那里经过,但就像漂浮的幻象一样,它们没有留下足够深刻的印象,以至于在他们的头脑中留下清晰、明确、持久的想法,直到理解力转向自身,反思自己的操作,并使它们成为自己思考的对象。孩子们刚进入这个世界时,被一个新事物的世界所包围,这些新事物通过对他们的感官的不断吸引,不断地把他们的思想吸引过来;向前看,注意新事物,并对各种变化的对象感到高兴。因此,最初的几年通常都是在向外看的过程中使用和转移注意力。人们在这些年里的任务是熟悉外面的事物;因此,在不断关注外在感觉的过程中成长起来的人,很少对他们内部的事物进行任何重要的思考,直到他们年岁渐长;而且有些人根本就没有思考过。
9. The Soul begins to have Ideas when it begins to perceive.
9.9. 灵魂在开始感知的时候就开始有了思想。
To ask, at what TIME a man has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive;—HAVING IDEAS, and PERCEPTION, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is from the body; which if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man’s ideas is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.
问一个人在什么时候开始有任何想法,就是问他什么时候开始感知;拥有想法和感知是同一件事。我知道有一种观点认为,灵魂总是在思考,而且只要它存在,就会不断地在自身中实际感知到观念;实际的思考与灵魂不可分割,就像实际的延伸与身体不可分割一样;如果这是真的,那么询问一个人的观念的开始就等于询问他的灵魂的开始。因为,根据这种说法,灵魂和它的思想,就像身体和它的延伸一样,将同时开始存在。
10. The Soul thinks not always; for this wants Proofs.
10.灵魂不常思考;因为这需要证明。
But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first rudiments of organization, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body always to move: the perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one of its operations. And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is not necessary to suppose that it should be always thinking, always in action. That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of all things, who “never slumbers nor sleeps”; but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly, by experience, that we SOMETIMES think; and thence draw this infallible consequence,—that there is something in us that has a power to think. But whether that substance PERPETUALLY thinks or no, we can be no further assured than experience informs us. For, to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason;—which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, “That the soul always thinks,” be a self-evident proposition, that everybody assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought at all last night or no. The question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove anything, and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so; which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.
但是,灵魂是否被认为存在于组织的最初雏形或身体生命的开端之前,或与之共生,或在之后的某个时间存在,我让那些对该问题有更好想法的人去争论吧。我承认我的灵魂很迟钝,它不认为自己总是在思考理念;也不认为灵魂总是思考比身体总是运动更有必要:(我认为)对理念的认识对灵魂来说,就像运动对身体一样;不是它的本质,而是它的操作之一。因此,尽管思考被认为从来不是灵魂的适当行动,但也没有必要认为它应该总是在思考,总是在行动。这也许是无限的作者和万物的保护者的特权,他 "从不打瞌睡,也不睡觉";但对任何有限的生命来说,至少对人的灵魂来说是不合适的。根据经验,我们当然知道,我们有时会思考;并由此得出这个无可置疑的结论--我们体内有某种东西具有思考的能力。但是,无论这种物质是否真正思考,我们都不能比经验告诉我们的更有把握。因为,说实际思维是灵魂的基本要素,与灵魂不可分割,是对问题的乞求,而不是用理性来证明它;如果这不是一个不言而喻的命题,那就必须这样做。但是,"灵魂总是在思考 "这个命题是否是一个不言自明的命题,每个人一听就会同意,我向人类呼吁。有人怀疑我昨晚到底有没有思考。这个问题是关于一个事实的,如果把一个假设作为它的证明,那就是在讨好它,而这个假设正是争论的焦点:通过这种方式,人们可以证明任何事情,这不过是假设所有的手表在天平跳动时都在思考,这就充分证明了,而且是毫无疑问的,我的手表昨晚一直在思考。但是,不愿意欺骗自己的人,应该把他的假设建立在事实的基础上,并通过感性的经验加以证明,而不是因为他的假设,也就是因为他假设是这样的,就对事实进行推测;这种证明方式相当于这样:我昨天晚上一定在思考,因为别人假设我总是在思考,尽管我自己无法觉察到我总是这样做。
But men in love with their opinions may not only suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an inference of mine, that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep? I do not say there is no SOUL in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; but I do say, he cannot THINK at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to anything but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it always will be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.
但是,热爱自己观点的人不仅可以假设问题所在,还可以指控错误的事实。否则,怎么会有人把我的推论说成一件事不是,因为我们在睡梦中没有感觉到它?我没有说一个人没有灵魂,因为他在睡梦中感觉不到它;但我确实说,他不可能在任何时候思考,不管是醒着还是睡着,都不会感觉到它。除了我们的思想,我们对它的感知对任何事物都是必要的;对它们来说,它是必要的;对它们来说,它将永远是必要的,直到我们能够在没有意识到它的情况下思考。
11. It is not always conscious of it.
11.它并不总是自觉的。
I grant that the soul, in a waking man, is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake. But whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man’s consideration; it being hard to conceive that anything should think and not be conscious of it. If the soul doth think in a sleeping man without being conscious of it, I ask whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not; no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible that the SOUL can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleasures or pain, apart, which the MAN is not conscious of nor partakes in,—it is certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same person; but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons: since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, without perceiving anything of it; no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For, if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.
我承认,在一个清醒的人身上,灵魂永远不会没有思想,因为它是清醒的条件。但是,睡觉而不做梦是不是整个人的感情,不管是头脑还是身体,都值得清醒的人考虑;很难想象,任何东西都会思考而不自觉。如果灵魂在睡着的人身上思考而不自知,我想问,在这种思考中,它是否有任何快乐或痛苦,或者能够得到幸福或痛苦?我敢肯定,这个人是没有的;就像他躺在床上或地上一样。因为在我看来,没有意识到的快乐或痛苦是完全不一致的,也是不可能的。或者说,如果身体在睡觉的时候,灵魂可以有它的思考、享受和关注,有它的快乐或痛苦,而人却没有意识到,也没有参与,那么可以肯定的是,睡着的苏格拉底和醒着的苏格拉底不是同一个人;但他睡觉时的灵魂和他醒着时由身体和灵魂组成的苏格拉底是两个人。因为醒着的苏格拉底对他的灵魂的幸福或痛苦并不了解,也不关心,他在睡觉的时候独自享受着这种幸福或痛苦,却没有察觉到任何东西;就像他对一个在印度的人的幸福或痛苦不了解一样。因为,如果我们把对我们的行为和感觉的所有意识,特别是对快乐和痛苦的意识,以及与之相伴的关注全部拿走,就很难知道该把个人身份放在哪里。
12. If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.
12.如果一个睡着的人在不知不觉中思考,睡着的人和醒来的人就是两个人。
The soul, during sound sleep, thinks, say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and IT must necessarily be CONSCIOUS of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart: the sleeping MAN, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose, then, the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping, retired from his body; which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life, without a thinking soul, to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated during his sleep from his body, to think apart. Let us suppose, too, that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul. For, if Castor’s soul can think, whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no matter what PLACE it chooses to think in. We have here, then, the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask, then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct PERSONS as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason, they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For, I suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist in the soul’s being united to the very same numerical particles of matter. For if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days, or two moments, together.
这些人说,灵魂在酣睡中会思考。在它思考和感知的时候,它当然能够产生快乐或烦恼的感知,也能够产生任何其他的感知;而且它必然会对自己的感知有意识。但它拥有这一切,而沉睡的人,很明显,对这一切没有意识。那么,让我们假设蓖麻的灵魂在他睡觉的时候,从他的身体里退了出来;对于我在这里要讨论的那些人来说,这并不是不可能的假设,他们如此宽松地允许所有其他动物有生命,而没有一个思考的灵魂。因此,这些人不可能认为身体没有灵魂而活着是不可能的,也不可能认为灵魂没有身体而生存和思考,或者有知觉,甚至对幸福或痛苦的知觉,是矛盾的。那么,我说,让我们假设卡斯特的灵魂在睡眠中与他的身体分离,单独思考。让我们再假设一下,它选择了另一个人的身体作为它的思考场所,例如Pollux,他正在睡觉,没有灵魂。因为,如果卡斯特的灵魂能在卡斯特睡着时思考卡斯特从未意识到的东西,那么它选择在什么地方思考就无关紧要。那么,我们在这里有两个人的身体,他们之间只有一个灵魂,我们将假设他们轮流睡觉和醒来;而灵魂仍然在醒来的人身上思考,而睡觉的人从来没有意识到这一点,从来没有感知到这一点。那么,我想问,卡斯特和波吕克斯之间只有一个灵魂,一个人思考和感知另一个人从未意识到的东西,另一个人也不关心的东西,是不是像卡斯特和赫拉克勒斯,或者苏格拉底和柏拉图一样,是两个不同的人?他们中的一个是否会非常幸福,而另一个是否会非常悲惨?同样的理由,他们把灵魂和人变成了两个人,他们让灵魂把人没有意识到的东西分开思考。因为,我想没有人会把人的同一性说成是灵魂与物质的相同数量的颗粒结合在一起。因为如果这对身份认同是必要的,那么在我们身体的颗粒不断变化的情况下,任何一个人在两天或两个时刻都是同一个人,这是不可能的。
13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
13.不可能说服那些睡觉不做梦的人,他们会思考。
Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach that the soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time SLEEP WITHOUT DREAMING, can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.
因此,我认为,每一个昏昏欲睡的人都会动摇他们的学说,他们教导说灵魂总是在思考。至少,那些在任何时候都在睡觉而不做梦的人,永远无法相信他们的思想有时会在不知不觉中忙碌四个小时;如果他们在睡觉的时候被拍到,在沉思中被叫醒,也无法说明问题。
14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.
14.人做梦不记得,徒然催促。
It will perhaps be said,—That the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the MEMORY retains it not. That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed in his life, till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances: at least every one’s acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming.
也许有人会说:"即使在最酣畅的睡眠中,灵魂也会思考,但记忆却不会保留它。睡梦中的灵魂此时正忙于思考,而下一刻在清醒的人身上却不记得,也无法回忆起所有这些想法,这是很难想象的,需要一些比赤裸裸的断言更好的证据来使人相信它。因为谁能不费吹灰之力就能想象,大部分人在一生中,每天都有几个小时在想一些事情,如果问他们,甚至在这些想法中,他们根本就记不起来?我想,大多数人在睡觉时有很大一部分时间是不做梦的。我曾经认识一个学者出身的人,他的记忆力并不差,他告诉我他这辈子从来没有做过梦,直到他发烧,当时他刚刚康复,大约是在他5岁或6岁20分的时候。我想世界上有更多这样的例子:至少每个人的熟人都会为他提供足够的例子,说明他们大部分的夜晚都没有做梦。
15. Upon this Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.
15.根据这个假设,一个睡着的人的想法应该是最理性的。
To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking; and the soul, in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for, such thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking MAN the materials of the body are employed, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the thinking of the SOUL, which is not perceived in a sleeping man, there the soul thinks apart, and making no use of the organs of the body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory of such thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this supposition, I answer, further,—That whatever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body, it is reasonable to conclude it can retain without the help of the body too; or else the soul, or any separate spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its own use, and be able to recall them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former experiences, reasonings, and contemplations, to what, purpose does it think? They who make the soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being than those do whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilist parts of matter. Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or impressions made on a heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking; that, once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived that our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable a faculty as the power of thinking, that faculty which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being, to be so idly and uselessly employed, at least a fourth part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless matter, any where in the universe, made so little use of and so wholly thrown away.
经常思考,但从不保留它,哪怕只有一瞬间,这就是一种非常无用的思考;在这种思考状态下,灵魂的作用很小,如果有的话,就像一个望远镜,它不断接收各种图像或想法,但没有保留;它们消失了,消失了,没有留下它们的脚步声;望远镜对这种想法没有好处,灵魂对这种思想也没有好处。也许有人会说,在一个清醒的人中,身体的材料在思考中被使用和利用;思想的记忆是通过在大脑上留下的印象和这种思考后留下的痕迹来保留的;但在灵魂的思考中,在一个睡着的人中是无法察觉的,在那里,灵魂是单独思考的,没有使用身体的器官,没有在它身上留下印象,因此也没有这种思想的记忆。我不想再提这个假设带来的两个不同的人的荒谬性,我进一步回答:--无论心灵在没有身体的帮助下能接受和思考什么想法,都可以合理地断定它在没有身体的帮助下也能保留;否则,灵魂或任何独立的精神,通过思考将没有什么好处。如果它对自己的思想没有记忆;如果它不能为自己所用,并能在必要时回忆起它们;如果它不能反思过去的事情,并利用它以前的经验、推理和思考,那么它思考的目的是什么?那些把灵魂当作思考的东西的人,不会比那些被他们谴责的人更高尚,因为他们认为灵魂只不过是物质的附属部分。在尘埃上画的字,风一吹就不见了;或在一堆原子上留下的印象,或动物的精神,都是一样有用的,使主体一样高贵,就像灵魂的思想在思考中灭亡一样;一旦离开视线,就永远消失了,没有留下任何关于它们的记忆。大自然从不为卑鄙或无用而制造优秀的东西:很难想象,我们无限智慧的造物主会让思考能力这样令人钦佩的能力,即最接近他自己不可理解的存在的卓越性的能力,在这里至少有四分之一的时间被闲置和无用地使用,因为它不断地思考,而不记得任何这些想法,对自己或他人没有任何好处,或对受造物的任何其他部分有任何作用。如果我们仔细观察,我想我们不会在宇宙中的任何地方发现枯燥无味的物质的运动,被如此少地利用和完全抛弃。
16. On this Hypothesis, the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflection, of which there is no Appearance.
16.根据这一假设,灵魂必须有并非来自感觉或反射的思想,而这些思想是没有外观的。
It is true, we have sometimes instances of perception whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being, those who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in,—whether the soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it, or no. If its separate thoughts be less rational, then these men must say, that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body: if it does not, it is a wonder that our dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations.
诚然,我们有时在睡梦中也会有感知的例子,并保留着这些想法的记忆:但这些想法在大多数情况下是多么的奢侈和不连贯;多么不符合一个理性人的完美和秩序,那些熟悉梦境的人不需要被告知。我愿意对这个问题感到满意--当灵魂这样单独思考时,就像它与身体分开一样,它的行为是否比与身体一起时更不理性,或者说不理性。如果它的独立思考不那么理性,那么这些人一定会说,灵魂把理性思考的完美性归功于身体:如果不是这样,那么我们的梦境大部分都是如此轻浮和非理性的,灵魂没有保留任何更理性的独白和冥想,这真是个奇迹。
17. If I think when I know it not, nobody else can know it.
17.如果我想的时候我不知道,别人也不可能知道。
Those who so confidently tell us that the soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those ideas are that are in the soul of a child, before or just at the union with the body, before it hath received any by sensation. The dreams of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man’s ideas; though for the most part oddly put together. It is strange, if the soul has ideas of its own that it derived not from sensation or reflection, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any impressions from the body,) that it should never, in its private thinking, (so private, that the man himself perceives it not,) retain any of them the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reason that the soul should, in its retirement during sleep, have so many hours’ thoughts, and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from sensation or reflection; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which, being occasioned from the body, must needs be less natural to a spirit? It is strange the soul should never once in a man’s whole life recall over any of its pure native thoughts, and those ideas it had before it borrowed anything from the body; never bring into the waking man’s view any other ideas but what have a tang of the cask, and manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be supposed but that during sleep it recollects its native ideas; and during that retirement from communicating with the body, whilst it thinks by itself, the ideas it is busied about should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in itself, underived from the body, or its own operations about them: which, since the waking man never remembers, we must from this hypothesis conclude either that the soul remembers something that the man does not; or else that memory belongs only to such ideas as are derived from the body, or the mind’s operations about them.
那些如此自信地告诉我们灵魂总是在思考的人,我希望他们也能告诉我们,在一个孩子的灵魂中,在与身体结合之前或刚开始时,在它接受任何感觉之前,那些想法是什么。我认为,睡梦中的人的梦都是由醒来的人的想法组成的;虽然大部分是奇怪的组合。奇怪的是,如果灵魂有自己的想法,而这些想法不是从感觉或思考中得来的,(如果它在接受身体的任何印象之前就进行思考,就一定有这样的想法),那么它在私下的思考中(如此私下,以至于人自己都没有察觉到),在它从这些想法中醒来的那一刻,就不会保留任何想法,然后用新的发现让人高兴。谁会认为灵魂在睡眠期间的休息中会有这么多的思考,但却从来没有从感觉或思考中借来的任何想法;或者至少没有保留任何记忆,而这些记忆是由身体引起的,对一个精神来说必须是不那么自然的?奇怪的是,灵魂在人的一生中从未回忆过它的任何纯粹的本源思想,以及它在从身体中借来任何东西之前的那些想法;除了那些有酒桶味道的、明显来自于这种结合的想法之外,从未将任何其他想法带入清醒的人的视野。如果它总是在思考,所以在它结合之前,或者在它从身体上得到任何东西之前,就有了想法,那么就不能假定,在睡眠中它会回忆起它的原始想法;在不与身体交流的退休期间,当它自己思考时,它所忙的想法应该是,有时至少是那些它本身就有的、从身体或它自己对它们的操作中得出的更自然和更一致的想法。既然醒着的人从来不记得,我们必须从这个假设中得出结论,要么是灵魂记得一些人不记得的东西;要么是记忆只属于那些从身体或心灵对它们的操作中得出的想法。
18. How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs Proof.
18.怎么会有人知道灵魂总是在思考?因为如果这不是一个不言而喻的命题,它就需要证明。
I would be glad also to learn from these men who so confidently pronounce that the human soul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it. This, I am afraid, is to be sure without proofs, and to know without perceiving. It is, I suspect, a confused notion, taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it is, that it is possible the soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory. And I say, it is as possible that the soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to itself, the next moment after, that it had thought.
我也很想从这些如此自信地宣称人的灵魂,或者说,人总是在思考的人那里知道,他们是如何知道的;不,他们是如何知道他们自己在思考,而他们自己并没有察觉到。我担心,这是在没有证据的情况下确定,在没有感知的情况下知道。我猜想,这是一个混乱的概念,是为一个假设服务的;而不是那些明确的真理,要么是他们自己的证据迫使我们承认,要么是共同的经验使人无耻地否认。因为最多只能说,灵魂有可能一直在思考,但不可能一直保留在记忆中。我说,灵魂不总是思考也是有可能的;它有时不思考,比它经常思考,而且思考了很长时间,但在下一刻却不知道自己已经思考了,这种可能性大得多。
19. That a Man should be busy in Thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.
19.一个人忙于思考,但下一刻却没有保留它,这是很不可能的。
To suppose the soul to think, and the man not to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man. And if one considers well these men’s way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For those who tell us that the SOUL always thinks, do never, that I remember, say that a MAN always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? Or a man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of jargon in others. If they say the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it, they may as well say his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking, I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything, when I perceive it not myself? No man’s knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him what he was that moment thinking of. If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking. May he not, with more reason, assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy; and it cannot be less than revelation, that discovers to another thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myself. And they must needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see that dogs or elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians; it seeming easier to make one’s self invisible to others, than to make another’s thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be “a substance that always thinks,” and the business is done. If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can serve for but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all; since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. For no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience; and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world.
假设灵魂在思考,而人却没有意识到这一点,就像人们所说的那样,是在一个人身上制造两个人。如果人们仔细考虑这些人的说话方式,就会怀疑他们是这样做的。因为那些告诉我们灵魂总是在思考的人,我记得从来没有说过一个人总是在思考。难道灵魂会思考,而人不会吗?或者一个人在思考,却没有意识到这一点?这也许会被别人怀疑是行话。如果他们说人总是在思考,但并不总是意识到这一点,他们也可以说他的身体是延伸的,但没有部分。因为说一个身体是没有部分的延伸,就像说任何东西都是在没有意识到它的情况下思考,或感知到它这样做,是完全可以理解的。这样说的人,如果对他们的假设有必要的话,可以有同样的理由说,一个人总是饿的,但他并不总是感到饿;而饥饿就在于这种感觉,就像思考在于意识到自己在思考。如果他们说一个人总是意识到自己在思考,我问,他们是怎么知道的?意识是一个人对自己头脑中的事物的感知。当我自己没有意识到的时候,另一个人能够察觉到我对任何事情有意识吗?在这里,没有人的知识可以超越他的经验。把一个人从酣睡中唤醒,问他那一刻他在想什么。如果他自己不知道他当时在想什么,那么他一定是一个著名的思想占卜师,可以保证他在思考。难道他不能以更大的理由向他保证他没有睡着吗?这是超越哲学的东西;它不能不说是一种启示,在我自己找不到思想的时候,向另一个人发现了我心中的思想。他们必须有一种透彻的洞察力,当我自己不能觉察到它时,当我宣称我没有思考时,他们肯定能看到我在思考;当狗或大象给出所有可以想象的证明时,他们却能看到它们没有思考,只是告诉我们它们有思考。有些人可能会怀疑这比玫瑰十字会更进一步;让别人看不到自己,似乎比让别人的思想对我来说更容易,而他自己是看不到的。但这不过是把灵魂定义为 "一种总是在思考的物质",事情就完成了。如果这样的定义有任何权威性,我不知道它能起到什么作用,只能让许多人怀疑他们根本没有灵魂;因为他们发现自己生命的大部分时间都是在没有思考的情况下过去的。因为据我所知,任何定义,任何教派的假设,都没有足够的力量来摧毁恒定的经验;也许正是因为有了超越我们感知的认识,才使得世界上出现了这么多无用的争论和噪音。
20. No ideas but from Sensation and Reflection, evident, if we observe Children.
20.如果我们观察儿童,就会发现,除了感觉和反思,没有任何想法。
I see no reason, therefore, to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes, by exercise, to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it; as well as, afterwards, by compounding those ideas, and reflecting on its own operations, it increases its stock, as well as facility in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.
因此,我认为没有理由相信,在感官为它提供了可供思考的观念之前,灵魂就已经开始思考了;随着这些观念的增加和保留,它通过锻炼,在它的各个部分提高了它的思考能力;以及之后,通过复合这些观念,反思自己的运作,它增加了它的储备,以及记忆、想象、推理和其他思考方式的便利。
21. State of a child on the mother’s womb.
21.孩子在母亲子宫上的状态。
He that will suffer himself to be informed by observation and experience, and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature, will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new-born child, and much fewer of any reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine that the rational soul should think so much, and not reason at all, And he that will consider that infants newly come into the world spend the greatest part of their time in sleep, and are seldom awake but when either hunger calls for the teat, or some pain (the most importunate of all sensations), or some other violent impression on the body, forces the mind to perceive and attend to it;—he, I say, who considers this, will perhaps find reason to imagine that a FOETUS in the mother’s womb differs not much from the state of a vegetable, but passes the greatest part of its time without perception or thought; doing very little but sleep in a place where it needs not seek for food, and is surrounded with liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same temper; where the eyes have no light, and the ears so shut up are not very susceptible of sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of objects, to move the senses.
如果他愿意通过观察和经验来了解情况,而不是把自己的假设作为自然的规则,那么他就会发现,在一个刚出生的孩子身上,很少有习惯于多思考的灵魂的迹象,也很少有任何推理的迹象。然而,很难想象理性的灵魂会有如此多的思考,而根本没有推理。如果他考虑到刚来到这个世界上的婴儿大部分时间都在睡觉,而且很少醒来,除非是在饥饿要求吃奶的时候,或者是一些疼痛(所有感觉中最迫切的),或者其他一些对身体的猛烈印象,迫使心灵去感知和关注它。-我说,考虑到这一点的人也许会有理由想象,胎儿在母亲的子宫里与植物人的状态差别不大,它的大部分时间都是在没有知觉或思想的情况下度过的;除了在一个不需要寻找食物的地方睡觉外,几乎不做任何事情,周围都是酒,总是同样柔软,而且接近相同的脾气;眼睛没有光,耳朵被关闭,不容易听到声音;而且几乎没有变化,或物体的变化,来移动感官。
22. The mind thinks in proportion to the matter it gets from experience to think about.
22.心灵的思考与它从经验中得到的思考事项成正比。
Follow a child from its birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time it begins to know the objects which, being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguishes them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it. And so we may observe how the mind, BY DEGREES, improves in these; and ADVANCES to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these; of which I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.
从一个孩子出生开始,观察时间带来的变化,你会发现,随着感官带来的思想越来越多,它越来越清醒;思考得越多,它就越有东西可想。一段时间后,它开始认识那些它最熟悉的、给人留下深刻印象的物体。因此,它逐渐认识了每天与它交谈的人,并将他们与陌生人区分开来;这是它开始保留和区分感官传达给它的观念的实例和效果。因此,我们可以观察到,头脑是如何在这些方面逐级提高的;并推进到行使其他的能力,即扩大、复合和抽象其观念,以及对它们进行推理,并对所有这些进行反思;我将在下文中更多地谈到这些能力。
23. A man begins to have ideas when he first has sensation. What sensation is.
23.一个人在第一次有感觉的时候就开始有了想法。感觉是什么。
If it shall be demanded then, WHEN a man BEGINS to have any ideas, I think the true answer is,—WHEN HE FIRST HAS ANY SENSATION. For, since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with SENSATION; WHICH IS SUCH AN IMPRESSION OR MOTION MADE IN SOME PART OF THE BODY, AS MAKES IT BE TAKEN NOTICE OF IN THE UNDERSTANDING.
如果有人问,一个人什么时候开始有任何想法,我认为真正的答案是:当他第一次有任何感觉的时候。因为,既然在感官传达任何观念之前,头脑中似乎没有任何观念,我认为,理解力中的观念与感觉是共存的;感觉是身体的某个部分产生的印象或运动,使它在理解力中被注意到了。
24. The Original of all our Knowledge.
24.我们所有知识的本源。
The impressions then that are made on our sense by outward objects that are extrinsical to the mind; and its own operations about these impressions, reflected on by itself, as proper objects to be contemplated by it, are, I conceive, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of human intellect is,—that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses by outward objects, or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of anything, and the groundwork whereon to build all those notions which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which SENSE or REFLECTION have offered for its contemplation.
那么,由外在物体给我们的感官造成的印象,以及它自己对这些印象的操作,由它自己反思,作为它要考虑的适当对象,我认为是所有知识的起源。因此,人类智力的第一种能力是:心灵适合于接受对它的印象;或者通过感官接受外在的物体,或者通过它自己对这些物体的反思操作。这是一个人发现任何事物的第一步,也是他在这个世界上自然产生的所有观念的基础。所有那些高耸入云、高达天堂的崇高思想,都是在这里产生和立足的:在心灵徘徊的所有大范围内,在那些看似高高在上的遥远猜测中,它没有一丝一毫超出理智或反思提供给它思考的那些想法。
25. In the Reception of simple Ideas, the Understanding is for the most part passive.
25.在接受简单的思想时,理解力在大多数情况下是被动的。
In this part the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or not; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions; and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them.
在这一部分,理解力只是被动的;它是否会有这些开始,以及作为知识的材料,并不取决于它自己的能力。因为无论我们是否愿意,我们感官的对象确实,其中的许多对象,把它们的特殊观念强加在我们的头脑中;我们头脑的运作不会让我们没有,至少,对它们的一些模糊的概念。没有人可以完全不知道他在思考时做了什么。这些简单的想法,当被提供给头脑时,理解力不能拒绝拥有,也不能在它们被印上时加以改变,更不能把它们抹掉,自己制造新的想法,就像镜子不能拒绝、改变或抹去摆在它面前的物体在其中产生的图像或想法一样。由于我们周围的物体对我们的器官产生了不同的影响,心灵就不得不接受这些印象;而且无法避免对这些印象所附带的那些想法的感知。
1. Uncompounded Appearances.
1.1.非复合型的表象。
The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them, are SIMPLE and some COMPLEX.
为了更好地理解我们知识的性质、方式和范围,有一件事需要仔细观察,那就是关于我们的想法,其中有些是简单的,有些是复杂的。
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple; and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas;—as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax: yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but ONE UNIFORM APPEARANCE, OR CONCEPTION IN THE MIND, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.
尽管影响我们感官的品质在事物本身中是如此的统一和混合,以至于它们之间没有分离,没有距离;但很明显,它们在头脑中产生的想法是通过感官进入的,而且是不混合的。因为,尽管视觉和触觉经常同时从同一物体中吸收不同的观念;如一个人同时看到运动和颜色;手在同一块蜡中感觉到柔软和温暖:但这样在同一主体中结合的简单观念,与那些通过不同感官进入的观念一样完全不同。一个人在一块冰上感觉到的冷和硬,在头脑中就像百合花的气味和白色一样,或者像糖的味道和玫瑰花的气味一样,是不同的概念。对一个人来说,没有什么比他对这些简单的观念的清晰和明确的感知更清楚的了;这些观念本身是不复合的,其中只包含一个统一的外观,或在头脑中的概念,而不能被区分为不同的观念。
2. The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.
2.心灵既不能制造也不能毁灭它们。
These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to INVENT or FRAME one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understanding DESTROY those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding being much what the same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea, not received in by his senses from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.
这些简单的观念,也就是我们所有知识的材料,只有通过上述两种方式,即感觉和思考,才会被提示并提供给头脑。当理解力一旦储存了这些简单的观念,它就有能力重复、比较和统一这些观念,甚至达到几乎无穷无尽的程度,因此可以随心所欲地产生新的复杂观念。但是,最崇高的智慧或扩大的理解力,通过任何快速或多样的思维,都无法在头脑中发明或构建一个新的简单概念,而不是通过前面提到的方式来获取:理解力的任何力量也无法破坏那些存在的概念。人在自己的理解力这个小世界中的支配权与在可见事物的大世界中的支配权是一样的;在那里,他的能力,无论如何通过艺术和技巧来管理,也不过是对他手中的材料进行复合和分割;但对制造新物质的最小颗粒或破坏已经存在的东西的一个原子却无能为力。每个人都会发现自己有同样的无能,如果他想在自己的理解中形成一个简单的概念,而不是通过他的感官从外部物体接受,或通过他自己的头脑对它们的思考。我想让任何人尝试想象一下从未影响过他的味觉,或者构思一下他从未闻到过的气味:当他能做到这一点时,我也会得出结论,盲人对颜色有概念,聋人对声音有真正明确的概念。
3. Only the qualities that affect the senses are imaginable.
3.只有影响感官的品质是可以想象的。
This is the reason why—though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man—yet I think it is not possible for any MAN to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four senses, the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be;—which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think that, in other mansions of it, there may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man’s having but five senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more;—but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.
这就是为什么--虽然我们不能相信上帝不可能制造一个具有其他器官的生物,以及除了他给人的那五种通常被计算的器官之外,还有更多的方法来传达对有形事物的注意--但我认为,除了声音、味道、气味、可见和有形的品质之外,任何一个人都不可能想象身体中还有任何其他品质,可以让人注意到它们。如果人类只有四种感官,那么作为第五种感官对象的品质就会像现在属于第六、第七或第八种感官的任何品质一样,远离我们的注意、想象和概念;--无论在这个广阔而巨大的宇宙中的某些其他地方,是否有其他生物可能没有这些品质,否认这一点都是一种极大的推测。他不会骄傲地把自己置于万物之首,而是考虑到这一结构的广袤,以及在他必须处理的这一小部分中所发现的巨大差异,可能会认为,在它的其他地方,可能有其他不同的智能生物,他对这些生物的能力所知甚少,就像关在柜子的一个抽屉里的虫子对一个人的感官或理解力的了解一样。这种多样性和卓越性适合于造物主的智慧和能力。我在这里遵循了人类只有五种感官的普遍观点;尽管也许可以合理地计算出更多的感官;但这两种假设对我目前的目的同样适用。
1. Division of simple ideas.
1.简单概念的划分。
The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.
为了更好地理解我们从感觉中得到的观念,我们不妨根据它们接近我们头脑的不同方式来考虑它们,并使它们为我们所感知,这样做不会有错。
FIRST, then, There are some which come into our minds BY ONE SENSE ONLY.
首先,有些东西只通过一种感觉进入我们的头脑。
SECONDLY, There are others that convey themselves into the mind BY MORE SENSES THAN ONE.
其次,还有一些是通过多种感官进入大脑的。
THIRDLY, Others that are had from REFLECTION ONLY.
第三,其他仅由反思产生的。
FOURTHLY, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind BY ALL THE WAYS OF SENSATION AND REFLECTION.
第四,有一些是通过所有的感觉和思考方式,让自己走到了前面,并被暗示到了心里。
We shall consider them apart under these several heads.
我们将在这几个标题下分别考虑它们。
Ideas of one Sense.
一个意识的想法。
There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several degrees or shades and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears. The several tastes and smells, by the nose and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain,—the mind’s presence-room (as I may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.
有些观念只能通过一种感官来接受,而这种感官又特别适合于接受它们。因此,光和颜色,如白色、红色、黄色、蓝色;以及它们的几个程度或色调和混合物,如绿色、猩红色、紫色、海绿色和其他颜色,只能通过眼睛进入。各种噪音、声音和音调,只通过耳朵。几种味道和气味,只能通过鼻子和上颚。如果这些器官,或者作为管道将它们从外部输送到它们在大脑中的听众--心灵的存在室(我可以这样称呼它)--其中任何一个器官紊乱到无法发挥它们的功能,它们就没有后门可以进入;没有其他方法使它们进入视野,并被理解力所感知。
The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and cold, and solidity: all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else, more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.
在属于触觉的那些东西中,最重要的是热和冷,以及牢固性:所有其余的,几乎完全由可感的构造组成,如光滑和粗糙;或者,或多或少的部件的牢固粘附,如硬和软,坚韧和脆性,都足够明显。
2. Few simple Ideas have Names.
2.2. 很少有简单的想法有名字。
I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. Sweet and stinking commonly serve our turn for these ideas, which in effect is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds. I shall, therefore, in the account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas; amongst which, I think, I may well account solidity, which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.
我认为没有必要列举属于每个感官的所有特定的简单概念。即使我们想列举也不可能;属于大多数感官的概念比我们的名字多得多。各种各样的气味,如果不是更多的话,几乎和世界上的身体种类一样多,它们中的大多数都需要名字。甜味和臭味通常是我们对这些概念的反应,实际上这只不过是把它们称为令人愉快或不愉快;尽管玫瑰和紫罗兰的气味都是甜的,但肯定是非常独特的概念。不同的味道,通过我们的味觉,我们得到了不同的概念,也有了更好的名称。甜、苦、酸、涩、咸,几乎是我们对无数种味道的全部称谓,这些味道不仅在几乎每一种生物中,而且在同一种植物、水果或动物的不同部位,都能找到不同的味道。颜色和声音的情况也是如此。因此,在我这里对简单概念的描述中,我将满足于只列出对我们目前的目的最重要的那些概念,或者说,虽然它们经常是我们复杂概念的成分,但它们本身不太容易被注意到;我认为,在这些概念中,我可以把实体性算进去,因此我将在下一章中讨论。
1. We receive this Idea from Touch.
1.我们从 "触摸 "中收到这个想法。
The idea of SOLIDITY we receive by our touch: and it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us that supports us, and hinders our further sinking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that, whilst they remain between them, they do, by an insurmountable force, hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. THAT WHICH THUS HINDERS THE APPROACH OF TWO BODIES, WHEN THEY ARE MOVED ONE TOWARDS ANOTHER, I CALL SOLIDITY. I will not dispute whether this acceptation of the word solid be nearer to its original signification than that which mathematicians use it in. It suffices that I think the common notion of solidity will allow, if not justify, this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it IMPENETRABILITY, he has my consent. Only I have thought the term solidity the more proper to express this idea, not only because of its vulgar use in that sense, but also because it carries something more of positive in it than impenetrability; which is negative, and is perhaps more a consequence of solidity, than solidity itself. This, of all other, seems the idea most intimately connected with, and essential to body; so as nowhere else to be found or imagined, but only in matter. And though our senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a sensation in us: yet the mind, having once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies, traces it further, and considers it, as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist; and finds it inseparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified.
我们通过触觉获得了 "固体 "的概念:它产生于我们发现身体对任何其他身体进入它所拥有的地方的阻力,直到它离开它。我们从感觉中得到的最经常的观念莫过于稳固性。无论我们是运动还是休息,无论我们是什么姿势,我们总是感觉到在我们下面有什么东西支撑着我们,并阻止我们进一步向下沉沦;我们每天处理的身体使我们认识到,虽然它们保持在它们之间,但它们确实以一种不可逾越的力量,阻碍了我们的手压迫它们的部分的接近。因此,当两个物体被移向另一个时,阻碍它们接近的东西,我称之为稳固性。我不想争论这个词的这种接受方式是否比数学家使用它的方式更接近它的原始含义。我认为固体的普通概念即使不能证明它的使用是合理的,也会允许;但如果有人认为把它称为 "弹性 "会更好,我也同意。只是我认为用 "坚固性 "这个词来表达这个概念更合适,不仅是因为它在这个意义上的通俗使用,而且还因为它比 "不可渗透性 "含有更多的积极因素;"不可渗透性 "是消极的,也许比坚固性本身更像是坚固性的一个结果。在所有其他概念中,这似乎是与身体最密切相关、最基本的概念;因此,除了在物质中,没有其他地方可以找到或想象到。尽管我们的感官没有注意到它,但在物质的块状物中,其体积足以引起我们的感觉:然而,头脑一旦从这种较粗的可感体中得到这种观念,就会进一步追踪它,并在可能存在的最微小的物质颗粒中考虑它,以及考虑它的形状;并发现它不可分割地存在于身体中,无论在哪里或如何修改。
2. Solidity fills Space.
2.固体充满了空间。
This is the idea which belongs to body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. The idea of which filling of space is,—that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances; and will for ever hinder any other two bodies, that move towards one another in a straight line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a line not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handle sufficiently furnish us with.
这就是属于身体的观念,我们据此设想它能填充空间。填充空间的概念是:当我们想象一个固体物质占据任何空间时,我们认为它是如此拥有它,以至于它排除了所有其他的固体物质;并且将永远阻碍任何其他两个在一条直线上相互移动的物体,使它们无法相互接触,除非它从它们之间移开,与它们移动的路线不平行。关于它的这个概念,我们通常所处理的物体就足以为我们提供。
3. Distinct from Space.
3.有别于空间。
This resistance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, that no force, how great soever, can surmount it. All the bodies in the world, pressing a drop of water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance which it will make, soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space, which is capable neither of resistance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardness. For a man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their superficies come to meet; whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity. For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body) I ask, whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place? I think it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another, than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another. I do not ask, whether bodies do so EXIST, that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the question for or against a VACUUM. But my question is,—whether one cannot have the IDEA of one body moved, whilst others are at rest? And I think this no one will deny. If so, then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure space without solidity; whereinto any other body may enter, without either resistance or protrusion of anything. When the sucker in a pump is drawn, the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or not: nor does it imply a contradiction that, upon the motion of one body, another that is only contiguous to it should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition that the world is full; but not on the distinct IDEAS of space and solidity, which are as different as resistance and not resistance, protrusion and not protrusion. And that men have ideas of space without a body, their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate, as is shown in another place.
这种阻力使其他物体无法进入它所拥有的空间,这种阻力是如此之大,以至于任何力量,无论多么强大,都无法逾越它。世界上所有的物体,把一滴水压在四面八方,都无法克服它对它们相互接近的阻力,因为它是软的,除非把它移开。因为人们可以设想,两个物体在一定距离内,可以相互接近,而不接触或移开任何固体,直到它们的表面相接;我认为,这样,我们就有了没有固体的空间的明确概念。因为(不要说到任何特定体的湮灭)我问,一个人是否不能单独拥有一个单一体的运动的概念,而没有任何其他体紧接着进入其位置?我认为很明显,他可以:一个身体的运动观念并不包括另一个身体的运动观念,就像一个身体中的方形图形的观念包括另一个身体中的方形图形的观念。我不问,身体是否如此存在,以至于一个身体的运动不可能真的没有另一个的运动。确定这一点的任何一种方式,都是在讨好支持或反对真空的问题。但我的问题是,一个人是否不能有一个身体运动而其他身体静止的想法?我想这是没有人会否认的。如果是这样,那么它所遗弃的地方就给了我们一个没有实体的纯粹空间的概念;任何其他物体都可以进入其中,而没有任何阻力或突起。当泵中的吸盘被抽出时,无论是否有其他物体跟随吸盘的运动,它在管中填充的空间肯定是一样的:这也不意味着在一个物体的运动中,另一个仅与之相邻的物体不应跟随它,这是一种矛盾。这种运动的必要性只是建立在世界是完整的假设上;而不是建立在空间和实体的不同概念上,它们就像阻力和非阻力、突起和非突起一样不同。正如在另一个地方所显示的那样,人们有关于没有身体的空间的想法,他们关于真空的争论清楚地证明了这一点。
4. From Hardness.
4.从硬度来看。
Solidity is hereby also differenced from hardness, in that solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses: but hardness, in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure. And indeed, hard and soft are names that we give to things only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain sooner than change figure by the pressure of any part of our bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the situation of its parts upon an easy and unpainful touch.
固体与坚硬也有区别,因为固体是由填充物组成的,因此完全将其他物体排除在它所拥有的空间之外:而坚硬则是由物质的各个部分牢固地凝聚在一起,组成具有明显体积的块状物,因此整体不容易改变其形状。事实上,硬和软是我们对事物的称呼,只是与我们自己身体的构造有关;我们通常称其为硬,因为我们身体的任何部分受压都会使我们痛苦,而不是改变形状;相反,软则是在轻松和不痛苦的触摸下改变其部分的情况。
But this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world than to the softest; nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water. For, though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them; yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water, or resist more; but because the parts of water, being more easily separable from each other, they will, by a side motion, be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place by that side motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble, as much as the diamond; and it would be as impossible by any force to surmount their resistance, as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water, will quickly find its resistance. And he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with the air inclosed in a football. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water, and exactly closed; which further shows the solidity of so soft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled, being put into a press, which was driven by the extreme force of screws, the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal, and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it.
但是,这种改变可感部分之间的情况或整体形状的困难,并没有给世界上最硬的身体带来比最软的身体更多的坚固性;金刚砂也没有比水更坚固。因为,尽管两块大理石的两个平面更容易相互接近,而它们之间只有水或空气,比它们之间有一块钻石更容易接近;但这并不是说钻石的部分比水的部分更坚固,或更有抵抗力;而是因为水的部分更容易相互分离,它们通过一个侧面运动,更容易被移除,并为两块大理石的接近让路。但是,如果它们可以通过这种侧面运动来阻止它们的位置,它们就会像钻石一样永远阻碍这两块大理石的接近;而且用任何力量都不可能克服它们的阻力,就像克服钻石各部分的阻力一样。世界上最柔软的身体,如果不把它放在外面,而是留在它们之间,就会像能找到或想象到的最硬的东西一样,不可战胜地抵制任何其他两个身体的结合。在一个柔软的身体里注入空气或水的人,会很快发现它的阻力。如果有人认为,除了坚硬的物体外,没有任何东西能使他的手不接近对方,那么他可能会乐意做一个试验,把空气包在一个足球里。我被告知,这个实验是在佛罗伦萨进行的,用一个空心的金球装满了水,并且完全封闭;这进一步说明了水这样柔软的物体的坚固性。因为这样装满水的金球被放进一个由螺丝钉极力驱动的压力机里,水穿过非常紧密的金属孔隙,发现里面的颗粒没有靠近的空间,就跑到了外面,在那里像露水一样上升,然后一滴滴地落下,然后金球的侧面就会被挤压的发动机的剧烈压缩所折服。
5. On Solidity depend Impulse, Resistance and Protrusion.
5.关于固体依赖冲力、阻力和突起。
By this idea of solidity is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space:—the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, movable parts; and the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immovable parts. Upon the solidity of bodies also depend their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion. Of pure space then, and solidity, there are several (amongst which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas; and that they can think on space, without anything in it that resists or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure space, which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extension of body: the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any solid parts between: and on the other side, they persuade themselves that they have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of SOMETHING THAT FILLS SPACE, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men, who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can in that case talk with one another; any more than a man who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet colour with the blind man I mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.
身体的延伸和空间的延伸是通过这种实体性的概念来区分的:身体的延伸只不过是固体的、可分离的、可移动的部分的凝聚力或连续性;而空间的延伸则是不固体的、不可分离的和不可移动的部分的连续性。身体的稳固性也取决于它们的相互冲力、阻力和突起。那么,对于纯粹的空间和实体性,有几个人(我承认我是其中之一)说服自己,他们有清晰而明确的想法;他们可以思考空间,其中没有任何抵抗或被身体突出的东西。这就是纯空间的观念,他们认为他们拥有的纯空间的观念与他们对身体的延伸的任何观念一样清楚:凹面的相对部分之间的距离的观念,在没有任何固体部分的情况下也同样清楚:在另一方面,他们说服自己,他们有不同于纯空间的观念,有某种填充空间的观念,它可以被其他身体的冲力突出,或抵制它们的运动。如果还有人没有这两种不同的观念,而是把它们混为一谈,我不知道在不同名称下有相同观念的人,或者在相同名称下有不同观念的人,在这种情况下如何能够相互交谈;就像一个不是瞎子或聋子的人,对大红的颜色和喇叭的声音有不同的观念,可以与我在另一个地方提到的盲人讨论大红的颜色,他认为大红的观念就像喇叭的声音。
6. What Solidity is.
6.团结是什么。
If any one asks me, WHAT THIS SOLIDITY IS, I send him to his senses to inform him. Let him put a flint or a football between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what extension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. The simple ideas we have, are such as experience teaches them us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man’s mind by talking; and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall show in another place.
如果有人问我,这种固体是什么,我让他去找他的感觉,告诉他。让他把火石或足球放在两手之间,然后努力把它们连在一起,他就会知道。如果他认为这还不能充分说明实体性,说明它是什么,以及它在哪里;我保证在他告诉我思维是什么,或者它在哪里时,我会告诉他它是什么,以及它在哪里;或者向我解释延伸或运动是什么,这也许看起来更容易。我们所拥有的简单观念,是经验告诉我们的;但是,如果除此之外,我们努力用语言使它们在头脑中更加清晰,我们的成功不会比我们通过说话来清除盲人头脑中的黑暗,并向他讲述光和颜色的观念更好。这方面的原因我将在另一个地方说明。
Ideas received both by seeing and touching.
通过视觉和触觉接受的思想。
The ideas we get by more than one sense are, of SPACE or EXTENSION, FIGURE, REST, and MOTION. For these make perceivable impressions, both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.
我们通过一种以上的感觉得到的观念是:空间或延伸、形状、静止和运动。因为这些在眼睛和触觉上都能产生可感知的印象;我们可以通过视觉和感觉来接受并将身体的延伸、形状、运动和静止的概念传达给我们的头脑。但由于在另一个地方有机会更详细地谈论这些,我在这里只列举它们。
Simple Ideas are the Operations of Mind about its other Ideas.
简单的思想是心灵对其他思想的操作。
The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.
心灵从外部接受前几章中提到的观念,当它把视线转向自身,并观察自己对这些观念的行为时,就会从那里得到其他的观念,这些观念与它从外部事物中得到的任何观念一样,能够成为它思考的对象。
The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Reflection.
感知的理念和意愿的理念,我们从反思中得到。
The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two:—
心灵的两个伟大和主要的行动,是最经常考虑的,而且是如此频繁,以至于每个人都可以在自己身上注意到它们,这两个行动是:-
PERCEPTION, or THINKING; and VOLITION, or WILLING.
觉察,即思考;和意志,即意愿。
The power of thinking is called the UNDERSTANDING, and the power of volition is called the WILL; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties.
思考的能力被称为 "理解",意志的能力被称为 "意愿";心灵中的这两种力量或能力被称为 "能力"。
Of some of the MODES of these simple ideas of reflection, such as are REMEMBRANCE, DISCERNING, REASONING, JUDGING, KNOWLEDGE, FAITH, &c., I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.
关于这些简单的反思理念的一些模式,如记忆、辨别、推理、判断、知识、信仰等,我将在下文中谈到。
1. Ideas of Pleasure and Pain.
1.快乐和痛苦的观念。
There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. PLEASURE or DELIGHT, and its opposite, PAIN, or UNEASINESS; POWER; EXISTENCE; UNITY mix with almost all our other Ideas.
还有其他一些简单的想法,它们通过各种感觉和思考的方式进入头脑,即快乐或喜悦,以及它的反面,痛苦或不愉快;力量;存在;统一与我们几乎所有的其他想法混合。
2. Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain, I would be understood to signify, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies. For, whether we call it; satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c., on the one side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c., the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneasiness; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.
2.快乐或不安,它们中的一个或另一个,几乎与我们所有的感觉和思考的想法结合在一起:我们的感官几乎没有任何来自外部的感情,我们头脑中的任何退缩的想法,都不能在我们身上产生快乐或痛苦。我所说的快乐和痛苦,是指任何使我们高兴或烦恼的东西;不管它是来自我们头脑中的思想,还是来自对我们身体的任何作用。因为,无论我们把它称为:满足、喜悦、快乐、幸福等等,还是把它称为不安、麻烦、痛苦、折磨、苦恼、不幸等等,它们仍然是同一事物的不同程度,属于快乐和痛苦、喜悦或不安的观念;这是我对这两类观念最常用的名称。
3. As motives of our actions.
3.作为我们行动的动机。
The infinite wise Author of our being, having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our body: having also given a power to our minds, in several instances, to choose, amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of,—has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations a perception of delight. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations, and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may so call it) run adrift, without any direction or design, and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which state man, however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle, inactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy, lethargic dream. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees, that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.
我们存在的无限智慧的创造者,给了我们对我们身体几个部分的权力,使它们按我们认为合适的方式运动或保持静止;并且,通过它们的运动,使我们自己和其他相邻的身体运动,我们身体的所有行为都在其中。他还赋予我们的头脑一种能力,在若干情况下,在它的观念中选择它要思考的问题,并以考虑和注意的方式探究这个或那个问题,以激发我们的这些思考和运动的行动,我们能够做到的,他高兴地把若干思想和若干感觉与快乐的感觉联系起来。如果这与我们所有的外在感觉和内在思想完全分离,我们就没有理由选择一种思想或行动而不是另一种;选择疏忽而不是关注,选择运动而不是休息。因此,我们既不应该搅动我们的身体,也不应该运用我们的思想,而应该让我们的思想(如果我可以这样说的话)漂流,没有任何方向或设计,让我们头脑中的想法,像没有人注意的影子一样,在那里露面,而不去注意它们。在这种状态下,无论人的理解力和意志力如何,都会是一个非常闲散、不活跃的生物,只能在懒散、昏昏欲睡的梦中打发时间。因此,我们聪明的造物主高兴地将一些物体和我们从这些物体中得到的想法,以及我们的一些想法,附在一些物体上,附在一些程度上,使他赋予我们的这些能力不至于完全闲置,不被我们所利用。
4. An end and use of pain.
4.痛苦的结束和使用。
Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to pursue this: only this is worth our consideration, that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us. This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker, who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he, not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath in many cases annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment: and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature, that when any object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might, by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before the organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future. The consideration of those objects that produce it may well persuade us, that this is the end or use of pain. For, though great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them: because that, causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unarmed in its natural state. But yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us: because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.
痛苦具有与快乐相同的效力和作用,使我们开始工作,我们愿意运用我们的能力来避免这种情况,就像追求这种情况一样:只有这一点值得我们考虑,即痛苦往往是由在我们身上产生快乐的相同物体和想法产生的。它们的这种紧密结合,使我们经常在我们期待的快乐的感觉中感到痛苦,这给我们提供了新的机会,使我们钦佩我们造物主的智慧和仁慈,他为了保护我们的存在,在对我们的身体使用许多东西时,都附加了痛苦,以警告我们它们会造成的伤害,并作为劝告我们退出它们。但是,他不是仅仅为了保护我们,而是为了保护每个部分和器官的完美,在许多情况下,他把痛苦附在那些使我们高兴的想法上。因此,在某种程度上对我们非常有利的热,只要稍微增加一点,就证明不是普通的痛苦:所有感官物体中最令人愉快的光本身,如果有太多的光,如果超过我们眼睛的适当比例,就会引起非常痛苦的感觉。这是自然界明智而有利的安排,当任何物体因其运作的激烈性而扰乱感觉工具时,而感觉工具的结构不能不说是非常好的和精致的,我们可以通过疼痛来警告我们,在器官完全失去秩序之前撤回,并因此不适合在未来发挥其适当的功能。对那些产生疼痛的物体的考虑可以很好地说服我们,这就是疼痛的目的或用途。因为,尽管巨大的光亮让我们的眼睛难以忍受,但最高程度的黑暗也不会使它们生病:因为黑暗不会使眼睛产生无序的运动,使这个好奇的器官在其自然状态下没有武器。但是,过冷和过热都会使我们感到痛苦:因为它同样会破坏维持生命和行使身体各种功能所必需的气质,而这种气质包括适度的温暖;或者,如果你愿意的话,我们身体的无知觉部分的运动被限制在一定范围内。
5. Another end.
5.另一个结束。
Beyond all this, we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us; and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with;—that we, finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him with whom there is fullness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.
除此以外,我们还可以找到另一个原因,即上帝在所有影响我们的事物中分散了若干程度的快乐和痛苦;并将它们混合在我们的思想和感官所涉及的几乎所有事物中;以便我们在受造物所能提供的所有享受中发现不完美、不满意和缺乏完整的幸福,从而引导我们在享受那与之有充分快乐、在其右边有永远的快乐的主时寻求幸福。
6. Goodness of God in annexing pleasure and pain to our other ideas.
6.上帝将快乐和痛苦附在我们的其他想法上的善意。
Though what I have here said may not, perhaps, make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.
虽然我在这里所说的也许不能使快乐和痛苦的概念比我们自己的经验更清楚,这是我们能够拥有它们的唯一途径;但是,考虑它们为什么附属于这么多其他概念的原因,使我们对支配万物的主宰者的智慧和善意产生应有的情感,可能不适合这些调查的主要目的:对他的认识和尊敬是我们所有思想的主要目的,也是所有理解的正当事务。
7. Ideas of Existence and Unity.
7.存在和统一性的观念。
EXISTENCE and UNITY are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us;—which is, that they exist, or have existence. And whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of unity.
存在和统一是另外两个想法,它们被每一个没有的物体和每一个内在的想法所暗示。当观念在我们的头脑中时,我们认为它们是实际存在的,就像我们认为事物实际上没有我们一样;也就是说,它们存在,或有存在。凡是我们能认为是一个东西的,无论是真实的存在还是观念,都会给理解力带来统一性的概念。
8. Idea of Power.
8.权力的概念。
POWER also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection. For, observing in ourselves that we do and can think, and that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects, also, that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses,—we both these ways get the idea of power.
力量也是我们从感觉和思考中得到的另一个简单的想法。因为,我们在自己身上观察到,我们会做,会思考,我们可以随心所欲地移动我们身体中处于静止状态的几个部分;还有,自然界的身体能够在彼此之间产生的效果,每时每刻都会出现在我们的感官中,--我们通过这两种方式获得力量的概念。
9. Idea of Succession.
9.9. 继承的概念。
Besides these there is another idea, which, though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by what passes in our minds; and that is the idea of SUCCESSION. For if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going and another coming, without intermission.
除了这些,还有一个想法,虽然是由我们的感官提出来的,但更多的是由我们头脑中的东西提供给我们;这就是 "持续 "的想法。因为如果我们立即审视自己,并思考在那里可以观察到的东西,我们会发现我们的想法总是在我们清醒的时候,或者有任何想法的时候,一列列地经过,一个去,另一个来,没有间断过。
10. Simple Ideas the materials of all our Knowledge.
10.简单的想法是我们所有知识的材料。
These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most considerable of those simple ideas which the mind has, out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two forementioned ways of sensation and reflection.
这些,如果不是全部,至少也是(我认为)心灵所拥有的那些简单观念中最重要的,它的所有其他知识都是由这些观念构成的;所有这些都是它只通过前面提到的感觉和思考这两种方式得到的。
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight further than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any SIMPLE IDEA which is not received from one of those inlets before mentioned, or any COMPLEX IDEA not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be so strange to think these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of twenty-four letters; or if, going one step further, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations that may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz. number, whose stock is inexhaustible and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth extension alone afford the mathematicians?
也不要让任何人认为这些界限对人的宽广的思想来说太狭窄了,它的飞行比星星还远,不能被世界的界限所限制;它的思想甚至经常超出物质的最大限度的扩展,并进入那不可理解的Inane。我同意这一切,但我希望有人能提出任何简单的想法,而这些想法不是从前面提到的那些入口中得到的,或者任何复杂的想法不是从那些简单的想法中产生的。如果我们考虑到从24个字母的不同组成中可以组成多少个单词,那么认为这几个简单的概念足以运用最敏捷的思维或最大的能力;并为全人类的所有各种知识和更多的幻想和意见提供材料,也就不会那么奇怪了;或者,如果再进一步,我们只需思考一下用上述概念中的一个就可以做出的各种组合,即。数,它的存量是取之不尽、用之不竭的:单单是外延就为数学家提供了多大的、巨大的领域?
1. Positive Ideas from privative causes.
1.1.来自私人原因的积极想法。
Concerning the simple ideas of Sensation; it is to be considered,—that whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation of the subject.
关于感觉的简单概念;应该考虑到,凡是在自然界中构成的,能够通过影响我们的感官,在头脑中引起任何感知的东西,都会因此在理解中产生一个简单的概念。不管它的外部原因是什么,当它被我们的辨别能力注意到时,它就会被心灵看成是理解力中的一个真正的积极想法,就像其他任何东西一样;尽管,也许它的原因只是主体的缺失。
2. Ideas in the mind distinguished from that in things which gives rise to them.
2.思想中的观念与事物中产生这些观念的观念相区别。
Thus the ideas of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them are barely privations, in those subjects from whence our senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them: which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding, but to the nature of the things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.
因此,冷与热、光与暗、白与黑、运动与静止的观念,在头脑中同样是清晰而积极的观念;尽管在我们的感官产生这些观念的那些主题中,产生这些观念的一些原因是勉强的缺点。理解力在看待它们的时候,把它们都看作是独特的积极观念,而没有注意到产生它们的原因:这是一种不属于观念的探究,因为它在理解力中是这样的,而是属于我们以外的事物的性质。这是两件截然不同的事情,要仔细加以区分;感知和了解白色或黑色的概念是一回事,而研究它们必须是什么样的颗粒,以及在表面的分布情况,以使任何物体呈现白色或黑色是另一回事。
3. We may have the ideas when we are ignorant of their physical causes.
3.当我们对其物理原因一无所知时,我们可能会有这些想法。
A painter or dyer who never inquired into their causes hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than the philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is, in its cause, positive or privative; and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that of white, however the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.
一个从未探究过它们的原因的画家或染匠,在他的理解中对白色和黑色以及其他颜色的观念是一样清楚、完美和明确的,也许比忙于考虑它们的性质的哲学家更清楚,并认为他知道它们中的任何一种在其原因上是积极的还是消极的;黑色的观念在他心中的积极性并不比白色的低,不管这种颜色在外部物体中的原因可能只是一种消极的。
4. Why a privative cause in nature may occasion a positive idea.
4.为什么自然界中的私人原因可以产生一个积极的想法。
If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive idea; viz. that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.
如果我现在的任务是探究感知的自然原因和方式,那么我应该提出这样一个理由,即至少在某些情况下,一个私人原因可能会产生一个积极的想法;也就是说,所有的感觉都是由我们的动物精神的不同程度和模式的运动产生的,受到外部物体的不同刺激,任何以前的运动的减少必须像它的变化或增加一样必然产生一个新的感觉;因此引入一个新的想法,这只取决于动物精神在该器官的不同运动。
5. Negative names need not be meaningless.
5.负面的名字不一定是无意义的。
But whether this be so or not I will not here determine, but appeal to every one’s own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and positive idea in his mind, as a man himself, though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative names, to which there be no positive ideas; but they consist wholly in negation of some certain ideas, as SILENCE, INVISIBLE; but these signify not any ideas in the mind but their absence.
但是,这是否是真的,我在此不做决定,而是呼吁每个人自己的经验,一个人的影子,尽管它只是由没有光线组成(而且越是没有光线,影子就越清晰),但当一个人看着它时,是否会在他的脑海中引起同样清晰和积极的想法,就像一个人自己,尽管被清晰的阳光所覆盖?而影子的图片是一个积极的东西。的确,我们有一些消极的名称,对它们来说没有积极的观念;但它们完全是对某些观念的否定,如沉默、不可见;但这些标志着在头脑中没有任何观念,而是它们的缺席。
6. Whether any ideas are due to causes really private.
6.是否有任何想法是由于真正的私人原因造成的。
And thus one may truly be said to see darkness. For, supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a question. The privative causes I have here assigned of positive ideas are according to the common opinion; but, in truth, it will be hard to determine whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined, whether rest be any more a privation than motion.
因此,人们确实可以说是看到了黑暗。因为,假设一个完全黑暗的洞,从那里没有光线被反射出来,人们肯定会看到它的形状,或者它可能被画出来;或者我用的墨水是否会产生任何其他的想法,这是一个问题。我在这里所指定的积极观念的私因是根据一般的意见;但是,事实上,在确定静止是否比运动更能成为一种私因之前,很难确定是否真的有来自私因的观念。
7. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.
7.心中的想法,身体的特质。
To discover the nature of our IDEAS the better, and to, discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them AS THEY ARE IDEAS OR PERCEPTIONS IN OUR MINDS; and AS THEY ARE MODIFICATIONS OF MATTER IN THE BODIES THAT CAUSE SUCH PERCEPTIONS IN US: that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.
为了更好地发现我们的观念的性质,并对它们进行理解性的讨论,最好是把它们区分开来,因为它们是我们头脑中的观念或感知;以及它们是在我们身体中引起这种感知的物质的变化。这样我们就不会认为(也许通常是这样),它们正是主体中固有事物的形象和相似性;大多数感觉在头脑中并不像不存在的事物,就像代表它们的名字与我们的观念相似一样,但一听到它们就会在我们心中激起。
8. Our Ideas and the Qualities of Bodies.
8.我们的想法和身体的特质。
Whatsoever the mind perceives IN ITSELF, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call IDEA; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call QUALITY of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round,—the power to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas; which IDEAS, if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us.
无论心灵在自身中感知到什么,或者是感知、思考或理解的直接对象,我都称之为 "理念";而在我们心中产生任何理念的力量,我称之为该力量所在的主体的质量。因此,一个雪球有能力在我们身上产生白色、寒冷和圆形的观念,--在我们身上产生这些观念的能力,因为它们在雪球中,我称之为品质;而因为它们是我们理解中的感觉或知觉,我称之为观念;如果我有时把这些观念说成在事物本身中,我就会被理解为在我们身上产生这些观念的物体的品质。
9. Primary Qualities of Bodies.
9.身体的主要特性。
Concerning these qualities, we, I think, observe these primary ones in bodies that produce simple ideas in us, viz. SOLIDITY, EXTENSION, MOTION or REST, NUMBER or FIGURE. These, which I call ORIGINAL or PRIMARY qualities of body, are wholly inseperable from it; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived; and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses: v.g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter, of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number.
关于这些品质,我认为,我们在身体中观察到这些主要的品质,这些品质在我们心中产生了简单的概念,即稳固性、伸展性、运动或静止、数字或图形。这些,我称之为身体的原始或首要的品质,是完全不可分割的;在它所遭受的所有改变和变化中,在它身上可以使用的所有力量中,它始终保持着这些品质;在每一个有足够体积的物质颗粒中,感官始终发现这些品质;心灵发现与每一个物质颗粒不可分割,尽管还不足以使自己单独被我们的感官所感知:V。g. 以一粒麦子为例,把它分成两部分;每一部分仍有坚固性、延伸性、形状和流动性:再分一次,它仍保持同样的品质;这样继续分下去,直到各部分变得不可感知;它们必须仍各自保持所有这些品质。因为分割(也就是磨子、杵子或任何其他物体在另一个物体上所做的一切,把它变成不可知的部分)永远不会从任何物体上拿走实体性、延伸性、形状或流动性,而只是把以前只是一个物体变成两个或更多不同的独立物质块;所有这些不同的物质块,在分割后被算作许多不同的物体,构成一定数量。
10. [not in early editions]
10.[早期版本中没有]
11. How Bodies produce Ideas in us.
11.身体如何在我们身上产生思想。
The next thing to be considered is, how bodies operate one upon another; and that is manifestly by impulse, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive that body should operate on WHAT IT DOES NOT TOUCH (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not), or when it does touch, operate any other way than by motion.
接下来要考虑的是,身体如何在另一个人身上运作;这显然是通过冲力,而不是其他。不可能想象身体会在它没有接触到的地方运作(这就是想象它可以在它没有接触到的地方运作),或者当它接触到的时候,以任何其他方式运作而不是通过运动。
12. By motions, external, and in our organism.
12.通过运动,外部的,以及在我们的有机体中。
If then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these ORIGINAL qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, maybe perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them; to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.
如果外部物体在我们的头脑中产生观念时,并没有与我们的头脑结合起来;但我们却能在其中单独落入我们感官的物体中感知到这些原始的品质,那么很明显,一些运动必须由我们的神经或动物精神,通过我们身体的某些部分,持续到大脑或感觉的所在地,在我们头脑中产生我们对它们的特殊观念。既然可观察到的物体的延伸、形状、数量和运动可以在远处被视觉感知,那么很明显,一些单独的不可感知的物体必须从它们那里来,到眼睛,从而传递给大脑一些运动;这就产生了我们对它们的这些想法。
13. How secondary Qualities produce their ideas.
13.次要素质是如何产生其思想的。
After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the ideas of SECONDARY qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses. For, it being manifest that there are bodies and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion,—as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and others extremely smaller than those; perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water, as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hail-stones;—let us suppose at present that, the different motions and figures, bulk and number, of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce: in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies; v.g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter, of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.
按照这些原始品质的观念在我们身上产生的同样方式,我们可以设想,次要品质的观念也会产生,即通过对我们的感官进行不可知的微粒操作。因为,很明显,有些物体和大量的物体,每一个都非常小,以至于我们的任何感官都无法发现它们的体积、形状或运动,这一点在空气和水的颗粒中很明显,还有一些比它们更小的颗粒;也许比空气和水的颗粒小得多,就像空气和水的颗粒比豌豆或冰雹小一样;我们现在假设,这些颗粒的不同运动和形状、体积和数量,影响我们感官的几个器官,产生。在我们身上产生了不同的感觉,这些感觉是我们从身体的颜色和气味中得到的;例如紫色,通过这种不可知的物质粒子的冲动,其特殊的数字和体积,以及其运动的不同程度和变化,使我们的头脑中产生蓝色的想法,以及该花的甜美气味。我们不可能想象,上帝会把这些想法附在这些运动上,而这些运动与之并不相似,就像他会把痛苦的想法附在一块分割我们肉体的钢铁运动上,而这个想法与之并不相像一样。
14. They depend on the primary Qualities.
14.它们取决于主要的素质。
What I have said concerning colours and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us; and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts and therefore I call them SECONDARY QUALITIES.
我所说的关于颜色和气味的内容,也可以理解为味道和声音以及其他类似的感官品质;无论我们错误地归因于它们的真实性如何,实际上它们在物体本身中什么都不是,而是在我们身上产生各种感觉的能力;并且取决于那些主要的品质,即体积、形状、质地和部件的运动,因此我称它们为次要品质。
15. Ideas of primary Qualities are Resemblances; of secondary, not.
15.第一性的概念是相似的,第二性的概念则不是。
From whence I think it easy to draw this observation,—that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.
从这里,我认为很容易得出这样的结论--身体的初级品质的观念是它们的相似性,它们的模式确实存在于身体本身,但由这些次级品质在我们身上产生的观念与它们完全没有相似性。没有任何东西像我们的观念,存在于身体本身。在我们所称的身体中,它们只是在我们身上产生这些感觉的一种力量:而在观念中的甜美、蓝色或温暖,不过是身体本身中不可感觉的部分的一定的体积、形状和运动,我们称之为这样。
16. Examples.
16.例子。
Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that, at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say—that this idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is ACTUALLY IN THE FIRE; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is NOT in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?
火焰被称为热和光;雪,白色和冷;甘露,白色和甜,这是由于它们在我们身上产生的观念。人们通常认为,这些物体的品质与我们的观念是一样的,一个与另一个完全相似,就像它们在镜子里一样,如果人们不这样说,会被大多数人认为是非常奢侈的。然而,如果有人认为,同样的火在远处会在我们身上产生温暖的感觉,而在近处又会在我们身上产生截然不同的痛苦感觉,那么他就应该想想他有什么理由说,这个由火在他身上产生的温暖的概念,实际上就在火里;而他的痛苦的概念,同样的火也在他身上产生,却不在火中。既然雪在我们身上产生了这两种观念,为什么白和冷都在雪里,而疼痛却不在雪里;而且除了其固体部分的体积、形状、数量和运动外,这两种观念都不能产生?
17. The ideas of the Primary alone really exist.
17.只有初级阶段的想法才真正存在。
The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them,—whether any one’s senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called REAL qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ear hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, AS THEY ARE SUCH PARTICULAR IDEAS, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.
火或雪的具体体积、数量、形状和运动部分确实存在于它们之中--无论任何人的感官是否察觉到它们:因此它们可以被称为真实的品质,因为它们确实存在于这些身体中。但是,光、热、白或冷,在它们身上并不像疾病或痛苦在甘露中那样真实。拿走它们的感觉;让眼睛看不到光或颜色,让耳朵听不到声音;让上颚尝不到味道,让鼻子闻不到气味,所有的颜色、味道、气味和声音,因为它们是如此具体的概念,就会消失和停止,并还原为它们的原因,即体积、形状和部分的运动。
18. The secondary exist in things only as modes of the primary.
18.次要的东西在事物中只是作为主要的模式而存在。
A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it as it really is in manna moving: a circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the mind or in the manna. And this, both motion and as figure, are really in the manna, whether we take notice of primary, them or no: this everybody is ready to agree to. Besides, manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a power to produce the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us. That these ideas of sickness and pain are NOT in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when we feel them not; this also every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, size, and figure of its particles, on the eyes and palate: as the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts, (for by nothing else can a body operate, as has been proved): as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, and thereby produce distinct ideas, which in itself it has not. These ideas, being all effects of the operations of manna on several parts of our bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts;—why those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna, than those produced by the stomach and guts; or why the pain and sickness, ideas that are the effect of manna, should be thought to be nowhere when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness, effects of the same manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the manna, when they are not seen or tasted, would need some reason to explain.
一块体积可观的甘露能够在我们心中产生圆形或方形的概念;并且通过从一个地方移到另一个地方,产生运动的概念。这种运动的观念代表了甘露运动的真实情况:无论是在观念中还是在存在中,在头脑中还是在甘露中,圆或方都是一样的。而这一点,无论是运动还是图形,都真正存在于甘露中,无论我们是否注意到它们的主要性:这一点每个人都愿意同意。此外,吗哪因其各部分的体积、形状、质地和运动,有能力在我们身上产生疾病的感觉,有时还产生剧烈的疼痛或抓挠的感觉。这些疾病和痛苦的想法并不在吗哪,而是它对我们的影响,当我们感觉不到它们的时候,它们就不存在了;这也是每个人都很乐意同意的。然而,人们很难认为甘露中没有甜味和白色;这不过是甘露通过其颗粒的运动、大小和形状对眼睛和上颚产生的作用:正如甘露引起的疼痛和疾病被认为不过是甘露通过其不可见的部分的大小、运动和形状对胃和肠道产生的作用(因为正如已经证明的那样,一个身体不可能通过其他方式运作)。就好像它不能对眼睛和上颚进行操作,从而在头脑中产生特定的、它本身没有的独特观念一样,我们也允许它对内脏和胃进行操作,从而产生它本身没有的独特观念。这些观念,都是甘露在我们身体的几个部分上运作的效果,通过其部分的大小、形状、数量和运动;为什么由眼睛和上颚产生的观念应该被认为是真的在甘露中,而不是由胃和肠子产生的观念。或者,为什么疼痛和疾病,即甘露的影响,在没有感觉到时,会被认为不存在;而甜味和白味,即同样的甘露对身体其他部位的影响,以同样未知的方式,在没有看到或尝到时,会被认为存在于甘露中,这都需要一些理由来解释。
19. Examples.
19.例子。
Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry. Hinder light from striking on it, and its colours vanish; it no longer produces any such ideas in us: upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphryry in the light, when it is plain IT HAS NO COLOUR IN THE DARK? It has, indeed, such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of whiteness; but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.
让我们考虑一下斑岩中的红色和白色。阻止光线照射它,它的颜色就消失了;它不再在我们心中产生任何这样的想法:当光线返回时,它又在我们身上产生这些表象。有谁能认为斑岩因光的存在或不存在而发生了任何真正的变化;而且那些白色和红色的概念在光下真的存在于斑岩中,而它在黑暗中显然是没有颜色的?的确,无论白天还是黑夜,它都有这样的颗粒结构,通过光线从那块硬石头的某些部分反弹,很容易在我们身上产生红色的概念,而从其他部分产生白色的概念;但白色或红色在任何时候都不在其中,而是这样一种质地,有能力在我们身上产生这样一种感觉。
20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in an body, but an alteration of the texture of it?
20.捣碎一个杏仁,透明的白色就会变成肮脏的颜色,甜味就会变成油腻的味道。除了改变身体的质地之外,铁杵的敲打能使身体发生什么真正的改变呢?
21. Explains how water felt as cold by one hand may be warm to the other.
21.解释为什么一只手觉得水是冷的,另一只手却觉得是热的。
Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand and of heat by the other: whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold. For, if we imagine WARMTH, as it is in our hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other; which yet FIGURE never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other; and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.
意念既然被这样区分和理解,我们就可以说明,同样的水,如何在同一时间,一方面产生冷的意念,另一方面产生热的意念:而同样的水,如果这些意念真的在其中,就不可能在同一时间既热又冷。因为,如果我们把 "温暖",就像它在我们手中一样,想象成只不过是我们的神经或动物精神的微小颗粒中的某种类型和程度的运动,我们就可以理解,同样的水怎么可能同时在一只手中产生热的感觉,而在另一只手中产生冷的感觉;但 "图形 "从来没有这样做过,一只手从未产生过方形的概念,而另一只手却产生过地球的概念。但是,如果热和冷的感觉只不过是我们身体的微小部分的运动的增加或减少,由任何其他身体的细胞引起的,那么很容易理解,如果这种运动在一只手上比在另一只手上大。如果一个身体被施加在两只手上,而这个身体的微小颗粒比其中一只手的运动大,比另一只手的运动小,那么它就会增加一只手的运动,而减少另一只手的运动;因此,就会产生不同的冷热感觉。
22. An excursion into natural philosophy.
22.对自然哲学的考察。
I have in what just goes before been engaged in physical inquiries a little further than perhaps I intended. But, it being necessary to make the nature of sensation a little understood; and to make the difference between the QUALITIES in bodies, and the IDEAS produced by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them;—I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy; it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the PRIMARY and REAL qualities of bodies, which are always in them (viz. solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned), from those SECONDARY and IMPUTED qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned;—whereby we may also come to know what ideas are, and what are not, resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.
在刚才的内容中,我对物理学的研究比我的初衷要深入一些。但是,为了使人们对感觉的性质有一点了解;为了使人们清楚地认识到身体的质量和它们在头脑中产生的观念之间的区别,否则就不可能对它们进行明白的讨论;我希望我对自然哲学的这一小小的偏离能得到原谅;在我们目前的探索中,有必要区分身体的主要和真实的质量,它们总是在身体中(即在我们目前的研究中,有必要区分身体的主要和真实的品质,这些品质总是存在于它们之中(即坚固性、延伸性、形状、数量和运动或静止,并且有时被我们感知,即当它们所在的身体大到足以单独被辨别出来时),与那些次要和假定的品质,它们只是这些主要品质的几个组合的力量,当它们运作时没有被明确辨别出来;--这样我们也可以知道什么是概念,什么不是,是我们从它们那里命名的身体中真正存在的东西的相似之处。
23. Three Sorts of Qualities on Bodies.
23.身体上的三种特质。
The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered are of three sorts:—
那么,在身体中的品质,正确地考虑有三种: --
FIRST, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself; as is plain in artificial things. These I call PRIMARY QUALITIES.
首先,它们的实体部分的体积、形状、数量、情况和运动或休息。无论我们是否察觉到它们,它们都在其中;当它们的尺寸大到我们可以发现它们的时候,我们就可以通过这些来了解事物本身的情况;就像在人造事物中一样。这些我称之为主要特征。
SECONDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in US the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called SENSIBLE QUALITIES.
第二,任何身体的力量,由于其不可感知的基本品质,以一种特殊的方式作用于我们的任何感官,从而在我们身上产生几种颜色、声音、气味、味道等的不同概念。这些通常被称为 "感性"(SENSIBLE QUALITIES)。
THIRDLY, The power that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of ANOTHER BODY, as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid.
第三,任何物体中的力量,由于其主要品质的特殊构成,使另一物体的体积、形状、质地和运动发生这样的变化,从而使它对我们的感官产生不同于以往的作用。因此,太阳有能力使蜡变白,火能使铅变成液体。
The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities; because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not: and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.
如前所述,我认为其中的第一种可以适当地称为真实的、原始的或主要的品质;因为它们存在于事物本身,无论它们是否被察觉;而次要的品质则取决于它们的不同变化。
The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things: which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.
其他两种只是以不同方式作用于其他事物的能力:这些能力是由这些主要品质的不同修改而产生的。
24. The first are Resemblances; the second thought to be Resemblances, but are not, the third neither are nor are thought so.
24.第一类是相似的;第二类被认为是相似的,但不是,第三类既不是也不被认为是相似的。
But, though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely, and nothing but powers, relating to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the SECOND sort, viz. the powers to produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities in the things thus affecting us: but the THIRD sort are called and esteemed barely powers, v.g. The idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by powers in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally POWERS IN THE SUN, DEPENDING ON ITS PRIMARY QUALITIES; whereby it is able, in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.
但是,尽管后两种品质是勉强的力量,而且只是力量,与其他几个机构有关,并由原始品质的不同变化而产生,但它们通常被认为是其他的。因为第二种,即通过我们的感官在我们身上产生几种观念的能力,被视为在这样影响我们的事物中的真实品质:但第三种被称为并被视为勉强的力量,例如,我们通过眼睛或触摸从太阳得到的热或光的观念,通常被认为是存在于太阳中的真实品质,而不是它的单纯力量。但是,当我们把太阳与它所熔化或变白的蜡联系起来考虑时,我们就会把蜡中产生的白色和柔软看成不是太阳的品质,而是它的力量所产生的效果。然而,如果正确地考虑,这些光和暖的品质,当我被太阳温暖或照亮时,在我身上产生的感觉,在太阳身上并没有别的东西,就像蜡在变白或融化时产生的变化,在太阳身上也有。它们在太阳中都具有同样的力量,取决于它的主要特性;因此,在一种情况下,它能够如此改变我的眼睛或手的一些不可触及的部分的体积、形状、质地或运动,从而在我身上产生光或热的概念;在另一种情况下,它能够如此改变蜡的不可触及部分的体积、形状、质地或运动,从而使它们适合在我身上产生白色和液体的独特概念。
25. Why the secondary are ordinarily taken for real Qualities and not for bare Powers.
25.为什么次要的东西通常被认为是真正的品质,而不是赤裸裸的权力。
The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be because the ideas we have of distinct colours, sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities; which appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production, and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward as to imagine, that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reason show how bodies BY THEIR BULK, FIGURE, AND MOTION, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But, in the other case in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For, through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are apt to think IT is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine THAT to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun, because we find not those different colours in the sun itself. For, our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power, and not the communication of any quality which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. But our senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.
之所以通常把前者当作真正的品质,而把后者当作赤裸裸的力量,似乎是因为我们对独特的颜色、声音等所产生的观念,根本不包含任何体积、形状或运动,我们不可能认为它们是这些主要品质的效果;在我们的感官看来,这些品质在它们的产生中没有任何作用,而且与它们也没有任何明显的一致性或可想象的联系。因此,我们才会如此前卫地想象,这些观念是物体本身真正存在的东西的相似性,因为在它们的产生过程中,感官没有发现任何物体的体积、形状或运动;理性也无法说明,物体通过它们的体积、形状和运动,如何在头脑中产生蓝色或黄色等观念。但是,在另一种情况下,在身体改变另一个人的品质的操作中,我们清楚地发现,所产生的品质通常与产生它的东西没有任何相似之处;因此,我们把它看成是力量的纯粹效果。因为,通过接受来自太阳的热或光的概念,我们很容易认为这是太阳中这种品质的感知和相似性;然而,当我们看到蜡或一张白皙的脸从太阳中接受颜色的变化时,我们不能想象这是太阳中任何东西的接受或相似性,因为我们在太阳本身中没有发现这些不同颜色。因为,我们的感官能够在两个不同的外部物体中观察到感性品质的相似或不相似,当我们在产生感性品质的事物中没有发现这样的感性品质时,我们就会很迅速地得出结论,认为在任何主体中产生的任何感性品质都是赤裸裸的力量的作用,而不是真正在有效中的任何品质的传达。但是,我们的感官无法发现在我们身上产生的观念与产生它的物体的质量之间有任何不相似之处,我们很容易想象,我们的观念是物体中某些东西的相似性,而不是某些权力的效果,这些权力被置于对它们的主要质量的修改中,而在我们身上产生的观念与这些主要质量并不相似。
26. Secondary Qualities twofold; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable.
26.次要特征有两个方面;第一,可立即感知;第二,可立即感知。
To conclude. Beside those before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies, viz. bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of their solid parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several powers in them, depending on those primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us; or else, by operating on other bodies, so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called secondary qualities IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVABLE: the latter, secondary qualities, MEDIATELY PERCEIVABLE.
总结一下。除了前面提到的身体中的那些主要品质,即体积、形状、延伸、数量和固体部分的运动;所有其他的,使我们注意到身体并将它们彼此区分开来的东西,无非是它们中的几种力量,取决于这些主要品质;据此,它们或者通过立即作用于我们的身体,在我们身上产生几种不同的观念;或者,通过作用于其他身体,如此改变它们的主要品质,使它们能够在我们身上产生不同于它们之前的观念。我认为,前者可称为可立即感知的次要品质:后者是可中度感知的次要品质。
1. Perception the first simple Idea of Reflection.
1.感知是反思的第一个简单概念。
PERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything. For in bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.
感知,因为它是心灵对我们的观念所行使的第一种能力;所以它是我们从思考中得到的第一个和最简单的观念,并被一些人称为一般的思维。虽然按照英语的说法,思考是指心灵对其观念的那种操作,其中心灵是活跃的;在那里,它以某种程度的自愿关注,考虑任何事情。因为在赤裸裸的感知中,心灵在大多数情况下只是被动的;而它所感知到的东西,它无法避免地被感知到。
2. Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is.
2.仅仅是反射就可以让我们了解到什么是感知。
What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c., or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it. And if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.
什么是感知,每个人都会通过反思他自己的行为,当他看到、听到、感觉到、等等,或思考时,比我的任何论述更清楚。谁要是反思一下自己心中的事,就不会错过。如果他不反思,世界上所有的语言都不能使他对它有任何概念。
3. Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression.
3.只有当心灵注意到有机印象时,才会在感觉中产生。
This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind; wherein consists actual perception.
可以肯定的是,无论身体发生了什么变化,如果它们没有到达心灵;无论外在的部分产生了什么印象,如果它们没有被内部注意到,就不会有感知。火烧我们的身体时,除非运动持续到大脑,并在那里产生热感或疼痛的概念,否则不会有其他效果;这就是实际的知觉。
4. Impulse on the organ insufficient.
4.对器官的冲动不足。
How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man’s ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no sensation. So that wherever there is sense of perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.
一个人经常可以观察到,当他的头脑正专注于思考一些物体,并好奇地观察那里的一些想法,它没有注意到声音的印象,在听觉器官上,用同样的改变来产生声音的想法?在器官上可能有足够的冲动,但它没有达到心灵的观察,就没有感知:虽然在耳朵里产生了声音的概念的运动,但没有听到声音。在这种情况下,感觉的缺乏不是由于器官的任何缺陷,也不是由于人的耳朵比其他时候听得少,而是用于产生理念的东西虽然由通常的器官传递进来,但在理解中没有被注意到,因此没有在头脑中留下任何理念,就没有感觉了。因此,凡是有感知的地方,就会有一些想法实际产生,并存在于理解中。
5. Children, though they may have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.
5.孩子们虽然在子宫里有思想,但没有先天的。
Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer; amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two: which probably are some of the first that children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.
因此,我毫不怀疑,孩子们通过对影响他们的物体的感官锻炼,在他们出生之前就已经接受了一些观念,作为不可避免的影响,要么是他们周围的身体,要么是他们遭受的那些需求或疾病;其中(如果人们可以对不太能够检查的东西进行猜测)我认为饥饿和温暖的观念是两个:这可能是一些孩子最初拥有的,他们很少再分开了。
6. The effects of Sensation in the womb.
6.感觉在子宫内的影响。
But though it be reasonable to imagine that children receive some ideas before they come into the world, yet these simple ideas are far from those INNATE PRINCIPLES which some contend for, and we, above, have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, are only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense, but only in the precedency of time. Whereas those innate principles are supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were, original characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its being and constitution.
但是,尽管可以合理地想象,儿童在来到这个世界之前就已经接受了一些观念,但这些简单的观念与一些人争论的、我们在上面已经拒绝的那些固有的原则相去甚远。这里提到的这些,作为感觉的效果,只是来自身体的一些影响,这些影响发生在那里,所以取决于心灵以外的东西;在产生方式上与其他来自感官的观念没有其他区别,只是在时间上的优先性。而那些先天的原则则被认为是另一种性质的;不是通过身体的任何偶然改变或操作而进入心灵的;而是在它存在和构成的最初时刻就被印在它身上的原始特征。
7. Which Ideas appear first is not evident, nor important.
7.哪种思想先出现并不明显,也不重要。
As there are some ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, subservient to the necessities of their life and being there: so, after they are born, those ideas are the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible qualities which first occur to them; amongst which light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guessed by what is observable in children new-born; who always turn their eyes to that part from whence the light comes, lay them how you please. But the ideas that are most familiar at first, being various according to the divers circumstances of children’s first entertainment in the world, the order wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.
我们有理由认为,有些观念是在子宫里被引入儿童的头脑中的,是为了满足他们生活和存在的需要:所以,在他们出生后,那些观念是最早被打上烙印的,而这些观念恰好是他们首先出现的感性品质;其中,光不是最不重要的,也不是效力最弱的。我们可以从刚出生的孩子身上观察到的情况来猜测,他们是多么渴望得到所有这些没有痛苦伴随的想法;他们总是把眼睛转向光照来的那部分,你想怎么放就怎么放。但是,一开始最熟悉的观念是根据儿童在这个世界上的不同情况而变化的,各种观念一开始进入头脑的顺序是非常不同的,也是不确定的;知道它也没有什么意义。
8. Sensations often changed by the Judgment.
8.感觉常常因判断而改变。
We are further to consider concerning perception, that the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having, by use, been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies;—the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes. So that from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting. To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since; and it is this:—“Suppose a man BORN blind, and now adult, and taught by his TOUCH to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, whether BY HIS SIGHT, BEFORE HE TOUCHED THEM, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?” To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, “Not. For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.”—I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this problem; and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help from them. And the rather, because this observing gentleman further adds, that “having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.”
我们要进一步考虑关于知觉的问题,在成年人中,我们通过感觉接受的观念经常被判断力所改变,而我们却没有注意到这一点。当我们把一个颜色均匀的圆球放在我们眼前时,例如黄金、雪花石或水银,可以肯定的是,由此印在我们脑海中的想法是一个扁平的圆,有不同的阴影,有不同程度的光线和亮度传到我们的眼睛。但是,我们通过使用,已经习惯于察觉到凸面体在我们身上会产生什么样的外观;在光的反射中,由于体的可感数字的不同会产生什么样的变化;--判断力现在,通过一种习惯性的做法,把外观变成了它们的原因。因此,从真正的影子或颜色的多样性中收集到的图形,它使之成为图形的标志,并将凸起的图形和统一的颜色的感觉框在自己身上;而我们从那里得到的概念只是一个颜色各异的平面,这在绘画中是很明显的。为了这个目的,我在这里插入一个问题,这个问题是由真正的知识推广者、博学而有价值的莫林克斯先生提出的,他很高兴在几个月前的一封信中寄给我;它是这样的:"假设一个人生来就是盲人,现在已经成年,并且通过他的触觉学会了区分相同金属的立方体和球体,而且几乎是相同大小的,这样,当他感觉到一个和另一个时,就能分辨哪个是立方体,哪个是球体。假设把立方体和球体放在桌子上,让盲人看见:那么,在他触摸它们之前,他是否能通过他的视觉分辨出哪个是球体,哪个是立方体?"对此,敏锐而明智的提议者回答说:"不能。因为,尽管他已经获得了地球仪和立方体如何影响他的触觉的经验,但他还没有获得这样的经验,即如此或如此影响他的触觉的东西,一定会如此或如此影响他的视觉;或者立方体中的一个突起的角度,不平等地压迫他的手,将在他的眼睛中出现,正如它在立方体中一样。"我同意这位有思想的先生--我很自豪地称他为我的朋友--对这个问题的回答;我认为,盲人在第一眼看到它们时,不能肯定地说出哪个是地球,哪个是立方体;尽管他可以通过触摸准确无误地说出它们的名字,并通过感觉到的数字差异肯定会区分它们。我把这段话写下来,留给我的读者,作为一个机会,让他考虑一下,在他认为自己没有使用过或没有得到过帮助的情况下,他可能会对经验、改进和后天的概念有多大的依赖性。更重要的是,这位善于观察的先生进一步补充说,"在我的书中,他向许多非常聪明的人提出了这个问题,几乎没有人一开始就给出他认为正确的答案,直到听到他的理由,他们才相信。"
9. This judgement apt to be mistaken for direct perception.
9.这种判断容易被误认为是直接感知。
But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas, but those received by sight. Because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases by a settled habit,—in things whereof we have frequent experience is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself;—as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.
但我认为,这在我们的任何观念中都是不常见的,除了那些由视觉接受的观念。因为视觉是我们所有感官中最全面的,它向我们的头脑传递着光和颜色的观念,而这些观念只为该感官所特有;还有空间、图形和运动等截然不同的观念,这些观念的不同种类会改变其适当对象(即光和颜色)的外观;我们通过使用,使自己通过另一种观念来判断这一点。在许多情况下,由于一种固定的习惯,在我们经常经历的事物中,这种习惯是如此持续和迅速地进行,以至于我们认为我们的感觉的感知是由我们的判断形成的观念;因此,一个,即感觉的感知,只是为了激发另一个,而很少注意到它本身;正如一个用心阅读或聆听的人,很少注意字符或声音,而是注意由它们激发的观念。
10. How, by Habit, ideas of Sensation are unconsciously changed into ideas of Judgment.
10.习惯上,感觉的观念是如何不自觉地转变为判断的观念。
Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed. For, as itself is thought to take up no space to have no extension; so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step show it another? Secondly, we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our observation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eyelids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark! Men that, by custom, have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe. And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.
如果我们考虑到心灵的行动是多么迅速的话,我们也不必奇怪这一点,因为它是在很少注意的情况下完成的。因为,正如它本身被认为不占空间,没有延伸;所以它的行动似乎不需要时间,但许多行动似乎被挤进了一个瞬间。我这样说是为了与身体的行动相比较。任何人都可以很容易地在自己的思想中观察到这一点,只要他愿意花心思去思考它们。如果我们考虑到把它写成文字并一步一步地展示给别人所需要的时间,那么我们的头脑是如何在一瞬间看到一个演示的所有部分的,这很可能被称为一个漫长的演示?其次,如果我们考虑到,我们通过做事的习惯所获得的便利,使它们在我们身上经常不经意地流逝,那么我们就不会对我们的这种行为感到惊讶了。习惯,尤其是很早就开始的习惯,最后在我们身上产生的行为,往往会逃过我们的观察。在一天中,我们经常用眼皮遮住眼睛,却没有意识到我们根本就在黑暗中!这就是我们的习惯。习惯于使用副词的人,几乎在每一句话中都会发出一些声音,虽然别人注意到了,但他们自己却没有听到或观察到。因此,我们的头脑经常把它的感觉的想法变成它的判断的想法,并且使一个想法只为激发另一个想法而服务,而我们却没有注意到这一点,这并不奇怪。
11. Perception puts the difference between Animals and Vegetables.
11.感知把动物和蔬菜的区别。
This faculty of perception seems to me to be, that which puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature. For, however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briskly alter their figures and motions, and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in animals follows upon sensation: yet I suppose it is all bare MECHANISM; and no otherwise produced than the turning of a wild oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles of moisture, or the shortening of a rope, by the affusion of water. All which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.
在我看来,这种感知能力是区分动物界和自然界低级部分的关键所在。因为,许多蔬菜都有一定程度的运动,而且在其他物体对它们的不同作用下,会非常迅速地改变它们的形状和运动,因此获得了敏感植物的名称,因为这种运动与动物在感觉之后的运动有一些相似之处:但我认为这都是赤裸裸的机械作用;与野生燕麦须因水分颗粒的插入而转动,或因水的注入而缩短绳子一样,没有其他的产生。所有这些都是在主体没有任何感觉,或者没有产生或接受任何想法的情况下完成的。
12. Perception in all animals.
12.所有动物的知觉。
Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of animals; though in some possibly the avenues provided by nature for the reception of sensations are so few, and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals; but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made. So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric, and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.
我相信,在某种程度上,各种动物都有感知;尽管在某些动物中,自然界提供的接收感觉的途径是如此之少,接收感觉的方式也是如此晦涩难懂,以至于它与其他动物中的感觉的快速性和多样性相差甚远;但它足以满足并明智地适应那类动物的状态和条件。因此,造物主的智慧和仁慈明显地体现在这个巨大结构的所有部分,以及其中所有生物的不同程度和等级。
13. According to their condition.
13.根据他们的情况。
We may, I think, from the make of an oyster or cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not so many, nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it, and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?
我想,我们可以从牡蛎或蚶子的制作过程中合理地得出结论,它不像人或其他一些动物那样有那么多、那么快的感官;如果它有,在那种状态下,在没有能力把自己从一个地方转移到另一个地方的情况下,它也不会被它们所改善。视觉和听觉对一个不能将自己移到或离开它所感知的善或恶的物体的生物有什么好处?对于一个必须静静地躺在命运安排的地方,并在那里接受更冷或更热、更干净或更脏的水的流入的动物来说,快速的感觉难道不是一种不便吗?
14. Decay of perception in old age.
14.老年时感知能力的衰退。
But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception, whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one in whom decrepit old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with, and has, by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell quite, and his taste to a great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter; or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made are scarcely perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cockle or an oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would be, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.
但我不能不认为有一些小的迟钝的知觉,据此他们与完全无知觉的人有区别。这可能是真的,我们有明显的例子,甚至在人类本身。就拿一个人来说,他的衰老已经抹去了他过去的知识记忆,清楚地抹去了他头脑中以前储存的想法,并且通过完全破坏他的视觉、听觉和嗅觉,以及在很大程度上破坏他的味觉,几乎堵住了所有的通道,让新的东西进入;或者如果有一些入口还半开着,所产生的印象几乎没有被感知,或者根本没有保留。这样的人(尽管有所有吹嘘的先天原则)在他的知识和智力能力方面,在多大程度上超过了蚶子或牡蛎的状况,我留待考虑。如果一个人在这样的状态下过了60年,他有可能和三天一样,我想知道他和最低级的动物之间在智力上有什么区别。
15. Perception the Inlet of all materials of Knowledge.
15.感知所有知识材料的入口。
Perception then being the FIRST step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impressions are that are made by them; and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them,—the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here,—that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand which way the learned shall determine of it.
因此,感知是通向知识的第一个步骤和程度,也是知识的所有材料的入口;任何人以及任何其他生物的感官越少;由它们产生的印象越少、越迟钝;与它们有关的能力越迟钝,他们离在某些人身上发现的知识就越遥远。但是,这种不同程度的知识(在人类中可以看到)肯定不能在几种动物中发现,更不能在它们的特定个体中发现。我只需在此指出,感知是我们所有智力能力的第一项操作,也是我们头脑中所有知识的入口。我也很容易想象,正是感知,在它的最低程度上,把动物和低等生物的界限划分开来。但这只是我的猜想;学识渊博的人以何种方式确定它,对眼前的问题无关紧要。
1. Contemplation
1.沉思
The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call RETENTION; or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways.
心灵的下一个能力,是我称之为 "保持 "的能力,即保持那些从感觉或思考中得到的简单概念,从而使它在知识方面取得进一步的进展。这有两种方式。
First, by keeping the idea which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is called CONTEMPLATION.
首先,通过保持被带入其中的想法,在一段时间内实际考虑,这被称为CONTEMPLATION。
2. Memory.
2.记忆。
The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. And thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet,—the object being removed. This is MEMORY, which is as it were the storehouse of our ideas. For, the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository, to lay up those ideas which, at another time, it might have use of. But, our IDEAS being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything; when there is no perception of them; this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this,—that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that IT HAS HAD THEM BEFORE. And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere;—but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings which, though we do not actually contemplate yet we CAN bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there.
保留的另一种方式是,有能力在我们的脑海中重新唤起那些经过印记后已经消失,或者已经被放在一边看不见的想法。因此,当我们设想热或光、黄或甜时,我们就会这样做,因为对象已经被移走了。这就是记忆,它是我们观念的仓库。因为,人的狭隘的头脑不可能同时看到和考虑到许多想法,所以有必要有一个仓库,把这些想法存放起来,以便在另一个时间可以使用。但是,我们的观念不过是头脑中的实际感知,当没有感知的时候,就不再是任何东西了;把我们的观念存放在记忆的仓库里,只意味着:在许多情况下,头脑有能力恢复它曾经有过的感知,并附加这种感知,即它曾经有过这些感知。在这个意义上,我们的观念被说成是在我们的记忆中,而实际上它们并不在任何地方;只是在头脑中存在着一种能力,当它愿意重新唤醒它们的时候,就像在自己身上重新涂抹一样,虽然有些更困难,有些不那么困难;有些更生动,有些更模糊。因此,在这种能力的帮助下,我们可以说在我们的理解中拥有所有这些想法,虽然我们没有实际考虑,但我们可以把它们带到眼前,并使它们再次出现,成为我们思想的对象,而不需要借助那些最初把它们印在那里的感性品质。
3. Attention, Repetition, Pleasure and Pain, fix Ideas.
3.注意力,重复,快乐和痛苦,固定思想。
Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory. But those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impressions, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses being, to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body, it is wisely ordered by nature, as has been shown, that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas; which, supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation; and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future.
注意力和重复对在记忆中固定任何想法有很大帮助。但那些最初自然会产生最深刻和最持久印象的,是那些伴随着快乐或痛苦的。感官的主要任务是使我们注意到对身体的伤害或好处,正如已经证明的那样,自然界明智地规定,在接受一些想法时应该伴随着疼痛;这在儿童中提供了考虑和推理的位置,在成年人中比考虑更快,使老人和年轻人都以保护他们所需的速度避免痛苦的对象;在两者中都在记忆中建立了对未来的警戒。
4. Ideas fade in the Memory.
4.思想在记忆中消逝。
Concerning the several degrees of lasting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may observe,—that some of them have been produced in the understanding by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once; others, that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of: the mind, either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men intent only on one thing; not setting the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the body, or some other fault, the memory is very weak. In all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn, and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there.
关于观念在记忆中的持久程度,我们可以看到,有些观念是由影响感官的物体在理解中产生的,只有一次,而且不超过一次;另一些观念则不止一次地提供给感官,但却很少被注意到:头脑要么不注意,如儿童,要么在其他方面,如人只想做一件事,没有把印记深入到自身。而在某些情况下,如果它们被小心翼翼地反复印证,要么是由于身体的脾气,要么是由于其他一些错误,记忆就会非常薄弱。在所有这些情况下,头脑中的想法很快就会消失,而且常常从理解中消失,没有留下更多的脚步声,也没有留下自己的特征,就像影子飞过玉米地一样,头脑中没有它们,好像它们从来没有出现过一样。
5. Causes of oblivion.
5.遗忘的原因。
Thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children, in the beginning of their sensation, (some of which perhaps, as of some pleasures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy,) if in the future course of their lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young; in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years after, there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in those of people born blind. The memory of some men, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle. But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed, by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching; where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies are concerned in this; and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand, I shall here inquire; though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory, since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble.
因此,许多在儿童心中产生的观念,在他们的感觉开始时,(其中一些观念,如一些快乐和痛苦,可能是在他们出生前产生的,另一些是在他们的婴儿期产生的),如果在他们未来的生活过程中不再重复,就会完全消失,没有一丝一毫的剩余。在那些年幼时因某种不幸而失去视力的人身上可以看到这一点;在他们身上,颜色的概念只被稍微注意过,而且不再重复,就完全消失了;因此,在若干年后,在他们的脑海中没有留下任何关于颜色的概念或记忆,比那些天生失明的人更甚。诚然,有些人的记忆力非常顽强,甚至达到了奇迹的程度。但是,我们所有的观念似乎都在不断地衰退,即使是那些被打得最深、在头脑中最有记忆力的观念也是如此;因此,如果不通过反复锻炼感官,或对最初引起它们的那些物体进行反思,有时就会使它们更新,印记就会磨灭,最后就没有什么可看的。因此,我们年轻时的想法和孩子们常常在我们面前死去:我们的头脑对我们来说就像那些我们正在接近的坟墓;在那里,虽然黄铜和大理石还在,但铭文却被时间抹去了,图像也消失了。我们脑海中所画的图画是用褪色的颜色铺成的;如果有时不刷新,就会消失不见。我们的身体状况与此有多大关系;大脑的脾气是否会造成这种差异,即有些人的大脑像大理石一样保留着画在上面的文字,有些人的大脑像青石一样保留着,有些人的大脑比沙子好不了多少,我将在此询问;不过,身体的状况有时确实可能影响记忆,因为我们经常发现一种疾病完全剥夺了大脑的所有想法,而发烧的火焰在几天内将所有这些图像烧成灰尘和混乱,它们似乎像大理石上刻的一样持久。
6. Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost.
6.6.不断重复的思想很少会丢失。
But concerning the ideas themselves, it is easy to remark, that those that are oftenest refreshed (amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, fix themselves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there; and therefore those which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest; and those that almost constantly affect our bodies, as heat and cold; and those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as existence, duration, and number, which almost every object that affects our senses, every thought which employs our minds, bring along with them;—these, I say, and the like ideas, are seldom quite lost, whilst the mind retains any ideas at all.
但是,关于观念本身,我们很容易注意到,那些最经常被刷新的观念(其中包括那些通过多种方式传入头脑的观念),通过经常回到产生这些观念的物体或行为,在记忆中固定下来,并在那里保持最清晰和最长的时间;因此,那些属于身体的原始品质的观念,即固体、延伸、形状、运动和静止;以及那些几乎经常影响我们的身体的观念,如热和冷;还有那些属于各种生物的影响的观念,如存在和持续时间和数量,这些观念几乎都是对我们的影响。因此,那些属于身体的原始品质的东西,即实体、延伸、形状、运动和静止;以及那些几乎一直影响我们身体的东西,如热和冷;还有那些属于各种生命的影响的东西,如存在、持续时间和数量,几乎每一个影响我们感官的物体,每一个运用我们头脑的思想,都会带来这些东西;我说,这些,以及类似的想法,很少会完全消失,而头脑却会保留任何想法。
7. In Remembering, the Mind is often active.
7.在记忆中,心智往往是活跃的。
In this secondary perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive; the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the WILL. The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding; and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight, by turbulent and tempestuous passions; our affections bringing ideas to our memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This further is to be observed, concerning ideas lodged in the memory, and upon occasion revived by the mind, that they are not only (as the word REVIVE imports) none of them new ones, but also that the mind takes notice of them as of a former impression, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with ideas it had known before. So that though ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in view, yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted; i.e. in view, and taken notice of before, by the understanding.
在这种次要的感知中,我可以这样称呼它,或者说,再次观看那些停留在记忆中的观念,头脑往往不仅仅是被动的;那些休眠的图画的出现有时取决于WILL。心灵常常开始工作,寻找一些隐藏的想法,并把灵魂的眼睛转向它;尽管有时它们也会主动在我们的头脑中出现,并向理解力提供自己;而且常常被汹涌澎湃的激情唤醒,从黑暗的牢房中翻出,进入光明的世界;我们的情感把想法带到我们的记忆中,否则它们就会安静地躺在那里,不被人理会。还应注意的是,关于停留在记忆中的观念,在某些情况下被心灵唤醒,它们不仅不是新的观念(正如REVIVE一词的含义),而且心灵会像注意以前的印象一样注意它们,并像认识以前的观念一样重新认识它们。因此,尽管以前印记的观念并不总是在视野中,但在记忆中,它们总是被认为是以前印记过的;也就是说,在视野中,被理解力注意到的。
8. Two defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.
8.记忆中的两个缺陷,遗忘和迟钝。
Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment, that, where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless. And we in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories; wherein there may be two defects:—
记忆,在一个智力生物中,是仅次于感知的必要条件。它是如此重要,以至于在缺少它的地方,我们所有其他的能力在很大程度上都是无用的。如果没有记忆的帮助,我们的思想、推理和知识就无法超越目前的对象;这里面可能有两个缺陷:--
First, That it loses the idea quite, and so far it produces perfect ignorance. For, since we can know nothing further than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.
首先,它完全失去了理念,到目前为止,它产生了完全的无知。因为,既然我们除了对它的想法之外,什么都不知道,当它消失时,我们就处于完全无知之中。
Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the mind upon occasion. This, if it be to a great degree, is stupidity; and he who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved there, ready at hand when need and occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions, consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.
第二,它的动作缓慢,没有迅速收回它所拥有的、储存起来的思想,以便在必要时为头脑服务。这一点,如果是在很大程度上,就是愚蠢;由于记忆中的这种缺失,他没有真正保存在那里的想法,在需要和场合需要它们的时候随时准备好,几乎可以说是完全没有它们,因为它们对他没有什么用处。迟钝的人失去了机会,当他在头脑中寻找那些应该为他服务的想法时,他的知识并不比完全无知的人快乐多少。因此,记忆的任务是为头脑提供它目前需要的那些沉睡的想法;在任何情况下都有这些想法,包括我们所说的发明、幻想和快速的部分。
9. A defect which belongs to the memory of Man, as finite.
9.属于人的记忆的缺陷,是有限的。
These are defects we may observe in the memory of one man compared with another. There is another defect which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general;—compared with some superior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may so far excel man, that they may have CONSTANTLY in view the whole scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their sight. The omniscience of God, who knows all things, past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of men’s hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to those glorious spirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections; in what proportions he pleases, as far as created finite beings can be capable? It is reported of that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal, that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege so little known to most men, that it seems almost incredible to those who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves; but yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it, in superior ranks of spirits. For this of Monsieur Pascal was still with the narrowness that human minds are confined to here,—of having great variety of ideas only by succession, not all at once. Whereas the several degrees of angels may probably have larger views; and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man,—if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be ALWAYS present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.
这些是我们可以观察到的一个人与另一个人相比在记忆方面的缺陷。还有一个缺陷,我们可以认为是人的一般记忆力的缺陷;与一些被造的高级智力动物相比,它们在这种能力上可能远远超过人类,以至于它们可以不断地看到它们以前所有行为的整个场景,在那里它们曾经有过的思想没有一个可以从它们的视线中溜走。上帝无所不知,他知道过去、现在和将来的一切,而且人的心思总是向他敞开的,这可以使我们相信这种可能性。因为谁能怀疑,上帝可以把他的任何完美的东西传达给那些光荣的灵魂,他的直接随从;只要被创造的有限生命能够做到,他就可以按他喜欢的比例传达给他们?据报道,帕斯卡尔先生是个神童,在他健康状况恶化、记忆力下降之前,他对自己在理性时代的任何部分所做的事、所读的书、所想的事都没有忘记。这是一个大多数人都不知道的特权,对于那些按照通常的方式以自己为标准来衡量所有其他人的人来说,这几乎是不可思议的;但是,如果考虑到这一点,可能会帮助我们扩大我们的想法,在精神的高级等级中实现更完美的目标。因为帕斯卡尔先生的这一观点仍然与人类思想在这里的狭隘性相一致,即只有通过连续的方式才有大量的想法,而不是一下子就有。而不同等级的天使可能有更大的视野;他们中的一些人被赋予了能力,能够把他们过去所有的知识保留在一起,并不断地摆在他们面前,就像在一幅画中一样。我们可以设想,这对一个有思想的人的知识来说是不小的好处--如果他过去所有的思想和推理都能永远呈现在他面前。因此,我们可以认为这是一种方式,在这种方式中,独立的精神的知识可能远远超过我们。
10. Brutes have Memory.
10.野蛮人有记忆。
This faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, several other animals seem to have to a great degree, as well as man. For, to pass by other instances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns. For it seems to me impossible that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes (as it is plain they do) of which they had no ideas. For, though I should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits in the brains of those birds, whilst the tune is actually playing; and that motion may be continued on to the muscles of the wings, and so the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the bird’s preservation; yet that can never be supposed a reason why it should cause mechanically—either whilst the tune is playing, much less after it has ceased—such a motion of the organs in the bird’s voice as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound, which imitation can be of no use to the bird’s preservation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appearance of reason be supposed (much less proved) that birds, without sense and memory, can approach their notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a tune played yesterday; which if they have no idea of in their memory, is now nowhere, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains, which, not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the like sounds; and why the sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the pipe, is impossible to conceive.
这种储存和保留被带入脑海中的想法的能力,其他一些动物似乎和人类一样,在很大程度上也有。因为,撇开其他例子不谈,鸟类学习曲子,以及人们在它们身上看到的努力打出正确的音符,使我不再怀疑它们有感知能力,在它们的记忆中保留观念,并使用它们的模式。因为在我看来,他们不可能努力使自己的声音符合他们没有想法的音符(这一点很明显)。因为,虽然我承认声音可能会机械地引起那些鸟的大脑中的动物精神的某种运动,而曲调实际上是在演奏;这种运动可能会继续到翅膀的肌肉,因此鸟会被某些声音机械地赶走,因为这可能有助于鸟的保护。但是,这决不能成为一个理由,说明它应该机械地引起鸟儿声音中的器官的运动--无论是在曲子演奏时,还是在曲子停止后--使其符合外来声音的音符,而这种模仿对鸟儿的保护毫无用处。但是,更重要的是,不能以任何表面上的理由来假设(更不用说证明),没有感觉和记忆的鸟儿可以通过程度上的接近它们的音符,来接近昨天演奏的曲子;如果它们的记忆中没有这个概念,现在就不存在,也不可能成为它们模仿的模式,或者任何重复的文章可以使它们更接近。既然没有理由让烟斗的声音在他们的大脑中留下痕迹,而这些痕迹不是一开始就有的,而是通过他们之后的努力,产生类似的声音;为什么他们自己发出的声音不能像烟斗的声音一样产生他们应该遵循的痕迹,这是不可能想象的。
1. No Knowledge without Discernment.
1.没有鉴别力就没有知识。
Another faculty we may take notice of in our minds is that of DISCERNING and DISTINGUISHING between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general. Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general, propositions, which have passed for innate truths;—because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it PERCEIVES two ideas to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.
我们可以注意到我们头脑中的另一种能力,那就是辨别和区分它所拥有的几种想法的能力。仅仅对一般事物有混乱的认识是不够的。除非头脑对不同的物体和它们的质量有明确的认识,否则它能够获得的知识就会很少,尽管影响我们的身体就像现在这样忙碌,而头脑也在不断地进行思考。一些被认为是先天真理的命题,甚至是非常笼统的命题,其证据和确定性都取决于这种区分事物的能力;因为人们忽视了这些命题得到普遍赞同的真正原因,而将其完全归咎于本土的统一印象;而事实上,它取决于心灵的这种清晰的辨别能力,它据此认为两个观念是相同的,或者是不同的。但关于这一点,下文会有更多介绍。
2. The Difference of Wit and Judgment.
2.智慧和判断力的差异。
How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies, either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some tempers, I will not here examine: it suffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe in itself. It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that so far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another,—so far our notions are confused, and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts; in this, of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason, which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation,—that men who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason. For WIT lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; JUDGMENT, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion; wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore is so acceptable to all people, because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture and the gaiety of the fancy. And it is a kind of affront to go about to examine it, by the severe rules of truth and good reason; whereby it appears that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.
准确辨别各种观念的缺陷在多大程度上在于感觉器官的迟钝或缺陷;或者是理解力不够敏锐、缺乏锻炼或注意力;或者是某些脾气所特有的匆忙和急躁,我在此不作研究:只要注意到这是心灵可以反思和观察自身的行动之一就够了。这对它的其他知识是有影响的,只要这种能力本身是迟钝的,或者没有正确地用于区分一件事和另一件事,那么我们的概念就会被混淆,我们的理性和判断力就会被干扰或误导。如果说,我们的观念在记忆中随手可得,就意味着部分的快速;在这一点上,我们的观念没有被混淆,并且能够很好地将一件事与另一件事区分开来,只要有最小的差别,就在很大程度上包括了判断的精确性和理智的清晰性,这在一个人身上是可以看到的。因此,也许可以为这一常见的观察提供一些理由--拥有大量智慧和快速记忆的人,并不总是有最清晰的判断和最深刻的理性。因为智慧最重要的是把各种想法集合在一起,并把那些可以找到任何相似或一致的想法放在一起,从而在想象中形成愉快的画面和令人愉快的幻觉;相反,判断力则完全在另一边,把可以找到最小差异的想法一个一个仔细分开,从而避免被相似性所误导,并通过亲和力把一个东西当作另一个。这是一种与比喻和影射完全相反的方式;其中大部分是机智的娱乐和乐趣,它如此生动地冲击着人们的想象力,因此为所有人所接受,因为它的美是一目了然的,不需要费心去研究其中的真理或理由。心灵不需要再看下去,就满足于画面的顺眼和想象的欢快。而用真理和理性的严格规则来审视它,则是一种侮辱;由此看来,它所包含的东西并不完全符合它们。
3. Clearness alone hinders Confusion.
3.3.只有清晰才能阻止混乱。
To the well distinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes that they be CLEAR and DETERMINATE. And when they are so, it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them, though the senses should (as sometimes they do) convey them from the same object differently on different occasions, and so seem to err. For, though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste, which at another time would produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that man’s mind would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet as if he had tasted only gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two ideas of sweet and bitter that the same sort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea by the taste, than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet, or white and round, that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of lignum nephritium, are no less distinct ideas than those of the same colours taken from two very different bodies.
要想很好地区分我们的观念,最主要的是要使它们清晰明确。当它们是这样的时候,就不会对它们产生任何混淆或错误,尽管感官在不同的场合会从同一物体上传达出不同的信息,因此似乎是错误的。因为,尽管一个发烧的人从糖中尝到了苦味,而在另一个时候却产生了甜味,但在这个人的脑海中,苦味的概念与甜味的概念是一样清晰和不同的,就像他只尝到了胆汁一样。同一种类的身体在某一时刻产生一种想法,而在另一时刻通过味觉产生另一种想法,这也不会在甜和苦这两种想法之间造成任何混淆,就像同一块糖在同一时刻在头脑中产生白色和甜或白色和圆形这两种想法一样。而由同一块木质肾上腺素输液在头脑中产生的橙色和天蓝色的概念,也不亚于那些从两个非常不同的物体中提取的相同颜色的概念。
4. Comparing.
4.比较一下。
The COMPARING them one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under RELATION; which, of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider hereafter.
在范围、程度、时间、地点或任何其他情况方面,将它们相互比较,是心灵对其观念的另一种操作,也是依赖关系所包含的所有观念的大部落;它的范围有多大,我将在下文中考虑。
5. Brutes compare but imperfectly.
5.畜生的比较,但并不完美。
How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not easy to determine. I imagine they have it not in any great degree, for, though they probably have several ideas distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding, when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared. And therefore, I think, beasts compare not their ideas further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be observed in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.
畜生在多大程度上具有这种能力,并不容易确定。我想,它们的这种能力不大,因为,尽管它们可能有几个足够独特的观念,但在我看来,当人类的理解力充分区分任何观念,以至于认为它们完全不同,因此是两个观念时,就会考虑它们在什么情况下能够被比较。因此,我认为,兽类在比较它们的观念时,不会超过对象本身所附的一些可感的情况。在人身上可以观察到的另一种比较能力,属于一般的观念,只对抽象的推理有用,我们大概可以推测野兽没有这种能力。
6. Compounding.
6.复式。
The next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of ENLARGING, wherein, though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together, though of the same kind. Thus, by adding several units together, we make the idea of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of a furlong.
我们在头脑中观察到的关于其观念的下一个操作是构成;据此,它把它从感觉和思考中得到的那些简单的观念放在一起,并把它们结合成复杂的观念。在这种构成之下,还可以算作扩大,虽然这种构成不像在更复杂的观念中那么明显,但它仍然是把几个观念放在一起,尽管是同一类的。因此,通过把几个单位加在一起,我们就形成了一打的概念;把几个栖息地的重复概念放在一起,我们就形成了一英里的概念。
7. Brutes compound but little.
7.畜生的复合物却很少。
In this also, I suppose, brutes come far short of man. For, though they take in, and retain together, several combinations of simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell, and voice of his master make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things, which possibly they distinguish less by their sight than we imagine. For I have been credibly informed that a bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of her puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long that her milk may go through them. And those animals which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened.
我想,在这一点上,畜生也远远比不上人类。因为,尽管它们接受并保留了几种简单的观念组合,就像狗的形状、气味和声音可能构成了它对主人的复杂观念,或者说是它认识主人的许多明显的标志;但我认为它们本身并没有将这些观念复合起来,形成复杂的观念。也许,即使我们认为它们有复杂的观念,也只是用一个简单的观念来指导它们对若干事物的认识,它们用视觉来区分这些事物的程度可能比我们想象的要低。因为我被可靠地告知,一只母狗会给小狐狸喂奶,和它们一起玩耍,并且喜欢它们,就像喜欢它的小狗一样,只要你能让它们吸吮它这么久,让它的奶水通过它们。而那些同时拥有众多幼崽的动物,似乎并不了解它们的数量;因为尽管它们非常关心在它们看到或听到时被带走的任何幼崽,但如果在它们不在时或在没有声音的情况下被偷走一两只,它们似乎并不想念它们,或感觉到它们的数量减少了。
8. Naming.
8.命名。
When children have, by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words, to signify their ideas to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in the first use of language.
当孩子们通过反复的感觉,把想法固定在他们的记忆中时,他们开始逐渐学习使用符号。当他们掌握了运用语言器官发出声音的技能时,他们就开始使用文字,向别人表示他们的想法。这些语言符号有时是从别人那里借来的,有时是自己创造的,正如人们可以从儿童在第一次使用语言时经常给事物起的新的和不寻常的名字中看到的那样。
9. Abstraction.
9.9.抽象化。
The use of words then being to stand as outward mark of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take up should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances,—separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name WHITENESS, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.
词语的使用是作为我们内在观念的外在标志,而这些观念来自于特定的事物,如果我们所接受的每一个特定的观念都有一个独特的名字,那么名字就必须是无穷无尽的。为了防止这种情况的发生,心灵会使从特定对象中得到的特定观念变得普遍;这是通过考虑它们在心灵中的表象来实现的,即与所有其他的存在以及现实存在的情况,如时间、地点或任何其他伴随的观念分开。这就是所谓的 "抽象"(ABSTRACTION),即从特定生命中提取的观念成为所有同类事物的一般代表;它们的名字是一般的名字,适用于符合这种抽象观念的任何存在。这种精确的、赤裸裸的显现在头脑中,而不考虑它们是如何、从何而来或与什么人一起出现的,理解力就会把它们(通常附有名称)作为标准,把真实的存在物分成各种类型,因为它们与这些模式一致,并相应地对它们进行命名。因此,今天在白垩或雪中观察到的颜色与昨天从牛奶中得到的颜色相同,它认为只有这种外观才能代表所有这类颜色;在给它起了白色这个名字后,它就用这个名字表示无论在哪里想象或遇到的相同质量;这样,无论是观念还是术语,普遍性就形成了。
10. Brutes abstract not.
10.野蛮人的抽象不是。
If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in,—that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.
如果有人怀疑野兽是否以这种方式复合和扩大它们的观念;我想,这一点我可以肯定,即它们根本没有抽象的能力;拥有一般的观念是将人和畜生完全区别开来的,是畜生的能力决不可能达到的一种优点。因为很明显,我们在他们身上看不到使用一般符号来表达普遍观念的脚步;由此我们有理由想象,他们没有抽象的能力,也没有产生一般观念的能力,因为他们没有使用文字或任何其他一般符号。
11. Brutes abstract not, yet are nor bare machines.
11.畜生不是抽象的,但也不是光秃秃的机器。
Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And, on the other side, men who, through some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words, a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And, therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines, (as some would have them,) we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction. 12. Idiots and Madmen.
也不能归咎于他们没有合适的器官来构筑发音,以至于他们没有使用或了解一般的词语;因为我们发现,他们中的许多人都能发出这样的声音,并能清楚地发音,但从来没有这种应用。另一方面,那些由于器官的某些缺陷而需要文字的人,却不能用符号来表达他们的普遍想法,这些符号为他们服务,而不是一般的文字,这是我们看到的野兽所不具备的能力。因此,我认为,我们可以假设,正是在这一点上,畜生的种类与人有区别:正是这种适当的区别使他们完全分开,并最终扩大到如此巨大的距离。因为如果他们有任何想法,而不是赤裸裸的机器,(就像有些人所认为的那样),我们就不能否认他们有一些理由。在我看来,他们确实有理性,就像他们有感觉一样明显;但这只是在特定的观念中,就像他们从感官中得到的那样。他们中最优秀的人被束缚在这些狭窄的范围内,没有能力(我认为)通过任何形式的抽象来扩大它们。12.白痴和狂人。
How far idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of faultering would no doubt discover. For those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in men’s understandings and knowledge.
在前述任何一种或所有能力的缺乏或弱点方面,对他们的几种错误方式进行准确的观察,无疑会发现白痴的问题。因为那些要么感知力低下,要么对进入他们头脑的想法保留得不好,不能轻易激发或复合这些想法的人,将没有什么可以思考的问题。那些不能区分、比较和抽象的人,几乎不能理解和使用语言,也不能在任何可容忍的程度上进行判断或推理;而只能对当前的、他们的感官非常熟悉的事物进行少量的、不完善的判断。事实上,上述任何一种能力,如果缺乏或失常,都会在人的理解和知识中产生适当的缺陷。
13. Difference between Idiots and Madmen.
13.白痴和疯子的区别。
In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning, but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles. For, by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience: others who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more, and some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen: that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.
总之,自然人的缺陷似乎是由于智力能力缺乏快速、活跃和运动,因此他们被剥夺了理性;而另一方面,疯子似乎受到另一个极端的影响。因为在我看来,他们并没有失去推理的能力,而是把一些想法非常错误地结合在一起,误以为是真理;他们的错误就像那些从错误的原则中论证正确的人那样。因为,由于他们的想象力太强,把他们的幻想当成了现实,他们就从这些幻想中作出正确的推论。因此,你会发现一个心烦意乱的人幻想自己是个国王,并以正确的推论要求适当的出席、尊重和服从:另一些人认为自己是玻璃做的,就用必要的谨慎来保护这种脆弱的身体。因此,一个非常清醒的人,在其他所有事情上都有正确的认识,但在某个方面却可能像在床铺上的人一样疯狂;如果不是因为突然产生了非常强烈的印象,就是因为他的幻想长期固定在一种想法上,不连贯的想法被有力地粘合在一起,从而保持一致。但是,疯狂和愚蠢是有程度之分的;无序地将各种想法拼凑在一起,有的人多,有的人少。简而言之,白痴和疯子之间的区别似乎就在这里:疯子把错误的想法放在一起,因此提出了错误的主张,但却从这些主张中进行论证和推理;但白痴却很少或没有提出主张,而且根本不推理。
14. Method followed in this explication of Faculties.
14.14.在解释能力方面所遵循的方法。
These, I think, are the first faculties and operations of the mind, which it makes use of in understanding; and though they are exercised about all its ideas in general, yet the instances I have hitherto given have been chiefly in simple ideas. And I have subjoined the explication of these faculties of the mind to that of simple ideas, before I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones, for these following reasons:—
我认为,这些是心灵的第一种能力和操作,它在理解中使用这些能力和操作;虽然它们一般都是针对所有的想法而行使的,但我迄今所举的例子主要是在简单的想法中。我在阐述简单概念之前,先把这些思维能力的解释与简单概念的解释联系起来,然后再谈我对复杂概念的看法,原因如下: --
First, Because several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them, in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements.
首先,由于这些能力中的一些起初主要是针对简单的想法而行使的,我们可以通过遵循自然界的正常方法,追踪和发现它们的兴起、进展和逐步改进。
Secondly, Because observing the faculties of the mind, how they operate about simple ideas,—which are usually, in most men’s minds, much more clear, precise, and distinct than complex ones,—we may the better examine and learn how the mind extracts, denominates, compares, and exercises, in its other operations about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake. Thirdly, Because these very operations of the mind about ideas received from sensations, are themselves, when reflected on, another set of ideas, derived from that other source of our knowledge, which I call reflection; and therefore fit to be considered in this place after the simple ideas of sensation. Of compounding, comparing, abstracting, &c., I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.
第二,因为观察心灵的能力,它们是如何对简单的观念进行操作的--在大多数人的头脑中,简单的观念通常比复杂的观念更加清晰、精确和明确,我们可以更好地研究和学习心灵是如何对复杂的观念进行提取、命名、比较和操作的,在这方面我们更容易犯错误。第三,因为心灵对从感觉中得到的观念的这些操作,在反思时,本身就是另一套观念,来自我们知识的另一个来源,我称之为反思;因此,在这个地方,适合在感觉的简单观念之后考虑。关于复合、比较、抽象等等,我刚刚说过,有机会在其他地方更详细地论述它们。
15. The true Beginning of Human Knowledge.
15.人类知识的真正开端。
And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true HISTORY OF THE FIRST BEGINNINGS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE;—whence the mind has its first objects; and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in and storing up those ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of: wherein I must appeal to experience and observation whether I am in the right: the best way to come to truth being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine.
因此,我给出了一个简短的,而且我认为是真实的人类知识的最初起源的历史;--头脑从什么时候开始有了最初的目标;以及它通过什么步骤进展到奠定和储存这些想法,从这些想法中形成它所能够得到的所有知识。其中,我必须求助于经验和观察,以确定我的观点是否正确:了解真相的最佳途径是按照事物的真实情况进行研究,而不是按照我们自己的想象或者别人教给我们的想象来断定它们是什么。
16. Appeal to Experience.
16.对经验的呼吁。
To deal truly, this is the only way that I can discover, whereby the IDEAS OF THINGS are brought into the understanding. If other men have either innate ideas or infused principles, they have reason to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in myself, and is agreeable to those notions, which, if we will examine the whole course of men in their several ages, countries, and educations, seem to depend on those foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this method in all the parts and degrees thereof.
说实话,这是我能发现的唯一方法,通过这种方法,事物的观念被带入理解。如果其他人有先天的观念或注入的原则,他们就有理由享受这些观念;如果他们确信这一点,其他人就不可能拒绝他们拥有的高于其邻居的特权。我只能说我在自己身上发现的、与那些观念相一致的东西,如果我们要考察人在不同的年龄、国家和教育中的整个过程,这些观念似乎取决于我所奠定的那些基础,并在其所有部分和程度上与这种方法相一致。
17. Dark Room.
17.暗室。
I pretend not to teach, but to inquire; and therefore cannot but confess here again,—that external and internal sensation are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this DARK ROOM. For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: which, would they but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.
我不是在教书,而是在探究;因此,我不得不在此再次承认--外部和内部的感觉是我能找到的唯一能让人理解的通道。就我所知,只有这些才是让光线进入这个黑暗房间的窗户。因为,我认为,理解力并不像一个完全与光线隔绝的壁橱,只留下一些小的开口,让外部可见的相似物,或外部事物的观念进入其中:如果这些相似物留在那里,并有序地躺在那里,以便偶尔被发现,它就会非常像一个人的理解力,涉及到所有视觉对象,以及对它们的观念。
These are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have and retain simple ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations about them.
这些是我对理解力产生和保留简单概念的方式的猜测,以及它们的模式,还有关于它们的一些其他操作。
I proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas an their modes a little more particularly.
我现在开始对其中一些简单的想法和它们的模式进行更具体的研究。
1. Made by the Mind out of simple Ones.
1.由心智造出的简单的人。
We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them together. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call COMPLEX;—such as are beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which, though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, signified by one name.
迄今为止,我们已经考虑了那些观念,在接受这些观念时,心灵只是被动的,也就是前面提到的从感觉和思考中接受的那些简单的观念,在这些观念中,心灵不能使自己成为一个整体,也不能有任何不完全由它们组成的观念。由于简单的观念被观察到存在于几个结合在一起的组合中,所以心灵有能力将几个结合在一起的观念视为一个观念;这不仅是由于它们在外部物体中的结合,而且是由于它自己将它们结合在一起。这样由几个简单的概念组成的概念,我称之为复合概念;例如美、感激、人、军队、宇宙;虽然这些概念是由各种简单的概念组成的,或者由简单的概念组成的复合概念,但是,当心灵喜欢的时候,可以把每个概念本身视为一个整体,用一个名字表示。
2. Made voluntarily.
2.2.自愿作出。
In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with: but all this still confined to those simple ideas which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions. For simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind CAN have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without [*dropped word] the senses; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself. But when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself from without; it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united.
在这种重复和连接其观念的能力中,心灵有很大的能力来改变和增加其思想的对象,无限地超越感觉或反思所提供的东西:但这一切仍然限于那些它从这两个来源得到的简单观念,而这些观念是其所有构成的最终材料。因为简单的观念都是来自于事物本身,在这些观念中,除了向它建议的以外,心灵不能有更多的,也不能有其他的。除了来自感官以外的东西,它不可能有其他关于感性品质的想法;除了它在自己身上发现的东西,它也不可能有关于思维物质的其他运作的想法。但是,当它一旦有了这些简单的观念,它就不会仅仅局限于观察和来自外部的东西;它可以凭借自己的力量,把它所拥有的那些观念组合起来,并产生新的复杂的观念,而这些观念是它从未接受过的。
3. Complex ideas are either of Modes, Substances, or Relations.
3.复杂的观念要么是模式,要么是物质,要么是关系。
COMPLEX IDEAS, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet I think they may be all reduced under these three heads:—1. MODES. 2. SUBSTANCES. 3. RELATIONS.
复杂的思想,无论如何复合和反复合,尽管它们的数量是无限的,种类也是无穷无尽的,它们充斥着人的思想,但我认为它们都可以归结为以下三个标题:1.模式。 2.物质。3.关系。
4. Ideas of Modes.
4.模式的想法。
First, MODES I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances;—such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c. And if in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in discourses, differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new words, or to use old words in somewhat a new signification; the later whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.
首先,我把这种复杂的观念称为模式,这种观念尽管是复合的,但不包含本身存在的假设,而是被视为对物质的依赖或影响;例如三角形、感激、谋杀等词所象征的观念。如果我在这里使用的模式这个词与它的普通含义有些不同,请原谅;在与普通的公认概念不同的论述中,不可避免地要创造新词,或者以新的含义使用旧词;在我们目前的情况下,后一种情况也许是两种情况中更可容忍的。
5. Simple and mixed Modes of Ideas.
5.思想的简单和混合模式。
Of these MODES, there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration:—
在这些模式中,有两种模式值得单独考虑。
First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other;—as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together, and these I call SIMPLE MODES as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea.
首先,有一些只是变化,或同一简单概念的不同组合,没有任何其他的混合;--如一打,或乐谱;这只不过是许多不同单位的概念加在一起,这些我称之为简单模式,因为它们包含在一个简单概念的范围之内。
Secondly, there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together to make one complex one;—v.g. beauty, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight to the beholder; theft, which being the concealed change of the possession of anything, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds: and these I call MIXED MODES.
其次,还有一些由几种简单的观念组成的复合体,把它们放在一起成为一个复杂的观念;例如,美,由颜色和身材的某种组合组成,使欣赏者感到高兴;偷窃,是未经所有者同意而隐蔽地改变对任何东西的占有,其中包含着,如可见的,几种观念的组合:这些我称之为混合模式。
6. Ideas of Substances, single or collective.
6.物质的概念,单一或集体。
Secondly, the ideas of SUBSTANCES are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct PARTICULAR things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought and reasoning, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a man. Now of substances also, there are two sorts of ideas:—one of SINGLE substances, as they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock of sheep—which COLLECTIVE ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one single idea as that of a man or an unit.
第二,物质的观念是简单观念的组合,被认为代表了单独存在的特定事物;在这些观念中,假定的或混乱的物质观念,如它,总是第一和主要的。因此,如果把某种暗淡的白色,以及某种程度的重量、硬度、延展性和可熔性的简单概念与物质结合起来,我们就有了铅的概念;而把某种身材,以及运动、思考和推理能力的概念与物质结合起来,就有了人的普通概念。现在,就物质而言,也有两种观念:一种是单独的物质,因为它们是单独存在的,如一个人或一只羊;另一种是几种物质组合在一起的,如一支人的军队或一群羊,这些由几种物质组成的集体观念就像一个人或一个单位的观念一样。
7. Ideas of Relation.
7.关系的概念。
Thirdly, the last sort of complex ideas is that we call RELATION, which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another.
第三,最后一种复杂的想法是我们称之为 "关系 "的,它包括考虑和比较一个想法与另一个想法。
Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order.
对于这几种类型,我们将按其顺序进行处理。
8. The abstrusest Ideas we can have are all from two Sources.
8.我们所拥有的最深奥的思想都来自两个来源。
If we trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that EVEN THE MOST ABSTRUSE IDEAS, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may, and does, attain unto.
如果我们追踪我们思想的进展,并注意观察它是如何重复、增加和结合从感觉或思考中得到的简单想法的,它将引导我们走得比起初也许我们应该想象的更远。我相信,如果我们谨慎地观察我们概念的起源,我们就会发现,即使是最抽象的概念,无论它们看起来与感官或我们自己的头脑的任何操作有多么遥远,都只是理解力通过重复和连接它从感官对象或从它自己对它们的操作中获得的概念而自己形成的。因此,那些即使是大的和抽象的观念也是从感觉或反思中得来的,并不是别的,而是头脑通过正常使用自己的能力,对从感官对象中得到的观念,或从它自己观察到的关于它们的操作中得到的观念,可能并且确实达到的。
This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of space, time, and infinity, and some few others that seem the most remote, from those originals.
我将努力在我们所拥有的空间、时间和无限的概念中,以及其他一些看起来最遥远的概念中,说明这一点。
1. Simple modes of simple ideas.
1.简单想法的简单模式。
Though in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different modifications of the SAME idea; which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within itself without the help of any extrinsical object, or any foreign suggestion.
虽然我在前面的部分经常提到简单的观念,它们确实是我们所有知识的材料;但是,在那里对它们的处理,与其说是区别于其他更复杂的观念,不如说是以它们进入心灵的方式来处理,在这种考虑下,再次对其中的一些观念进行观察,研究同一观念的不同变化;心灵要么在现有事物中发现,要么在没有任何外在对象或任何外来暗示的帮助下,能够在自己内部产生。
Those modifications of any ONE simple idea (which, as has been said, I call SIMPLE MODES) are as perfectly different and distinct ideas in the mind as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the idea of two is as distinct from that of one, as blueness from heat, or either of them from any number: and yet it is made up only of that simple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together make those distinct simple modes, of a dozen, a gross, a million. Simple Modes of Idea of Space.
任何一个简单概念的变体(如前所述,我称之为简单模式)在头脑中都是完全不同的、独特的概念,就像那些最大的距离或对比一样。因为 "二 "的概念与 "一 "的概念是不同的,就像 "蓝 "与 "热",或其中任何一个与任何一个数字一样:但它只是由一个单位的简单概念重复组成的;这种重复连在一起就形成了那些不同的简单模式,一打、一大片、一百万。空间观念的简单模式。
2. Idea of Space.
2.空间的概念。
I shall begin with the simple idea of SPACE. I have showed above, chap. 4, that we get the idea of space, both by our sight and touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their sight, a distance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the same body, as that they see colours themselves: nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch.
我将从空间的简单概念开始。我已在上文(第4章)表明,我们通过视觉和触觉获得空间的概念;我认为这是非常明显的,以至于无需再去证明空间的概念。我认为这是非常明显的,以至于没有必要去证明人们通过视觉感知不同颜色的物体之间的距离,或者同一物体的各个部分之间的距离,就像他们看到颜色本身一样;同样明显的是,他们可以通过感觉和触摸在黑暗中这样做。
3. Space and Extension.
3.空间和扩展。
This space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called DISTANCE: if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called CAPACITY. When considered between the extremities of matter, which fills the capacity of space with something solid, tangible, and moveable, it is properly called EXTENSION. And so extension is an idea belonging to body only; but space may, as is evident, be considered without it. At least I think it most intelligible, and the best way to avoid confusion, if we use the word extension for an affection of matter or the distance of the extremities of particular solid bodies; and space in the more general signification, for distance, with or without solid matter possessing it.
这个空间,如果只考虑任何两个生命之间的长度,而不考虑他们之间的任何其他东西,就叫做距离:如果考虑长度、宽度和厚度,我想它可以叫做容量。如果在物质的两端之间考虑,用固体的、有形的和可移动的东西来填补空间的容量,它就被恰当地称为延伸。因此,延伸是一个只属于身体的概念;但空间可以被视为没有它,这是显而易见的。至少我认为,如果我们用 "延伸 "这个词来表示物质的感情或特定固体物体两端的距离,这是最容易理解的,也是避免混淆的最好办法;而空间则是更普遍的含义,表示距离,不管是否有固体物质拥有它。
4. Immensity.
4.无限大。
Each different distance is a different modification of space; and each idea of any different distance, or space, is a SIMPLE MODE of this idea. Men having, by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of space, which they use for measuring other distances—as a foot, a yard or a fathom, a league, or diameter of the earth—made those ideas familiar to their thoughts, can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or anything else; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic feet, yards or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the universe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and, by adding these still one to another, enlarge their ideas of space as much as they please. The power of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of IMMENSITY.
每一个不同的距离都是对空间的不同修改;而每一个关于任何不同距离或空间的想法,都是这个想法的简单模式。人们通过习惯于他们用来测量其他距离的空间长度--如一英尺、一码或一法顿、一个联盟或地球的直径--使这些想法为他们的思想所熟悉,就可以在他们的头脑中随意重复这些想法,而不把身体或其他东西的想法混入或加入它们。并在自己的头脑中形成长、方、立方英尺、码或法尺的概念,在宇宙的身体中,或者在所有身体的最大界限之外;并且,通过把这些概念一个一个地加上去,随心所欲地扩大他们的空间概念。我们对任何距离都有重复或加倍的想法,并随心所欲地把它加到前者上,而不能有任何停顿或停顿,让我们随心所欲地扩大它,这种能力使我们有了IMMENSITY的概念。
5. Figure.
5.图。
There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view: where, observing how the extremities terminate,—either in straight lines which meet at discernible angles, or in crooked lines wherein no angles can be perceived; by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call FIGURE, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, besides the vast number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible. And so it can multiply figures IN INFINITUM.
这个概念还有另一种变化,它只不过是延伸的终止部分或限定的空间彼此之间的关系。触觉在我们触手可及的可感物体中发现了这一点;眼睛从其视野范围内的物体和颜色中也发现了这一点:在这里,观察物体的两端是如何终止的--或者是在可辨认的角度上相遇的直线,或者是在无法察觉角度的弯曲线条中;通过考虑这些彼此之间的关系,在任何物体或空间的两端的所有部分,它具有我们称之为图形的概念,它给头脑带来了无限的变化。因为,除了在物质的连贯性中确实存在的大量不同的图形之外,心灵通过改变空间的观念,从而通过重复自己的观念并按自己的意愿将它们连接起来,它所拥有的存量是完全取之不尽的。因此,它可以无穷无尽地增加数字。
6. Endless variety of figures.
6.无穷无尽的数字。
For the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction, which is to double the length of that straight line; or else join another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases: and being able also to shorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness. So also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases, which joining again to other lines, of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly enclosed any space, it is evident that it can multiply figures, both in their shape and capacity, IN INFINITUM; all which are but so many different simple modes of space.
因为心灵有能力重复任何长度的概念,并在同一方向上与另一条直线相连接,也就是把那条直线的长度增加一倍;或者以它认为合适的倾斜度与另一条直线相连接,从而形成它所喜欢的角度:而且还能够缩短它所想象的任何直线,从它那里拿走一半、四分之一,或者它所喜欢的部分,而不能结束任何这种分割,它可以形成任何大小的角度。因此,作为其边的线也是如此,其长度随心所欲,而这些线又与其他不同长度和不同角度的线相连,直到它完全包围了任何空间,很明显,它可以在形状和容量上无限地增加数字;所有这些都只是空间的许多不同的简单模式。
The same that it can do with straight lines, it can also do with crooked, or crooked and straight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the simple modes of space.
它能用直线做的,也能用弯曲的,或弯曲和直线一起做的;它能用线条做的,也能用表面做的;通过这些,我们可以进一步想到,心灵有能力制造出无穷无尽的图形,从而使空间的简单模式倍增。
7. Place.
7.地方。
Another idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call PLACE. As in simple space, we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points; so in our idea of place, we consider the relation of distance betwixt anything, and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest. For when we find anything at the same distance now which it was yesterday, from any two or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same place: but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points, we say it hath changed its place: though, vulgarly speaking, in the common notion of place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from these precise points, but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to observe.
在这个标题下,属于这个部落的另一个概念,就是我们所说的位置。正如在简单的空间中,我们考虑的是任何两个物体或点之间的距离关系;因此在我们的位置概念中,我们考虑的是任何东西和任何两个或更多的点之间的距离关系,这些点被认为是彼此保持相同的距离,因此被认为是静止的。因为当我们发现任何东西与任何两个或更多的点之间的距离与昨天相同,而这两个或更多的点后来没有改变它们之间的距离,并且我们当时与之进行了比较,我们就说它保持了相同的位置:但如果它与其中任何一个点的距离发生了明显的改变,我们就说它改变了它的位置。虽然,庸俗地讲,在普通的位置概念中,我们并不总是准确地观察与这些精确的点的距离,而是从更大的可感物体的部分观察,我们认为被放置的东西与之有关系,它的距离我们有一些理由观察。
8. Place relative to particular bodies.
8.相对于特定机构的位置。
Thus, a company of chess-men, standing on the same squares of the chess-board where we left them, we say they are all in the SAME place, or unmoved, though perhaps the chessboard hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another; because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though perhaps the ship which it is in sails all the while. And the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth hath turned round, and so both chess-men, and board, and ship, have every one changed place, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess-board; and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship,—these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects: though their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect; and we ourselves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.
因此,一连串的棋手,站在我们离开棋盘的同一格子上,我们说他们都在同一个地方,或没有被移动,尽管棋盘可能在这段时间内被从一个房间搬到另一个房间;因为我们只把他们与棋盘的各个部分相比较,它们彼此保持着相同的距离。我们还说,如果棋盘停留在船舱的同一个地方,它就在原来的地方,尽管它所在的船可能一直在航行。说船在同一个地方,是假设它与邻近陆地的各部分保持相同的距离;尽管地球可能已经转了一圈,因此,无论是棋子、棋盘还是船,就较远的天体而言,都改变了位置,它们彼此之间保持着相同的距离。但是,与棋盘某些部分的距离决定了棋手的位置;与船舱固定部分的距离(我们与之进行了比较)决定了棋盘的位置;与地球的固定部分决定了船的位置,--这些东西在这些方面可以说是处于同一位置。虽然它们与其他一些我们没有考虑的事物的距离不同,但它们在这方面的位置无疑已经改变;当我们有机会将它们与其他事物进行比较时,我们自己也会这样认为。
9. Place relative to a present purpose.
9.相对于现在的目的而言的地方。
But this modification of distance we call place, being made by men for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation; men consider and determine of this place by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their present purpose, without considering other things which, to another purpose, would better determine the place of the same thing. Thus in the chess-board, the use of the designation of the place of each chess-man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to measure it by anything else; but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to determine the place by the part of the room it was in, and not by the chessboard; there being another use of designing the place it is now in, than when in play it was on the chessboard, and so must be determined by other bodies. So if any one should ask, in what place are the verses which report the story of Nisus and Euryalus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying, they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley’s library: but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil’s works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his AEneids, and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since Virgil was printed: which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times, the use of the idea of place here being, to know in what part of the book that story is, that so, upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for use.
但是,这种对距离的修改,我们称之为位置,是人们为了他们的共同使用而做的,通过它,他们可以在他们有机会进行这种指定的地方设计事物的特定位置;人们考虑和确定这个位置时,会参考那些最适合他们当前目的的相邻事物,而不考虑其他的事物,这些事物对另一个目的来说,可以更好地确定同一事物的位置。因此,在棋盘上,每个棋子的位置只在那块棋盘上确定,用其他东西来衡量它就会与这个目的相悖;但当这些棋子被放在一个袋子里时,如果有人问黑王在哪里,就应该根据它在房间里的部分来确定位置,而不是根据棋盘;设计它现在所在的位置有另一种用途,而不是在游戏时它在棋盘上,所以必须由其他机构确定。因此,如果有人问,报告尼苏斯和尤里阿勒斯的故事的诗句在什么地方,那么通过说它们在地球的某个地方,或者在博德利的图书馆,来确定这个地方是非常不恰当的:而正确的指定地点应该是通过维吉尔作品的各个部分;正确的答案应该是,这些诗句大约在他的《埃涅伊德》第九册的中间,而且自从维吉尔印刷以来,它们一直都在同一个地方。这是真的,尽管这本书本身已经移动了一千次,这里的位置概念是指,知道这个故事在书的哪一部分,这样,在有机会的时候,我们就可以知道在哪里找到它,并求助于它来使用。
10. Place of the universe.
10.宇宙的位置。
That our idea of place is nothing else but such a relative position of anything as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist; this, though a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location: and when one can find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infinite space: though it be true that the word place has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which anybody takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea, therefore, of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular limited consideration,) viz. by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance.
当我们考虑到我们不能对宇宙的位置有任何概念,尽管我们可以对它的所有部分有任何概念;因为在宇宙之外,我们没有任何固定的、独特的、特殊的生命的概念,我们可以想象它与之有任何距离关系;但在它之外的所有东西都是一个统一的空间或扩张,在那里头脑没有发现任何变化,没有标记。因为说世界在某个地方,只不过意味着它确实存在;这虽然是一个从地方借来的短语,但只表示它的存在,而不是位置:当一个人能够找出,并在他的头脑中清晰明确地框定宇宙的位置时,他将能够告诉我们,它是在无限空间的不可区分的无序中移动还是静止:尽管地方这个词有时确实具有更混乱的意义,它代表任何人占据的空间;所以宇宙是在一个地方。因此,我们对地方的概念是通过与我们对空间的概念相同的方式获得的,(这只是一种特别有限的考虑),即通过我们的视觉和触觉;通过其中任何一种方式,我们在头脑中得到了延伸或距离的概念。
11. Extension and Body not the same.
11.延伸和身体不一样。
There are some that would persuade us, that body and extension are the same thing, who either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of,—they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If, therefore, they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz. by BODY something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways; and by EXTENSION, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them,—they confound very different ideas one with another; for I appeal to every man’s own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet colour exist without extension, but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others, as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived, without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion; space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space is not body, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it; SPACE and SOLIDITY being as distinct ideas as THINKING and EXTENSION, and as wholly separable in the mind one from another. Body then and extension, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,
有些人想说服我们,身体和延伸是一回事,他们或者改变了词语的含义,我不会怀疑他们,--他们曾如此严厉地谴责其他人的哲学,因为它太多地被置于不确定的含义中,或者被可疑的或不重要的术语欺骗性地模糊。因此,如果他们对身体和延伸的意思与其他人一样,即对身体的意思是指固体和延伸的东西,其部分是可分离和可移动的不同方式;而对延伸的意思,只是指那些固体连贯部分的两端之间的空间,并且是由它们所拥有的,--他们把非常不同的概念混为一谈;因为我呼吁每个人自己的想法,空间的概念是否与固体的概念一样不同,正如它与猩红的颜色的概念一样?诚然,实体不可能没有延伸而存在,猩红的颜色也不可能没有延伸而存在,但这并不妨碍它们是不同的观念。许多观念需要其他观念,作为其存在或概念的必要条件,但这些观念是非常独特的。如果没有空间,运动就不可能存在,也不可能被构想出来;但运动不是空间,空间也不是运动;空间可以不存在,它们是非常不同的观念;我认为,空间和固体的观念也是如此。固体是一个与身体不可分割的概念,它取决于它对空间的填充,它的接触、冲力和对冲力的运动交流。如果它是证明精神与身体不同的理由,因为思维中不包括延伸的观念;我想,同样的理由也可以证明空间不是身体,因为它中不包括固体的观念;空间和固体与思维和延伸一样是不同的观念,在头脑中是完全可以相互分离的。很明显,身体和延伸是两个不同的概念。因为。
12. Extension not solidity.
12.延伸性而非稳固性。
First, Extension includes no solidity, nor resistance to the motion of body, as body does.
首先,延伸不包括实体,也不包括对身体运动的阻力,就像身体那样。
13. The parts of space inseparable, both really and mentally.
13.空间的各部分是不可分割的,无论是真的还是假的。
Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, both neither really nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally is, to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of. But neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.
第二,纯空间的各个部分是不可分割的,所以,无论是在现实中还是在精神上,这种连续性都是不可分割的。因为我要求任何人把它的任何部分从另一个地方移走,因为它与另一个地方是连续的,甚至在思想上也是如此。实际上的分割和分离,正如我所认为的,是通过把各部分从另一个中移开,在以前有连续性的地方形成两个表层;而精神上的分割是,在头脑中形成两个表层,在以前有连续性的地方,把它们视为从另一个中移开;这只能在被头脑视为能够被分离的事物中进行;通过分离,获得新的不同表层,它们当时没有,但能够获得。但是这些分离的方式,无论是真实的还是精神的,我认为都不符合纯空间。
It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation or division; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun without its heat, or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.
诚然,一个人可以考虑这样一个空间中与一英尺相称的部分,而不考虑其余部分,这的确是一种局部考虑,但还不至于在心理上进行分离或分割;因为一个人如果不考虑两个表面的相互分离,就不可能在心理上进行分割,也不可能在实际分割中不使两个表面相互分离:但局部考虑不是分离。一个人可以考虑太阳中的光而不考虑它的热,或身体中的流动性而不考虑它的延伸,而不考虑它们的分离。一个只是部分的考虑,仅止于一个;而另一个是对两者的考虑,因为它们分别存在。
14. The parts of space immovable.
14.空间不可移动的部分。
Thirdly, The parts of pure space are immovable, which follows from their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things; but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable, which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.
第三,纯空间的各部分是不可移动的,这源于它们的不可分割性;运动只不过是任何两个事物之间距离的变化;但这不可能发生在不可分割的部分之间,因此,它们必须在彼此之间永远保持静止。
Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the motion of body.
因此,简单空间的决定性概念将它与身体明确而充分地区别开来;因为它的各部分是不可分割的,不可移动的,而且对身体的运动没有阻力。
15. The Definition of Extension explains it not.
15.延伸的定义》解释说,它不是。
If any one ask me WHAT this space I speak of IS, I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension. For what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts? As if one, asking what a fibre was, I should answer him,—that it was a thing made up of several fibres. Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?
如果有人问我我说的这个空间是什么,我会在他告诉我他的延伸是什么时告诉他。因为像通常所说的那样,说延伸是有额外的部分,只是说延伸就是延伸。因为当我被告知,延伸是有延伸的部分,在延伸的部分之外,即延伸由延伸的部分组成时,我对延伸的性质有什么更好的了解?就好像有人问我什么是纤维,我回答他说,它是由几根纤维组成的东西。这样他就能比以前更好地理解什么是纤维吗?或者说,他不会有理由认为我的目的是为了跟他开玩笑,而不是认真地指导他?
16. Division of Beings into Bodies and Spirits proves not Space and Body the same.
16.16. 众生分为身体和精神,证明空间和身体不一样。
Those who contend that space and body are the same, bring this dilemma:—either this space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, Whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer by another question, Who told them that there was, or could be, nothing; but SOLID BEINGS, WHICH COULD NOT THINK, and THINKING BEINGS THAT WERE NOT EXTENDED?—which is all they mean by the terms BODY and SPIRIT.
那些认为空间和身体是一样的人,带来了这样的困境:要么这个空间是有的,要么是无的;如果两个身体之间没有什么,它们必然会接触;如果允许它是有的,他们问,它是身体还是精神?对此,我用另一个问题来回答:谁告诉他们,除了不能思考的实体生物和不能延伸的思考生物外,什么都没有,也不可能有?
17. Substance, which we know not, no Proof against Space without Body.
17.我们不知道的物质,不能证明没有身体的空间。
If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this space, void of body, be SUBSTANCE or ACCIDENT, I shall readily answer I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance.
如果有人问我(通常是这样),这个没有身体的空间是物质还是偶然,我将欣然回答我不知道;也不会羞于承认我的无知,直到问我的人给我一个明确的物质概念。
18. Different meanings of substance.
18.物质的不同含义。
I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, SUBSTANCE, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite, incomprehensible God, to finite spirits, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow—that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different MODIFICATION of that substance; as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter, which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirit, and matter, in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance; for another when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body is called so;—if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification. And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?
我尽力使自己摆脱那些我们容易以言代物的谬误。在我们没有知识的地方假装有知识,用声音制造噪音,没有明确的含义,这对我们的无知没有帮助。随意起的名字,既不能改变事物的性质,也不能使我们理解它们,只是因为它们是既定观念的标志和代表。我希望那些如此强调这两个音节 "SUBSTANCE "的人考虑一下,像他们那样把它用于无限的、不可理解的上帝,用于有限的精神和身体,是否具有相同的意义;当这三个如此不同的生命被称为物质时,它是否代表着相同的理念。如果是这样,是否会由此得出结论--上帝、精神和身体,在物质的共同性质上是一致的,除了对该物质进行简单的不同修改外,没有任何其他区别;就像一棵树和一块卵石,在同一意义上是身体,在身体的共同性质上是一致的,只是在该共同物质的简单修改上有区别,这将是一个非常苛刻的学说。如果他们说,他们把它应用于上帝、有限的精神和物质,有三种不同的含义,当上帝被说成是物质时,它代表一个概念;当灵魂被称为物质时,它代表另一个概念;当身体被称为物质时,它代表第三个概念。-如果物质这个名字代表着三个不同的概念,那么他们就应该把这些不同的概念公之于众,或者至少给它们起三个不同的名字,以防止在如此重要的概念中出现混乱和错误,而这种混乱和错误自然会因乱用如此可疑的术语而产生;这个术语远没有被怀疑有三个不同的含义,在通常的使用中,它几乎没有一个明确的含义。如果他们可以这样对物质产生三种不同的概念,那么还有什么可以阻止别人不产生第四种呢?
19. Substance and accidents of little use in Philosophy.
19.哲学中的实质和意外没有什么用处。
They who first ran into the notion of ACCIDENTS, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word SUBSTANCE to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher,—that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth, as take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European philosophers,—that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.
最早接触到事故概念的人,作为一种需要某种东西来支撑的真实存在,被迫找到了SUBSTANCE这个词来支持它们。如果可怜的印度哲学家(他认为地球也需要某种东西来支撑它)想到了物质这个词,他就不需要费尽心思去找一头大象来支撑它,找一只乌龟来支撑他的大象:物质这个词会有效地做到这一点。询问的人可以从印度哲学家那里得到同样好的答案--物质,不知道它是什么,就是支撑地球的东西,就像从我们的欧洲哲学家那里得到充分的答案和好的学说--物质,不知道它是什么,就是支撑事故的东西。因此,对于物质,我们不知道它是什么,而只是对它的作用有一个混乱模糊的概念。
20. Sticking on and under-propping.
20.粘连和保护不足。
Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if, desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper. But were the Latin words, inhaerentia and substantio, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called STICKING ON and UNDER-PROPPING, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.
无论一个有学问的人在这里做什么,一个聪明的美国人,如果想学习我们的建筑,却被告知柱子是一个由基础支撑的东西,而基础是支撑柱子的东西,那么,他就不会认为这是一个令人满意的说法。难道他不会认为这样的说法是在嘲弄他,而不是在教导他吗?如果有人告诉他,所有有学问的书都是由纸和字母组成的,字母是纸上的东西,而纸是盛放字母的东西,那么,一个陌生人就会在书的性质和它们所包含的东西方面得到很好的指导:这是对字母和纸有明确概念的一个显著方法。但是,如果把拉丁文的inhaerentia和substantio这两个词换成与之对应的英文词,并称之为STICKING ON和UNDER-PROPPING,它们就会更好地向我们展示物质和事故学说中的巨大清晰性,并表明它们在决定哲学问题上有什么用。
21. A Vacuum beyond the utmost Bounds of Body.
21.超越身体最大界限的真空。
But to return to our idea of space. If body be not supposed infinite, (which I think no one will affirm,) I would ask, whether, if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before space without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be space between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him:) and then I ask,—whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be substance or accident, something or nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves,—what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that, where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies,) a body put in motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch. For pure space between is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare space in the way is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that they think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bounds to space, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either. And therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.
但还是要回到我们的空间观念上来。如果身体不被认为是无限的,(我想没有人会肯定这一点),我想问,如果上帝把一个人放在肉体生命的极点,他是否不能把他的手伸到身体之外?如果他能,那么他就会把他的手臂放在没有身体的空间之前的地方;如果他在那里伸展他的手指,他们之间仍然会有没有身体的空间。如果他不能伸出他的手,那一定是由于某种外部的阻碍;(因为我们假设他还活着,具有他现在所拥有的移动身体各部分的能力,这本身并不是不可能的,如果上帝愿意拥有它的话;或者至少上帝这样移动他也不是不可能的:)然后我问,--阻碍他的手向外移动的东西是物质还是意外,是有还是无?当他们解决了这个问题之后,他们就能解决自己的问题,即在两个身体之间有或可能有的,不是身体,没有实体的东西是什么。同时,这个论点至少是好的,即在没有任何阻碍的地方(如超出所有物体的最大界限),运动的物体可以继续前进,就像在中间没有任何东西的地方,两个物体必然会接触。因为中间的纯粹空间足以消除相互接触的必要性;但在路上的光秃秃的空间却不足以阻止运动。事实是,这些人必须承认他们认为身体是无限的,尽管他们不愿意说出来,否则就肯定空间不是身体。因为我很想见见那个有思想的人,他能在他的思想中为空间设定任何界限,就像他能为时间设定界限一样;或者通过思考希望达到两者的终点。因此,如果他对永恒的想法是无限的,那么他对广袤的想法也是无限的;它们都是有限的或无限的。
22. The Power of Annihilation proves a Vacuum.
22.湮灭的力量证明了真空的存在。
Farther, those who assert the impossibility of space existing without matter, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow that God can, during such a general rest, ANNIHILATE either this book or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum. For, it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain, and be a space without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out;—our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying that there is no necessary connexion between space and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct IDEAS of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extension void of solidity, though they deny its EXISTENCE; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of words, as to call extension body, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension without solidity, must talk absurdly whenever they speak of vacuum; since it is impossible for extension to be without extension. For vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies space without body; whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any particle of it.
更远的是,那些断言空间不可能没有物质而存在的人,不仅必须使身体无限,而且还必须否认上帝有能力消灭物质的任何部分。我想,没有人会否认上帝可以结束物质中的所有运动,并将宇宙中的所有物体固定在一个完美的安静和休息中,并按照他的意愿继续它们。那么,谁会允许上帝在这样一个普遍的休息期间,消灭这本书或阅读这本书的人的身体,就必须承认真空的可能性。因为很明显,被消灭的身体部分所填充的空间仍然存在,而且是一个没有身体的空间。因为周围的身体处于完全静止状态,是一堵金刚墙,在这种状态下,任何其他身体都不可能进入这个空间。事实上,一粒物质进入另一粒物质被移走的地方的必要运动,不过是充实性假设的一个结果;因此,这需要一些更好的证明,而不是一个假定的事实,实验永远无法证明;我们自己清晰明确的想法清楚地表明,空间和实体之间没有必要的联系,因为我们可以想象到一个没有另一个。那些支持或反对真空的人,因此承认他们对真空和实体有不同的概念,也就是说,他们对没有实体的延伸有一种想法,尽管他们否认它的存在;否则,他们根本就没有争议。因为他们如此改变词语的含义,把延伸称为身体,从而使身体的全部本质不过是没有实体的纯粹延伸,每当他们谈到真空时,就一定会说得很荒谬;因为延伸不可能没有延伸。因为真空,无论我们肯定还是否定它的存在,都意味着没有身体的空间;没有人能够否认它的存在是可能的,谁也不会把物质变成无限的,并从上帝那里获得消灭它的任何微粒的权力。
23. Motion proves a Vacuum.
23.运动证明了真空。
But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to God’s omnipotency to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seems to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void space as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-seed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid matter as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed; for if it hold in the one it will hold in the other, and so on IN INFINITUM. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a space void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body; and makes as great a difference between space and body as if it were mega chasma, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to 1/10 or 1/1000 of it, the same consequence will always follow of space without matter.
但是,我们不能超越宇宙中身体的最大界限,也不能求助于上帝的全能来寻找真空,在我们的视野中和附近的身体的运动在我看来明显地显示了这一点。因为我希望任何一个人都能把他所喜欢的任何尺寸的固体物体分割开来,以便使固体部分能够在该表面的范围内自由上下移动,如果其中没有留下与他所分割的固体物体的最小部分一样大的空隙。如果被分割的身体的最小颗粒像芥末籽一样大,就需要一个相当于芥末籽体积的空隙,以便为被分割的身体的各部分在其表面范围内的自由运动提供空间,如果物质的颗粒比芥末籽少100,000,000,也必须有一个固体物质的空隙,其大小相当于芥末籽的100,000,000部分。因为如果它在一个空间里,也会在另一个空间里,以此类推,无穷无尽。让这个空洞的空间有多小就有多小,它破坏了丰满性的假设。因为如果能有一个没有身体的空间,相当于现在自然界中存在的最小的独立物质粒子,它仍然是没有身体的空间;并且使空间和身体之间的差别变得很大,就像它是巨大的血浆,与自然界中的任何距离一样宽。因此,如果我们不认为运动所需的空隙等于最小的分割的固体物质的包裹,而是等于它的1/10或1/1000,那么没有物质的空间就会产生同样的后果。
24. The Ideas of Space and Body distinct.
24.空间和身体的观念截然不同。
But the question being here,—Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body? it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a VACUUM, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have when they inquire and dispute whether there be a VACUUM or no. For if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.
但这里的问题是,空间或延伸的概念是否与身体的概念相同?没有必要证明真空的真实存在,而是证明它的概念;当人们询问和争论是否存在真空时,显然有这种概念。因为如果他们没有没有身体的空间的观念,他们就不可能对它的存在提出疑问;如果他们关于身体的观念中不包括比空间的单纯观念更多的东西,他们就不可能对世界的丰富性产生怀疑;要求有空间无身体,就像有空间无空间,有身体无身体一样荒谬,因为这些只是同一观念的不同名称。
25. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.
25.延伸是与身体不可分割的,证明它不是同一回事。
It is true, the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible, and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to SEE no one, or FEEL very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the busiest of all our senses,) so filled with the idea of extension, and, as it were, wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to anything that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension,—I shall desire them to consider, that, had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found that THEY included in them no idea of extension at all, which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.
诚然,延伸的概念与所有可见的和最有形的品质不可分割地结合在一起,以至于我们在看到任何人或感觉到很少的外部物体时,都不会不考虑延伸的印象。我想,这种延伸性使自己与其他观念一起不断被注意到的意愿,已经成为一些人把身体的全部本质归结为延伸性的原因;这并不值得奇怪,因为一些人通过他们的眼睛和触觉(我们所有感官中最繁忙的),使他们的头脑充满了延伸性的观念,而且,就像它完全拥有的那样,他们不允许任何没有延伸性的东西存在。我现在不打算和那些人争论,他们只从自己狭隘和粗暴的想象中来衡量和判断所有的存在。但在这里,我只想和那些认为身体的本质是延伸的人争论,因为他们说他们无法想象任何没有延伸的身体的任何感性品质,--我将希望他们考虑,如果他们对他们的味道和气味的想法进行反思,就像对视觉和触觉的想法一样。我希望他们考虑一下,如果他们反思一下他们对味道和气味的看法,就像反思一下对视觉和触觉的看法一样;如果他们研究一下他们对饥饿和口渴以及其他一些痛苦的看法,他们就会发现,他们根本不包括延伸的概念,这不过是身体的一种感情,也是其他方面,可以由我们的感官发现,而我们的感官还不够敏锐,无法观察到事物的纯粹本质。
26. Essences of Things.
26.事物的本质。
If those ideas which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of everything. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently.
如果那些不断与其他所有的观念结合在一起的观念,因此必须被断定为那些不断有这些观念与之结合并与之不可分割的事物的本质;那么统一性无疑是一切事物的本质。因为没有任何感觉或思考的对象不带有一的观念:但这种论证的弱点我们已经充分显示了。
27. Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.
27.空间和实体的观念与众不同。
To conclude: whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a VACUUM, this is plain to me—that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas; and we can as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion, though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a RELATION resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance; or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon, ‘The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;’ or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, ‘In him we live, move, and have our being,’ are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. For, whether we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether, considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings, without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between, we call it distance;—however named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of space, taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant; whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of anything that was, there.
总结:不管人们对真空的存在有什么看法,对我来说,这一点是很清楚的,即我们对不同于实体的空间有同样清晰的概念,就像我们对不同于运动的实体,或不同于空间的运动有同样清晰的概念。我们没有更多的两个不同的概念;我们可以很容易地想象出没有实体的空间,就像我们可以想象出没有运动的身体或空间一样,尽管从来没有那么肯定,没有空间,身体或运动都不可能存在。但是,是否有人会认为空间只是一种因其他生命的存在而产生的关系;或者他们是否会认为最有见识的所罗门王的话:'天,以及天中之天,都不能容纳你';或者受启发的哲学家圣保罗的那些更强调的话语:'我们在他里面生活,运动,有我们的存在',都应该从字面上理解,我让每个人考虑:我认为,只有我们的空间概念是像我提到的那样,并且与身体的概念不同。因为,无论我们是否考虑到,在物质本身中,其连贯的固体部分的距离,并且就这些固体部分而言,称之为延伸;或者,无论我们是否考虑到它位于任何身体的几个维度的两端之间,我们称之为长度、宽度和厚度;或者,考虑到它位于任何两个身体或实在存在之间,不考虑中间是否有任何物质,我们称之为距离;--无论如何命名或考虑,它总是相同的统一的简单空间概念,取自我们感官已经熟悉的物体。如果在我们的头脑中形成了固定的概念,我们就可以随心所欲地恢复、重复和增加它们,并认为这样想象出来的空间或距离,要么是充满了固体部分,所以另一个身体如果不取代和推开之前在那里的身体,就不能到那里去;要么是没有固体,所以一个与那个空的或纯的空间有同等尺寸的身体可以放在里面,而不需要移除或赶走那里的任何东西。
28. Men differ little in clear, simple ideas.
28.人在清晰、简单的想法上差别不大。
The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in: though amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men’s brains is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation. It requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a NECESSARY connexion and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.
我想,在这种情况下,以及在许多其他情况下,如果能准确地知道我们的词语所代表的含义,就会很快结束争议。因为我倾向于认为,当人们来研究他们时,发现他们简单的想法一般都是一致的,尽管在彼此的讨论中,他们可能会用不同的名称来混淆彼此。我想,那些把自己的思想抽象出来,并很好地检查自己头脑中的想法的人,在思维上不会有太大的差异;不管他们如何用词,根据他们所生长的几个学校或教派的说话方式,使自己感到困惑。但是,在没有思想的人中间,如果他们不认真仔细地检查自己的思想,不把它们从人们为它们使用的标记中剥离出来,而是用语言来混淆它们,就一定会有无休止的争论、争吵和行话;特别是如果他们是有学问的、有书卷气的人,投身于某个教派,并习惯于其中的语言,而且已经学会跟着别人说话。但是,如果发生任何两个有思想的人真的有不同的想法,我不知道他们如何能够互相讨论或争论。在这里,我不能误认为人的大脑中每一个浮动的想象力都是我所说的那种想法。心灵要摆脱那些从习惯、疏忽和普通谈话中吸收的混乱的观念和偏见并不容易。它需要努力和勤奋来检查它的观念,直到它把它们分解成那些清晰和明确的简单观念,它们是由这些观念组成的;并看看在这些简单的观念中,哪些有或没有必要的联系和相互依赖。除非一个人在事物的主要和原始概念上做到这一点,否则他就会建立在浮动和不确定的原则之上,并经常发现自己无所适从。
1. Duration is fleeting Extension.
1.持续时间是转瞬即逝的延伸。
There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call DURATION; the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have distinct ideas, as HOURS, DAYS, YEARS, &c., TIME and ETERNITY.
还有一种距离,或长度,我们不是从空间的永久部分得到的概念,而是从连续的转瞬即逝和永久消亡的部分得到的。我们称之为 "时间";它的简单模式是任何不同的长度,我们对其有不同的概念,如小时、日、年等等,时间和永恒。
2. Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas.
2.它的想法来自于对我们思想的火车的反思。
The answer of a great man, to one who asked what time was: Si non rogas intelligo, (which amounts to this; The more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it,) might perhaps persuade one that time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are, not without reason, thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, viz. sensation and reflection, will be able to furnish us with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many others which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.
一位伟人对问及什么是时间的人的回答是:Si non rogas intelligo。Si non rogas intelligo, (这句话的意思是:我越是想它,就越是不明白它。)也许可以说服人们,时间揭示了所有其他事物,它本身是不被发现的。持续时间、时间和永恒,被认为在其本质上有非常深奥的东西,这不是没有道理的。但是,无论这些东西看起来离我们的理解力有多远,但如果我们追溯到它们的起源,我毫不怀疑,我们所有知识的来源之一,即感觉和思考,将能够为我们提供这些想法,就像许多其他被认为不那么晦涩的想法一样清晰和明确;我们会发现,永恒的想法本身是来自与我们其他想法相同的原始。
3. Nature and origin of the idea of Duration.
3.3. 时间概念的性质和起源。
To understand TIME and ETERNITY aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of DURATION, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of SUCCESSION: and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call DURATION. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or anything else, commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the duration of ourselves, or any such other thing co-existent with our thinking.
为了正确理解时间和永恒,我们应该注意考虑我们对时间的概念是什么,以及我们如何得到它。任何一个人只要观察一下自己头脑中的情况,就会发现,只要他还醒着,就会有一连串的想法在他的理解中不断地相互延续。对这些在我们头脑中一个接一个出现的想法的反思,为我们提供了连续的概念:而这种连续的任何部分之间的距离,或者任何两个想法在我们头脑中出现的距离,我们称之为持续时间。因为当我们在思考的时候,或者当我们在头脑中连续接受几个观念的时候,我们知道我们确实存在;所以我们把我们自己的存在或者存在的延续,或者与我们头脑中任何观念的连续相称的任何其他东西,称为我们自己的持续时间,或者与我们思考同时存在的任何其他东西。
4. Proof that its idea is got from reflection on the train of our ideas.
4.证明它的想法是从反思我们的想法的火车上得到的。
That we have our notion of succession and duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of duration but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, while he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep ONLY ONE idea in his mind, without variation and the succession of others. And we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration, it is because during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another, he hath then, during such dreaming, a sense of duration, and of the length of it. By which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflections on the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings; without which observation they can have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in the world.
在我看来,我们对连续和持续时间的概念是来自于这一原始概念,即来自于对我们发现在我们自己的头脑中一个接一个出现的想法的思考,因为除了考虑在我们的理解中轮流出现的想法之外,我们没有对持续时间的认识。当这种观念的连续停止时,我们对持续时间的感知也随之停止;每个人都在自己身上清楚地实验过,当他酣睡时,无论是一小时还是一天,一个月还是一年;当他睡觉或不思考时,他对事物的持续时间完全没有感知,而是完全失去了感知;当他离开思考的时刻,直到他再次开始思考的时刻,对他来说似乎没有距离。对一个清醒的人来说,如果他能在脑海中只保留一个想法,而没有变化和其他想法的延续,我相信情况也会如此。我们看到,一个人如果把他的思想集中在一件事情上,以至于在他认真思考的时候,很少注意到在他脑海中传递的各种想法,那么他就会从他的账户中漏掉很长时间,并认为那段时间比实际时间短。但是,如果睡眠通常将时间的远近结合起来,那是因为在那段时间里,我们的头脑中没有思想的连续性。因为如果一个人在睡眠中做梦,各种想法在他的头脑中一个接一个地被感知,那么在这种梦境中,他就会有一种持续时间的感觉,以及它的长度。在我看来,这就很清楚了,人的时间观念来自于他们对自己的理解中所观察到的接连不断的观念的反思;没有这种观察,无论世界上发生什么,他们都不可能有时间观念。
5. The Idea of Duration applicable to Things whilst we sleep.
5.持续时间的概念适用于我们睡觉时的事情。
Indeed a man having, from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts, got the notion or idea of duration, he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think; as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies by his sight or touch, can apply it to distances, where no body is seen or felt. And therefore, though a man has no perception of the length of duration which passed whilst he slept or thought not; yet, having observed the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the supposition that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do at other times, he can, I say, imagine and make allowance for the length of duration whilst he slept. But if Adam and Eve, (when they were alone in the world,) instead of their ordinary night’s sleep, had passed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued sleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.
的确,一个人从反思他自己思想的连续和数量中得到了持续时间的概念或想法,他可以把这个概念应用于他不思考时存在的事物;就像他通过视觉或触觉得到身体延伸的概念,可以把它应用于没有看到或感觉到身体的距离。因此,尽管一个人对他睡觉或不思考时的时间长度没有感知;但是,如果他观察了白天和黑夜的旋转,并发现它们的时间长度在外观上是有规律的和恒定的,他就可以在假设这种旋转在他睡觉或不思考时以同样的方式进行,就像它在其他时候一样,我说,他可以想象并允许他睡觉时的时间长度。但是,如果亚当和夏娃,(当他们独自在这个世界上时),不是他们普通的夜间睡眠,而是在一次持续的睡眠中度过了整个二十四小时,那么这二十四小时的持续时间对他们来说已经无可挽回地失去了,并且永远地被排除在他们的时间帐户之外。
6. The Idea of Succession not from Motion.
6.不从运动中继承的想法。
Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understandings, we get the notion of succession; which, if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses, he will perhaps be of my mind when he considers, that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas. For a man looking upon a body really moving, perceives yet no motion at all unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas: v.g. a man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; though it be certain that two, and perhaps all of them, have moved during that time a great way. But as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body, as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But wherever a man is, with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all,—if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find succession where he could observe no motion.
因此,通过思考各种观念一个接一个地出现在我们的理解中,我们得到了连续的概念;如果有人认为我们是通过我们的感官观察运动而得到的,那么当他考虑到即使运动在他的头脑中产生连续的观念,也不外乎在那里产生一连串可区分的观念时,他也许会同意我的看法。因为一个人看着一个真正运动的物体,根本感觉不到运动,除非这个运动产生了一连串持续不断的观念:例如,一个在海上漂泊的人,在一个晴朗的日子里,看不到陆地,他可能整整看了一个小时的太阳、大海或船,却根本感觉不到任何运动;尽管可以肯定的是,在这段时间里,它们中的两个,也许全部,都运动了很远。但是,一旦他察觉到其中任何一个物体与其他物体的距离发生了变化,一旦这种运动在他心中产生了任何新的想法,那么他就察觉到有运动存在。但是,无论一个人在哪里,在他周围所有的东西都处于静止状态,根本没有察觉到任何运动,--如果在这一小时的安静中,他一直在思考,他将察觉到他自己头脑中的各种想法,一个接一个地出现,从而在他无法观察到运动的地方观察并发现连续不断。
7. Very slow motions unperceived.
7.非常缓慢的运动未被察觉。
And this, I think, is the reason why motions very slow, though they are constant, are not perceived by us; because in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another. And so not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which consisting in a constant succession, we cannot perceive that succession without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it.
我认为,这就是为什么非常缓慢的运动,尽管它们是恒定的,但我们却感觉不到;因为在它们从一个感性部分移向另一个感性部分的过程中,它们的距离变化是如此缓慢,以至于它没有在我们心中引起新的想法,而是一个接一个的好一会儿。因此,如果不能在我们的头脑中立即引起一列不断的新观念,我们就没有对运动的感知;运动包括不断的连续,如果没有由它产生的不断连续的变化的观念,我们就不能感知这种连续。
8. Very swift motions unperceived.
8.非常迅速的运动,不被察觉。
On the contrary, things that move so swift as not to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived. For anything that moves round about in a circle, in less times than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect entire circle of the matter or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.
相反,那些运动迅速,以至于不会以其运动的几个可区分的距离明显地影响感官的事物,因此不会在头脑中引起任何想法,也不会被察觉。因为任何东西如果在一个圆圈中移动,其时间比我们的思想在我们头脑中习惯性地相互延续的时间还要短,就不会被认为是在移动;而似乎是物质或颜色的一个完美的整体圆圈,而不是运动中的一个圆圈的一部分。
9. The Train of Ideas has a certain Degree of Quickness.
9.9. 思想列车有一定程度的快速性。
Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable that our ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our minds at certain distances; not much unlike the images in the inside of a lantern, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, though perhaps it may be sometimes faster and sometimes slower, yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking man: there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.
因此,我让其他人来判断,当我们清醒时,我们的想法是否有可能在我们的头脑中以一定的距离相互延续;这与灯笼内的图像被蜡烛的热量转过来不太一样。它们的这种排列方式,虽然可能有时快,有时慢,但我想,对一个清醒的人来说,变化不大:这些想法在我们头脑中的相互继承的快慢似乎有一定的界限,它们既不能延迟也不能加速。
10. Real succession in swift motions without sense of succession.
10.迅速运动中的真正继承,没有继承感。
The reason I have for this odd conjecture is, from observing that, in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceeding quick, the sense of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession. Let a cannon-bullet pass through a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleshy parts of a man, it is as clear as any demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the room: it is also evident, that it must touch one part of the flesh first, and another after, and so in succession: and yet, I believe, nobody who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive any succession either in the pain or sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we call an INSTANT, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another; wherein, therefore, we perceive no succession at all.
我之所以提出这个奇怪的猜想,是因为我观察到,在我们的任何感官上产生的印象中,我们只能在一定程度上察觉到任何连续;如果速度过快,就会失去连续的感觉,即使在很明显存在真正的连续的情况下。让一发炮弹穿过一个房间,并在途中带走一个人的任何肢体或肉体部分,这就像任何证明一样清楚,它必须先后击中房间的两边:同样明显的是,它必须先碰到肉体的一个部分,然后再碰到另一个部分,如此连续进行:然而,我相信,没有人感受过这种射击的痛苦,或听到对远处两面墙壁的打击,能在如此迅速的打击的痛苦或声音中感知到任何连续。像这样的持续时间的一部分,我们没有察觉到连续,这就是我们所说的瞬间,是在我们头脑中只占一个想法的时间,而没有另一个想法的连续;因此,在这里,我们根本没有察觉到连续。
11. In slow motions.
11.在缓慢的运动中。
This also happens where the motion is so slow as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds between those offered to our senses by the moving body, there the sense of motion is lost; and the body, though it really moves, yet, not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still; as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials, and other constant but slow motions, where, though, after certain intervals, we perceive, by the change of distance, that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not.
这种情况也发生在运动非常缓慢的地方,以至于不能以头脑能够接受新观念的速度向感官不断提供新的观念;因此,我们自己思想的其他观念,在运动的身体向我们的感官提供的观念之间有了进入我们头脑的空间,在那里,运动的感觉就消失了。而身体,尽管它真的在运动,但是,它与其他一些身体之间可感知的距离的变化,并不像我们自己思想的观念自然地相互跟随那样快,事物似乎是静止的;这一点在钟表的指针、日晷的影子以及其他持续但缓慢的运动中很明显,在那里,尽管经过一定的间隔,我们通过距离的变化察觉到它已经移动,但运动本身我们却没有察觉到。
12. This Train, the Measure of other Successions.
12.这辆火车,是其他继承人的衡量标准。
So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular succession of IDEAS in a waking man, is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other successions. Whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two sounds or pains, &c., take up in their succession the duration of but one idea; or else where any motion or succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns, as when any one or more ideas in their ordinary course come into our mind, between those which are offered to the sight by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion, or between sounds or smells following one another,—there also the sense of a constant continued succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.
因此,在我看来,在一个清醒的人身上,思想的持续和有规律的继承,就像它一样,是所有其他继承的衡量和标准。如果任何一个人超过了我们思想的速度,比如两个声音或痛苦等等。否则,如果任何运动或连续是如此缓慢,以至于它不能与我们头脑中的想法保持同步,或者它们轮流的速度,比如当任何一个或多个想法在其正常过程中进入我们的头脑,在那些由运动中的身体的不同可感知距离提供给视觉的想法之间,或者在声音或气味之间彼此相继,--在那里也会失去持续不断的感觉,我们不会感知到它,而是在中间有某些间隙的休息。
13. The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.
13.13. 心灵不能长期固定在一个不变的理念上。
If it be so, that the ideas of our minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift in a continual succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it be meant that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all, I think, in matter of fact, it is not possible. For which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I can give no other reason but experience: and I would have any one try, whether he can keep one unvaried single idea in his mind, without any other, for any considerable time together.
如果是这样,我们头脑中的想法,只要我们有任何想法,就会不断地变化,不断地转移,那么,任何人都可以说,一个人不可能长期思考任何一件事。如果这是说一个人可以在他的头脑中长期单独拥有一个相同的想法,而没有任何变化的话,我认为,事实上,这是不可能的。对于这一点(我不知道我们头脑中的观念是如何形成的,它们是用什么材料制成的,它们的光芒来自何处,以及它们是如何出现的),除了经验之外,我无法给出其他理由:我想让任何人试试,他是否能在他的头脑中保持一个没有变化的单一观念,而没有任何其他观念,在任何相当长的时间内。
14. Proof.
14.证明。
For trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light or whiteness, or what other he pleases, and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind; but that some, either of another kind, or various considerations of that idea, (each of which considerations is a new idea,) will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.
对于试验,让他采取任何图形,任何程度的光或白,或他喜欢的其他东西,我想,他将发现很难把所有其他的想法从他的脑海中排除;但是,一些,要么是另一种,或对该想法的各种考虑,(每一种考虑都是一个新的想法,)将不断地在他的想法中相互继承,让他尽可能地警惕。
15. The extent of our power over the succession of our ideas.
15.我们对我们思想的继承的权力的程度。
All that is in a man’s power in this case, I think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are that take their turns in his understanding; or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, though he may commonly choose whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.
我认为,在这种情况下,一个人的能力只是注意和观察在他的理解中轮流出现的想法;或者引导这种想法,并召唤他所渴望或使用的想法:但我认为他不能阻止新鲜想法的不断涌现,尽管他通常可以选择是否会仔细观察和考虑它们。
16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.
16.思想,无论如何制造,都不包括运动的感觉。
Whether these several ideas in a man’s mind be made by certain motions, I will not here dispute; but this I am sure, that they include no idea of motion in their appearance; and if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all, which is enough to my present purpose; and sufficiently shows that the notice we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the idea of succession and duration, without which we should have no such ideas at all. It is not then MOTION, but the constant train of IDEAS in our minds whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the idea of duration; whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas, as I have before showed: and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration, by the train of other ideas succeeding one another in our minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas caused by the uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two bodies, which we have from motion; and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration were there no sense of motion at all.
一个人心中的这些想法是否是由某些运动产生的,我在此不做争论;但我可以肯定的是,它们的出现不包括运动的概念;如果一个人没有运动的概念,我想他根本就不会有,这对我现在的目的来说已经足够了;这也充分说明,我们对我们自己头脑中一个接一个出现的想法的注意,就是给我们提供了连续和持续的概念,没有这种概念我们根本就不会有这种想法。因此,为我们提供持续时间概念的不是运动,而是我们清醒时头脑中不断出现的观念;而运动除了在我们的头脑中造成观念的不断连续外,并没有给我们任何其他的感觉,正如我之前所表明的那样。在我们的头脑中,通过其他观念的连续,我们对连续和持续时间有同样清晰的概念,而没有任何运动的概念,就像我们从运动中得到的两个物体之间距离的不间断的可感知的变化所引起的观念的连续一样;因此,如果根本没有运动的感觉,我们也应该有持续时间的概念。
17. Time is Duration set out by Measures.
17.时间是由《措施》规定的期限。
Having thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is to get some measure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist; without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused, and a great part of history be rendered very useless. This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that, I think, which most properly we call TIME.
在获得了持续时间的概念之后,人们自然要做的下一件事就是获得这种共同持续时间的某种衡量标准,从而判断其不同的长度,并考虑若干事物存在的不同顺序;如果没有这一点,我们的大部分知识将被混淆,大部分历史将变得非常无用。我认为,这种对持续时间的考虑,正如由某些时期所规定的和由某些措施或时代所标志的那样,是我们称之为时间的最恰当的东西。
18. A good Measure of Time must divide its whole Duration into equal Periods.
18.一个好的时间衡量标准必须把整个时间划分为相等的时期。
In the measuring of extension, there is nothing more required but the application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing of whose extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another. And nothing being a measure of duration but duration, as nothing is of extension but extension, we cannot keep by us any standing, unvarying measure of duration, which consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of certain lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c., marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not distinguished, or considered as distinguished and measured, by such periods, come not so properly under the notion of time; as appears by such phrases as these, viz. ‘Before all time,’ and ‘When time shall be no more.’
在测量延伸时,除了将我们使用的标准或尺度应用于我们要了解其延伸的事物外,没有其他要求。但在测量持续时间时,这是做不到的,因为没有两个不同的连续部分可以放在一起相互测量。而且,除了时间之外,没有任何东西是衡量时间的尺度,因为除了延伸之外,没有任何东西是衡量延伸的尺度,我们不能像我们可以用某些延伸的长度,如英寸、英尺、码等,在永久的物质包裹中标出的那样,保持任何常设的、不变的时间尺度,这包括不断的转瞬即逝的继承。因此,没有什么能很好地作为时间的衡量标准,只有通过不断重复的时期,将整个时间长度分成明显相等的部分。哪些时间段没有被区分,或被认为是被区分和衡量的,就不属于时间的概念;正如这些短语所显示的那样,即'在所有时间之前'和'当时间不再是'。
19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon, the properest Measures of Time for mankind.
19.太阳和月亮的旋转,是人类最恰当的时间尺度。
The diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun, as having been, from the beginning of nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration. But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another. For men, in the measuring of the length of time, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c., which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on, all which portions of time were measured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies, they were apt to confound time and motion; or at least to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another. Whereas any constant periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas, in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use of. For, supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again,—would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were constant, universally observable, in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for measure of time as well were the motion away.
太阳的日转和年转,从自然界一开始就是恒定的、有规律的、全人类都能观察到的,并且被认为是彼此相等的,因此被合理地用来衡量持续时间。但是,由于日和年的区别取决于太阳的运动,它带来了这样的错误,即人们认为运动和持续时间是相互衡量的。因为人们在测量时间长度时,已经习惯了分、时、日、月、年等概念,他们发现自己一提到时间或期限就会想到,所有这些时间部分都是由这些天体的运动来衡量的,他们很容易把时间和运动混为一谈;或者至少认为它们之间有一种必然的联系。而任何恒定的周期性出现,或观念的改变,在看似等距的时间空间里,如果是恒定的和普遍可观察到的,就会像那些被利用的时间间隔一样,将时间的间隔区分开来。因为,假设太阳(有人认为它是一团火)在相同的时间距离内被点亮,现在它每天都会到达同一子午线,然后在大约12小时后再次熄灭,在一年一度的旋转中,它的亮度和热量明显增加,然后再次减少,--这种有规律的表象难道不可以向所有能够观察到它的人测量出时间的距离,就像没有运动时一样?因为如果这种出现是恒定的,是普遍可以观察到的,是在等距离的时期内出现的,那么它们就可以为人类测量时间,就像运动的时候一样。
20. But not by their Motion, but periodical Appearances.
20.但不是通过他们的运动,而是定期的出现。
For the freezing of water, or the blooming of a plant, returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth, would as well serve men to reckon their years by, as the motions of the sun: and in effect we see, that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague; the sense of hunger or thirst; a smell or a taste; or any other idea returning constantly at equidistant periods, and making itself universally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of succession, and distinguish the distances of time. Thus we see that men born blind count time well enough by years, whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions that they perceive not. And I ask whether a blind man, who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer, or cold of winter; by the smell of any flower of the spring, or taste of any fruit of the autumn, would not have a better measure of time than the Romans had before the reformation of their calendar by Julius Caesar, or many other people, whose years, notwithstanding the motion of the sun, which they pretended to make use of, are very irregular? And it adds no small difficulty to chronology, that the exact lengths of the years that several nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may say all of them from the precise motion of the sun. And if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the equator, and so equally dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the same length without its annual variations to the tropics, as a late ingenious author supposes, I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the sun) men should in the antediluvian world, from the beginning, count by years, or measure their time by periods that had no sensible mark very obvious to distinguish them by.
因为水的结冰或植物的开花,在地球上的所有地方都是等距离返回的,就像太阳的运动一样,也可以为人们计算他们的年岁:实际上,我们看到,美洲的一些人通过某些鸟在特定的季节来到他们中间,在其他季节离开他们来计算他们的年岁。因为痛症的发作;饥饿或口渴的感觉;气味或味道;或任何其他的想法都会在相同的时间段内不断返回,并使自己被普遍注意到,不会不衡量连续的过程,并区分时间的距离。因此,我们看到,先天性失明的人用年份来计算时间已经足够了,但他们却无法通过他们所不知道的运动来区分时间的转折。我想问的是,如果一个盲人通过夏天的炎热或冬天的寒冷,通过春天的花香或秋天的果实的味道来区分他的年份,那么他的时间衡量标准是不是比罗马人在凯撒大帝改革他们的日历之前的时间衡量标准要好呢?这给年代学增加了不小的困难,因为几个国家所计算的年份的确切长度很难知道,它们彼此之间差别很大,我想我可以说所有这些都是由于太阳的精确运动造成的。如果太阳从创世到洪水期间一直在赤道上运动,并如此平等地将其光和热散布到地球上所有可居住的地方,在没有年度变化的情况下,所有的日子都是一样长的,正如一位已故的聪明作者所假设的那样,我认为不容易想象,(尽管有太阳的运动)人们在以前的世界里,从一开始就用年来计算,或用没有明显的标志来区分的时期来衡量他们的时间。
21. No two Parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.
21.没有两个持续时间的部分可以肯定地知道是相等的。
But perhaps it will be said,—without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such periods were equal? To which I answer,—the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known, or presumed to be so at first; which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas which had passed in men’s minds in the intervals; by which train of ideas discovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the artificial days, or nuchthaemera, were guessed to be equal, which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure; though exacter search has since discovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun, and we know not whether the annual also be not unequal. These yet, by their presumed and apparent equality, serve as well to reckon time by (though not to measure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the measures we make use of to judge of its length. Duration, in itself, is to be considered as going on in one constant, equal, uniform course: but none of the measures of it which we make use of can be KNOWN to do so, nor can we be assured that their assigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another; for two successive lengths of duration, however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. The motion of the sun, which the world used so long and so confidently for an exact measure of duration, has, as I said, been found in its several parts unequal. And though men have, of late, made use of a pendulum, as a more steady and regular motion than that of the sun, or, (to speak more truly,) of the earth;—yet if any one should be asked how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so; since we cannot be sure that the cause of that motion, which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally; and we are sure that the medium in which the pendulum moves is not constantly the same: either of which varying, may alter the equality of such periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration still remaining clear, though our measures of it cannot (any of them) be demonstrated to be exact. Since then no two portions of succession can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a measure of time is, to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods; of which seeming equality we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other PROBABLE reasons, to persuade us of their equality.
但也许有人会说,如果没有一个有规律的运动,如太阳或其他的运动,怎么可能知道这些周期是相等的呢?对此,我回答说:"任何其他返回的表象的平等性都可以通过与天数的平等性相同的方式来知道,或在开始时被假定为平等性;这只是通过在间隔期间在人们头脑中传递的思想体系来判断它们。通过这种想法,发现自然日中有不平等,但人工日中没有,人工日或nuchthaemera被猜测为平等,这足以使它们成为一种衡量标准;尽管后来精确的研究发现太阳的日轮中有不平等,我们不知道年轮是否也不平等。然而,由于它们的假定和表面上的平等,它们也可以用来计算时间(尽管不能精确地测量时间的各个部分),就像它们可以被证明是完全平等的一样。因此,我们必须仔细区分持续时间本身和我们用来判断其长度的措施之间的区别。时间本身应被视为在一个恒定的、平等的、统一的过程中进行:但我们所使用的对它的测量方法没有一个可以被知道是这样的,我们也不能保证其指定的部分或周期在时间上是相等的;因为两个连续的时间长度,无论如何测量,都不能被证明是相等的。太阳的运动,世界如此长久地、如此自信地用它来衡量时间的长短,正如我所说,它的几个部分被发现是不相等的。尽管近来人们利用钟摆,认为它的运动比太阳的运动或(说得更真实些)地球的运动更稳定、更有规律;但如果有人问他如何肯定地知道钟摆的两次连续摆动是相等的,那就很难让他相信它们是绝对相等的;因为我们不能肯定那运动的原因,即我们不知道的原因,将总是平等地运作;而且我们肯定钟摆运动的介质并不总是一样的。其中任何一个变化,都可能改变这种周期的平等性,从而破坏运动测量的确定性和精确性,以及其他表象的任何其他周期;持续时间的概念仍然是明确的,尽管我们对它的测量不能(其中任何一个)被证明是精确的。既然没有任何两部分的继承可以放在一起,那么就永远不可能肯定地知道它们的平等。对于时间的衡量,我们所能做的就是,在看似相等的时间段内连续出现;对于这种看似平等的情况,我们没有其他的衡量标准,只能根据我们自己的想法在我们的记忆中留下的痕迹,以及其他可能的理由,来说服我们相信它们的平等。
22. Time not the Measure of Motion
22.时间不是运动的尺度
One thing seems strange to me,—that whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, time yet should be defined to be the ‘measure of motion’: whereas it is obvious to every one who reflects ever so little on it, that to measure motion, space is as necessary to be considered as time; and those who look a little farther will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will estimate or measure motion so as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming equidistant periods. For if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds, sometimes very slow, and at others irregularly very swift; or if, being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same appearances,—it would not at all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.
有一件事在我看来很奇怪,那就是尽管所有的人都明显地通过世界上巨大的和可见的物体的运动来衡量时间,但时间却被定义为 "运动的尺度":而对于每一个稍微思考一下的人来说,很明显,为了衡量运动,空间和时间一样需要考虑;那些稍微看远一点的人还会发现,任何要估计或衡量运动以便正确判断它的人,都必须把所移动的物体的体积纳入计算。事实上,运动对时间的测量也没有任何其他的帮助,只是因为它不断地使某些感性的想法在看似相等的时间内返回。因为如果太阳的运动像一艘被不稳定的风吹动的船一样不平等,有时非常缓慢,有时又不规则地非常迅速;或者,如果它一直是同样迅速的,但却不是圆形的,并且产生不一样的外观,--它根本不会帮助我们测量时间,就像彗星的看似不平等的运动一样。
23. Minutes, hours, days, and years are, then, no more Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years not necessary Measures of duration, necessary to time or duration, than inches, feet, yards, and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extension. For, though we in this part of the universe, by the constant use of them, as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun, or as known parts of such periods, have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time whose lengths we would consider; yet there may be other parts of the universe, where they no more use these measures of ours, than in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles; but yet something analogous to them there must be. For without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or signify to others, the length of any duration; though at the same time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured; no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension to those who make use of those different measures.
23.那么,分、时、日、年就不是时间或持续时间所必需的时间尺度,就像在任何事物中标出的英寸、英尺、码和英里一样,也不是延伸。因为,尽管我们在宇宙的这个部分,通过不断使用它们,作为太阳旋转所确定的周期,或作为这种周期的已知部分,在我们的头脑中固定了这种持续时间的概念,我们将其应用于我们要考虑的所有时间部分;然而,宇宙的其他部分,他们可能不使用我们的这些措施,就像在日本他们使用我们的英寸、英尺或英里;但一定有与它们类似的东西。因为如果没有一些有规律的周期性回报,我们就无法衡量自己,也无法向别人表示任何时间的长度;尽管同时世界也像现在一样充满了运动,但它的任何部分都没有被安排成有规律的、明显的等距离的旋转。但是,用于计算时间的不同度量衡,根本没有改变作为测量对象的时间概念;就像一英尺和一立方英尺的不同标准,对使用这些不同度量衡的人来说,也没有改变延伸的概念。
24. Our Measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.
24.我们对时间的衡量适用于时间之前的期限。
The mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do. For should one say, that Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the world, though there were so far back no motion of the sun, nor any motion at all. For, though the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the sun,—yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure durations as well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun, is as easily APPLICABLE in our thoughts to duration, where no sun or motion was, as the idea of a foot or yard, taken from bodies here, can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.
心灵一旦有了太阳年轮这样的时间尺度,就可以把这个尺度应用于这个尺度本身并不存在的时间,而且在其存在的现实中,它与这个尺度毫无关系。因为如果有人说,亚伯拉罕出生在朱利安时期的第两千七百一十二年,这完全可以理解为从世界的开端计算,尽管这么久以前没有太阳的运动,也没有任何运动。因为,尽管朱利安时期被认为是在真正有日、夜或年之前的几百年开始的,并以太阳的任何旋转为标志,但我们的计算是正确的,从而也衡量了持续时间,就好像在那个时候太阳真的存在,并保持与现在一样的普通运动。在我们的思想中,相当于太阳每年转一圈的持续时间的概念很容易适用于没有太阳或运动的地方的持续时间,就像从这里的物体中提取的一英尺或一码的概念,可以在我们的思想中适用于世界范围以外的距离,那里根本就没有物体。
25. As we can measure space in our thoughts where there is no body.
25.由于我们可以在我们的思想中测量没有身体的空间。
For supposing it were 5639 miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remotest body of the universe, (for, being finite, it must be at a certain distance,) as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world;—we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies; and by the one measure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body.
因为假设从这个地方到宇宙中最遥远的身体有5639英里,或数百万英里,(因为,它是有限的,必须有一定的距离,)就像我们假设从这个时候到世界之初任何身体的第一次存在有5639年。-在我们的思想中,我们可以用一年的时间来衡量创世前的时间,或超越身体或运动的时间,就像我们可以用一英里的时间来衡量最远的身体以外的空间一样;通过一个衡量时间,在没有运动的地方,以及通过我们思想中的另一个衡量空间,在没有身体的地方。
26. The assumption that the world is neither boundless nor eternal.
26.假设世界既不是无边的,也不是永恒的。
If it be objected to me here, that, in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I should not, viz. that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose it is not needful, in this place, to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite both in duration and extension. But it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary; and I doubt not, but that every one that will go about it, may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, though not of all duration, and so may come to a step and non ultra in his consideration of motion. So also, in his thoughts, he may set limits to body, and the extension belonging to it; but not to space, where no body is, the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.
如果有人在这里反对我,说我以这种方式解释时间,是在乞求我不应该乞求的东西,即世界既不是永恒的,也不是无限的;我回答说,为了我目前的目的,在这个地方没有必要用论据来证明世界在时间和范围上都是有限的。但是,这至少和相反的情况一样可以想象,我当然可以自由地假设它,就像任何人都可以假设相反的情况一样;我不怀疑,每一个愿意去做的人都可以在他的头脑中轻松地想象出运动的开始,尽管不是所有的时间,因此在他对运动的考虑中可以达到一个步骤,而不是越界。同样,在他的思想中,他可以为身体和属于它的延伸设定限制;但不能为没有身体的空间设定限制,空间和时间的最大界限超出了思想的范围,就像数字的最大界限超出了思想的最大理解力一样;所有这些都是出于同样的原因,我们将在另一个地方看到。
27. Eternity.
27. 永恒。
By the same means, therefore, and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time, we have also that idea which we call Eternity; viz. having got the idea of succession and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses; and having from the revolutions of the sun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration,—we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past or to come. And this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration, supposed before the sun’s or any other motion had its being, which is no more difficult or absurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial to the duration of something last night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion; and it is as impossible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night to co-exist with any motion that now is, or for ever shall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co exist with the motion of the sun now. But yet this hinders not but that, having the IDEA of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light last night, as I can the duration of anything that does now exist: and it is no more than to think, that, had the sun shone then on the dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour-line to another whilst that flame of the candle lasted.
因此,通过同样的方式,并从我们产生时间观念的同一原点出发,我们也产生了我们称之为永恒的观念;也就是说,通过反思我们自己的观念路线,在我们身上产生了连续和持续的观念,这些观念要么是自然出现在我们清醒的思想中,要么是由外部物体相继引起的。我们通过反思我们自己的观念,得到了连续和持续的观念,这些观念在我们心中要么是由这些观念的自然表象不断进入我们清醒的思想,要么是由外部物体连续影响我们的感官而引起的;我们从太阳的旋转中得到了某些持续时间的观念,我们可以在我们的思想中把这些持续时间的长度互相增加,只要我们愿意,并把它们这样增加,应用到过去或未来的持续时间。我们可以继续这样做,没有界限或限制,无限地进行下去,并这样把太阳的年度运动的长度应用于在太阳或任何其他运动存在之前假定的持续时间,这并不更困难或荒谬,就像把我对今天在日晷上移动一小时的影子的概念应用于昨晚某事的持续时间,如蜡烛的燃烧,它现在与所有实际的运动是绝对分开的;昨晚火焰的持续时间一小时不可能与现在或将来的任何运动共存,就像世界开始之前的任何部分持续时间与现在的太阳运动共存一样。但是,这并不妨碍我对表盘上的影子在两个小时之间的运动长度有一个认识,我可以在我的思想中清楚地测量昨晚烛光的持续时间,就像我可以测量现在确实存在的任何东西的持续时间一样:这不过是在想,如果太阳当时照在表盘上,并以现在同样的速度运动,表盘上的影子就会在蜡烛的火焰持续的时候从一个小时线传到另一个小时线。
28. Our measures of Duration dependent on our ideas.
28.我们对持续时间的衡量取决于我们的想法。
The notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory derived from my senses or reflection; I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to anything that is but a minute or a day antecedent to the motion that at this very moment the sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday: the measuring of any duration by some motion depending not at all on the REAL co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear IDEA of the length of some periodical known motion, or other interval of duration, in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.
一小时、一天或一年的概念,只是我对某些周期性定期运动的长度的想法,这些运动都不曾同时存在,而只是在我的记忆中从我的感官或思考中得到的想法;我可以以同样的轻松,并出于同样的理由,在我的思想中把它应用于各种运动的前因后果,以及任何只比太阳此刻的运动早一分钟或一天的东西。所有过去的事物都同样完全处于静止状态;以这种方式考虑它们都是一个整体,无论它们是在世界开始之前,还是在昨天:通过某种运动来测量任何持续时间,完全不取决于该事物与该运动的真实共存,或任何其他革命时期,而是在我的头脑中对某种周期性的已知运动的长度,或其他持续时间的间隔,有一个明确的想法,并将其应用于我要测量的事物的持续时间。
29. The Duration of anything need not be co-existent with the motion we measure it by.
29.任何事物的持续时间不需要与我们衡量它的运动同时存在。
Hence we see that some men imagine the duration of of the world, from its first existence to this present year 1689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the sun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who in the time of Alexander counted 23,000 years from the reign of the sun; and the Chinese now, who account the world 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and say one is longer than the other, as I understand, that Methusalem’s life was longer than Enoch’s. And if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true, (as it may be as well as any other assigned,) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world one thousand years older, since every one may with the same facility imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be 50,000 years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50,000 years as 5639. Whereby it appears that, to the measuring the duration of anything by time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of ANY regular periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed.
因此,我们看到,有些人认为世界的持续时间,从最初的存在到现在的1689年,是5639年,或相当于太阳的5639个年轮,而另一些人则更多;如古埃及人,在亚历山大的时代,他们从太阳的统治算起有23000年。和现在的中国人,他们认为世界有3,269,000年的历史,甚至更多;根据他们的计算,世界的时间更长,虽然我不相信这是真的,但我也可以和他们一样想象,并且真正理解,说一个比另一个长,就像我理解,麦瑟勒斯的生命比伊诺克的长。如果普通的5639年的计算是真实的,(它可能和任何其他分配的计算一样),它一点也不妨碍我想象其他人的意思,当他们把世界变老一千年的时候,因为每个人都可以以同样的便利想象(我不说相信)世界有5万年的历史,就像5639年一样;也可以像5639年一样设想5万年的时间。由此可见,要用时间来衡量任何事物的持续时间,并不要求该事物与我们所衡量的运动或任何其他周期性的革命同时存在;但为此目的,我们有一个关于任何定期出现的长度的想法就足够了,我们可以在头脑中把它用于持续时间,而运动或出现从未与之同时存在。
30. Infinity in Duration.
30.时间上的无限性。
For, as in the history of the creation delivered by Moses, I can imagine that light existed three days before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking that the duration of light before the sun was created was so long as (IF the sun had moved then as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; so by the same way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created before there was either light or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or one thousand years. For, if I can but consider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to sixty; and by the same way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i.e. such or such parts of the sun’s revolutions, or any other period whereof I have the idea) proceed IN INFINITUM, and suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of eternity; of whose infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.
因为,在摩西所讲的创世史中,我可以想象,在太阳存在或有任何运动之前,光就已经存在三天了,只要想到在太阳被创造之前,光的持续时间是如此之长(如果太阳当时像现在这样运动),就等于他的三个昼夜轮回;所以,用同样的方法,我可以想到,在有光或任何持续运动之前,混沌或天使已经被创造,一分钟、一个小时、一天、一年或一千年。因为,如果我可以认为在任何物体的存在或运动之前,持续时间等于一分钟,我可以再增加一分钟,直到我达到60分钟;用同样的方法增加分钟、小时或年(即太阳的这样或那样的部分)。以同样的方式增加分钟、小时或年(即太阳旋转的这样或那样的部分,或我有概念的任何其他时期),以无限的方式进行,并假设持续时间超过我可以计算的这样的时期,让我随意增加,我想这就是我们对永恒的概念;对其无限性,我们没有其他概念,就像我们对数的无限性一样,我们可以永远无休止地增加。
31. Origin of our Ideas of Duration, and of the measures of it.
31.我们对时间的概念和对时间的衡量的起源。
And thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned, viz. reflection and sensation, we got the ideas of duration, and the measures of it.
因此,我认为很明显,从前面提到的所有知识的两个源泉,即思考和感觉,我们得到了持续时间的概念,以及它的措施。
For, First, by observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of SUCCESSION. Secondly, by observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of DURATION.
因为,首先,通过观察我们头脑中的变化,观察我们的想法如何不断地在那里消失,而其他的想法开始出现,我们就得到了连续的概念。其次,通过观察这种连续的部分的距离,我们得到了时间的概念。
Thirdly, by sensation observing certain appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain LENGTHS or MEASURES OF DURATION, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.
第三,通过感官观察某些表象,在某些有规律的、看似等距离的时期,我们得到了某些长度或时间尺度的概念,如分钟、小时、天、年等等。
Fourthly, by being able to repeat those measures of time, or ideas of stated length of duration, in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine DURATION,—WHERE NOTHING DOES REALLY ENDURE OR EXIST; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence.
第四,通过能够在我们的脑海中不断重复这些时间尺度,或所述持续时间的想法,我们可以来想象持续时间,在没有任何东西真正持续或存在的情况下;因此我们想象明天、明年或七年后。
Fifthly, by being able to repeat ideas of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add; we come by the idea of ETERNITY, as the future eternal duration of our souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being which must necessarily have always existed.
第五,通过能够在我们自己的思想中经常重复任何时间长度的概念,如一分钟、一年或一个时代,并把它们一个一个地加起来,而没有达到这种加法的终点,这比我们接近数字的终点更近,因为我们总是可以加到数字上;我们得到了永恒的概念,作为我们灵魂的未来永恒期限,以及那个必然一直存在的无限存在的永恒。
Sixthly, by considering any part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call TIME in general.
第六,通过考虑无限期的任何部分,作为周期性的措施,我们得出了我们所说的一般时间的概念。
1. Both capable of greater and less.
1.既能做大又能做小。
Though we have in the precedent chapters dwelt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration, yet, they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call EXPANSION, to distinguish it from extension, which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word expansion to space, because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz. expansion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or less quantities. For a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.
虽然我们在前面的章节中已经对空间和时间的考虑进行了相当长的讨论,但是,由于它们是普遍关注的概念,在其性质上有一些非常深奥和特殊的东西,将它们相互比较也许对它们的说明有帮助;我们可以通过将它们放在一起看而对它们有更清楚和明确的概念。距离或空间,在其简单的抽象概念中,为了避免混淆,我称之为扩展,以区别于延伸,有些人只用来表达这种距离,因为它是在物质的固体部分,所以包括,或至少暗示,身体的概念:而纯粹的距离的概念不包括这种东西。比起空间,我更喜欢扩张这个词,因为空间经常被应用于转瞬即逝的连续部分的距离,这些部分永远不会一起存在,也被应用于那些永久性的部分。在这两种情况下(即扩张和持续时间),头脑中都有这种持续长度的共同概念,能够有更大或更小的数量。因为一个人对一小时和一天的长度的区别,就像对一英寸和一英尺的区别一样清楚。
2. Expansion not bounded by Matter.
2.扩张不受物质的限制。
The mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span, or a pace, or what length you will, CAN, as has been said, repeat that idea, and so, adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces; and so, as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of SOLID extension; the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all; unless he will confine God within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts when he says, ‘Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee.’ And he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts further than God exists, or imagine any expansion where He is not.
心灵在得到扩张的任何部分的长度的概念后,让它成为一个跨度,或一个步伐,或任何你想要的长度,如前所述,可以重复这个概念,因此,在前者的基础上,扩大它的长度概念,并使它等于两个跨度,或两个步伐;如此,只要它愿意,直到它等于地球上任何部分的距离,并以此增加,直到它相当于太阳或最遥远的星星的距离。通过这样的进展,从它所在的地方或任何其他地方出发,它可以继续前进并通过所有这些长度,并且没有发现任何东西可以阻止它继续前进,无论是在体内还是在体外。的确,在我们的思想中,我们可以很容易地走到实体延伸的尽头;所有身体的极限和界限我们都不难到达:但当思想在那里时,它发现没有什么可以阻碍它进入这种无尽的扩张;它既找不到也想象不到任何尽头。也不要让任何人说,在身体的界限之外,根本就没有什么;除非他将上帝限制在物质的界限之内。所罗门的理解力被智慧所充满和扩大,当他说:'天,和天中的天,都不能容纳你'时,似乎有其他想法。我认为他非常夸大了自己的理解能力,他认为自己可以把自己的思想延伸到比上帝存在的地方,或者想象上帝不存在的地方的任何扩展。
3. Nor Duration by Motion.
3.也没有动议的期限。
Just so is it in duration. The mind having got the idea of any length of duration, CAN double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of all the world and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that, though we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. God, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason why any one should doubt that he likewise fills immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.
在时间上也是如此。心灵有了任何时间长度的概念,就可以把它翻倍、增殖和扩大,不仅超越它自己,而且超越所有肉体生命的存在,以及从全世界的大物体和它们的运动中得出的所有时间尺度。但是,每个人都很容易承认,尽管我们使时间无边无际,因为它肯定是无边无际的,但我们还不能把它扩展到所有的存在。每个人都很容易承认,上帝充满了永恒;而且很难找到一个理由,让任何人怀疑他也充满了无限。他无限的存在肯定是无边无际的;我想,说没有身体的地方就没有东西,这对物质来说有点过分了。
4. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration than infinite Expansion.
4.为什么人们更容易接受无限的持续时间而不是无限的扩张。
Hence I think we may learn the reason why every one familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes Eternity, and sticks not to ascribe INFINITY to DURATION; but it is with more doubting and reserve that many admit or suppose the INFINITY OF SPACE. The reason whereof seems to me to be this,—That duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: but, not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And, therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body: as if space were there at an end too, and reached no further. Or if their ideas, upon consideration, carry them further, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary space: as if IT were nothing, because there is no body existing in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary: because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the original of men’s ideas, (as I am apt to think they may very much,) one may have occasion to think by the name DURATION, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from, hardness) were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words so near of kin as durare and durum esse. And that durare is applied to the idea of hardness, as well as that of existence, we see in Horace, Epod. xvi. ferro duravit secula. But, be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body and all other things: which may, (to those who please,) be a subject of further meditation.
因此,我认为我们可以了解为什么每个人都熟悉地、毫不犹豫地谈论和假设永恒,并坚持不把无限性归于持续时间;但许多人承认或假设空间的无限性时,却有更多的怀疑和保留。其中的原因在我看来是这样的--持续时间和延伸被用作属于其他生命的情感的名称,我们很容易在上帝身上设想出无限的持续时间,而且我们无法避免这样做:但是,不把延伸归于他,而只归于物质,而物质是有限的,我们更容易怀疑没有物质的扩张是否存在;只有物质,我们通常认为它是一个属性。因此,当人们追求他们对空间的想法时,他们很容易停在身体的界限上:仿佛空间在那里也是一个终点,不再延伸。或者,如果他们的想法,经过考虑,把他们带到了更远的地方,但他们把宇宙界限之外的东西称为想象的空间:好像它什么都不是,因为没有身体存在于其中。而在所有的身体和它所测量的运动之前的时间,他们从来没有称之为虚无的:因为它从来没有被认为是没有其他真实的存在。如果事物的名称可以将我们的思想引向人的观念的原点,(我倾向于认为它们很有可能),那么人们可能有机会通过 "持续 "这个名称想到,存在的延续,对任何破坏性力量的一种抵抗。坚固性的延续(这很容易与物质的细微解剖部分相混淆,而且如果我们愿意研究一下物质的细微解剖部分,就会发现它与硬度没有什么区别)被认为有某种相似性,并产生了像durare和durum esse这样近似的词。我们在贺拉斯的书信中看到,durare既适用于硬度的概念,也适用于存在的概念,即ferro duravit secula。但是,无论如何,可以肯定的是,无论谁追求自己的思想,都会发现它们有时会超出身体的范围,进入无限的空间或扩展;其中的想法与身体和所有其他事物是不同的、独立的:(对那些愿意的人来说)这可能是一个进一步沉思的主题。
5. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion.
5.时间到了,就是地点到了,就是扩张。
Time in general is to duration as place to expansion. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by landmarks; and so are made use of to denote the position of FINITE real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space. These, rightly considered, are only ideas of determinate distances from certain known points, fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another. From such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which, so considered, are that which we call TIME and PLACE. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things, without such known settled points, would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion.
一般来说,时间对于持续时间就像地点对于扩张一样。它们是那些无边无际的永恒和无边无际的海洋中的一部分,就像用地标区分出来的那样;因此被用来表示有限的真实存在的位置,就彼此而言,在那些统一的无限的持续时间和空间的海洋中。这些,正确地考虑,只是从某些已知的点出发的确定的距离的概念,这些点固定在可区分的可感事物中,并被认为彼此保持相同的距离。从这些固定在可感事物中的点出发,我们进行计算,从这些点出发,我们测量我们在那些无限量中的份额;如此考虑,这些就是我们称之为时间和空间的东西。因为时间和空间本身是统一的、无界限的,如果没有这些已知的固定点,事物的秩序和位置就会在其中消失;所有的事物都会在无可救药的混乱中错乱。
6. Time and Place are taken for so much of either as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Bodies.
6.6.时间和地点是指由物体的存在和运动所规定的其中一部分。
Time and place, taken thus for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest, by marks and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.
时间和地点,就这样被视为空间和时间的无限深渊中的确定的可区分的部分,通过标记和已知的边界,将其与其他部分区分开来,它们各自有双重的含义。
FIRST, Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration as is measured by, and co-existent with, the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know anything of them: and in this sense time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before mentioned, ‘Before all time,’ or, ‘When time shall be no more.’ Place likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space which is possessed by and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion; though this may be more properly called extension than place. Within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined, the particular time or duration, and the particular extension and place, of all corporeal beings.
首先,一般来说,时间通常被认为是无限的持续时间,是由宇宙大体的存在和运动所衡量的,并且与之共存,就我们对它们的了解而言:在这个意义上,时间开始和结束于这个感性世界的框架,正如前面提到的这些短语,'在所有时间之前'或'当时间不再'。地方有时也被认为是无限空间的那一部分,它被物质世界所拥有并包含在其中;并因此与其余的扩展区分开来;尽管这可能更恰当地被称为扩展而不是地方。在这两个范围内,并通过它们的可观察部分来衡量和确定,所有肉体生命的特定时间或持续时间,以及特定的延伸和位置。
7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by Measures taken from the Bulk or Motion of Bodies.
7.有时,我们通过从物体的体积或运动中提取的措施来设计其中的一部分。
SECONDLY, sometimes the word time is used in a larger sense, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence, and periodical motions of bodies, that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs and for seasons and for days and years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that infinite uniform duration, which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time; and so consider them as bounded and determined. For, if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly enough, and should be understood if we said, it is a longer time since the creation of angels than the creation of the world, by 7640 years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted, 7640 annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk, in the great INANE, beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive, a body of any assigned dimensions, as a cubic foot; or do suppose a point in it, at such a certain distance from any part of the universe.
其次,有时时间这个词被用在更大的意义上,并被应用于那无限的持续时间的一部分,而不是那些真正被区分和测量出来的真实存在,以及身体的周期性运动,从一开始就被指定为标志、季节、日子和年,并相应地成为我们的时间量度;但那无限的统一持续时间的其他部分,我们在任何场合都认为等于某些测量的时间长度;并因此认为它们是有界限和确定的。因为,如果我们假设天使的创造或堕落是在朱利安时期的开始,我们就应该说得很恰当,如果我们说,从天使的创造到现在比世界的创造要长7640年,就应该被理解:这样,我们就会在那无差别的时间中标出我们认为等于,并承认太阳以现在的速度每年转7640圈的部分。同样地,我们有时也会在世界范围之外的大INANE中说到位置、距离或体积,当我们考虑到该空间中相当于或能够接受任何指定尺寸的物体,如一立方英尺;或者假设其中有一个点,与宇宙的任何部分有一定的距离。
8. They belong to all finite beings.
8.它们属于所有有限的生命。
WHERE and WHEN are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world, and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be lost, to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion, which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up. And place is the position of any body, when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of anything is, an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing; so the time when the thing existed is, the idea of that space of duration which passed between some known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shows the distance of it in place, or existence from other fixed points of space or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincoln’s Inn Fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period. All which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration,—as inches, feet, miles, and degrees, and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.
何时何地是属于所有有限存在的问题,我们总是从这个可感知世界的某些已知部分,以及从在其中可观察到的运动向我们标出的某些纪元来计算。如果没有这样一些固定的部分或时期,在我们有限的理解中,事物的秩序就会迷失在无边无际的不变的时间和扩张的海洋中,这些海洋包含了所有有限的生命,并且在其全部范围内只属于神性。因此,我们不必奇怪,我们不理解它们,而且当我们抽象地考虑它们时,或以任何方式归因于第一个不可理解的存在时,常常发现我们的思想无所适从。但是,当应用于任何特定的有限生命时,任何身体的延伸都是身体的体积所占的无限空间的一部分。而位置是指任何身体的位置,当考虑到与其他物体的一定距离时。正如任何事物的特定持续时间的概念是,在该事物存在期间经过的那部分无限持续时间的概念;因此,该事物存在的时间是,在某个已知和固定的持续时间与该事物的存在之间经过的那个持续时间空间的概念。一个表明同一事物的体积或存在的两端的距离,如它是一英尺见方,或持续了两年;另一个表明它在地方上的距离,或从空间或持续时间的其他固定点的存在,如它在林肯酒店的中间,或金牛座的第一度,和在我们的主1671年,或朱利安时期的第1000年。所有这些距离,我们都是通过对某些空间和时间长度的先入为主的想法来衡量的,如英寸、英尺、英里和度数,以及在其他方面,分钟、天和年,等等。
9. All the Parts of Extension are Extension, and all the Parts of Duration are Duration.
9.延伸的所有部分都是延伸,而期限的所有部分都是期限。
There is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our SIMPLE IDEAS, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition: it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility, THAT would be, as it were, the indivisible unit or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration. But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of ANY space without parts, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which, by familiar use in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration);—the mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones: and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind upon occasion makes by the addition of such known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused; and it is the NUMBER of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct; as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But THE LEAST PORTIONS OF EITHER OF THEM, WHEREOF WE HAVE CLEAR AND DISTINCT IDEAS, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolved. Such a small part in duration may be called a MOMENT, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary succession there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a SENSIBLE POINT, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.
还有一件事,空间和持续时间有很大的一致性,那就是,尽管它们被合理地算作我们的简单概念,但我们对其中任何一个的独特概念都不是没有各种组成方式的:它们的本质都是由部分组成的:但它们的部分都是同类的,没有任何其他概念的混合,阻碍了它们在简单概念中的地位。如果心智像数字一样,达到延伸或持续时间的如此小的一部分,排除了可分割性,那就会成为不可分割的单位或观念;通过重复这些观念,它将产生更多的延伸和持续时间的观念。但是,由于头脑无法建立一个没有部分的任何空间的概念,因此它利用了普通的度量衡,这些度量衡由于在每个国家的熟悉使用,已经在记忆中打下了烙印(如英寸和英尺;或立方体和伞形体;以及持续时间中的秒、分、小时、天和年);我说,头脑利用了这些概念,作为简单的概念:这些是较大概念的组成部分,头脑偶尔会通过增加它所熟悉的已知长度而形成这些想法。在另一方面,我们对其中任何一个的普通最小尺度都被看作是一个数字单位,而头脑会通过分割将它们减少到更小的分数中。尽管在空间或持续时间的加法和除法两方面,当所考虑的概念变得非常大或非常小时,其精确的体积变得非常模糊和混乱;而只有其反复加法或除法的数值才保持清晰和明确;正如任何一个将他的思想放任在空间的巨大扩张或物质的可分割性中的人将很容易看到的。持续时间的每一部分也是持续时间;延伸的每一部分也是延伸,它们都能够无限地增加或分割。但是,其中最小的部分,我们有清晰明确的概念,也许最适合被我们视为那种简单的概念,我们的空间、延伸和持续时间的复杂模式就是由这些概念组成的,而且它们又可以被明确地分解为这些概念。持续时间中的这样一个小部分可以被称为MOMENT,是一个概念在我们头脑中的时间,是它们在那里的普通继承过程中的时间。另一个,由于没有合适的名称,我不知道是否可以称之为 "感觉点",意思是我们能够辨别的物质或空间的最小颗粒,通常是一分钟左右,对最敏锐的眼睛来说,很少少于30秒的圆,而眼睛是圆心。
10. Their Parts inseparable.
10.他们的零件是不可分割的。
Expansion and duration have this further agreement, that, though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, no not even in thought: though the parts of bodies from whence we take our MEASURE of the one; and the parts of motion, or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the MEASURE of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.
膨胀和持续时间还有一个共同点,即虽然它们都被我们视为有部分,但它们的部分是不能相互分离的,甚至在思想上也是如此:虽然身体的部分(我们从这里获得对一个部分的测量)和运动的部分,或者说我们思想中的观念的连续,从这里获得对另一个部分的测量,可以被打断和分离;因为一个部分经常被休息,而另一个则被睡眠,我们也称之为休息。
11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid.
11.持续时间是一条线,扩张是一个固体。
But there is this manifest difference between them,—That the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way, and so make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the SAME moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion, as it is to have the idea of any real existence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration. And therefore, what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.
但它们之间有一个明显的区别,那就是我们对长度的概念,即扩张的概念,是以各种方式转动的,因此会产生数字、广度和厚度;但持续时间只是一条直线的长度,无限延伸,不可能有多重性、变化或数字;而是所有存在的一个共同尺度,所有事物在其存在时,都平等地参与其中。因为这个时刻是所有现在存在的事物所共有的,同样包含了它们存在的那一部分,就像它们都是一个单一的存在一样;我们可以真正地说,它们都存在于同一个时间时刻。在扩展方面,天使和精神是否有任何类似的东西,我无法理解:也许对我们来说,我们的理解和理解力适合于我们自己的保存和我们自己存在的目的,但不适合所有其他生命的现实和程度,在完全否定所有方式的扩展的情况下,几乎很难想象任何存在,或对任何真实存在的想法,就像在完全否定所有方式的持续时间的情况下对任何真实存在的想法一样。因此,我们不知道精神与空间有什么关系,也不知道它们如何在其中交流。我们所知道的是,根据固体部分的范围,身体单独拥有它的适当部分;从而排除所有其他身体在空间的特定部分的任何份额,而它仍然在那里。
12. Duration has never two Parts together, Expansion altogether.
12.持续时间从来没有两个部分在一起,扩张在一起。
DURATION, and TIME which is a part of it, is the idea we have of PERISHING distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; an EXPANSION is the idea of LASTING distance, all whose parts exist together and are not capable of succession. And therefore, though we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does NOW exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past he can never recall; and what is yet to come he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings; who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite or any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite. God’s infinite duration, being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things, past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no further removed from his sight, than the present: they all lie under the same view: and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For the existence of all things, depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude: expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to further speculation.
寿命,以及作为其一部分的时间,是我们所拥有的永恒的距离的概念,其中没有两个部分同时存在,而是彼此相继;扩展是持久的距离的概念,其所有部分同时存在,不可能相继。因此,尽管我们无法想象任何没有连续的持续时间,也无法在我们的思想中拼凑出任何生命现在存在于明天,或一下子拥有比现在更多的持续时间;但我们可以想象全能者的永恒持续时间与人类或任何其他有限生命的持续时间大不相同。因为人的知识和能力无法理解所有过去和未来的事物:他的思想只是昨天的,他不知道明天会发生什么。过去的事,他永远无法回忆;未来的事,他无法呈现。我所说的人,也是指所有的有限生命;他们虽然在知识和能力上远远超过人,但与上帝本身相比,也不过是最卑微的生物。有限的或任何程度都与无限的不相称。上帝的无限期,伴随着无限的知识和无限的能力,他看到了所有的事物,过去的和未来的;它们与他的知识没有更多的距离,与他的视线没有更多的距离,它们都在同一个视线之下:没有什么东西是他不能在他喜欢的每一刻使之存在的。因为所有事物的存在都取决于他的善意,所有事物在他认为合适的时刻都存在。总结:扩张和持续时间确实相互包容,相互理解;空间的每一部分都在持续时间的每一部分中,持续时间的每一部分也在扩张的每一部分中。我想,两个不同概念的这种结合,在我们所做的或所能想象的所有巨大的变化中是很少见的,而且可能提供了进一步推测的问题。
1. Number the simplest and most universal Idea.
1.数字是最简单和最普遍的想法。
Amongst all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of UNITY, or one: it has no shadow of variety or composition in it: every object our senses are employed about; every idea in our understandings; every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts; everything that either doth exist or can be imagined.
在我们所拥有的所有观念中,没有任何一种观念能以更多的方式提示给人们,也没有任何一种观念比 "统一 "或 "一个 "更简单:它没有任何种类或成分的影子:我们的感官所使用的每个对象;我们理解中的每个观念;我们头脑中的每个想法,都会带来这个观念。因此,它对我们的思想来说是最亲密的,就其与所有其他事物的一致性而言,它是我们拥有的最普遍的观念。因为数字本身适用于人、天使、行动、思想;一切存在的或可想象的事物。
2. Its Modes made by Addition.
2.其模式由加法制成。
By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the COMPLEX ideas of the MODES of it. Thus, by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together we have the complex idea of a dozen; and so of a score or a million, or any other number.
通过在我们的头脑中重复这个概念,并把重复的内容加在一起,我们就得到了它的各种模式的复杂概念。因此,通过把一加到一,我们就有了一对夫妇的复杂概念;通过把十二个单位放在一起,我们就有了一打的复杂概念;于是就有了一个分数或一百万,或任何其他数字。
3. Each Mode distinct.
3.每种模式都不同。
The SIMPLE MODES of NUMBER are of all other the most distinct; every the least variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote; two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it: or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?
数字的简单模式是所有其他模式中最明显的;每一个最小的变化,都是一个单位,使每个组合与最接近它的组合有明显的不同,就像最遥远的一样;二与一的不同,就像两百一样;二的概念与三的概念的不同,就像整个地球的大小与一个螨虫的大小一样。在其他简单的模式中却不是这样,在这些模式中,我们不容易,也许也不可能区分两个接近的概念,但它们确实是不同的。因为有谁会承诺在这张纸的白色和它旁边的白色之间找到区别:或者能对每一个最小的过度延伸形成不同的概念?
4. Therefore Demonstrations in Numbers the most precise.
4.因此,"数字演示 "是最精确的。
The clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension; where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered; which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90 as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90. But it is not so in extension, where, whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch, is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot or an inch; and in lines which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts: nor can any one assign an angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one.
每种数的模式与其他所有模式,甚至那些最接近的模式的清晰性和独特性,使我很容易认为,在数字中的演示,如果它们不比在扩展中更明显和准确,但它们在使用上更普遍,在应用上更确定。因为数的概念比扩展的概念更精确、更有区别;在扩展的概念中,每一个平等和过度都不容易被观察或测量;因为我们的思想在空间中不能达到任何确定的小,它不能超越这个单位;因此,任何最小的过度的数量或比例都不能被发现;这在数中是很明显的,正如已经说过的,91与90的区别和9000的区别一样,尽管91是90的次要过度。但在延伸方面则不然,凡是超过一英尺或一英寸的东西,都无法与一英尺或一英寸的标准区分开来;在看似等长的线条中,一条可能比另一条长出无数部分:也没有人能够指定一个角度,这将是直角的次大角度。
5. Names necessary to Numbers.
5.数字所需的名称。
By the repeating, as has been said, the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make thereof one collective idea, marked by the name two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number, and gave a name to it, may count, or have ideas, for several collections of units, distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that series, with their several names: all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new or distinct name or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by subtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, though not perhaps of more. For, the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but more or less, names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas. For, without such names or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together, without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.
如前所述,通过重复一个单位的概念,并将其与另一个单位结合起来,我们就会使其成为一个集体的概念,并以二为名。谁能做到这一点,并继续下去,在他对任何数字的最后一个集体概念上再加一个,并给它起个名字,谁就可以计算,或对几个单位的集合有想法,一个比一个有区别,只要他对后面的数字有一系列的名字,并有记忆来保留这个系列,以及它们的几个名字。所有的数字都是增加一个单位,并给包含在一个概念中的整体赋予一个新的或独特的名称或符号,从而将其与之前和之后的数字区分开来,并将其与每一个较小或较大的单位区分开来。因此,他能把一加到一,再加到二,如此继续他的故事,并带着属于每个进展的独特名称;同样,通过从每个集合中减去一个单位,缩小和减少它们,就能在他的语言范围内,或在他有名称的情况下,掌握所有的数的概念,尽管可能没有更多。因为,在我们的头脑中,数的几种简单模式不过是许多单位的组合,它们没有种类,也不可能有任何其他的区别,只是多一点或少一点,为每一种不同的组合命名或标记似乎比任何其他种类的概念更有必要。因为,如果没有这样的名字或标记,我们就很难在计算中使用数字,特别是当组合是由任何大量的单位组成的时候;这些组合在一起,如果没有一个名字或标记来区分这个精确的集合,就很难避免成为一堆混乱的东西。
6. Another reason for the necessity of names to numbers.
6.另一个原因是名字对数字的必要性。
This I think to be the reason why some Americans I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough,) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct idea of that number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy, simple life, unacquainted either with trade or mathematics, had no words in it to stand for 1000; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers, they would show the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude, which they could not number; which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above 5; any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were present. And I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal further than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them, by millions of millions of millions, &c., it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most, four and twenty, decimal progressions, without confusion. But to show how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful ideas of numbers, let us see all these following figures in one continued line, as the marks of one number: v. g.
我认为这就是为什么我所接触过的一些美国人(他们在其他方面足够敏捷和理性)不能像我们一样数到1000;也没有任何关于这个数字的明确概念,尽管他们可以很好地计算到20。因为他们的语言贫乏,只适应于贫困、简单生活的少数必需品,既不懂贸易,也不懂数学,所以他们的语言中没有代表1000的词;所以当他们被问及那些更大的数字时,他们会露出头来,以表示他们无法计算的巨大数量;我想,这种无能是由于他们没有名字。Tououpinambos人对5以上的数字没有名字;任何超过这个数字的数字,他们都是通过展示自己的手指和其他在场的人的手指来表示的。我不怀疑,如果我们能找到一些合适的名称来表示它们,我们自己就能清楚地用文字说出比我们通常所做的更多的数字;而按照我们现在所采取的命名方式,用几百万几千万等等来命名,很难超过十八个,或者最多四个和二十个,小数的递增,而不至于混乱不堪。但为了说明不同的名称对我们的计算有多大的帮助,或者说对数字有多大的帮助,让我们把下面这些数字放在一条直线上,作为一个数字的标志:V. G.
Nonillions. 857324
没有几十亿。857324
Octillions. 162486
八十亿。162486
Septillions. 345896
九亿。345896
Sextillions. 437918
Sextillions。437918
Quintrillions. 423147
五万亿。423147
Quartrillions. 248106
Quartrillions.248106
Trillions. 235421
万亿。235421
Billions. 261734
十亿。261734
Millions. 368149
数百万。368149
Units. 623137
单位。623137
The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second six figures). In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number. But whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.
用英语命名这个数字的普通方法,将是经常重复的百万、千百万、百万、千万、千万、千万、千万,(这是第二个六位数的名称)。这样一来,就很难对这个数字有任何区分的概念了。但是,通过给每一个六位数一个新的、有秩序的名称,这些数字,也许还有更多的数字,是否可以很容易地被清楚地计算出来,以及对它们的概念对我们来说是否更容易,对其他人来说是否更清楚,我把它留给大家考虑。我提到这一点,只是为了说明明确的名称对计数是多么必要,而不是假装介绍我发明的新名称。
7. Why Children number not earlier.
7.为什么儿童数量不早。
Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas: and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names, annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their lifetime to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know that nineteen went before, with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no further. So that to reckon right, it is required, (1) That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of ONE unit: (2) That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations, from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another. In either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.
因此,孩子们,要么是由于没有名字来标记数字的几个进展,要么是还没有能力将零散的想法收集成复杂的想法,并将它们按规则的顺序排列,并将它们保留在他们的记忆中,这是计算所必需的,他们不会很早就开始计算,也不会在这方面进行得很远或很稳定,直到他们有了很好的其他想法之后。有些人,由于他们的记忆力不足,不能保留数字的几种组合,以及它们的名字,并按它们的不同顺序排列,以及这么长的数字递增的依赖性,以及它们之间的关系,终其一生都不能计算,或有规律地复习任何适度的数字系列。因为要数二十个数字,或者对这个数字有任何想法的人,必须知道前面有十九个数字,并知道每一个数字的明确名称或符号,因为它们都按顺序标出;因为只要这一点做不到,就会出现漏洞,链条就会断裂,数字的进展就无法继续。因此,要想计算正确,就需要:(1)头脑要仔细区分两个概念,它们之间的区别只在于一个单位的加减。(2)在记忆中保留几个组合的名称或标记,从一个单位到那个数字;而且不是混乱地和随意地,而是按照数字之间的确切顺序。无论哪种情况,如果它失败了,整个编号工作就会受到干扰,只剩下混乱的数字概念,而独特的编号所需的概念则无法达到。
8. Number measures all Measurables.
8.数字衡量所有的可衡量因素。
This further is observable in number, that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are EXPANSION and DURATION; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of Eternity and Immensity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of number; in which we can come to no end of addition? For such an inexhaustible stock, number (of all other our ideas) most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases, this multitude how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number; where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this ENDLESS ADDITION or ADDIBILITY (if any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.
这一点在数字中也是可以观察到的,它是心灵用来测量所有我们可以测量的东西的,这些东西主要是扩展和时间;而我们的无限概念,即使应用于这些,似乎也只是数字的无限性。因为我们关于永恒和无量的观念,除了是对某些想象中的持续时间和扩展部分的反复添加,以及对数的无限性的添加之外,还有什么是我们的观念?对于这样一个取之不尽、用之不竭的存量,数(在我们所有其他观念中)为我们提供了最明显的条件,这对每个人来说都是显而易见的。因为让一个人随心所欲地把大量的数字汇集成一个总和,无论这个数字有多大,都不会削弱他的加法能力,也不会使他更接近数字这个取之不尽、用之不竭的存量的终点;在这里,仍然有很多东西可以添加,就像没有任何东西被取出来一样。数字的这种无止境的增加或可增加性(如果有人更喜欢这个词的话),在头脑中是如此明显,我认为它给了我们关于无限的最清晰和最明确的概念:关于这一点,在下一章会有更多介绍。
1. Infinity, in its original Intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.
1.无限,在其原始意图中,归于空间、期限和数量。
He that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of INFINITY, cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed; and then how the mind comes to frame it.
如果他想知道我们赋予 "无限 "这个名字的是什么样的概念,那么最好的办法就是考虑一下头脑中更直接地把 "无限 "归结为什么;然后再考虑一下头脑是如何把它框起来的。
FINITE and INFINITE seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the MODES OF QUANTITY, and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any the least part: and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number, which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite: but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For, when we call THEM infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on, and imitation of, that number or extent of the acts or objects of God’s power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities: they do, without doubt, contain in them all possible perfection: but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity.
在我看来,"有限 "和 "无限 "似乎被认为是数量的模式,并且在它们的第一个名称中只归属于那些有部分的事物,并且能够通过增加或减少任何最小的部分来增加或减少:这就是我们在前几章中所考虑的空间、时间和数量的概念。诚然,我们不能不确信,伟大的上帝(万物皆由他而来)是不可理解的无限的:但是,当我们把我们的无限概念应用于这位第一和最高的存在时,在我们软弱和狭隘的思想中,我们主要是针对他的持续时间和无处不在;而且,我认为更形象的是针对他的权力、智慧和仁慈,以及其他适当的取之不尽和不可理解的属性,等等。因为,当我们称它们为无限时,我们对这种无限没有别的想法,只是对上帝的权力、智慧和仁慈的行为或对象的数量或范围进行了一些思考和模仿,这些属性永远不会被认为如此之大,或如此之多,这些属性不会总是超越和超过,让我们在思想中尽可能地把它们乘以无尽的数量。我并不打算说这些属性在上帝身上是怎样的,他是无限地超出了我们狭隘的能力范围:毫无疑问,它们确实包含了所有可能的完美:但是,我说,这是我们构想它们的方式,这些是我们对它们的无限性的想法。
2. The Idea of Finite easily got.
2.有限的想法很容易得到。
Finite then, and infinite, being by the mind looked on as MODIFICATIONS of expansion and duration, the next thing to be considered, is,—HOW THE MIND COMES BY THEM. As for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extension that affect our senses, carry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by those BOUNDLESS IDEAS of eternity and immensity; since the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness.
那么,有限和无限,被思想看作是扩张和持续时间的修正,接下来要考虑的是,思想是如何得出这些东西的。至于有限性的概念,并没有什么大的困难。影响我们感官的明显的延伸部分,在头脑中带着有限的概念:普通的连续时期,我们据此衡量时间和持续时间,如小时、天和年,是有界限的长度。困难的是,我们是如何得到那些永恒和巨大的无边无际的概念的;因为我们交谈的对象远远没有接近或达到那个巨大的比例。
3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity.
3.我们是如何得出 "无限 "这个概念的。
Every one that has any idea of any stated lengths of space, as a foot, finds that he can repeat that idea; and joining it to the former, make the idea of two feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet; and so on, without ever coming to an end of his additions, whether of the same idea of a foot, or, if he pleases, of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or of the orbis magnus: for whichever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds, that, after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition, than he was at first setting out: the power of enlarging his idea of space by further additions remaining still the same, he hence takes the idea of infinite space.
每一个对空间长度有任何想法的人,如一英尺,都会发现他可以重复这个想法,并把它与前者结合起来,形成两英尺的想法;再加上第三个,就是三英尺;以此类推,他的补充永远不会结束,无论是一英尺的想法,还是如果他愿意,把它加倍,或者他对任何长度的其他想法,如一英里,或地球的直径,或大宇宙。因为无论他采取哪种方式,无论他如何翻倍,或以其他方式乘以它,他都会发现,在他继续在他的思想中翻倍,并尽可能地扩大他的想法之后,他没有更多的理由停下来,也没有比他最初出发时更接近这种增加的终点:通过进一步增加来扩大他的空间概念的能力仍然保持不变,他因此采取无限的空间概念。
4. Our Idea of Space boundless.
4.我们对空间的概念是无边的。
This, I think, is the way whereby the mind gets the IDEA of infinite space. It is a quite different consideration, to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space ACTUALLY EXISTING; since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things: but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are APT TO THINK that space in itself is actually boundless, to which imagination the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us. For, it being considered by us, either as the extension of body, or as existing by itself, without any solid matter taking it up, (for of such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its necessary existence,) it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it, or be stopped anywhere in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension that it rather facilitates and enlarges it. For so far as that body reaches, so far no one can doubt of extension; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body, what is there that can there put a stop, and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space, when it perceives that it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For, if it be necessary for the motion of body, that there should be an empty space, though ever so little, here amongst bodies; and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space;—nay, it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space; the same possibility of a body’s moving into a void space, beyond the utmost bounds of body, as well as into a void space interspersed amongst bodies, will always remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure space, whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself by any thought, either amongst, or remote from all bodies, it can, in this uniform idea of space, nowhere find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.
我认为,这就是心灵获得无限空间的理念的方式。这是一个完全不同的考虑,以检查心灵是否有这样一个无边的空间的想法实际存在;因为我们的想法并不总是证明事物的存在:但是,既然这在我们这里出现了,我想我可以说,我们被迫认为空间本身实际上是无边的,对空间的想象或其本身的扩张自然导致我们。因为,我们把它看作是身体的延伸,或者看作是它本身的存在,没有任何固体物质占据它,(因为对于这样一个虚无的空间,我们不仅有想法,而且我已经证明,正如我认为的那样,从身体的运动中,它必然存在,)思想不可能找到或假设它的任何终点,或者在它在这个空间的任何地方停止前进,无论它把思想延伸到多远。任何用身体制造的界限,甚至是金刚墙,都远远不能阻止思想在空间和延伸方面的进一步发展,反而会促进和扩大它。因为身体到达的范围有多大,延伸的范围就有多大,没有人可以怀疑;当我们走到身体的极致时,有什么东西可以阻止它,使心灵确信它已经到了空间的尽头,而它却认为它不是;不,当它确信身体本身可以进入空间时,还有什么东西可以阻止它?因为,如果身体的运动需要有一个空的空间,尽管是那么小,在身体之间;如果身体有可能在那个空的空间里或通过那个空的空间运动;不,任何物质的粒子除了进入一个空的空间外不可能运动;一个身体有可能进入一个空的空间,超出身体的最大界限,以及进入一个穿插在身体之间的空的空间,这一点将始终是清楚和明显的。空旷的纯空间的概念,无论是在所有身体的范围内还是在所有身体的范围外,都是完全一样的,虽然在体积上没有性质上的差异;没有任何东西可以阻碍身体移动到它。因此,无论心灵通过任何思想把自己放在哪里,无论是在所有身体中,还是在远离所有身体的地方,它都可以在这个统一的空间概念中,在任何地方找到任何界限,任何终点;因此,根据它的每一部分的性质和想法,必然得出结论,它实际上是无限的。
5. And so of Duration.
5.持续时间也是如此。
As, by the power we find in ourselves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of space, we get the idea of IMMENSITY; so, by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of ETERNITY. For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas than we can come to the end of number; which every one perceives he cannot. But here again it is another question, quite different from our having an IDEA of eternity, to know whether there were ANY REAL BEING, whose duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to Something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity.
正如我们发现自己有能力随心所欲地重复任何空间的概念,我们就得到了 "无限 "的概念;同样,通过能够重复我们头脑中任何时间长度的概念,以及所有数字的无尽增加,我们得到了 "永恒 "的概念。因为我们发现,在我们自己身上,我们无法结束这种重复的想法,就像我们无法结束数字一样;每个人都知道,他无法结束。但是,这又是另一个问题,与我们对永恒的想法完全不同,要知道是否有任何真实的存在,其持续时间是永恒的。关于这一点,我说,认为现在存在的东西的人,必然会想到永恒的东西。但我在另一个地方谈到了这一点,我在这里就不再多说了,而是继续对我们的无限性概念进行一些其他考虑。
6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity.
6.为什么其他的思想不可能有无限性。
If it be so, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves of repeating, without end, our own ideas, it may be demanded,—Why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas, as well as those of space and duration; since they may be as easily, and as often, repeated in our minds as the other: and yet nobody ever thinks of infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness, though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white, as frequently as those of a yard or a day? To which I answer,—All the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of an equal or less parts, afford us, by their repetition, the idea of infinity; because, with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlargement of which there CAN be no end. But for other ideas it is not so. For to the largest idea of extension or duration that I at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to the perfectest idea I have of the whitest whiteness, if I add another of a less equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea,) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my idea at all; and therefore the different ideas of whiteness, &c. are called degrees. For those ideas that consist of part are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part; but if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to our sight, and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, all run into one, and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those ideas that consist not of parts cannot be augmented to what proportion men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses; but space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of endless room for more; nor can we conceive anywhere a stop to a further addition or progression: and so those ideas ALONE lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.
如果是这样,我们的无限概念是来自于我们自己观察到的无休止地重复我们自己的概念的能力,那么可以问:为什么我们不把无限归于其他概念,以及空间和时间的概念;因为它们在我们的头脑中可以像其他概念一样容易和经常地重复:然而没有人想到无限的甜蜜或无限的白色,尽管他可以像一码或一天的概念一样经常重复甜蜜或白色?对此,我回答说:"所有被认为是有部分的概念,并且能够通过增加相同或更少的部分来增加,通过它们的重复,给我们提供了无限的概念;因为,随着这种无休止的重复,会继续扩大,而这种扩大是没有尽头的。但对于其他观念来说,情况并非如此。因为对于我目前所拥有的最大的延伸或持续时间的观念来说,增加任何一个最小的部分都会增加;但是对于我所拥有的最完美的最白的观念来说,如果我再增加一个不那么平等的白,(而且是比我拥有的更白的,我不能增加这个观念),就不会增加,而且根本不会扩大我的观念;因此关于白度等的不同观念被称为程度。因为那些由部分组成的观念能够通过每一个最小部分的增加而增加;但是如果你把昨天在我们眼前的一包雪产生的白色观念和今天你看到的另一包雪的白色观念放在一起,并把它们放在你的脑海中,它们就象是体现了所有的东西,而白色的观念根本没有增加,如果我们把一个较小的白色程度加到一个较大的程度,我们远远没有增加,而是减少了它。那些不是由部分组成的观念,不能按人们所希望的比例增加,也不能超出他们感官所接受的范围;但空间、时间和数量,由于能够通过重复而增加,在头脑中留下了无穷无尽的空间;我们也无法想象在任何地方停止进一步的增加或发展:因此,这些观念单独导致我们的头脑走向无限的思想。
7. Difference between infinity of Space, and Space infinite.
7.空间的无限性和空间的无限性之间的区别。
Though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, as an infinite space, or an infinite duration. For, as our idea of infinity being, as I think, AN ENDLESS GROWING IDEA, but the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time TERMINATED in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,)—to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk; and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite. The first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of ALL those repeated ideas of space which an ENDLESS repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.
尽管我们的无限概念来自于对数量的思考,以及心灵能够通过反复增加它所喜欢的部分而使数量无止境地增加;但我想,当我们把无限与心灵所拥有的任何假定的数量概念联系起来,并如此讨论或推理一个无限的数量,如无限的空间或无限的时间时,我们的思想就会产生极大的混乱。因为,我认为,我们的无限概念是一个不断增长的概念,而心灵所拥有的任何数量的概念,在那个时候就已经终止了,(因为不管它有多大,它都不可能比它更大,)--把无限与它联系起来,就是把一个固定的尺度调整为一个不断增长的体积;因此,我认为,如果我说我们要仔细区分空间的无限性的概念和空间的无限性的概念,这不是一个微不足道的诡辩。前者只不过是心灵在它所喜欢的重复的空间观念上的一个假定的无休止的进展;但是在心灵中实际有一个空间无限的观念,就是假定心灵已经过去了,并且实际上对所有那些重复的空间观念有一个看法,而这些重复的空间观念对它来说永远不可能完全代表;这里面有一个明显的矛盾。
8. We have no Idea of infinite Space.
8.我们对无限的空间没有概念。
This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it. But, how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatsoever POSITIVE ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration, or number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, without ever completing the idea, there we have our idea of infinity: which, though it seems to be pretty clear when we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end, yet, when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration, that idea is very obscure and confused, because it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For, let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number, as great as he will; it is plain the mind RESTS AND TERMINATES in that idea, which is contrary to the idea of infinity, which CONSISTS IN A SUPPOSED ENDLESS PROGRESSION. And therefore I think it is that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue and reason about infinite space or duration, &c. Because the parts of such an idea not being perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes, whatever consequences we draw from the other; as an idea of motion not passing on would perplex any one who should argue from such an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at rest. And such another seems to me to be the idea of a space, or (which is the same thing) a number infinite, i. e. of a space or number which the mind actually has, and so views and terminates in; and of a space or number, which, in a constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can in thought never attain to. For, how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind, it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, though I be capable the next instant to double it, and so on in infinitum; for that alone is infinite which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.
如果我们用数字来考虑,这一点也许会更清楚一些。数字的无限性,每个人都认为没有办法达到它的终点,这对任何一个思考它的人来说都是很容易的。但是,不管这个数字的无限性的概念有多清楚,没有什么比无限的数字的实际概念的荒谬性更明显了。无论我们对任何空间、时间或数字有什么积极的想法,即使它们是如此之大,它们仍然是有限的;但当我们假设有一个取之不尽的余数,我们从中消除所有的界限,并且在其中我们允许思想的无尽发展,而不完成这个想法,我们就有了我们的无限的想法。尽管当我们不考虑其他因素而只考虑否定一个终点时,它似乎是非常清楚的,但是,当我们在头脑中构建一个无限的空间或持续时间的概念时,这个概念是非常模糊和混乱的,因为它是由两个部分组成的,非常不同,甚至不一致。因为,让一个人在他的脑海中构建一个任何空间或数字的想法,只要他愿意;很明显,他的思想停留在这个想法中,并且终止了,这与无限的想法相反,后者包含在一个假定的无尽的进展中。因此,我认为,当我们争论和推理无限空间或持续时间等问题时,我们很容易被混淆了。因为这种想法的各个部分并不被认为是不一致的,无论我们从另一个方面得出什么结果,一方或另一方总是令人困惑的;就像一个关于运动不会继续的想法会使任何从这种想法出发进行论证的人感到困惑,这并不比一个关于运动静止的想法好。在我看来,这样的另一个概念是一个空间的概念,或(这是同一回事)一个无限的数字,即一个空间或数字,它是心灵实际拥有的,所以看待并终止于此;还有一个空间或数字,它在不断和无止境的扩大和发展中,在思想上永远无法达到的。因为,无论我心中的空间概念有多大,它都不会比我拥有它的那一瞬间更大,尽管我有能力在下一瞬间将它翻倍,以此类推,无穷无尽;因为只有那没有界限的才是无限的;那就是无限的概念,我们的思想在其中找不到任何界限。
9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity.
9.数字为我们提供了最清晰的 "无限 "概念。
But of all other ideas, it is number, as I have said, which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity we are capable of. For, even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions and millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas,—kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself; and when it has added together as many millions, &c., as it pleases, of known lengths of space or duration, the clearest idea it can get of infinity, is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers, which affords no prospect of stop or boundary.
但在所有其他观念中,正如我所说,我认为是数字为我们提供了我们所能得到的最清晰和最明确的无限性观念。因为,即使在空间和时间方面,当思想追求无限的概念时,它也会利用数字的概念和重复,如百万和百万英里,或年,这是许多不同的概念,最好是通过数字来防止跑到一个混乱的堆里,在那里思想会失去自我;当它把许多百万,等等。当它随心所欲地把已知的空间或时间长度加在一起时,它能得到的关于无限的最清楚的概念,就是无尽的可加数字的混乱的不可理解的剩余部分,它没有提供停止或边界的前景。
10. Our different Conceptions of the Infinity of Number contrasted with those of Duration and Expansion.
10.我们对 "数的无限性 "的不同概念与 "持续时间 "和 "扩展 "的不同概念形成对比。
It will, perhaps, give us a little further light into the idea we have of infinity, and discover to us, that it is NOTHING BUT THE INFINITY OF NUMBER APPLIED TO DETERMINATE PARTS, OF WHICH WE HAVE IN OUR MINDS THE DISTINCT IDEAS, if we consider that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence,—that in number we are at one end, as it were: for there being in number nothing LESS than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of number, we can set no bounds: and so it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards, beyond all that we can conceive. But in space and duration it is otherwise. For in duration we consider it as if this line of number were extended BOTH ways—to an unconceivable, undeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to anyone that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, will find to be nothing else but the turning this infinity of number both ways, a parte ante and a parte post, as they speak. For, when we would consider eternity, a parte ante, what do we but, beginning from ourselves and the present time we are in, repeat in our minds ideas of years, or ages, or any other assignable portion of duration past, with a prospect of proceeding in such addition with all the infinity of number: and when we would consider eternity, a parte post, we just after the same rate begin from ourselves, and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come, still extending that line of number as before. And these two being put together, are that infinite duration we call ETERNITY which, as we turn our view either way, forwards or backward appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of number, i.e. the power still of adding more.
如果我们考虑到我们一般不认为数是无限的,而持续时间和延伸时间却很容易被认为是无限的,这就会发现,它只不过是适用于确定部分的数的无限性,而我们在我们的头脑中却有不同的想法。因为在数中没有比一个单位更少的东西,我们就在那里停止,处于一个尽头;但在增加,或增加的数量中,我们不能设定任何界限:所以它就像一条线,其中一端以我们为终点,另一端仍然向前延伸,超出我们所能想象的一切。但在空间和时间上,情况则不同。因为在时间上,我们认为这条数线是双向延伸的,是不可想象的、不确定的和无限的长度;这对任何一个愿意思考他对永恒的考虑的人来说都是显而易见的;我想,他们会发现,这只不过是把这个无限的数向两边转,就像他们说的那样,向前和向后转。因为,当我们要考虑永恒时,单方前,我们要做的是,从我们自己和我们现在所处的时间开始,在我们的脑海中重复年,或年龄,或过去的任何其他可分配的时间部分的想法,并希望以这样的加法来进行所有数字的无限性:而当我们要考虑永恒时,单方后,我们只是以同样的速度从我们自己开始,并以尚未到来的倍增的时期计算,仍然像以前一样延伸数字的线条。这两种情况放在一起,就是我们称之为永恒的无限时间,当我们把视线转向任何一边,向前或向后看,都显得无限,因为我们仍然把数的无限端转向那一边,即仍然有增加的力量。
11. How we conceive the Infinity of Space.
11.我们如何构思空间的无限性。
The same happens also in space, wherein, conceiving ourselves to be, as it were, in the centre, we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number; and reckoning any way from ourselves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth or orbis magnus,—by the infinity of number, we add others to them, as often as we will. And having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of immensity.
同样的情况也发生在空间,在那里,我们认为自己是在中心,我们在四面八方追寻那些不可确定的数字线;从我们自己出发,以任何方式计算,一码、一英里、地球的直径或大卫星,--通过数字的无限性,我们在它们之上经常增加其他的数字,只要我们愿意。我们没有理由为这些重复的想法设定界限,就像我们没有理由为数字设定界限一样,我们有那种无法确定的巨大的想法。
12. Infinite Divisibility.
12.无限的可分性。
And since in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that, which has the infinity also of number; but with this difference,—that, in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration, we only use addition of numbers; whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind also can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former additions; it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers: though in the addition of the one, we can have no more the POSITIVE idea of a space infinitely great, than, in the division of the other, we can have the positive idea of a body infinitely little;—our idea of infinity being, as I may say, a growing or fugitive idea, still in a boundless progression, that can stop nowhere.
既然我们的思想在任何体积的物质中都不可能达到最大的可分性,因此,对我们来说,也有一个明显的无限性,它也有数字的无限性;但有一点不同,即在以前对空间和时间的无限性的考虑中,我们只使用数字的加法;而这就像把一个单位分割成它的分数,在那里思想也可以无限地进行,就像以前的加法一样;它确实只是新数字的增加。尽管在加法中,我们不可能有一个无限大的空间的正面概念,就像在除法中,我们不可能有一个无限小的身体的正面概念一样;我们的无限概念,可以说是一个不断增长或逃逸的概念,仍然在无边无际地发展,不可能停止。
13. No positive Idea of Infinity.
13.没有积极的无限概念。
Though it be hard, I think, to find anyone so absurd as to say he has the POSITIVE idea of an actual infinite number;—the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like also being in the infinity of space and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions;—yet there be those who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite, to ask him that has it,—whether he could add to it or no; which would easily show the mistake of such a positive idea. We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space or duration which is not made up of, and commensurate to, repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years; which are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of this sort of quantities. And therefore, since an infinite idea of space or duration must needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number CAPABLE still of further addition; but not an actual positive idea of a number infinite. For, I think it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths whereof we have the positive ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite than as number does; which consisting of additions of finite units one to another, suggests the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind; without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression.
虽然我认为很难找到一个如此荒谬的人,说他有一个实际的无限数的正面想法;--其无限性只在于有能力在任何以前的数字上增加任何单位的组合,而且是随心所欲地增加;这也是空间和时间的无限性,这种能力总是给人留下无限增加的空间;--但有一些人想象他们有无限时间和空间的正面想法。我认为,只要问一下拥有这种想法的人,他是否能够增加它,就足以摧毁任何这种关于无限的积极想法;这将很容易表明这种积极想法的错误。我认为,我们不可能对任何空间或时间有任何积极的想法,这些想法不是由重复的英尺或码数,或天数和年数组成并与之相称的;这些是常见的衡量标准,我们在心中有这样的想法,并且我们据此判断这类数量的伟大程度。因此,既然空间或持续时间的无限概念必须由无限的部分组成,那么除了能够进一步增加的数字之外,它不可能有其他的无限性;但不是一个实际的无限数字的积极概念。因为,我认为很明显的是,把有限的东西加在一起(就像我们有积极观念的所有长度一样),除了像数那样产生无限的观念之外,永远不可能产生无限的观念;这包括把有限的单位一个接一个地加起来,提出无限的观念,只是因为我们发现我们有一种力量,可以继续增加总和,增加更多同类的东西;而不会接近这种进展的终点。
14. How we cannot have a positive idea of infinity in Quantity.
14.在数量上,我们如何不能对无限有一个积极的概念。
They who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation on it is positive. He that considers that the end is, in body, but the extremity or superficies of that body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white, will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure negation. Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But as they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am sure they cannot deny but the beginning of the first instant of being, and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation; and therefore, by their own argument, the idea of eternal, A PARTE ANTE, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.
在我看来,那些想证明他们的无限概念是积极的人,是通过一个愉快的论证来实现的,这个论证来自于对目的的否定;目的是否定的,对它的否定就是积极的。如果有人认为,在身体上,目的只是身体的极端或表面,那么他也许不会同意目的是一个纯粹的否定:如果有人认为他的笔的目的是黑色或白色,那么他就会认为目的不仅仅是一个纯粹的否定。当适用于持续时间时,它也不是对存在的赤裸裸的否定,而是更恰当地指它的最后时刻。但是,既然他们要把结束看作是对存在的赤裸裸的否定,我确信他们不能否认存在的第一个瞬间的开始,而且没有任何机构认为是赤裸裸的否定;因此,根据他们自己的论点,永恒的概念,A PARTE ANTE,或没有开始的持续时间,只是一个否定的概念。
15. What is positive, what negative, in our Idea of infinite.
15.在我们的无限概念中,什么是积极的,什么是消极的。
The idea of infinite has, I confess, something of positive in all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite space or duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration. But what still remains beyond this we have no more a positive distinct notion of than a mariner has of the depth of the sea; where, having let down a large portion of his sounding-line, he reaches no bottom. Whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much the more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: and could he always supply new line, and find the plummet always sink, without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case, let this line be ten, or ten thousand fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it, and gives only this confused and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of: but in endeavouring to make it infinite,—it being always enlarging, always advancing,—the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. So much space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture, and positive in the understanding: but infinite is still greater. 1. Then the idea of SO MUCH is positive and clear. 2. The idea of GREATER is also clear; but it is but a comparative idea, the idea of SO MUCH GREATER AS CANNOT BE COMPREHENDED. 3. And this is plainly negative: not positive. For he has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension, (which is that sought for in the idea of infinite), that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it: and such, nobody, I think, pretends to in what is infinite. For to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea-shore, who knows not how many there be, but only that they are more than twenty. For just such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space or duration, who says it is LARGER THAN the extent or duration of ten, one hundred, one thousand, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has or can have a positive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive idea TOWARDS infinity, lies in obscurity, and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity. And that cannot but be very far from a positive complete idea, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being still greater. For to say, that, having in any quantity measured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the end, is only to say that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity is, in other words, only to say that it is bigger; and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity; and adding this IDEA OF STILL GREATER to ALL the ideas you have, or can be supposed to have, of quantity. Now, whether such an idea as that be positive, I leave any one to consider.
我承认,"无限 "这个概念在我们应用于它的所有事物中都有一些积极意义。当我们想到无限的空间或持续时间时,我们第一步通常会产生一些非常大的想法,也许是几百万年的时间,或者是几英里,可能我们会把这些想法翻倍并乘以几倍。我们这样在我们的思想中聚集起来的所有东西都是积极的,是大量积极的空间或时间概念的集合。但是,在这之外,我们仍然没有一个积极明确的概念,就像一个水手对大海的深度一样;在那里,他放下了大部分的探测线,却没有到达底部。因此,他知道深度有这么多,甚至更多;但更多的是,他根本没有明确的概念:如果他总是提供新的线,并发现梅花总是下沉,没有停止过,他就会在头脑中形成一个完整和积极的无限概念的姿势。在这种情况下,如果这条线有十英尺或一万英尺长,它同样会发现它以外的东西,而只给出这种混乱和比较的想法,即这不是全部,但人们还可以走得更远。心灵所理解的任何空间,它都有一个积极的概念:但在努力使它成为无限的时候,它总是在扩大,总是在前进,这个概念仍然是不完善和不完整的。心灵在对伟大的沉思中所看到的空间,是一幅清晰的图画,在理解中是积极的:但无限的空间仍然更大。1.那么,"如此之多 "的概念是积极和清晰的。2.2. 更大的概念也是清楚的;但它只是一个比较性的概念,即 "如此之大 "的概念是无法比拟的。3.这显然是消极的,而不是积极的。因为他对任何延伸的大小都没有积极的明确概念,(这是在无限的概念中所寻求的),他对它的尺寸没有一个全面的概念:我认为,没有人在无限的东西中假装这样。因为说一个人对任何数量都有明确的概念,但不知道它有多大,这就像说他对海边的沙子数量有明确的概念,但不知道有多少,只知道它们超过了20。因为他对无限的空间或持续时间也有这样一个完美和积极的想法,他说它比他有或能有积极想法的十、一百、一千或任何其他数量的英里或年的范围或持续时间都要大;我想,这就是我们对无限的所有想法。因此,在我们的积极想法之外,向着无限的方向的东西,是模糊的,具有消极想法的不确定的混乱,在那里我知道我既不做也不能理解我想要的一切,它对于有限和狭窄的能力来说太大。而这不能不说与一个积极的完整概念相去甚远,在这个概念中,我所要理解的东西的最大部分被遗漏了,在不确定的暗示下,它还会更大。因为如果说,在任何数量上测量了这么多,或走了这么远,你还没有到达终点,那就只能说这个数量更大。因此,对任何数量的终点的否定,换句话说,只是说它更大了;而对终点的完全否定,只是在你的思想在数量上的所有进展中,仍然带着这个更大的东西;并把这个 "仍然更大 "的想法加入到你对数量的所有想法中,或者可以被认为是对数量的想法中。现在,这样的想法是否是积极的,我让任何人来考虑。
16. We have no positive Idea of an infinite Duration.
16.我们没有关于无限期的积极想法。
I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it succession, or not? If it does not, they ought to show the difference of their notion of duration, when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite; since, perhaps, there may be others as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point, and acknowledge that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If, to avoid succession in external existence, they return to the punctum stans of the schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration; there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. Besides, that punctum stans, if it signify anything, being not quantum, finite or infinite cannot belong to it. But, if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of INFINITE SUCCESSION OF MOMENTS OF DURATION WHEREIN ANYTHING DOES EXIST; and whether any one has, or can have, a positive idea of an actual infinite number, I leave him to consider, till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity.
我问那些说他们对永恒有积极看法的人,他们对持续时间的看法是否包括继承?如果不包括,他们应该说明他们的持续时间概念在应用于永恒的存在和有限的存在时有什么不同;因为,也许有其他人和我一样,会向他们承认他们在这一点上理解力的弱点,并承认他们的持续时间概念迫使他们设想,凡是有持续时间的东西,今天的持续时间比昨天的要长。如果为了避免外部存在的连续性,他们回到学校的punctum stans,我想他们这样做几乎不能弥补这个问题,也不能帮助我们对无限的持续时间有一个更清晰和积极的概念;对我来说,没有什么比没有连续的持续时间更难以想象。此外,如果punctum stans表示什么,它不是量子,有限或无限都不属于它。但是,如果我们软弱的理解力不能从任何持续时间中分离出来,那么我们对永恒的概念就只能是任何东西都存在的无限的持续时间的片段。是否有人对实际的无限数有或能有积极的想法,我让他自己考虑,直到他的无限数大到他自己不能再增加;只要他能增加,我怀疑他自己会认为他对它的想法对积极的无限数来说有点太少。
17. No complete Idea of Eternal Being.
17.没有完整的永恒存在的概念。
I think it unavoidable for every considering, rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal, wise Being, who had no beginning: and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning, being but the negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity; which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confess myself at a loss, and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.
我认为,每一个有思想、有理性的生物,只要愿意审视自己或任何其他的存在,都不可避免地会有一个永恒的、明智的存在的概念,他没有开始:我确信我有这样一个无限的想法。但是,这种对开始的否定,只是对一个正面事物的否定,几乎没有给我一个关于无限的正面概念;每当我努力将我的思想延伸到这个问题时,我承认我很茫然,我发现我无法达到对它的任何清晰理解。
18. No positive Idea of infinite Space.
18.没有关于无限空间的积极想法。
He that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he has of the least space. For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea. All our POSITIVE ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds, though our COMPARATIVE idea, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds. For that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other, WITHOUT CEASING. A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acutest thought of a mathematician; and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space, as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a positive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind, and so can frame one of 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, and so on, till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little; but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce. What remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite divisibility.
那些认为自己对无限空间有积极想法的人,当他考虑时,会发现他对最大的空间的积极想法不可能多于对最小的空间的想法。因为在后者中,这似乎是两者中最容易的,而且更在我们的理解范围之内,我们只能对小的东西有一个比较性的概念,而这一概念总是小于我们有正面概念的任何一个。我们对任何数量的正面想法,无论是大的还是小的,总是有界限的,而我们的比较想法,即我们总是可以从一个人身上增加,从另一个人身上拿走,是没有界限的。因为剩下的东西,无论是大的还是小的,都没有被包含在我们所拥有的那个积极的概念中,都是模糊的;我们对它没有其他的概念,只有不停地扩大一个和减少另一个的能力。杵和臼会很快使任何物质的颗粒达到不可分割,就像数学家最敏锐的思想一样;测量员可以很快用他的链条测量出无限的空间,就像哲学家通过最快的思维飞行到达它或通过思考理解它一样;这就是对它有一个积极的想法。对一个直径为一英寸的立方体进行思考的人,在他的脑海中对它有一个清晰而积极的概念,因此,他可以构建一个1/2、1/4、1/8的立方体,以此类推,直到他在他的思想中对非常小的东西有了概念;但却没有达到分割所能产生的那种难以理解的小的概念。剩余的小东西离他的思想就像他刚开始时一样遥远;因此,他根本就没有对无限可分性所带来的小东西有一个清晰而肯定的概念。
19. What is positive, what negative, in our Idea of Infinite.
19.在我们的 "无限 "概念中,什么是积极的,什么是消极的。
Every one that looks towards infinity does, as I have said, at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be space or duration; and possibly he wearies his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that first large idea: but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinite, than the country fellow had of the water which was yet to come, and pass the channel of the river where he stood:
正如我所说的,每个人在展望无限时,首先会对他所适用的事物产生一些非常大的想法,不管是空间还是时间;而且他可能会通过在他的脑海中增加第一个大的想法而使他的思想疲惫不堪:但通过这样做,他并不像那个乡下人对尚未到来的水和通过他所站的河道那样,更接近于对构成一个积极的无限的东西有一个明确的想法。
‘Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.’
Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.
20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity, and not of infinite Space.
20.有些人认为他们对永恒有一个积极的想法,而不是无限的空间。
There are some I have met that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space, that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity, but that they have not, nor can have any idea of infinite space. The reason of which mistake I suppose to be this—that finding, by a due contemplation of causes and effects, that it is necessary to admit some Eternal Being, and so to consider the real existence of that Being as taken up and commensurate to their idea of eternity; but, on the other side, not finding it necessary, but, on the contrary, apparently absurd, that body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude that they can have no idea of infinite space, because they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which consequence, I conceive, is very ill collected, because the existence of matter is no ways necessary to the existence of space, no more than the existence of motion, or the sun, is necessary to duration, though duration uses to be measured by it. And I doubt not but that a man may have the idea of ten thousand miles square, without any body so big, as well as the idea of ten thousand years, without any body so old. It seems as easy to me to have the idea of space empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a bushel without corn, or the hollow of a nut-shell without a kernel in it: it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid body, infinitely extended, because we have an idea of the infinity of space, than it is necessary that the world should be eternal, because we have an idea of infinite duration. And why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real existence of matter to support it, when we find that we have as clear an idea of an infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration past? Though I suppose nobody thinks it conceivable that anything does or has existed in that future duration. Nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration with present or past existence, any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow to be the same; or bring ages past and future together, and make them contemporary. But if these men are of the mind, that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite space, because it is past doubt that God has existed from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space; yet those philosophers who are of opinion that infinite space is possessed by God’s infinite omnipresence, as well as infinite duration by his eternal existence, must be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration; though neither of them, I think, has any positive idea of infinity in either case. For whatsoever positive ideas a man has in his mind of any quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former, as easy as he can add together the ideas of two days, or two paces, which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and so on as long as he pleases: whereby, if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration or space, he could add two infinites together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than another—absurdities too gross to be confuted.
我遇到过一些人,他们把无限的时间和无限的空间相提并论,以至于他们说服自己,说他们对永恒有一种积极的想法,但他们没有,也不可能有任何关于无限空间的想法。我认为这种错误的原因是:通过对因果关系的适当思考,发现有必要承认某种永恒的存在,因此认为这种存在的实际存在与他们的永恒观念是相称的;但是,在另一方面,他们认为身体应该是无限的,这不是必要的,相反,显然是荒谬的,他们预先得出结论,他们不可能有无限空间的观念,因为他们不可能有无限的物质的观念。我认为,这个结论是很不妥当的,因为物质的存在对空间的存在没有任何必要,就像运动或太阳的存在对时间的存在是必要的一样,尽管时间是用它来衡量的。我不怀疑,一个人可以有一万英里方圆的想法,而没有任何身体这么大,也可以有一万年的想法,而没有任何身体这么老。在我看来,要想有一个没有身体的空间概念,就像想一个没有玉米的蒲团的容量,或者一个没有果核的坚果壳的空洞一样容易:因为我们有一个空间无限的概念,所以没有必要存在一个无限延伸的实体,就像因为我们有一个无限的时间概念,所以世界应该是永恒的。当我们发现我们对即将到来的无限时间的想法和我们对过去的无限时间的想法一样清楚时,我们为什么要认为我们的无限空间的想法需要物质的真实存在来支持它呢?尽管我想没有人认为在未来的时间里有任何东西存在或已经存在是可以想象的。也不可能把我们对未来期限的想法与现在或过去的存在结合起来,就像把昨天、今天和明天的想法变成一样;或者把过去和未来的时代结合起来,使它们成为当代人。但是,如果这些人认为,他们对无限的时间比无限的空间有更清楚的概念,因为上帝从所有的永恒中存在是毋庸置疑的,但没有真正的物质与无限的空间共同延伸。然而,那些认为无限空间是由上帝的无限无所不在所拥有的,以及无限时间是由他的永恒存在所拥有的哲学家们,必须被允许对无限空间和无限时间有同样清晰的概念;尽管我认为他们中的任何一个人都没有任何关于无限的积极概念。因为无论一个人在他的头脑中对任何数量有什么积极的想法,他都可以重复它,并把它加到前一个数量上,就像他可以把两天或两步的想法加在一起一样容易,这是他头脑中对长度的积极想法,只要他愿意就可以这样做:因此,如果一个人对无限有积极的想法,无论是持续时间还是空间,他可以把两个无限加在一起;不,使一个无限比另一个无限大,这些荒谬之处无法被驳倒。
21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infinity, cause of Mistakes.
21.假设的无限性的积极想法,错误的原因。
But yet if after all this, there be men who persuade themselves that they have clear positive comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think that the great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity,—whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities. For, whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space or duration, as if they had as complete and positive ideas of them as they have of the names they use for them, or as they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity; it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of, or reason about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions, and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them. 22. All these are modes of Ideas got from Sensation and Reflection.
但是,如果在这一切之后,还有人说服自己,认为他们对无限性有明确的、积极的、全面的想法,那么他们就应该享受他们的特权:我应该非常高兴(和我认识的其他一些人一样,他们承认他们没有这样的想法),通过他们的交流得到更好的信息。因为我一直认为,所有关于无限的讨论--无论是空间、持续时间还是可分性--都永远存在着巨大而难以解决的困难,这无疑是我们关于无限的观念存在缺陷的标志,而且其性质与我们狭隘的能力的理解不相称。因为,当人们谈论和争论无限的空间或时间时,仿佛他们对它们有完整和积极的想法,就像他们对它们使用的名称一样,或者就像他们对一码、一小时或任何其他确定的数量一样;如果他们谈论或推理的东西的不可理解的性质导致他们陷入困惑和矛盾,并且他们的思想被一个巨大和强大的物体所覆盖,无法被他们调查和管理,这也不足为奇。22.所有这些都是从感觉和反思中得到的理念的模式。
If I have dwelt pretty long on the consideration of duration, space, and number, and what arises from the contemplation of them,—Infinity, it is possibly no more than the matter requires; there being few simple ideas whose MODES give more exercise to the thoughts of men than those do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude. It suffices to my design to show how the mind receives them, such as they are, from sensation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense, or operation of our mind, has, nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity. But this hinders not but that they themselves, as well as all other men, got the first ideas which they had of infinity from sensation and reflection, in the method we have here set down.
如果我对持续时间、空间和数量的考虑以及对它们的思考所产生的东西--无限性进行了相当长的论述,那么这可能并没有超过事情的需要;很少有简单的想法,其模式比这些想法更能锻炼人的思想。我不打算在它们的全部范围内进行讨论。在我的设计中,只要说明心灵是如何从感觉和思考中接受它们的就足够了;即使是我们对无限的概念,无论它看起来与任何感官对象或我们心灵的运作有多么遥远,然而,就像我们所有其他的概念一样,它的最初来源也在那里。也许有些数学家,在先进的推测中,可能有其他方法将无限的概念引入他们的头脑。但这并不妨碍他们自己,以及所有其他人,按照我们在这里列出的方法,从感觉和思考中获得他们对无限的最初想法。
1. Other simple Modes of simple Ideas of sensation.
1.其他简单的模式,简单的感觉思想。
Though I have, in the foregoing chapters, shown how from simple ideas taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity; which, however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception, yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas: received into the mind by the senses, and afterwards there put together, by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas; —Though, I say, these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation, and suffice to show how the mind comes by them, yet I shall, for method’s sake, though briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.
尽管我在前几章中已经表明,心灵是如何从感觉所接受的简单观念中,将自己延伸到无穷大;无论它在所有其他事物中似乎与任何感性认识相距最远,但最终除了由简单观念构成的东西外,什么也没有。虽然我说,这些可能是感觉的简单观念的简单模式的例子,足以说明心灵是如何得到它们的,但是,为了方法,我还是要简单地介绍一下另外一些例子,然后再继续介绍更复杂的观念。
2. Simple modes of motion.
2.运动的简单模式。
To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard but every one who understands English has presently in his mind distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion. Modes of motion answer those of extension; swift and slow are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together; so they are complex ideas, comprehending time and space with motion.
滑动、滚动、翻滚、行走、匍匐、奔跑、舞蹈、跳跃、跳过,以及许多其他可以命名的词,这些词刚一听到,每个懂英语的人脑海中就会出现不同的想法,这些想法都是运动的不同变体。运动的方式与延伸的方式相对应;快速和缓慢是两种不同的运动概念,其衡量标准是由时间和空间的距离组合而成;因此它们是复杂的概念,包含了时间和空间的运动。
3. Modes of Sounds.
3.声音的模式。
The like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of sound; by which we see that, from the sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas, to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a tune, which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds, so put together silently in his own fancy.
我们在声音方面也有同样的多样性。每一个发音词都是对声音的不同修饰;由此我们可以看出,从听觉上看,通过这种修饰,头脑中可以有不同的想法,几乎可以达到无限的数量。除了鸟类和野兽的独特叫声之外,声音还被不同长度的音符组合在一起,构成了被称为曲调的复杂概念,当音乐家听到或根本没有声音时,他可以通过思考这些声音的概念,在自己的想象中默默地组合在一起,从而在头脑中产生这种想法。
4. Modes of Colours.
4.颜色的模式。
Those of colours are also very various: some we take notice of as the different degrees, or as they were termed shades, of the same colour. But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours, either for use or delight, but figure is taken in also, and has its part in it, as in painting, weaving, needleworks, &c.;—those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to MIXED MODES, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour, such as beauty, rainbow, &c.
那些颜色也是多种多样的:有些我们注意到的是同一颜色的不同程度,或者说是所谓的深浅不一。但是,由于我们很少将各种颜色组合在一起,无论是为了使用还是为了取悦,而人物也被纳入其中,并在其中占有一席之地,如在绘画、编织、针线活等方面;那些被注意到的颜色通常属于混合模式,因为它们是由各种观念组成的,即人物和颜色,如美、彩虹等等。
5. Modes of Tastes.
5.味道的模式。
All compounded tastes and smells are also modes, made up of the simple ideas of those senses. But they, being such as generally we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader.
所有复合的味道和气味也是模式,是由这些感官的简单概念组成的。但是,由于它们通常我们没有名称,所以较少被注意到,也无法用文字记录下来;因此,必须不加列举地留给我的读者的想法和经验。
6. Some simple Modes have no Names.
6.一些简单的模式没有名称。
In general it may be observed, that those simple modes which are considered but as different DEGREES of the same simple idea, though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas, yet have ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of, as distinct ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these modes, and given no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because, when they were so distinguished, that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use, I leave it to the thoughts of others. It is sufficient to my purpose to show, that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection; and that when the mood has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex ideas. But, though white, red, or sweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas, by several combinations, so as to be named, and thereby ranked into species; yet some others of the simple ideas, viz. those of unity, duration, and motion, &c., above instanced in, as also power and thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.
一般来说,我们可以看到,那些被认为是同一简单概念的不同程度的简单模式,虽然它们本身是许多非常独特的概念,但通常没有独特的名称,也没有被注意到,作为独特的概念,它们之间的差异只是非常小。人们忽视这些模式,不给它们起名字,是因为没有很好的措施来区分它们;还是因为当它们被如此区分时,这种知识不会有普遍或必要的用途,我把它留给其他人去思考。就我的目的而言,只要说明我们所有的简单观念都是通过感觉和思考才进入我们的头脑的;而当情绪有了这些观念之后,它就可以不同程度地重复和复合它们,从而产生新的复杂观念。但是,尽管白色、红色或甜味等等没有被修改,或通过几种组合成为复杂的观念,从而被命名,并因此被列为物种;但其他一些简单的观念,即上述例子中的统一性、持续时间和运动等等,以及权力和思维,已经被这样修改为大量的复杂观念,并有属于它们的名称。
7. Why some Modes have, and others have not, Names.
7.为什么有些模式有名字,而有些则没有。
The reason whereof, I suppose, has been this,—That the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another, the knowledge of men, and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made ideas of ACTIONS very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas names, that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another), is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language, are not understood: v. g. COLTSHIRE, DRILLING, FILTRATION, COHOBATION, are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists; who, having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive those ideas in their minds;-as by COHOBATION all the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names; and of modes many more; which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of WORDS.
我想其原因是这样的--人们最关心的是人与人之间的关系,对人和他们的行为的了解,以及相互之间的表示,是最有必要的;因此,他们对行为的概念进行了很好的修改,并给这些复杂的概念起了名字,以便他们能更容易地记录和谈论他们每天所熟悉的事情,而不需要长篇大论和绕口令;而且,他们不断提供和接受信息的事情也能更容易和更快地理解。事实就是如此,人们在构思不同的复杂概念并为其命名时,在很大程度上受制于一般的语言表达方式,(这是一种非常简短和迅速地将他们的想法传达给另一个人的方式),这一点在几种艺术中发现的名称中是显而易见的,这些名称被应用于属于他们几种行业的、经过修改的行动的复杂概念,以便在指导或讨论这些行动时,能够迅速地完成。在不熟悉这些操作的人的头脑中,一般不会有这种想法。因此,大部分使用同一种语言的人都不理解代表它们的词语:例如例如,COLTSHIRE、DRILLING、FILTRATION、COHOBATION,这些词代表着某些复杂的概念,除了那些从事特殊工作的少数人外,很少有人会想到这些概念,所以除了铁匠和糜烂者外,一般人都不理解这些名称。他们在构思了这些词所代表的复杂概念后,给它们起了名字,或从别人那里得到了这些名字,在交流中听到这些名字后,很容易在头脑中构思出这些概念;就像通过蒸馏的所有简单概念,以及把从任何东西中蒸馏出来的酒倒在剩余的物质上,再进行蒸馏。因此,我们看到,有许多种类的简单概念,如味道和气味,是没有名字的;还有许多模式;这些模式要么没有被普遍观察到,要么在人的事务和交谈中没有被注意到的重大用途,它们没有被赋予名称,因此不被视为物种。这一点我们以后会有机会详细考虑,当我们谈到词语的时候。
1. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c., modes of thinking.
1.1.感觉、回忆、沉思,等等,思维模式。
When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, THINKING is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call SENSATION;—which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is REMEMBRANCE: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is RECOLLECTION: if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is CONTEMPLATION: when ideas float in our mind without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call REVERIE; our language has scarce a name for it: when the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is ATTENTION: when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call INTENTION or STUDY: sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these: and DREAMING itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all: and whether that which we call ECSTASY be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.
当心灵把目光转向自身,并思考自己的行为时,思考是首先发生的。在这一过程中,心灵观察到各种各样的变化,并从那里得到独特的想法。因此,实际伴随着外部物体对身体的任何印象而产生的感知或思想,与所有其他的思维方式不同,为心灵提供了一个独特的想法,我们称之为感性;这就是,任何想法通过感官实际进入理解。同样的想法,当它再次出现时,如果没有类似对象对外部感官的作用,那就是回忆:如果它被头脑寻找,并经过痛苦和努力找到,并再次进入视野,那就是回忆:如果它在认真考虑下长期保持在那里,那就是考虑。当想法在我们的脑海中漂浮,而没有任何思考或理解的考虑时,这就是法国人所说的REVERIE;我们的语言几乎没有这样的名字:当提供给自己的想法(因为,正如我在另一个地方指出的,在我们清醒的时候,总是有一连串的想法在我们的脑海中接连出现)被注意到,并且,就像在记忆中登记一样,这就是注意。当头脑怀着极大的诚意和选择,把它的观点固定在任何想法上,从各个方面考虑它,并且不会被其他想法的普通诱惑所吸引,这就是我们所说的意图或研究:睡眠,没有做梦,是对所有这些的休息。梦境本身就是思想的存在(当外在的感官停止时,所以它们不会以通常的速度接受外在的物体),不是由任何外在的物体或已知的场合所暗示的;也不是在理解力的任何选择或行为之下:而我们称之为ECSTASY的东西是否不是睁着眼睛做梦,我留待研究。
2. Other modes of thinking.
2.其他思维模式。
These are some few instances of those various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and so have as distinct ideas of as it hath of white and red, a square or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shown here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of REASONING, JUDGING, VOLITION, and KNOWLEDGE, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.
这些是那些不同的思维模式的一些例子,人们可以在自己身上观察到这些思维模式,因此对它们的想法就像对白色和红色、方形或圆形的想法一样鲜明。我不打算把它们全部列举出来,也不打算大篇幅地论述这一系列从思考中得到的观念:那将是一卷书。就我目前的目的而言,只要在这里通过一些例子说明这些观念是什么样的,以及头脑是如何产生这些观念的就足够了;尤其是因为我以后会有机会更详细地论述推理、判断、意志和知识,这些都是头脑的一些最重要的操作和思维方式。
3. The various degrees of Attention in thinking.
3.思考中的各种注意程度。
But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c., before mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one’s experience convinces him; though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides; marks their relations and circumstances; and views every part so nicely and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions: at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them: and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no impression.
但是,如果我们在这里思考一下思维的不同状态,也许就不会是不可原谅的离题,也不会完全不符合我们目前的设计,因为前面提到的那些注意力、遐想和梦境等例子,自然而然地表明了这一点。每个人的经验都表明,在清醒的人的头脑中总是存在着一些或其他的想法;尽管头脑对这些想法的注意程度不同。有时,大脑会非常认真地沉浸在对某些物体的思考中,把它们的想法转到所有方面;标记出它们的关系和情况;对每一个部分都看得如此仔细,如此用心,以至于它把所有其他的想法都拒之门外,对当时在感官上产生的普通印象毫不在意,而这些印象在其他季节会产生非常明智的感知。在其他时候,它几乎没有观察到在理解力中继任的一系列想法,而没有指导和追求其中的任何一个:在其他时候,它让它们几乎完全不被关注,就像没有印象的微弱阴影。
4. Hence it is probable that Thinking is the Action, not the Essence of the Soul.
4.因此,思考很可能是行动,而不是灵魂的本质。
This difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little further, and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming. And, last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further conclude from hence is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission: but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.
我想每个人都在自己身上做过实验,这种意图的不同和思维的放松,以及在认真学习和非常接近于什么都不想的程度之间的巨大差异。再往前追溯,你就会发现睡眠中的思想就像从感官中退了出来,并且不在那些在其他时候产生非常生动和感性的想法的感官器官上的运动的范围之内。为此,我不需要举例说明,有些人在整个暴风雨的夜晚都在睡觉,却没有听到雷声,没有看到闪电,也没有感觉到房子的摇晃,而这些对醒着的人来说是很有意义的。但是,在这种远离感官的状态下,它常常保持着一种更加松散和不连贯的思维方式,我们称之为梦境。最后,酣畅淋漓的睡眠将场景完全封闭,并结束了所有的表象。我想,几乎每个人都有自己的经验,他自己的观察毫无困难地引导他走到这一步。我想从这里进一步得出的结论是,既然头脑可以在几个时间段内,在几个程度上进行思考,甚至在一个清醒的人身上,有时也会如此失职,以至于思想模糊不清,与没有思想相差甚远;最后,在酣睡的黑暗中,完全失去了对所有想法的观察。既然,我说,在事实和不断的经验中,这显然是这样的,我想问,思考是灵魂的行动而不是本质,这难道不是可能的吗?因为代理人的行动很容易允许有意图和减免,但事物的本质却不被认为能够有任何这样的变化。但这是顺便说一下。
1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas.
1.快乐和痛苦,简单的想法。
AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us.
在我们从感觉和思考中得到的简单想法中,痛苦和快乐是两个非常重要的想法。因为在身体中,感觉本身几乎没有,或者伴随着痛苦或快乐,所以思想或心灵的感知也是如此,否则也会伴随着快乐或痛苦,高兴或烦恼,随你怎么说。这些,像其他简单的观念一样,不能被描述,也不能定义它们的名字;认识它们的方法,就像认识感官的简单观念一样,只能通过经验。因为,用善或恶的存在来定义它们,除了让我们反思我们自己的感受,反思善和恶在我们头脑中的几种不同的作用,因为它们被我们不同地应用或考虑之外,没有别的办法让我们认识它们。
2. Good and evil, what.
2.善与恶,什么。
Things then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call GOOD, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that EVIL which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us: or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the MIND, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.
那么,事物的好坏,只与快乐或痛苦有关。我们称之为 "善",它能使我们产生或增加快乐,或减少痛苦;或者使我们获得或保持拥有任何其他的善或没有任何恶。相反,我们把容易在我们身上产生或增加任何痛苦,或减少任何快乐,或者为我们带来任何邪恶,或剥夺任何美好的东西,称为邪恶。我所说的快乐和痛苦,必须被理解为身体或心灵的,因为它们通常是有区别的;尽管事实上,它们只是心灵的不同构造,有时是由身体的紊乱引起的,有时是由心灵的想法引起。
3. Our passions moved by Good and Evil.
3.我们的激情被善与恶所感动。
Pleasure and pain and that which causes them,—good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn. And if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.
快乐和痛苦以及导致它们的原因,即善与恶,是我们的激情所依赖的铰链。如果我们反思自己,观察这些东西在不同的考虑因素下是如何在我们身上运作的;它们在我们身上产生什么样的变化或心态,什么样的内部感觉(如果我可以这样称呼它们),我们就可以由此形成我们激情的概念。
4. Love.
4.爱。
Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call LOVE. For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them, or in spring when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him: let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.
因此,任何一个人在思考他对任何现在或不存在的事物容易在他身上产生的快乐的想法时,都会有我们称之为爱的想法。因为当一个人在秋天吃葡萄时,或在春天没有葡萄时,宣称他爱吃葡萄,这不过是葡萄的味道使他高兴而已:如果健康或体质的改变破坏了葡萄味道的喜悦,那么他就可以说是不再爱吃葡萄了。
5. Hatred.
5.仇恨。
On the contrary, the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call HATRED. Were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I should remark that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses though with their destruction. But hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or misery, is often the uneasiness of delight which we find in ourselves, arising from their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man’s children or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused in us.
相反,想到任何存在或不存在的东西都会在我们心中产生痛苦,这就是我们所说的憎恨。如果我在这里要进一步探究我们激情的基本概念,因为它们取决于快乐和痛苦的不同变化,那么我应该指出,我们对无生命的无知觉的生命的爱和恨通常是建立在我们从它们的使用和对我们的感官的应用中得到的快乐和痛苦之上的,尽管它们会被破坏。但是,对能够带来幸福或痛苦的生命的憎恨或爱,往往是我们在自己身上发现的快乐的不安,而这种不安是由他们的存在或幸福引起的。因此,一个人的孩子或朋友的存在和福利,在他身上产生了持续的喜悦,他被说成是持续地爱他们。但我们只需注意到,我们的爱与恨的观念不过是心灵的倾向,就一般的快乐和痛苦而言,无论在我们身上如何引起。
6. Desire.
6.欲望。
The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call DESIRE; which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is UNEASINESS. For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything, that it carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts further, were it seasonable in this place.
一个人在没有任何东西的情况下发现自己的不安,而这些东西目前的享受带有快乐的概念,我们称之为欲望;这种欲望随着这种不安的强烈程度而增大或减弱。顺便说一句,也许可以说,如果不是对人类工业和行动的唯一刺激,也是对人类工业和行动的主要刺激,那就是不愉快。因为无论提出什么好处,如果它的缺失没有带来任何不快或痛苦,如果一个人没有它就会感到轻松和满足,那么就没有对它的渴望,也没有追求它的努力;只有一种赤裸裸的欲望,这个词用来表示最低程度的欲望,也就是几乎没有的欲望,当没有任何东西的时候,人们的不安如此之小,以至于除了对它的一些微弱愿望外,没有更有效或有力地使用手段来达到它。欲望也会因为对所提议的好处的不可能性或不可实现性的看法而停止或减弱,只要不安被这种考虑所治愈或缓解。如果在这个地方合适的话,这可能会使我们的思想更进一步。
7. Joy.
7.欢乐。
JOY is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are then possessed of any good, when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it: and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.
喜悦是一种心灵的愉悦,来自于对当前或确信即将拥有某种物品的考虑;当我们拥有任何物品,以至于我们可以在我们喜欢的时候使用它时,我们就拥有了这种物品。因此,一个几乎挨饿的人在得到救济之前,就会因救济的到来而感到高兴;而一个父亲,他的孩子的幸福会使他感到高兴,只要他的孩子处于这种状态,他就一直拥有这种好处;因为他只需要思考一下,就会有这种高兴。
8. Sorrow.
8.悲伤。
SORROW is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present evil.
忧虑是指一想到失去了本来可以更长时间享受的美好事物,或感觉到当前的邪恶,心里就会感到不安。
9. Hope.
9.希望。
HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him.
希望是指每个人在想到未来可能会享受到一件令他高兴的事情时,在心中找到的那种快乐。
10. Fear.
10.恐惧。
FEAR is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.
恐惧是一种心灵上的不安,一想到未来可能发生的邪恶,我们就会感到不安。
11. Despair.
11.绝望。
DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men’s minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.
痛苦是对任何美好事物无法实现的想法,它在人的头脑中起着不同的作用,有时产生不安或痛苦,有时产生休息和放纵。
12. Anger.
12 愤怒。
ANGER is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.
愤怒是指在受到任何伤害时,心中的不安或不快,并有报复的目的。
13. Envy.
13.羡慕。
ENVY is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.
嫉妒是一种心灵上的不安,是由于考虑到我们渴望的好处被一个我们认为不应该在我们面前得到的人所引起的。
14. What Passions all Men have.
14.人都有什么激情。
These two last, ENVY and ANGER, not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them. But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the by.
最后这两个,嫉妒和愤怒,不是单纯由痛苦和快乐本身引起的,而是有一些对自己和他人的混合考虑,因此不是在所有的人身上都能找到,因为在他们身上缺少其他部分,即重视他们的功绩,或打算报复。但是,我认为,所有其余的,纯粹以痛苦和快乐为终点的部分,在所有的人身上都可以找到。因为我们的爱、欲望、喜悦和希望,只是为了快乐;我们的恨、恐惧和悲伤,最终只是为了痛苦。总之,所有这些激情都是由事物引起的,只是因为它们似乎是快乐和痛苦的原因,或者以某种方式附带着快乐或痛苦。因此,我们通常对在我们身上产生痛苦的对象(至少,如果是一个有感觉的或自愿的媒介)表示憎恨;因为它所留下的恐惧是一种持续的痛苦:但我们并不总是爱对我们有好处的东西;因为快乐对我们的影响没有痛苦那么强烈,也因为我们不那么愿意希望它能再次这样做。但这是顺便说一下。
15. Pleasure and Pain, what.
15.愉悦和痛苦,什么。
By pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection.
我所说的快乐和痛苦、喜悦和不安,必须一直被理解为(正如我上面所暗示的),不仅指身体上的痛苦和快乐,而且指我们所感到的任何喜悦或不安,不管是由任何感激或不可接受的感觉或思考所引起的。
16. Removal or lessening of either.
16.移除或减少其中之一。
It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates, as a pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.
还需要考虑的是,就激情而言,痛苦的消除或减轻被认为是一种快乐,而快乐的丧失或减弱则是一种痛苦。
17. Shame.
17.羞愧。
The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For SHAME, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.
在大多数人身上,激情也对身体产生作用,并导致身体的各种变化;这些变化并不总是可感知的,也不构成每种激情的必要组成部分。因为羞愧,是想到自己做了不体面的事,或者会降低别人对我们的尊重而产生的心灵不安,并不总是伴随着脸红。
18. These Instances to show how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflection.
18.这些例子表明,我们对激情的认识是如何从感觉和反思中得到的。
I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here, as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them: the pain of teeth set on edge; the pleasure of music; pain from captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth. But the passions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or reflection.
我不会在这里误解,好像我的意思是把它作为激情的论述;它们比我在这里提到的要多得多:我所注意到的那些,每一个都需要更多、更准确的论述。我在这里只提到了这些,因为有许多例子表明,我们的思想因各种善恶考虑而产生了快乐和痛苦的模式。我也许可以举出其他比这些更简单的快乐和痛苦的例子;如饥渴的痛苦,以及为消除这些痛苦而吃喝的快乐:牙齿被咬的痛苦;音乐的快乐;因无教养的争吵而产生的痛苦,以及与朋友理性交谈的快乐,或为寻找和发现真理而进行的良好研究。但激情对我们来说更为重要,我宁愿选择以它们为例,说明我们对它们的想法是如何从感觉或思考中得到的。
1. This Idea how got.
1.这个想法是如何得到的。
The mind being every day informed, by the senses, of the alteration of those simpl